Manning v. Town of Englewood, Tennessee et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION: the Court hereby GRANTS the motion for extension. (Doc. 48 .) hereby GRANTS IN PART Defendant's motion for summary judgment to the extent that it seeks summary judgment as to Plaintiff's other (Fed eral) claims (Doc. 44 .)The Court finds that the interests of judicial economy and abstaining from needlessly deciding state-law issues weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims. Accordingly,the Court will REMAND Plaintiff's remaining claims back to McMinn County Circuit Court. Signed by District Judge Travis R McDonough on 3/17/2016. (BJL)Certified Copy mailed to McMinn County Circuit Court.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
BOBBIE MANNING,
Plaintiff,
v.
TOWN OF ENGLEWOOD TENNESSEE,
et al.,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 1:15-cv-75
Judge Travis R. McDonough
Magistrate Judge Christopher H. Steger
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This action was removed to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The notice of
removal alleged that this Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on Plaintiff’s
claim that Defendants had violated federal laws regarding the employment of disabled persons.
(Doc. 1, at 1.) There was no allegation of diversity among the parties. (Doc. 1.)
On February 18, 2016, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on all of
Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. 44.) Plaintiff filed a motion for an extension1 and then filed his
response on March 15, 2016. (Doc. 51.) In Plaintiff’s memorandum, he concedes that
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on all of his claims except for “(a) his claim against
the Town of Englewood under the Tennessee Public Protection Act and (b) his alternative claim,
raised in both his original complaint in state court and his amended complaints in this court, that
he was never fired by the Town of Englewood and that he is still, in effect, the legal Town
Manager of Englewood, Tennessee.” (Doc. 51, at 2.) Based on Plaintiff’s concession, the Court
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Given that Defendant did not oppose this motion, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion for
extension. (Doc. 48.)
hereby GRANTS IN PART Defendant’s motion for summary judgment to the extent that it
seeks summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s other claims. (Doc. 44.)
“[A] federal court that has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal-law claims should not ordinarily
reach the plaintiff’s state-law claims.” Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th
Cir. 2006). According to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over claims for which it does not have original jurisdiction if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the
district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Continuing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should only be done “in
cases where the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation
outweigh [] concern over needlessly deciding state law issues.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
When “all federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered
under pendent jurisdiction doctrine – judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity – will
point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.” CarnegieMellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988).
The factors set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1367 clearly militate in favor of declining to exercise
jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s claims are quintessential state law claims. His first claim alleges that his
termination was against Tennessee public policy—a matter of State concern. His second claim
deals with the circumstances under which the Town of Englewood, a Tennessee locality, may
effectively remove a local official—a question upon which the parties agree “little Tennessee
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law exists.” (Compare Doc. 45, at 26 with Doc. 51, at 15.) The Court sees no reason to insert
itself into such matters of local concern. Finally, these state law issues clearly predominate over
the federal claims given that Plaintiff concedes the federal claims should be dismissed and on the
basis of that concession, the Court has granted summary judgment on all of the remaining federal
law claims.
The Court finds that the interests of judicial economy and abstaining from needlessly
deciding state-law issues weigh in favor of declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. Accordingly, the Court will REMAND Plaintiff’s
remaining claims back to McMinn County Circuit Court.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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