Edmonds v. Gestamp Chattanooga, LLC et al

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM: the Court will DISMISS all claims against Gestamp North America, and DENY summary judgment as to Plaintiffs FMLA interference claim and Plaintiff's FMLA and workers compensation retaliation claims. An appropriate Order shall enter. Signed by District Judge Curtis L Collier on 4/17/2017. (BJL, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
RICKY EDMONDS,
Plaintiff,
v.
GESTAMP CHATTANOOGA, LLC &
GESTAMP NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:15-cv-65

Judge Curtis L. Collier
Magistrate Judge Christopher Steger

MEMORANDUM
Defendants Gestamp Chattanooga, LLC and Gestamp North America, Inc. move for
summary judgment in their favor on all of Plaintiff Ricky Edmonds’s claims.

(Doc. 16.)

Plaintiff asserts the following claims against Defendants: (1) interference under the Family and
Medical Leave Act (the “FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq.; (2) retaliation under the FMLA; and
(3) workers’ compensation retaliation under Tennessee Code Annotated § 50–6–114. Defendants
additionally seek dismissal of all claims against Gestamp North America, Inc.
For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN
PART Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 16). The Court will DISMISS all
claims against Gestamp North America, Inc., and DENY summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s
FMLA interference claim, Plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim, and Plaintiff’s workers’
compensation retaliation claim.

I.

BACKGROUND
Gestamp Chattanooga (“Gestamp”) manufactures and assembles automotive parts and is a

wholly owned subsidiary of Gestamp North America, Inc. (“Gestamp North America”). 1
Plaintiff Ricky Edmonds (“Edmonds”) began work at Gestamp in January 2012 as a parts maker.
On June 14, 2013, a supervisor asked Edmonds to assist in dismantling industrial shelving.
Edmonds suffered a serious injury to his right shoulder while performing this work, and he filed a
workers’ compensation claim as a result of the injury. Edmonds’s pain persisted, and he saw a
physician, Dr. McKinley Lundy, who prescribed medication and instructed him to return if the
pain did not subside. Edmonds continued to experience pain, so Dr. Lundy referred him to Dr.
Mark Sumida, a specialist.
Dr. Sumida performed an MRI, which revealed Edmonds had torn his right rotator cuff.
Dr. Sumida placed Edmonds on work restrictions limiting his ability to lift heavy objects and
performed surgery to repair the torn rotator cuff on October 4, 2013. On October 23, 2013, Dr.
Sumida released Edmonds to return to work with restrictions stating Edmonds could only perform
light-duty work and could not use his right arm. Gestamp assigned Edmonds to light-duty work
as a label maker, a job consisting of printing labels and sticking them on containers.
Edmonds returned to Dr. Sumida on November 11, 2013. Dr. Sumida issued new work
restrictions for Edmonds, which prohibited him from using his right arm or working on an
assembly line. Gestamp initially assigned Edmonds to various light-duty tasks, including label
1

Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is drawn from Defendant’s
memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment (Doc. 17 at 2–11) and Plaintiff’s
response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 19 at 1–12). Factual disputes and
reasonable inferences regarding the underlying facts are presented in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986).
2

making, clerical work, and inspecting parts; however, Edmonds was later assigned to the press
area of the plant. In the press area, Edmonds’s duties involved organizing bins and moving scrap
metal, requiring him to lift heavy objects and use both arms. Edmonds complained that these
duties caused him pain in his shoulders on a number of occasions.

Despite Edmonds’s

complaints, Gestamp never modified Edmonds’s work responsibilities. Edmonds worked in the
press area of the plant on work restrictions from Dr. Sumida until his termination in April 2014.
In March 2014, Edmonds missed work three times due to shoulder pain. Gestamp’s
attendance policy involves the assessment of attendance points against employees for unexcused
absences. Various forms of discipline are imposed as attendance points accumulate, including
termination when an employee has received six attendance points. Edmonds was assessed one
attendance point each for his absences in March 2014—one point for leaving work early due to
shoulder pain on March 17, 2014, one point for leaving work early due to shoulder pain on March
19, 2014, and one point for missing work on March 29, 2014 to have an MRI on his shoulder.2
Edmonds was assessed an attendance point for his absence on March 29, 2014, a Saturday, despite
Edmonds’s assertion that he was not scheduled to work on March 29, 2014. Furthermore,
Edmonds asserts that even had he been scheduled to work on March 29, 2014, he was not allowed
to work on March 29, 2014 because Gestamp did not allow employees on work restrictions to
work overtime, and working on a Saturday constituted working overtime.

2

Edmonds complained of pain in both his shoulders in March 2014. Edmonds’s left
shoulder pain began in November 2013, after the surgery on his right shoulder. Edmonds asserts
the pain in his left shoulder was a result of overworking his left shoulder in order to complete his
job responsibilities, which involved moving scrap metal, while complying with his work
restrictions, which forbid him from using his right arm. The March 29, 2014 MRI was conducted
on Edmonds’s left shoulder.
3

On April 3, 2014, Edmonds was informed by his supervisors that he was being moved from
first shift to second shift. Edmonds told his supervisors he was disappointed by this assignment.
On April 4, 2014, a previously scheduled vacation day for Edmonds, Edmonds called Gestamp’s
human resources department and asked for FMLA leave because he needed time to rest his
shoulders.

Edmonds also mentioned he was feeling sick.

Gestamp’s human resources

generalist, Vickie Gilbert, informed Edmonds he did not qualify for FMLA leave because FMLA
leave runs concurrently with workers’ compensation.
Edmonds missed work on April 7 and 8, 2014, due to a serious illness. Edmonds was
diagnosed with acute sinusitis and pharyngitis by Dr. Teresa Baysden on April 7, 2014. Dr.
Baysden prescribed five-day courses of two different medications and provided Edmonds with a
return-to-work form allowing Edmonds to return to work on April 10, 2014. Dr. Baysden later
extended Edmonds’s return-to-work form to April 11, 2014.
On both April 7 and 8, Edmonds left voicemails with two separate supervisors, Vickie
Gilbert and Tony Cates, notifying them that he would be absent from work due to his illness.
Gestamp claims not to have received a voicemail from Edmonds on either day. In addition to
remembering the specific dates and general content of the voicemails, Edmonds asserts he is
certain he left the voicemails because on both days he reached the personalized voice mailbox of
each supervisor and recognized their name and voice in their greeting.
In addition to their attendance points system, Gestamp implements a “two-day no-call,
no-show” policy, which involves treating an employee’s absence without notice on two
consecutive days as a voluntary resignation. Gestamp does not dispute that leaving a voicemail
for a supervisor would constitute sufficient notice under this policy. On April 9, 2014, Gestamp

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sent Edmonds a letter notifying him it had terminated his employment pursuant to this policy due
to his absences on April 7 and 8.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating no genuine issue of material fact
exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888,
897 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court should view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Nat’l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc., 253 F.3d 900,
907 (6th Cir. 2001).

III.

DISCUSSION
Defendants seek dismissal of all claims against Gestamp North America, Inc. Defendants

also seek summary judgment on each of Plaintiff’s claims: (1) interference under the FMLA; (2)
retaliation under the FMLA; and (3) workers’ compensation retaliation under Tennessee Code
Annotated § 50–6–114. Defendants’ arguments for summary judgment rely in part on the “sham
affidavit doctrine.” The Court will address Defendants’ arguments under the sham affidavit
doctrine prior to addressing each of Defendants’ claims for summary judgment.
A.

Claims Against Gestamp North America

As an initial matter, Defendants argue all claims against Gestamp North America should be
dismissed because Gestamp North America is not Edmonds’s employer. (Doc. 17.) Edmonds

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did not respond to this argument (see Doc. 19), and has thus conceded dismissal of all claims
against Gestamp North America is appropriate. See Brown v. VHS of Michigan, Inc., 545 F.
App’x 368, 372 (6th Cir. 2013) (“A plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff
fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment.”). All claims against Gestamp
North America will therefore be dismissed.
B.

The Sham Affidavit Doctrine

Gestamp argues Edmonds’s claim that he told Vickie Gilbert he was feeling sick during the
April 4, 2014 conversation and Edmonds’s claim that he left voicemails on April 7 and 8, 2014
should be excluded from consideration under the sham affidavit doctrine. See French v. Lucas,
836 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016). The sham affidavit doctrine precludes parties from creating an
issue for trial by submitting an affidavit that directly contradicts their prior sworn testimony. Id.
Regarding the content of the April 4 conversation, Edmonds states in his complaint that on
approximately April 7, 2014 he requested time off due to sinusitis, that request was denied, when it
was denied he asked about his rights under the FMLA, and in response he was told the FMLA was
not available to him. (Doc. 1-1 ¶ 17–18.) In his deposition, when asked, “So Paragraph 18 [in
which Edmonds states he was told the FMLA was not available for him] doesn’t relate to the
sinusitis or pharyngitis condition on April 7. Right?” Edmonds responded, “Yeah, because I
hadn’t—I hadn’t talked with anyone.” Edmonds later submitted an affidavit clarifying that he
raised the issue of feeling sick in his April 4 conversation with Vickie Gilbert, and it was in that
conversation she informed him he could not take FMLA leave. Gestamp argues the Court should
not consider Edmonds’s claim that he notified Vickie Gilbert he was sick in their April 4
conversation when ruling on its motion for summary judgment because Edmonds has created an
issue for trial by filing a “sham affidavit.”

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The Court declines to exclude this claim under the sham affidavit doctrine. As an initial
matter, Edmonds’s alleged contradiction is ambiguous; Edmonds appeared to be confused during
this part of the deposition, as he asked several times which paragraph the parties were discussing.
Edmonds’s affidavit is also consistent with his complaint, in which he states he was told the
FMLA was not available to him on approximately April 7. Edmonds clarified in his affidavit the
conversation in question in fact took place on April 4, the last workday prior to April 7. This
supports the inference that Edmonds was confused at his deposition, as opposed to the inference
that he attempted to manufacture an issue for trial.
With regard to the voicemails, Edmonds initially stated he left voicemails for two of his
supervisors before visiting the doctor on April 7, and that in the voicemails he advised his
supervisors he would be absent from work because he had pharyngitis. (Doc. 18 at 99–100).
Gestamp points out an inconsistency in this statement—Edmonds could not have known he had
pharyngitis at the time of the April 7 voicemail because he had not yet visited the doctor and
received a diagnosis. Edmonds has since submitted an affidavit clarifying that he did not identify
his specific diagnosis in the April 7 voicemail, but instead did so in the April 8 voicemail, which
was left after he received a diagnosis. (Doc. 19-6.) Gestamp argues the Court should not
consider these alleged voicemails when ruling on their motion for summary judgment because
Edmonds has created an issue for trial by filing a “sham affidavit.”
The Court declines to exclude consideration of the alleged voicemails under the sham
affidavit doctrine. There is no inconsistency related to Edmonds’s claim that he left voicemails
on April 7 and 8 informing his supervisors that he would be absent from work due to illness, and
that in at least one of the voicemails he informed them of his serious medical condition. The
material fact at issue is whether Edmonds provided notice of his absences and his condition via

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voicemail. The question of which voicemail contained notice of his diagnosis is not a material
fact, as notice in either voicemail is sufficient to support his claim.
Thus, for the purposes of ruling on this motion, the Court will assume Edmonds told Vickie
Gilbert he was feeling sick in their April 4 conversation and that Edmonds left voicemails for both
Vickie Gilbert and Tony Cates on both April 7 and 8. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (requiring
courts to view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party when ruling on motions for summary judgment).
C.

FMLA Interference

The FMLA makes it unlawful for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the
exercise of or the attempt to exercise any right provided under the statute.

29 U.S.C.

§ 2615(a)(1); Stimpson v. UPS, 351 F. App’x 42, 45 (6th Cir. 2009). To succeed on an FMLA
interference claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) he is an eligible employee; (2) the defendant is an
employer; (3) the plaintiff was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (4) the plaintiff gave the
defendant notice of his intention to take leave; and (5) the employer denied the employee FMLA
benefits to which he was entitled. Stimpson v. UPS, 351 F. App’x 42, 45 (6th Cir. 2009).
Gestamp concedes Edmonds is an eligible employee and Gestamp is an employer.
Edmonds asserts he requested FMLA leave on April 4, 2014, and was told he did not
qualify. Edmonds also asserts he provided notice to Gestamp via voicemail on April 8 that he
needed to miss work due to sinusitis and pharyngitis, which triggered Gestamp’s duty to notify
Edmonds of his FMLA rights. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(b)(1). Edmonds never received FMLA
leave related to his April 4 request and never received notice of his rights related to his April 8
voicemail. For the purposes of summary judgment, the Court accepts Edmonds’s assertions as
true, and these assertions satisfy the notice and denial elements. Thus, the only remaining point

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of contention related to the elements above is whether Edmonds was entitled to benefits under the
FMLA.3
With regard to entitlement, Edmonds argues Gestamp interfered with his FMLA rights by
telling him he was not qualified for FMLA leave when he was, in fact, qualified, and by failing to
provide him notice of his FMLA rights after he informed them of a serious medical condition. On
April 4, 2014, Edmonds asked Vickie Gilbert if he could take FMLA leave. She responded that
Edmonds was not eligible for FMLA leave because FMLA leave runs concurrently with workers’
compensation. Because Edmonds was eligible for FMLA leave as an employee working on
light-duty restrictions, see 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d), Gestamp interfered with Edmonds’s FMLA
rights by telling him he was not eligible. See Wallner v. Hilliard, 590 F. App’x 546, 550 (6th Cir.
2014) (“Because an employer interferes with an employee’s exercise of FMLA rights whenever
the employee does not receive the rights that are due to her under the statute, the intent of the
employer is irrelevant to whether an FMLA violation has occurred under the interference
theory.”).
Additionally, Edmonds claims he notified his employer via voicemail on April 8, 2014 that
he was diagnosed with acute sinusitis and pharyngitis and excused from work for four days. This
triggered Gestamp’s obligation to notify Edmonds of his FMLA rights.

29 C.F.R.

§ 825.300(b)(1) (“When an employee requests leave, or when the employer acquires knowledge
3

Gestamp also argues the FMLA is not a strict liability statute, and thus to survive
summary judgment Edmonds must establish that Gestamp’s violation caused him harm. Edgar v.
JAC Prods., 443 F.3d 501, 508 (6th Cir. 2006). Gestamp vigorously argues that even if they
interfered with Edmonds’s FMLA rights, Edmonds did not suffer harm as a result of that
interference. The Court sees no merit in this argument, as Defendants’ proffered reasons for
terminating Edmonds were his unexcused absences on April 7 and 8, 2014. (Doc. 16 at 1.) If
Edmonds had received FMLA leave, his absences on April 7 and 8 would not have been
unexcused, he would have been in compliance with Gestamp’s attendance policy, and he would
not have been terminated.
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that an employee’s leave may be for an FMLA-qualifying reason, the employer must notify the
employee of the employee’s eligibility to take FMLA leave within five business days, absent
extenuating circumstances.”). See also Woods v. DiamlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th
Cir. 2005) (finding the employer’s duty is triggered when the employee provides enough
information to the employer to suggest that the employee’s health condition could be serious—the
employee need not mention FMLA leave); Festerman v. County of Wayne, 611 F. App’x 310, 315
(6th Cir. 2015).
Edmonds thus raises two possible grounds for entitlement to FMLA leave in April 2014,
his shoulder pain and his illness. Defendants stipulated for the purpose of summary judgment that
sinusitis and pharyngitis are serious health conditions under the FMLA, for which an individual
would be entitled to FMLA benefits. (Doc. 16 at 16.) Edmonds’s claims have thus satisfied the
entitlement element for the purposes of summary judgment, and the Court need not also address
whether the shoulder pain was FMLA qualifying.
Instead of arguing Edmonds’s condition was not serious enough to qualify for FMLA
leave, Gestamp argues Edmonds’s claim that he provided sufficient notice of a serious condition in
his April 8 voicemail is “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could
believe it,” and thus the Court should not adopt Edmonds’s version of events for the purposes of
summary judgment. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 280 (2007). Edmonds’s supervisors
deny receiving voicemails from Edmonds on April 7 or 8. Additionally, Gestamp claims its call
logs from those days do not show calls from Edmonds, and Gestamp points to the inconsistency in
Edmonds’s initial statements regarding the content of the April 7 voicemail, in which he seemed to
have identified his specific illness prior to his diagnosis, as evidence that Edmonds never left either
voicemail. Edmonds, on the other hand, claims to remember the specific dates and general

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content of the voicemails, and asserts he is certain he left the voicemails because on both days he
reached the personalized voice mailbox of each supervisor and recognized their name and voice in
their greeting. The Court finds a reasonable juror could believe Edmonds’s version of events, and
thus this question must be resolved by a jury.
The Court will thus deny summary judgment as to Edmonds’s FMLA interference claim.
D.

FMLA Retaliation

To establish a claim of retaliation under the FMLA, Edmonds must show: (1) he availed
himself of a protected right under the FMLA; (2) he was adversely affected by an employment
decision; and (3) there is a causal connection between his protected activity and the adverse
employment decision. Nawrocki v. United Methodist Ret. Cmty., 14 F. App’x 334, 339 (6th Cir.
2006). If Edmonds makes this showing, the burden shifts to Gestamp to articulate a legitimate,
non-retaliatory justification for the adverse employment action. Id. If Gestamp makes this
showing, the burden shifts back to Edmonds to show Gestamp’s articulated justification is a
pretext for retaliation. Id. Edmonds cannot establish pretext, however, if Gestamp’s articulated
justification, while ultimately incorrect, was based on an honestly held belief. See Jones v. St.
Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 504 F. App'x 473, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155
F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998)).
Edmonds availed himself of a protected right under the FMLA when he requested FMLA
leave on April 4 and when he notified his employer of a serious medical condition on April 8. 29
C.F.R. § 825.300(b)(1). Edmonds then suffered an adverse employment decision when he was
terminated on April 9. The remaining issue regarding Edmonds’s prima facie case is thus
whether there is a causal connection between Edmonds’s April 4 FMLA request or April 8
voicemail and Edmonds’s termination.

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Edmonds argues the proximity in time between his protected activity and his termination is
sufficient evidence of a causal connection to survive summary judgment. See Mickey v. Zeidler
Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008). This argument is persuasive, especially when
viewed in the context of Gestamp’s alleged harassment of Edmonds in response to his work
restrictions and workplace injuries. Edmonds was terminated on April 9, the day following his
alleged April 8 voicemail in which he notified Gestamp of his illness, and five days after his
request to take FMLA leave. The April 9 termination followed several months in which Edmonds
was required to perform work he claims violated his work restrictions, despite his complaints of
pain. Edmonds was also assessed attendance points three times in the month preceding his
termination for missing work due to his shoulder injuries, and was demoted to second shift on
April 3, shortly after he was assessed his third attendance point on March 29. This is sufficient
evidence of a causal connection between Edmonds’s exercise of a protected activity and his
termination.
Gestamp argues it terminated Edmonds for a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason—his
violation of the company’s two-day no-call, no-show policy due to his absences on April 7 and 8.
Edmonds, however, responds by arguing Gestamp’s proffered justification is mere pretext for his
retaliatory discharge on the ground that Getamp’s justification has no basis in fact. See Curry v.
Brown, 607 F. App’x 519, 525 (6th Cir. 2015). Edmonds claims there is no basis in fact for his
termination under the two-day no-call, no-show policy because he left voicemails notifying
Gestamp of his absences on both April 7 and 8.
In response, Gestamp relies on the “honest belief rule,” and argues its proffered
explanation for Edmonds’s termination should survive his demonstration of pretext because it
honestly believed he did not leave voicemails on April 7 or 8. See Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155

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F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Pesterfield v. TVA, 941 F.2d 437, 443–44 (6th Cir. 1991)
(“Thus, according to Pesterfield, in order for an employer’s proffered non-discriminatory basis for
its employment action to be considered honestly held, the employer must be able to establish its
reasonable reliance on the particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was
made.”)). To support this argument, Gestamp states none of its employees, including Tony Cates
and Vickie Gilbert, the individuals Edmonds claims to have called, received voicemails from
Edmonds on April 7 or 8. Additionally, Gestamp states it contacted its technology department to
search the company’s call logs for incoming calls or voicemails from Edmonds on April 7 or 8.
According to Gestamp, the logs showed no incoming calls or voicemails from Edmonds on either
day, and Gestamp thus fired Edmonds based on an honestly held belief that he violated the
two-day no-call, no-show policy.
Gestamp’s arguments under the honestly held belief rule directly contradict Edmonds’s
assertion that he called and left voicemails on April 7 and 8. At the summary judgment stage, the
Court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. The Court also finds it inappropriate to apply
the honestly held belief rule to settle disputed issues of fact. See Kurincic v. Stein, Inc., 30 F.
App’x 420, 431 (6th Cir. 2002) (J. Gibson, dissenting) (“[T]he ‘honest belief’ rule, if not applied
with punctilious care for preserving issues of fact, can make a serious incursion into [a] plaintiff’s
ability to prove discrimination circumstantially.”). The Court thus assumes for the purposes of
this motion that Edmonds called and left voicemails for both Vickie Gilbert and Tony Cates on
April 7 and 8.
Gestamp provides no explanation for how it could have honestly believed Edmonds did not
leave voicemails on April 7 and 8 if Edmonds did, in fact, leave voicemails on those dates. Based

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on the facts provided, the only way Gestamp could have honestly believed Edmonds did not call
and leave voicemails would have been if both Vickie Gilbert and Tony Cates’s voicemail and call
log systems malfunctioned on both April 7 and 8. Such a malfunction would have necessarily
allowed Edmonds to hear the personal voicemail greetings of Vickie Gilbert and Tony Cates and to
record messages for each of them on both days, but would have caused the system not to register or
record any of the four incoming calls or messages from Edmonds. In fact, implicit in Gestamp’s
claim that it searched the call logs for incoming calls from Edmonds on April 7 and 8 is the
admission that call logs existed for those days—i.e. that other parties were able to call into
Gestamp’s system on the days in question, these calls were recorded in call logs for those days, and
thus the system functioned normally in response to calls from other parties, but malfunctioned in
response to calls from Edmonds.
Gestamp’s proffered explanation for its honestly held belief thus directly contradicts
Edmonds’s assertion that he left voicemails on April 7 and 8. At the summary judgment stage,
the Court assumes the truth of Edmonds’s assertion, which does not allow the Court to accept
Gestamp’s assertion of an honestly held belief.
The Court will thus deny summary judgment as to Edmonds’s FMLA retaliation claim.
E.

Workers’ Compensation Retaliation

To establish a claim of workers’ compensation retaliation, Edmonds must show: (1) he was
an at-will employee of Gestamp at the time of his injury; (2) he made a claim against Gestamp for
workers’ compensation benefits; (3) Gestamp terminated his employment; and (4) the claim for
workers’ compensation benefits was a substantial factor in Gestamp’s motivation to terminate his
employment. Yardley v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., LLC, 470 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Tenn. 2015). As
with his FMLA retaliation claim, if Edmonds is able to establish a prima facie case of workers’

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compensation retaliation, the burden shifts to Gestamp to demonstrate a legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason for firing Edmonds. Newcomb v. Kohler Co., 222 S.W.3d 368, 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
If Gestamp meets this burden, Edmonds must demonstrate Gestamp’s proffered reason for his
termination is mere pretext. Id. Edmonds cannot establish pretext, however, if Gestamp’s
articulated justification, while ultimately incorrect, was based on an honestly held belief. Thayer
v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 355 F. App’x 886, 890–92 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying the honest belief rule to
a workers’ compensation retaliation claim based on Tennessee state law).
Gestamp concedes the first three elements of the prima facie case, but argues Edmonds’s
workers’ compensation claim was not a substantial factor in Gestamp’s motivation to terminate his
employment. Alternatively, Gestamp argues that even if Edmonds were able to establish a prima
facie case, Gestamp’s decision to terminate Edmonds was based on an honestly held belief.
In contrast to Edmonds’s FMLA retaliation claim, Edmonds is unable to rely on temporal
proximity between his workers’ compensation claim and his termination, as Edmonds filed his
workers’ compensation claim shortly after his shoulder injury in June 2013, nearly a year before
his termination. Instead, Edmonds relies on a series of incidents and harassing conduct related to
his workers’ compensation claim, which in the aggregate, he argues, amount to sufficient evidence
of a connection between Edmonds’s workers’ compensation claim and his eventual termination.
Edmonds points to his supervisors’ failure to file an incident report until six days after his injury,
despite company policy requiring them to file a report immediately. Edmonds also points out that
he was required to work in violation of his doctor’s work restrictions, first by being required to
work on the assembly line, then by being required to move scrap metal, despite company policy
requiring his supervisors to comply with his work restrictions. Edmonds also complained to his
supervisors about feeling pain while working on several occasions, but his work responsibilities

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were never modified. Edmonds was assessed attendance points for missing work on a Saturday, a
day when he was not allowed to work due to his overtime restrictions, and for missing work for
medical treatment. Around the same time, Edmonds was also demoted from first shift to second
shift, and finally, Edmonds was fired for an alleged violation of Gestamp’s two-day no-call,
no-show policy, despite the fact that he called and left voicemails for two separate supervisors on
each day.
For the purposes of summary judgment, the Court accepts these allegations as true, and
finds they are sufficient evidence that Edmonds’s workers’ compensation claim was a substantial
factor in Gestamp’s motivation to terminate his employment. The Court’s analysis of Gestamp’s
proffered non-discriminatory justification for firing Edmonds, Edmonds’s pretext argument, and
Gestamp’s honestly held belief argument in the FMLA context applies in the workers’
compensation context as well. As was the case with Edmonds’s FMLA retaliation claim, the
Court finds Gestamp proffered a non-discriminatory justification for Edmonds’s termination,
Edmonds responded with evidence of pretext, and Gestamp is unable to prevail on its argument
under the honestly held belief rule because the Court assumes for the purposes of summary
judgment that Edmonds left voicemails for his supervisors on both April 7 and 8.
The Court will thus deny summary judgment as to Edmonds’s workers’ compensation
retaliation claim.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court will DISMISS all claims against Gestamp

North America, and DENY summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s FMLA interference claim and
Plaintiff’s FMLA and workers’ compensation retaliation claims.
An appropriate Order shall enter.
/s/
CURTIS L. COLLIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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