Ory v. Hamilton County, Tennessee et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM Signed by District Judge Curtis L Collier on 3/18/14. (mailed to plaintiff)(GRE, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at CHATTANOOGA
SHANNON ORY,

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Plaintiff,
v.
HAMILTON COUNTY, TENNESSEE;
HAMILTON COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE;
SHERIFF JIM HAMMOND, OFFICER
ROBERT STARNES; OFFICER JEFF
BAKER; OFFICER ROBIN LANGFORD;
OFFICER PAUL HOLLOWAY; OFFICER
VAN HINTON; CITY OF COLLEGEDALE;
COLLEGEDALE POLICE DEPARTMENT;
CHIEF BRIAN HICKMAN; OFFICER
DARRELL HANNAH;
Defendants.

1:13-cv-110
Judge Curtis L. Collier

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Shannon Ory (“Plaintiff”) filed a pro se prisoner civil rights complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Court File No. 2). Also before the Court are Plaintiff’s motions requesting
to proceed in forma pauperis (Court File Nos. 1 & 8), the appointment of counsel (Court File No.
5), and to amend Form AO 440 (Court File No. 9). Plaintiff contends he was maliciously prosecuted
by the defendants, and his resulting criminal conviction (for reckless endangerment) was the result
of the defendants conducting an illegal search of his property and residence, illegally seizing
evidence, and presenting perjured testimony. Plaintiff also brings an unrelated claim regarding the
medical treatment he received while incarcerated (Court File No. 2).

Plaintiff seeks to recover $19,900,000.00 in compensatory and punitive damages and
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associated court costs and legal fees.
For the reasons set forth below, no service shall issue, Plaintiff’s complaint will be
DISMISSED (Court File No. 2), his prisoner motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be DENIED
as MOOT (Court File No. 1), his non-prisoner motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be
GRANTED (Court File No. 8), and his motions to appoint counsel and to amend the AO 440 forms
will be DENIED as MOOT (Court File Nos. 5 & 9).
I.

NON-DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS
Plaintiff's prisoner motion to proceed in forma pauperis will be DENIED as MOOT since

he is no longer incarcerated (Court File No. 1). Plaintiff’s non-prisoner motion to proceed in forma
pauperis reflects he has no income or assets. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s non-prisoner motion to
proceed in forma pauperis will be GRANTED (Court File No. 8).
Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion requesting the appointment of counsel (Court File
No. 5). Because the case is being dismissed, the motion to appoint counsel will be DENIED as
MOOT (Court File No. 5).
Plaintiff’s motion requesting to serve Defendants at their home address is also pending
before the Court (Court File No. 9). The motion will be DENIED as MOOT since the Defendants
will not be served. Further, the Clerk will be DIRECTED to REDACT the Defendants’ addresses
from page two of document number nine and from all the summonses (Court File Nos. 9 and 9-1,
at 1-8).
II.

SCREENING
The Court screens the complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous,

malicious, or for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. When

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performing this task, the Court bears in mind that the pleadings of pro se litigants must be liberally
construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless,
the complaint must be sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), which simply means the factual content pled by a
plaintiff must permit a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged[,]” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and must contain factual
allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In other words, a complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action[;]” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to
“raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Thus, when the Court screens the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or for failure, a federal court applies the same
standard applied to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Fridman
v. City of New York, 195 F.Supp.2d 534, 538 (S.D. N.Y. 2002) (“The standard for dismissal of an
action or appeal taken in forma pauperis is identical to the standard for dismissal on a motion made
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)”).
The Court is not required to accept as true mere legal conclusions and unwarranted
inferences of fact. Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir. 1999), abrogated on
other grounds by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). The complaint must do more
than recite bare assertions of legal conclusions without supporting allegations of material facts.

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Evans v. Pearson Enterprises Inc., 434 F.3d 839, 847 (6th Cir. 2006). Factually unsupported
allegations or bare legal conclusions will not suffice as factual allegations. Followell v. Mills, 317
Fed. Appx. 501 (6th Cir. March 18, 2009), available at 2009 WL 723132, *4; see also Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must contain more than statement of facts that
merely creates speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action).
Thus, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility
standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully. When a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’
a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief.” Id. (Internal punctuation and citations omitted).
During the screening process, the Court is mindful that where a deficiency in the complaint
is able to be cured, Plaintiff shall be permitted to amend his complaint to cure such deficiency. See
LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding a district court can allow a plaintiff to
amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA). However,
a complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action[;]” it must contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to
relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations
omitted).

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III.

ANALYSIS
Although Plaintiff’s complaint consists only of vague, factually unsupported allegations, the

Court discerns this complaint is based on a criminal investigation and prosecution which resulted
in Plaintiff’s conviction for reckless endangerment.1 Plaintiff’s complaint is based on allegations
that his underlying criminal conviction is the result of an alleged illegal search and seizure,
malicious prosecution, and perjured testimony. Because Plaintiff’s civil complaint brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires application of the Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), favorable
termination rule as to all Plaintiff’s civil rights claims pertaining to the investigation and prosecution
in his underlying criminal case, and Plaintiff has not alleged and Court’s research has not revealed
that his conviction has been favorably terminated, for the reasons explained below, all of these
claims must be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s medical care claim, however, will be
dismissed with prejudice for the reasons explained below.
A.

Civil Complaint

Although the complaint is factually lacking, the Court discerns Plaintiff brings this § 1983
action alleging he was maliciously prosecuted in his underlying criminal conviction which he claims
is based on an illegal search and seizure and perjured testimony. In addition, without identifying
a specific defendant, Plaintiff alleges he received inadequate medical care while incarcerated on the
underlying criminal conviction (Court File No. 2). The sparse facts relating to the medical claim
will be discussed in section F below.
Plaintiff brings this § 1983 action pertaining to his underlying criminal conviction for
reckless endangerment against Hamilton County, the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Jim

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See www.tfponline.com/news/2013/mar/09/ory-guilty-of-mi (timesfreepress.com).
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Hammond, Officers Robert Starnes (“Officer Starnes”), Jeff Baker (“Officer Baker”), Robin
Langford (“Officer Langford”), Paul Holloway (“Officer Holloway”), Van Hinton (“Officer
Hinton”), City of Collegedale, Collegedale Police Department, Chief Brian Hickman (“Chief
Hickman”), and Officer Darrell Hannah (“Officer Hannah).
On Wednesday, December 16, 2009, agents of the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department
and agents of the Collegedale Police Department entered Plaintiff’s property and residence in
response to an alleged aggravated assault. Plaintiff specifically asserts the following claims: (1)
Officer Starnes lied to Plaintiff during the investigation, lied on a sworn affidavit to obtain the
search warrant on December 16, 2009, and maintained communication with Officers Baker and
Langford, presumably while they were searching Plaintiff’s residence and Officer Starnes was
interrogating Plaintiff; (2) Officers Starnes and Baker motivated an unidentified witness to present
unidentified false testimony in a criminal trial; (3) Officers Starnes and Baker ignored unidentified
exculpatory evidence and undescribed inconsistent statements in a criminal investigation; (4) Officer
Baker presented false testimony to the Hamilton County Grand Jury; (5) Officer Baker participated
in an alleged stalking claim in Davidson County to revoke Plaintiff’s bond when he refused a plea
offer by the state; (6) Officer Holloway inserted false statements in an official report describing the
December 16, 2009 assault; (7) Officer Hinton participated in some unidentified way to entrap
Plaintiff in a felony charge; (8) Sheriff Hammond is responsible for his employees; (9) The
Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office and Hamilton County have failed to enforce its policies to prevent
misconduct; (10) Officer Hannah lied during the criminal investigation; (11) Chief Hickman is
responsible for Officers Langford and Hannah’s conduct; and (12) the City of Collegedale and the
Collegedale Police Department are responsible for the conduct of the Collegedale Police Officers

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(Doc. 2).
B.

42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege he was deprived of
a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States by a person
acting under color of law, without due process of law. Flagg Brothers Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
155 (1978); Chatman v. Slagle, 107 F.3d 380, 384 (6th Cir. 1997); Brock v. McWherter, 94 F.3d
242, 244 (6th Cir. 1996); O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1994); Rhodes
v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 119 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1032 (1992).
C.

Defendants Not “Persons” for § 1983 Purposes

Initially the Court observes Plaintiff has named two entities as defendants who are not legal
entities subject to suit under § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff has named the Hamilton County Sheriff’s
Office and Collegedale Police Department as Defendants in this matter. For purposes of § 1983,
“person” includes individuals and “bodies politic and corporate.” Monell v. Dept. of Social Services
of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 & n. 55 (1978). Neither the sheriff’s office nor the police
department is subject to suit under § 1983 as neither is a “person” or legal entity subject to liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Boykin v. Van Buren Twp., 479 F.3d 444, 450 (6thCir. 2007) (police
department improper defendant); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he
Sheriff’s Department is not a legal entity subject to suit[.]”).
Accordingly, the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office and the Collegedale Police Department
will be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and § 1915A since any claim against them
is frivolous.

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D.

Heck v. Humphrey Favorable Termination Rule

Although Plaintiff specifically requests compensation, he is effectively challenging the
constitutionality of his conviction and sentence. Specifically, Plaintiff’s allegations he was
maliciously prosecuted and his conviction was the result of the Defendants’ unconstitutional search
of his residence, seizure of evidence, and presentation of perjured testimony during the criminal
investigation and trial, effectively challenges the validity of his conviction and sentence resulting
from those proceedings, and therefore, is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck’s
favorable termination rule bars § 1983 claims that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prior
conviction or sentence that has not been overturned.
In Heck v. Humphrey the Supreme Court considered whether this rule should be modified
where a prisoner challenges the constitutionality of his conviction but rather than seeking release,
he seeks an award of monetary damages. The Supreme Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not
been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87. This “favorable termination” rule bars § 1983 claims that “would
necessarily imply the invalidity” of a prior conviction of sentence that has not been overturned. Id.
at 487. In the case before the Court, Plaintiff does not allege, and nothing in the record before the
Court nor the Court’s research demonstrates, he has successfully challenged his conviction and
sentence. Consequently, because Plaintiff’s sentence has not been favorably terminated, his claims
must be dismissed. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
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Here, Plaintiff requests monetary damages based on claims he was maliciously prosecuted
and his conviction is based on Defendants unconstitutional search of his residence, seizure of
evidence, and presentation of perjured testimony during the investigation and trial in his underlying
criminal case. Success on any of Plaintiff's claims pertaining to the criminal investigation and
prosecution of his underlying criminal conviction would necessarily imply the convictions and
sentence are invalid because underlying his claims are the allegations Defendants illegally searched
his residence, seized evidence, and committed perjury to obtain his conviction. See Williams v.
Schario, 93 F.3d 527, 529 (8th Cir., 1996) (claim defendants presented perjured testimony was
barred by Heck’s favorable termination rule). Plaintiff's arguments, assuming they were true, would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and sentence because it would have been based
on evidence that was illegally obtained, fabricated, and untruthful. Plaintiff's claims are precisely
the type prohibited under Heck. In other words, an aspect of each of Plaintiff's specific claims
necessarily implies the invalidity of his convictions and sentence. Consequently, a finding in
Plaintiff's favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and sentence.2
Plaintiff’s allegations effectively seek to undermine the validity of his conviction which he
has not demonstrated “has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared

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Although Fourth Amendment claims may be brought under § 1983 if success would
not undermine the conviction and sentence if the plaintiff alleges a compensable injury other than
the conviction and sentence, see Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 1999),
abrogated on other grounds in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), such is not the case presented
here. Nevertheless, even assuming a hypothetical judgment in this litigation that the search and
seizure were unconstitutional would not necessarily imply the invalidation of Plaintiff’s criminal
conviction, the claim would have to be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred. This is so, because
the alleged unconstitutional conduct occurred on December 9, 2009, the cause of action accrued on
that date, and more than one year elapsed between December 9, 2009, and the filing of this suit in
April 2013.
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invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus [pursuant to] 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486-87.
Plaintiff’s claims pertaining to the investigation and prosecution in his underlying criminal case are
barred by the Heck “favorable termination” rule. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims raising issues that
directly implicate the legality of his conviction and judgment, i.e., malicious prosecution,
unconstitutional search and seizure, and presentation of perjured testimony, will be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE sua sponte, pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted as his claims are not cognizable under § 1983 because his
conviction and sentence have not been invalidated.
E.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A.

Requested Relief Barred by Heck

Plaintiff does not specifically request the Court to invalidate his conviction and release him
from prison, even though, as previously stated, a finding in his favor on his claims would necessarily
imply that his convictions and sentences were invalid. Rather, he seeks nineteen million, nine
hundred thousand dollars in monetary relief. Heck, as extended by Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.
641, 648 (1997) (prisoner’s claim for injunctive and monetary relief not cognizable under § 1983
as it necessarily implied invalidity of good-time credits where he alleged deceit and bias on part of
hearing officer), does not permit money damages based on allegations that necessarily imply the
invalidity of a conviction or sentence. Because awarding relief to Plaintiff on any portion of his
claims pertaining to the investigation and prosecution of his underlying criminal conviction would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and sentence, his claim for money damages is not
cognizable under § 1983.
Accordingly, because a favorable ruling would necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff's

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convictions in direct violation of Heck, and Plaintiff has not had his convictions reversed, expunged,
or otherwise declared invalid, his claims are not yet cognizable in a § 1983 action.
F.

Medical Claims

At the end of his complaint, Plaintiff, who is insulin dependent, raises a claim that in March
2013 his ALC test result was 10.0 and the American Diabetes Association recommends an ALC of
less than 6.0. Without providing any factual support, Plaintiff claims his ALC result was the result
of the “severely inadequate” diet and medical treatment he received while incarcerated by the
Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff has not identified any Defendant in relation to this
vague, factually unsupported claim about the medical treatment he received while incarcerated in
relation to the underlying criminal conviction. Plaintiff’s failure to identify any defendant, provide
any factual support, or allege a constitutional violation in relation to his medical claim is fatal to the
claim (Court Doc. 2). For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s medical claim will be dismissed
with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff claims the diet and medical treatment he received while incarcerated was inadequate
and resulted in a ALC test result of 10.0 in March 2013, which is four points higher that the
American Diabetes Association recommends. Plaintiff’s factually unsupported claim fails to allege
a constitutional violation or identify any party in relation to his medical claim. Plaintiff, an insulin
dependent diabetic, has alleged a serious medical need, his assertions, however, fail to allege
deliberate indifference, identify a defendant, or provide any factual allegations from which the Court
can infer some unidentified medical personnel violated his constitutional rights. A vague and
factually unsupported claim of improper or inadequate medical care under these
circumstances–without any allegation of deliberate indifference, identification of a defendant, or

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factual support–is insufficient to amount to a constitutional violation.
A prison authority’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs violates the
Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). An Eighth Amendment claim has both
an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The
objective component requires the plaintiff to show a “sufficiently serious” deprivation. Id. A
medical need may be objectively serious if even a lay person would recognize the seriousness of the
need for medical care. Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Blackmore v.
Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004)). The subjective component requires a
showing that a defendant possessed the state of mind of deliberate indifference. A plaintiff
establishes deliberate indifference by demonstrating “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in
denying medical care. Thus, a plaintiff must show defendants were aware of facts from which they
could infer that denying medical care would potentially result in a substantial risk of harm and that
they actually drew that inference. The subjective component requires a showing that a defendant
possessed the state of mind of deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 842. A prison
official who takes reasonable measures to abate the risk, however, avoids liability, even if the harm
ultimately is not averted. Id. at 835-36. “Deliberate indifference is more than negligence and
approaches intentional wrongdoing.” Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Generally, once a prisoner has actually been given treatment and the dispute is over the
adequacy of such treatment, such dispute does not state a cognizable § 1983 claim. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105-06. Even if the medical personnel’s opinion is inaccurate and treatment
is unsuccessful, mere negligence or allegedly poor medical judgment does not constitute cruel and

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unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106. Therefore, where a prisoner receives
medical care and the dispute is over its adequacy, no claim has been stated. Westlake v. Lucas, 537
F.2d 857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1976). Similarly, a viable Eighth Amendment claim is not stated by
allegations that a medical condition has been negligently diagnosed or treated, as the mere fact that
the victim happens to be a prisoner does not convert it to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S.
at 106. In other words, negligence is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment. Ordinary
medical malpractice–malpractice that consists of negligent treatment–is not cruel and unusual
punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106. However, “a prisoner who suffers pain needlessly
when relief is readily available has a cause of action against those whose deliberate indifference is
the cause of his suffering.” See Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal
punctuation and
citation omitted); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (“[D]enial of medical care may result in pain and
suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose.”).
Plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional violation of his right to medical care against anyone.
Plaintiff clearly admits he received medical treatment, although he describes it as inadequate without
providing any factual support for that conclusion. The propriety of a certain course of medical
treatment is not a proper subject for § 1983 review. Determining how to treat a patient’s diabetes
is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment as to the appropriate course of treatment.
Plaintiff’s claim, therefore, amounts to, at most, a vague assertion of medical negligence or
malpractice. This type of vague and factually unsupported allegation fails to state a viable claim for
relief under § 1983, because, as Estelle instructs, “a complaint that a physician has been negligent
in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment

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under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 106. In sum, accepting as true all of Plaintiff’s allegations,
there is simply nothing indicating anyone was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
Plaintiff states his diet and medical treatment were controlled by Hamilton County. That sole
allegation is insufficient to raise a claim against the county. In order to prevail in an action against
a county, a plaintiff must show, first, that he has suffered harm because of a constitutional violation
and second, that a policy or custom of the county caused the harm. See Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). Plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the
entity itself, and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.
See Garner v. Memphis Police Dept. 8 F.3d 358, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1177
(1994) (citation omitted). Aside from Plaintiff’s failure to allege he suffered harm because of a
constitutional violation, Plaintiff has not alleged any unconstitutional conduct on the part of
Hamilton County or any county employee. The record contains nothing from which the Court can
infer Plaintiff’s ALC test was the result of a Hamilton County policy and Plaintiff was injured
because of the policy. Plaintiff has done nothing more than make factually baseless allegations, all
of which are insufficient to raise a constitutional violation. Because Plaintiff has not alleged a
constitutional violation, his claim fails.
Plaintiff has failed to allege deliberate indifference on the part of any identifiable defendant
or anyone else in relation to the medical treatment provided to him. Accordingly, Plaintiff's medical
claim will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A for
failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
V.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s claims pertaining to his underlying criminal conviction are

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Heck-barred, those claims, i.e., he was maliciously prosecuted and his conviction is the result of an
illegal search and seizure and perjured testimony, are sua sponte DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1); his medical claim is sua sponte DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1); and his complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED in its entirety
(Doc. 2). The Clerk will be DIRECTED to close the case.
An appropriate judgment order will enter.

/s/
CURTIS L. COLLIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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