Messler v. Cohutta Banking Company of Tennessee et al

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: this case must be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.Accordingly, and for the reasons stated, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15 ) is hereby GRANTED. This case is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case and all member cases. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 8/20/2012. Associated Cases: 1:11-cv-00225 et al. (BJL)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at CHATTANOOGA
CATHERINE MESSLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
COHUTTA BANKING COMPANY OF
TENNESSEE, et al.,
Defendants.

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Lead Case No. 1:11-cv-2251
Judge Mattice

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15). Defendants assert
that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case.

Defendants’ Motion will be

GRANTED.
On August 24, 2011, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint in federal court against
Defendants Cohutta Banking Company of Tennessee; Chambliss, Bahner & Stophel, PC
(“Chambliss”); and Chris Varnell.2 (Doc. 1). To the extent a cause of action may be
discerned from the somewhat-diffuse Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff asserts that
Defendants intended to foreclose on her home but lack the legal standing to do so. (See,
e.g., id. at 4-5). She therefore seeks declaratory and injunctive relief related to a July
2011 foreclosure sale.

Plaintiff represents that she is a citizen and domiciliary of the

State of Tennessee. (Id. at 1).

1 This is a consolidated case. Member case numbers are: 1:11-cv-228; 1:11-cv-229; 1:11-cv-230; 1:11-cv231; 1:11-cv-232; 1:11-cv-233; 1:11-cv-234; 1:11-cv-235; 1:11-cv-236; and 1:11-cv-237.
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Cohutta Banking Company, after several corporate iterations, is now known as Synovus Bank. (See
Doc. 15).

Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). (Doc. 15). Appended to their Motion, they attached the sworn
declaration of Dana Perry, President of Chambliss. (Doc. 15-1).

In it, Ms. Perry states

that Chambliss is a Tennessee professional corporation with its principal place of
business in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Defendants assert that the parties are not diverse,
and that Plaintiff raises no issue of federal law in her Complaint. (See Docs. 15, 16).
Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ Motion.
When faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion. Nichols
v. Muskingum College, 318 F.3d 674, 677 (6th Cir. 2003).3 In its review of a Rule
12(b)(1) motion, the Court may consider “evidence outside the pleadings to resolve
factual disputes concerning jurisdiction, and both parties are free to supplement the
record by affidavits.” Id.
The Court notes that Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. The Court is
mindful that pro se complaints are liberally construed and are held to less stringent
standards than the formal pleadings prepared by attorneys. Bridge v. Ocwen Fed.
Bank, 681 F.3d 355, 358 (6th Cir. 2012).

However, the leniency afforded to pro se

plaintiffs is not boundless, and they “are not automatically entitled to take every case to
trial.”

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).

Likewise, “liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient treatment of
substantive law,” and ultimately, those who proceed without counsel must still comply
with the procedural rules that govern civil cases. Durante v. Fairlane Town Ctr., 201 F.

3 In this case, Plaintiff’s failure to respond is arguably a basis on which to conclude she failed to carry this
burden. Nevertheless, in the interests of fairness to a pro se litigant, the Court considered Defendants’
Motion in light of the statements made in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

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App’x 338, 344 (6th Cir. 2006); Whitson v. Union Boiler Co., 47 F. App’x 757, 759 (6th
Cir. 2002).
It is axiomatic that “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They
possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be
expanded by judicial decree. It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited
jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations
omitted); see also Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)
(“Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is
authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress
pursuant thereto.”); Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The
character of the controversies over which federal judicial authority may extend are
delineated in Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is further limited
to those subjects encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction.”). Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a) requires pleadings to contain, inter alia, “a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.”

Plaintiff has provided no such statement in this

case, so the Court must attempt to discern it from the Complaint.
It does not appear the Court has jurisdiction, at least pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 or 1332, which are the only jurisdictional statutes relevant here. Under § 1331
(governing “federal question” jurisdiction): “The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”

Plaintiff’s Complaint references neither the Constitution nor any

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discernible federal statute. Thus, the Court lacks federal question jurisdiction over this
matter.
The Court also lacks diversity jurisdiction, which is exercised pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332 over cases between “citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
Under this statute, “there must be complete diversity such that no plaintiff is a citizen of
the same state as any defendant.” V&M Star, LP v. Centimark Corp., 596 F.3d 354, 355
(6th Cir. 2010). For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, “a corporation shall be
deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated
and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business . . . .” 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
In this case, the Complaint does not allege diversity of citizenship, and nothing of
record suggests it is present.

Indeed, just the opposite appears true.

Plaintiff

acknowledges that she is a citizen of Tennessee. (Doc. 1 at 1). Defendant Chambliss is
also a citizen of Tennessee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Thus, there is not complete
diversity among the parties, and the exercise of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
would be inappropriate. See V&M Star, 596 F.3d at 355.
There being no other apparent basis for the exercise of this Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction, this case must be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Accordingly, and for the reasons stated, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15)
is hereby GRANTED. This case is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case and all member cases.

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SO ORDERED this 20th day of August, 2012.

/s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._______
HARRY S. MATTICE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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