Guthrie v. Ball et al

Filing 195

ORDER granting 106 Motion in Limine. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan K Lee on October 8, 2014. (CNC, ) Mailed to John W. Pate (CNC, ).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA

KAREN GUTHRIE, Individually and on
behalf of the estate of DONALD GUTHRIE,
Plaintiff,
v.
GREGORY BALL, M.D.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 1:11-cv-333-SKL

ORDER
This order will address “Motion in Limine #2” filed by Defendant Gregory Ball, M.D.
(“Defendant”) to prohibit Plaintiff Karen Guthrie, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Donald
Guthrie (“Plaintiff”) from introducing any evidence of the net worth of either Plaintiff or Defendant
at the liability phase of the trial pursuant to Tennessee substantive law, and Federal Rules of
Evidence 401 and 403 [Doc. 106]. Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant’s motion in which she
agreed not to reference Defendant’s net worth during the liability and compensatory damages phase
of the trial, but noted evidence and argument concerning Defendant’s net worth are permissible
during any punitive damages phase of the trial [Doc. 148]. No reply was filed. Accordingly, the
aspect of the motion in limine to exclude evidence of the net worth of Defendant at the liability
phase of the trial is GRANTED.
The aspect of the motion seeking to exclude all evidence of Plaintiff’s net worth is
conclusory and provides no support other than a general citation to Rules 401 and 403 of the Federal

Rules of Evidence. Under the applicable rules, evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. “In performing the 403 balancing, the
court should give the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable
prejudicial value.” Donathan v. Orthopaedic & Sports Med. Clinic, PLLC, No. 4:07-cv-18, 2009
WL 3584263, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 26, 2009) (quoting Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Serv., 202
F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing 1 J. Weinstein & M. Burger, Weinstein's Evidence §
403[3], 403–25 to 403–26 (1982))) (internal quotation marks omitted). In weighing the probative
value of evidence, a court must consider the evidence “against the background of all the evidence
in the case.” Id. (citing 22 Charles Alan Wright, Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice &
Procedure: Evidence § 5214 (1978)). The evidence rules discourage only unfair prejudice, which
is evidence that has “an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly but
not necessarily an emotional one.” Id. (citing United States v. Whittington, 455 F.3d 736, 739 (6th
Cir. 2006)).
Plaintiff has responded with two examples of how certain evidence of Plaintiff’s financial
circumstances (which is obviously not the same thing as net worth) may be relevant at it relates to
the claim of damages: funeral expenses paid and loss of disability payments made to Mr. Guthrie.
Plaintiff has also agreed that she will not attempt to argue comparative net worth at any punitive
damage phase of the case, and the Court will hold her to that representation. The examples given
by Plaintiff in her response regard information about financial loss that may be relevant and the
examples do not appear to be unduly prejudicial. At this point, the Court does not perceive that the
parties have any actual dispute about the proper use of such financial information. Thus, any

2

remaining aspects of the motion as it relates to admissibility of any evidence of Defendant’s “net
worth” will be reserved until an evidentiary objection, if any, is made at trial.
SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
s/fâátÇ ^A _xx
SUSAN K. LEE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

3