Schreane v Patterson et al

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM: Plaintiff's complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) (Doc. 1). An appropriate judgment order will enter. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 2/4/2014. (BJL, )***Mailed to Clarence D Schreane.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at CHATTANOOGA
CLARENCE D. SCHREANE,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
)
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY
)
BOYDE PATTERSON, OFFICER MIKE )
MATHIS, In Both Their Individual and )
Official Capacities,
)
)
Defendants.
)

No. 1:12-cv-323
Judge Mattice

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Clarence D. Schreane (“Plaintiff”) has filed a pro se prisoner’s civil rights
complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an application to proceed in forma pauperis
(Docs. 1 & 1-2).

This action stems from Plaintiff’s criminal convictions by a Hamilton

County Criminal Court jury for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated
robbery.

Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights by

suppressing material evidence and committing perjury during the course of his criminal
prosecution.
For the reasons set forth herein, no service shall issue, and this complaint will be
sua sponte DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE (Doc. 1). In addition, Plaintiff’s motion
to proceed in forma pauperis will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART (Doc.
1-2).
I.

APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
It appears from the application to proceed in forma pauperis submitted by

Plaintiff that he lacks sufficient financial resources at the present time to pay the

required filing fee of $350.00. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis
will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART (Doc. 1-2). Plaintiff’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis will be GRANTED to the extent Plaintiff can file his complaint
without the prepayment of the full filing fee but DENIED to the extent the filing fee will
not be waived. Therefore, Plaintiff is not relieved of the ultimate responsibility of paying
the $350.00 filing fee, but rather, will be ASSESSED the entire filing fee and permitted
to pay it in installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); see McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 205
(2007).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate
trust account at the institution where he now resides shall submit to the Clerk, United
States District Court, 900 Georgia Ave., Room 309 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402, as
an initial partial payment, whichever is the greater of
(a)

twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to
Plaintiff’s inmate trust account; or

(b)

twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in
Plaintiff’s inmate trust account for the six-month period
preceding the filing of the complaint.

Thereafter, the custodian shall submit twenty percent (20%) of Plaintiff’s
preceding monthly income (or income credited to his trust account for the preceding
month), but only when such monthly income exceeds $10.00, until the full filing fee of
$350.00 as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
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The Clerk of Court will be DIRECTED to send a copy of this memorandum and
judgment order to the Warden and Trust Fund Officer at Lewisburg U.S. Penitentiary,
P.O. Box 1000 in Lewisburg, PA 17837,1 the Commissioner of the Bureau of Prisons,
and the Court’s Financial Deputy to ensure the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust
account complies with the portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act relating to
payment of the filing fee.
The agency having custody of Plaintiff shall collect the filing fee as funds become
available.

This order shall become a part of Plaintiff’s file and follow him if he is

transferred to another institution.

The agency having custody of the Plaintiff shall

continue to collect monthly payments from his prisoner account until the entire filing fee
of $350.00 is paid.
Plaintiff will also be ORDERED to provide the prison officials at any new
institution with a copy of this order. Failure of the Plaintiff to notify the new prison
officials of this order and outstanding debt, will result in the imposition of appropriate
sanctions against Plaintiff without any additional notice or hearing by the Court.
II.

SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
The Court screens the complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed as

frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and
§ 1915A. When performing this task, the Court bears in mind that the pleadings of pro
se litigants must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing

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Plaintiff has other matters pending in this district, and although he has failed to notify the Clerk’s
office in this case of his change of address, he has filed such notification in other cases. This is the
address change contained in his most recent notification in another pending matter.

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Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, the complaint must be
sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), which simply means the factual content pled by a
plaintiff must permit a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Therefore, the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff
and accepts all well-pleaded allegations of fact in the complaint as being true. Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). When a factual allegation is capable of more than one
reasonable inference, it must be construed in Plaintiff’s favor. Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins.
Co., 112 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 1997). The Court may not dismiss a complaint merely
because the Court does not believe the allegations of fact set forth in the complaint. In
re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1997).
The Court is not required to accept as true mere legal conclusions and
unwarranted inferences of fact. Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th
Cir. 1999). The complaint must do more than recite bare assertions of legal conclusions
without supporting allegations of material facts. Evans v. Pearson Enterprises Inc., 434
F.3d 839, 847 (6th Cir. 2006). Conclusory allegations or bare legal conclusions will not
suffice as factual allegations. Followell v. Mills, 317 Fed. Appx. 501 (6th Cir. March 18,
2009), available at 2009 WL 723132, *4; see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must contain more than statement of facts that merely
creates speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action).
Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct.
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1937, 1949 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a mere possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.

When a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief” Id. (Internal punctuation and citations omitted).
During the screening process, the Court is mindful that where a deficiency in the
complaint is able to be cured, Plaintiff shall be permitted to amend his complaint to cure
such deficiency. See LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944 (6th Cir. 2013) (overruling in
part, McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), and holding a district court
can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to
dismissal under the PLRA). However, a complaint must contain more than “labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[;]” it must
contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
III.

BACKGROUND
A summary of Plaintiff’s underlying criminal case is necessary to place Plaintiff’s

complaint into context because his complaint is based on claims of alleged unlawful
withholding of evidence and perjured testimony in the underlying criminal case.
Because Plaintiff’s civil complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires application
of the Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) favorable termination rule as to all of

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Plaintiff’s civil rights claims, the facts and procedural history in the criminal case are
discussed in some detail.
Although the district courts ordinarily do not consider matters outside a civil rights
complaint when deciding whether to dismiss it for failure to state a claim, Weiner v. Klais
& Co., 108 F.3d 86, 88-89 (6th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds, Swierkiwica v.
Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), they may consider public records and any other
matters of which the court may take judicial notice under Rule 201(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
In reviewing Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2),
this Court takes judicial notice of the record in the underlying criminal case of State v.
Schreane, No. E2005-00520-CCA-R3CD, 2006 WL 891394 (Tenn. Crim. App., April 5,
2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 28, 2006); underlying state post-conviction case
of Schreane v. State, No. E2009-01103-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 3919264 (Tenn. Crim.
App., Oct. 7, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011), and his subsequent
petition for writ of error coram nobis, Schreane v. State, No. E2012-01202-CCA-R3-PC,
2013 WL 173193 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jan. 16, 2013), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. May 7,
2013).
A.

Procedural History

Plaintiff was convicted of first-degree felony murder and especially aggravated
robbery by a Hamilton County Criminal Court jury and was sentenced by the trial court
to life imprisonment for the murder and sixty years for the robbery, ordering the
defendant to serve his sixty-year sentence as a career offender consecutively for an
effective sentence of life plus sixty years. State v. Schreane, No. E2005-00520-CCA6 

R3CD, 2006 WL 891394, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., April 5, 2006).
appeal and state post-conviction proceedings were unsuccessful.

Plaintiff’s direct
Id.; Schreane v.

State, 2010 WL 3919264 (Tenn. Crim. App., Oct. 7, 2010), perm. app. denied (Jan. 18,
2011); Schreane v. State, 2013 WL 5516430 (Tenn. Crim. App., Oct. 2, 2013);
Schreane v.State, 2013 WL 6229527 (Tenn. Crim. App., Dec. 2, 2013).
B.

Facts

The facts of Plaintiff’s underlying criminal case are taken from the Court of
Criminal Appeals decision affirming his convictions for first degree felony murder and
especially aggravated robbery on direct appeal:
This case relates to the defendant's participation in the killing of Marcus
Edwards on September 19, 1991. The Chattanooga Police Department
investigated the murder; however, the case went cold and remained
unsolved for eight years. In 1999, the defendant was incarcerated on
unrelated charges when he contacted Chattanooga Police Department
detectives and told them he had information related to the unsolved 1991
murder. The detectives had the defendant brought to their location to
speak with him, and after a period of a few hours, the defendant
confessed.
At the trial, the evidence showed that the defendant accompanied Charles
Turner to the victim's place of business to help Mr. Turner commit a
robbery. As the victim was talking to Mr. Turner, the defendant struck the
victim with a rock, and Mr. Turner then shot the victim with a .38 caliber
handgun. Mr. Turner took the victim's .357 magnum handgun, which was
on the victim's body. Mr. Turner also took a cigar box containing cash and
gave the defendant one hundred dollars as both men fled the scene in the
defendant's 1983 Cadillac Eldorado.
Before the trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession,
arguing that it was taken in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. At the motion to suppress hearing, Chattanooga Police
Department Detective Mike Mathis testified that he was the lead
investigator for the 1991 murder. He said the victim was shot to death and
found in his business. Detective Mathis said few solid leads developed
until the defendant contacted them.

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Detective Mathis said that sometime before September 19, 1999,
Chattanooga Police Department Lieutenant Steve Angel had been
receiving collect telephone calls from the Hamilton County Jail, which he
was unable to answer. He said that the defendant's “significant other”
contacted the detectives and told them the defendant wanted to talk to
them about an unsolved murder. He said the defendant also called and
spoke with Lt. Angel and told him enough specific information about the
murder to cause Lt. Angel to have the defendant transported from the
Hamilton County Jail to the police service center.
Detective Mathis said he conducted an interview with the defendant,
culminating in a tape-recorded statement. He said that although the
defendant was in custody on unrelated charges, he was not under arrest
or charged with the victim's murder when he confessed. Detective Mathis
said he did not promise the defendant anything in return for his
confession. Detective Mathis said the defendant waived his constitutional
right to remain silent and to an attorney before making the tape-recorded
statement.

On cross-examination, Det. Mathis said he talked with the defendant for
some period of time before reading him his Miranda rights. He admitted
that before he arrived to interview the defendant, Lt. Angel had been
talking to the defendant. Detective Mathis said that although he did not
promise the defendant anything specific in return for his confession, he did
explain to the defendant that he would tell the district attorney general's
office that the defendant had come forward on his own and cooperated
with the police. Detective Mathis admitted that he may have told the
defendant he would try to help transport the defendant from the Hamilton
County Jail to Silverdale, a state correctional facility.

On redirect examination, Det. Mathis said the defendant initiated the
contact with the police department. Detective Mathis explained that the
reason for the delay in reading the defendant his Miranda rights was the
defendant initially maintained that he had only heard about the murder, not
that he had any involvement in it. He said the defendant ultimately “came
clean” and confessed.

The defendant testified that when he first arrived at the police service
center, he was placed in an interview room with Det. Carroll and Det.
Mathis. He said Lt. Angel entered the room later. The defendant said Det.
Mathis told him he believed “the bicycle bandit” was responsible for the
victim's murder. The defendant said that he then asked to speak with his
attorney but that Det. Mathis told him he did not need an attorney. The
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defendant said Det. Mathis made promises to him before the taping
began. He said Det. Mathis promised him that the defendant would not be
charged with the murder, that Det. Mathis would speak with the
defendant's parole officer in another case, and that Det. Mathis would
speak with the district attorney general's office in order to have them
dismiss certain charges against the defendant from another case in return
for the defendant's cooperation. He said Det. Mathis also promised to
transfer him from the Hamilton County Jail to Silverdale. The defendant
said he was transferred to Silverdale two days later. The defendant said
he did not sign the waiver form until after the taped statement was made.
After considering the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the trial
court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. It stated:
Even on your motion, I can base all of my findings on what Mathis
and the statement says.... The initial contact came not from the
police to [the defendant] but from someone on [the defendant's]
behalf and then later by [the defendant] to the police. [The police]
would have been derelict in their duty not to see what [the defendant]
had to say about it, something like this. So they bring him out there
and talk with him.

Now, as far as the requirements for Miranda warnings, you have to
be in custody and subject to interrogation. He was in custody but
certainly not on this and not by these officers on this. So I don't think
that it actually applies in this situation.

The fact that he is in custody on something else doesn't mean for
Miranda purposes he wasn't in custody on this.

He also made the initial contact. Certainly they questioned him after
he gave them some information but I find from the transcript itself
and the conversation between Mr. Mathis at the very beginning of
the tape, he says, “Prior to taking this statement I advised you of
your constitutional rights and did you understand these.” [The
defendant] says, “Yes, he did.”
Mathis says, “Am I correct in saying that as I started to advise you of
them, you basically recited them to me, did you not?” [The
defendant] said, “Yes.”

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Mathis says, “And I mean you read-told me what your rights were
without even looking at that form, you knew your rights, is that
correct?” [The defendant] says, “Yes.”

Mathis says, “And you have signed this rights waiver agreeing to talk
to us today.” “Yes.” “And that's your signature that I'm pointing to on
this rights form.” [The defendant] says, “Yes.”

It's incredible to believe that the rights waiver got signed after the
taped statement when they discuss it prior to even questioning on
the tape, so that's totally unbelievable.

....

Now, I don't believe that [the defendant] walked in there, signed the
waiver, and started this. I think he had probably been there a while.
He probably got there before midnight and had been talking to some
of them and talking to them about things and as they decided they
had information they needed to use, they read him rights waiver and
did the tape. There is really nothing wrong with it. He made a
knowing and voluntary statement to the police. It was not made
during the course of negotiations or settlement of this case. He
obviously wanted good treatment and was looking out for himself, no
doubt about that, that happens all the time. There was nothing
improper about this. The motion to suppress the confession is
overruled.

At the trial, the jury convicted the defendant as charged. The defendant
filed a motion for new trial, and at the ensuing hearing, the defendant
called Clyde Edwards, the victim's father, who testified that either the
police or the district attorney's office told him that the state was going to
offer the defendant a sentence of life imprisonment. Mr. Edwards said, “I
told them I didn't care if [the defendant] didn't get but two years, as long as
he didn't get out of the pen.” Mr. Edwards maintained that he did not
remember who told him about the proposed offer. Thereafter, the trial
court denied the defendant's motion for new trial.
State v. Schreane, 2006 WL 891394, at 1-3 (Tenn. Crim. App., April 5, 2006), perm.
app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 28, 2006).
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IV.

CIVIL COMPLAINT
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a

constitutional right by a person acting under color of state law. See AirTrans, Inc. v.
Mead, 389 F.3d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff brings this § 1983 against Assistant
District Attorney Patterson (“ADA Patterson”) and Chattanooga Police Detective Mike
Mathis (“Detective Mathis”), both of whom were involved in his underlying criminal case.
Plaintiff specifically asserts the following claims:

(1)

ADA Patterson concealed

material, exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and
its progeny, and (2)
and trial.

Detective Mathis falsely testified during his suppression hearing

Thus, the main thrust of Plaintiff’s complaint is that ADA Patterson violated

his due process rights when he “withheld investigation tapes of suspects, that
demonstrated in detail of [sic] the crime that was committed[,] how it was committed,
names of the suspects that committed the crime with the description,” and Detective
Mathis” committed perjury when he testified during his suppression hearing and criminal
trial (Doc. 1).
A.

Claims Barred by Heck v. Humphrey

Plaintiff’s claims that the prosecution withheld material, discoverable evidence
and the detective committed perjury during the trial and prosecution of him for the
September 19, 1991, murder and especially aggravated robbery of Marcus Edwards are
barred by Heck because each claim necessarily implies the invalidity of his convictions
and sentences. Under Heck, a plaintiff cannot pursue a § 1983 claim that, if successful,
would necessarily imply the invalidity of a previous conviction or sentence, unless the

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plaintiff can demonstrate favorable termination of the prior conviction or sentence. Id. at
487. The Supreme Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A
claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence
that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 486-487 (footnote omitted).
Plaintiff’s sentence has not been favorably terminated as required by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Plaintiff does not allege and nothing in the record
before the Court or the Court’s research demonstrates he has successfully challenged
his conviction and sentence.
Here, success on either one of Plaintiff’s claims would necessarily imply the
convictions and sentence are invalid because underlying his claims are the allegations
that ADA Patterson withheld material exculpatory evidence and Detective Mathis
committed perjury during his suppression hearing and jury trial, thus resulting in his
illegal conviction obtained based on perjured testimony and the withholding of Brady
material. See Williams v. Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 529 (8th Cir., 1996) (claim defendants
presented perjured testimony was barred by Heck’s favorable termination rule); and
Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1300 (2011) (noting Brady claims are outside the
province of § 1983). Plaintiff’s arguments, assuming they were true, would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction and sentence because it would have been based on

12 

evidence that was fabricated and untruthful. Plaintiff’s claims are precisely the type
prohibited under Heck.
In other words, an aspect of each of Plaintiff’s specific claims necessarily implies
the invalidity of his convictions and sentence. Plaintiff’s first claim is that his conviction
was unconstitutional based on a purported Brady violation.

Plaintiff’s second claim is

his statement and convictions are based on perjured testimony.

Consequently, a

finding in Plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and
sentence.
In sum, to recognize that his motion to suppress and conviction were based on
perjured testimony and material evidence was unconstitutionally withheld by the
prosecution would necessarily imply his conviction and sentence are invalid.
Accordingly, the claims are barred by the Heck v. Humphrey’s favorable termination
rule, as relief on any of his claims would imply the invalidity of his murder and especially
aggravated robbery convictions and sentences which have not been reversed or set
aside.
B.

Requested Relief Barred by Heck

Plaintiff does not specifically request the Court to invalidate his conviction and
release him from prison, even though, as previously stated, a finding in his favor on his
claims would necessarily imply that his convictions and sentences were invalid. Rather,
he seeks five million dollars in monetary relief.

Heck, as extended by Edwards v.

Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (prisoner’s claim for injunctive and monetary relief not
cognizable under § 1983 as it necessarily implied invalidity of good-time credits where
he alleged deceit and bias on part of hearing officer), does not permit money damages
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based on allegations that necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence.
Because awarding relief to Plaintiff on any portion of his claims would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his convictions and sentences, his claim for money damages is not
cognizable under § 1983.
Accordingly, because a favorable ruling would necessarily imply the invalidity of
Plaintiff’s convictions in direct violation of Heck, and Plaintiff has not had his convictions
reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid, his claims are not yet cognizable in a
§ 1983 action.
V.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s claims are Heck-barred, Plaintiff’s complaint is

sua sponte DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) (Doc.
1).
An appropriate judgment order will enter.

/s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._______
HARRY S. MATTICE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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