Edwards v. State of Tennessee et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 5/6/15. (KFB, ) Modified on 5/6/2015 (KFB, ). Serviced via US Mail to Randy Edwards.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at CHATTANOOGA
RANDY EDWARDS, GDOC #564997,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, R. STEVEN
BABB, District Att’y, 10th Judicial District,
BRADLEY COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEP’T, et. al,
Defendants.
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No.: 1:15-cv-68-HSM-WBC
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Randy Edwards, a prisoner in the Hall County Correctional Institution in
Gainesville, Georgia, filed this pro se complaint for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging that his federal rights under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act
(IAD”) have been violated (Doc. 1). This action was filed in the Middle District of
Tennessee, which transferred it to this division, without performing a review of the
merits of the pleading (Doc. 4).
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), district courts must screen
prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to
state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., Benson v.
O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
Responding to a perceived deluge of frivolous lawsuits, and, in particular,
frivolous prisoner suits, Congress directed the federal courts to review or
"screen" certain complaints sua sponte and to dismiss those that failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that sought monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief, or that were frivolous or
malicious.
Id. at 1015-16 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A).
In performing this task, the Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be
generously construed and "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). All well-pleaded allegations in the complaint will be
taken as true and the factual allegations will be considered to determine whether “they
plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009).
The Court examines the complaint in light of those requirements.
Plaintiff contends that, on May 24, 2013, while confined in a jail in Georgia, he
signed a waiver of extradition form, agreeing to be extradited to answer to a charge in
Bradley County, Tennessee, for theft of property, Case No. 13-CR-1353.
Plaintiff
likewise maintains that there is a pending warrant from Bradley County, which relates to
a criminal charge in Georgia, for which he has accepted responsibility and has been
ordered to pay $2,450.00 to the victim in Tennessee.
Plaintiff asserts that, since the signing of the waiver, he has corresponded with
the Bradley County District Attorney’s office about the charge and was informed, by a
letter from a legal secretary in that office, that no detainer had been filed against him.
The letter further informed plaintiff that a “hold” was different from a detainer, implying
that a “hold” had been placed against plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that he has followed the
procedures set forth in the Georgia state statutes involving the IAD, but that he has
been unable to secure disposition of the hold. Plaintiff seemingly argues that, since both
a detainer and a “hold” affect his release date, deprive him of parole consideration in
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Georgia, and prolong his confinement, he has a “liberty interest” in obtaining a
resolution of the “hold” and the warrant.
Plaintiff requests the Court to review the files of the District Attorney and of the
Clerk of the Bradley County General Sessions Court to verify that he has followed the
correct procedures in his attempts to resolve the matter, to find that the State failed to
comply with the 180-day rule in the IAD, and to dismiss the charge(s), the warrant, and
the indictment with prejudice.
First, the statute upon which plaintiff’s lawsuit is based, i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
provides for redress of the deprivation of a right guaranteed by the Constitution or laws
of the United States caused by a “person” acting under color of state law. See Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Serve., 436 U.S. 658, 690 & n. 55 (1978) (for purposes of a § 1983 action,
a "person" includes individuals and "bodies politic and corporate").
Here, plaintiff has named the Bradley County Sheriff’s Department as a
defendant, but unfortunately for plaintiff, this defendant is not an entity subject to suit
under § 1983. See Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (a police
department is not an entity which can be sued under § 1983); see also De La Garza v.
Kandiyohi County Jail, 18 F. App'x 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001) (neither a county jail nor a
sheriff's department is a suable entity).
Turning now to plaintiff’s invocation of his rights under the IAD, the United States,
forty-eight states (including Georgia and Tennessee), and the District of Columbia have
entered into this interstate compact, to establish procedures for resolution of one
jurisdiction’s outstanding charges against another jurisdiction’s prisoner. See New York
v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000). As explained by the Sixth Circuit, “the IAD provides,
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in essence, that if a receiving state has an outstanding information or indictment against
a person serving a sentence in another party state (sending state), and if the receiving
state has issued a detainer (defined as any notification to the sending state that the
receiving state wishes to try the defendant upon an outstanding information), then the
defendant must be tried within 180 days (with certain exceptions) after he is delivered to
the custody of the receiving state.”1 Browning v. Foltz, 837 F.2d 276, 283 (6th Cir. 1988
However, the procedural requirements of the IAD do not apply until a detainer is
lodged against a prisoner. See United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 361 (1978)
(finding that where a detainer had not been filed, the IAD never became applicable, so
as to bind the government to its provisions), and at 361-62 (noting that, once a detainer
is lodged against a prisoner with state prison officials, the IAD “by its express terms
becomes applicable,” so that compliance with its provisions is required); see also
Jenkins v. Snyder, 3 F. App’x 350, 351 (6th Cir. 2001) ( observing that “[t]he provisions
of the IAD are not triggered until a detainer is filed with the custodial state by another
state having untried charges pending against the prisoner”) (emphasis omitted).
Therefore, to the extent this claim can even be entertained in a § 1983 action,
see Barnett v. Clark, No. 1:06-CV-235, 2008 WL 189856, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 22,
2008) (noting that the Supreme Court “has recognized that a plaintiff may state a § 1983
claim for relief if he is transferred pursuant to the IAD in violation of any pre-existing
rights he may have under state or federal law”) (citing Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433
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A detainer is a notice filed with an institution in which a particular prisoner is incarcerated,
advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction, and
requesting that the prisoner either be held for the other jurisdiction or that the other
jurisdiction be notified when the prisoner’s release is imminent. Hill, 528 U.S. at 111-112.
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(1981)), the Court finds that, at this time, plaintiff has not stated a claim for violation of
his rights under the IAD.
Finally, plaintiff’s request to have the Bradley County criminal charge, the
warrant, and the indictment dismissed are not cognizable types of relief in a civil rights
action, as it is well-recognized law that the sole federal remedy for claims relating
directly to the fact and duration of an individual’s physical confinement lies in filing a
petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 487 (1973). Because these kinds of relief are not available in a civil action
and because such claims must be brought in a habeas corpus application, all such
claims fail to state a claim entitling plaintiff to relief in this civil suit.
For all the above reasons, plaintiff’s complaint does not pass the screening test
since it fails to state a claim which would entitle him to relief under § 1983. It will be
DISMISSED sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and1915A.
A separate judgment will enter.
ENTER:
/s/Harry S. Mattice, Jr.
HARRY S. MATTICE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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