Goode v. Quality Correctional Healthcare et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 4/29/2015. (CNC, ) Serviced to David Jason Goode, the Sheriff of Bradley County, and the Court's financial deputy.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
DAVID JASON GOODE,
Plaintiff,
v.
QUALITY CORRECTIONAL
HEALTHCARE, et al.,
Defendants.

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No.: 1:15-CV-80-HSM-WBC

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is a pro se prisoners’ civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and an application to proceed in forma pauperis. It appears from the application
that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the $350.00 filing fee.
Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, plaintiff is allowed to proceed in this action
without the prepayment of costs or fees or security therefor. For the reasons stated
below, however, process shall not issue and this action will be DISMISSED.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen
prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to
state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A); Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
Responding to a perceived deluge of frivolous lawsuits, and, in particular,
frivolous prisoner suits, Congress directed the federal courts to review or
"screen" certain complaints sua sponte and to dismiss those that failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that sought monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief, or that were frivolous or
malicious.

Id. at 1015–16 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A). The dismissal
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007) “governs dismissals for
failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant
statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,
470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he
was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v.
Barberton Citizens Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O’Brien v. City of Grand
Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036,
1042 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir.
1990) (stating that “Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it
creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found
elsewhere”).
According to the complaint, plaintiff began breaking out with a rash and hives all
over his body five to six months ago, while he was incarcerated. Plaintiff has seen the
medical personnel at the jail numerous times for this issue and has been charged for
these medical visits, but has gotten no results. Plaintiff requested “outside medical skin
graphs [sic]” and received a skin graft on March 4th. The results of that graft were
inconclusive, and no other graft has been taken. Plaintiff alleges that Lynn Roe, an
employee of the Bradley County Sheriff’s Department, threatens him with solitary
confinement due to his condition, and that Judge Donahue refused outside treatment
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because plaintiff cannot pay for it.

Plaintiff seeks treatment by a skin care

specialist/dermatologist, reimbursement for his medical treatment at the jail, and
“possibly to file a claim for pain and suffering.” Plaintiff has sued the Bradley County
Sherriff’s Office, Quality Correctional Healthcare, Dr. Bates (whom plaintiff states is the
jail’s attending doctor), and Eric Watson (whom plaintiff alleges is the supervisor of jail
lieutenants and staff).

1. Bradley County Sheriff’s Office
Bradley County Sheriff’s Office is not a suable entity within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 688-90 (1978);
see, e.g., Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (a police department is
not an entity which can be sued under § 1983), Smith v. Ritter, No. 1:12-CV-417, 2013
WL 3753984, at *4 (E.D. Tenn., July 15, 2013), Ambrose v. Knight, No. 3:13-CV-376,
2013 WL 3430840, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. July 8, 2013), Banner v. Hamblen County Sheriff’s
Department, No. 2:09-CV-122, 2012 WL 1565385, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. April 30, 2012;
Johnson v. Anderson, No. 2:07-CV-161, 2008 WL 4093352, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. August
28, 2008); Vega v. Harville, No. 3:07-CV-287, 2008 WL 1840742, at *2 (E.D. Tenn.
April 23, 2008); Maroney v. Ward, No. 3:08-CV-38, 2008 WL 509532, at *1 (E.D.
Tenn. February 22, 2008). Accordingly, any allegations against Bradley County Sheriff’s
Office fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and Bradley County
Sheriff’s Office is therefore DISMISSED from this lawsuit.

2. Denial of Medical Care
While the complaint contains no direct factual assertions involving Quality
Correctional Health Care or Dr. Bates, construing the complaint liberally, plaintiff
appears to allege that these defendants have failed to provide him with proper medical
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care. A prison authority’s deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs
violates the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Prison medical
personnel or officials may be deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical
needs “in their response to a prisoner’s needs” or by “interfer[ing] with treatment once
prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–5. Also, “a prisoner who suffers pain needlessly
when relief is readily available has a cause of action against those whose deliberate
indifference is the cause of his suffering.” See Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566
(6th Cir. 1998) (citing Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1154–55 (6th Cir.1991)); see
also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (“[T]he denial of medical care may result in pain and
suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose”).
Where a prisoner receives some medical care and the dispute is over its adequacy,
however, “federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and
to constitutionalize claims which sound in tort law.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857,
860 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1976). By the same token, a difference of opinion between medical
care providers as to appropriate treatment for an inmate’s ailment does not present a
constitutional controversy. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–6; see also Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d
1309, 1314 (8th Cir.1997) (finding that a disagreement between prison physician and
physician who originally prescribed medications is not of constitutional magnitude).
Plaintiff does not allege that he has been denied medical treatment at the jail.
Rather, plaintiff alleges that, despite multiple medical visits and a skin graft, medical
personnel have not yet cured his rash, and have denied plaintiff’s request for blood
work. Based on these allegations, it is clear that plaintiff disagrees with the course of
medical treatment provided to him at the jail, for which he attempts to hold these
defendants liable under § 1983. Plaintiff’s disagreement with his course of medical
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treatment does not establish a denial of a federal right. Accordingly, the complaint fails
to state a cognizable claim under § 1983 as to these defendants and they will be
DISMISSED.

3. Respondeat Superior
Plaintiff makes no allegations as to defendant Watson, but rather appears to
assert that he is liable for the acts in the complaint based upon his position as a jail
supervisor. In a suit brought under § 1983, liability cannot be imposed solely on the
basis of respondeat superior. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Bellamy v.
Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). The law is well settled that a plaintiff must
allege that a defendant official was personally involved in the unconstitutional activity of
a subordinate in order to state a claim against such a defendant. Dunn v. State of
Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 128 (6th Cir. 1982). “[L]iability cannot be based solely on the
right to control employees.” Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir.
1989). Likewise, a supervisor cannot be held liable for a mere failure to act. Greene v.
Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[s]upervisory liability under §
1983 does not attach when it is premised on a mere failure to act; it ‘must be based on
active unconstitutional behavior’” (quoting Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th
Cir. 1999))); see also Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that
knowledge of a prisoner’s grievance and a failure to respond or remedy the complaint
was insufficient to impose liability on supervisory personnel under § 1983). As plaintiff
does not allege any active unconstitutional behavior on the part of Eric Watson, the
complaint fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim against him and he will be
DISMISSED.

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As the complaint fails to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against any defendant,
this action will be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Because plaintiff is an inmate in
the Bradley County Justice Center, he is herewith ASSESSED the civil filing fee of
$350.00. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B), the custodian of the plaintiff’s
inmate trust account at the institution where he now resides is directed to submit to the
Clerk, U.S. District Court, 800 Market Street, Suite 130, Knoxville, Tennessee 37902, as
an initial partial payment, whichever is greater of:
(a)

twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to the plaintiff’s

inmate trust account; or
(b)

twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in the plaintiff’s

inmate trust account for the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint.
Thereafter, the custodian shall submit twenty percent (20%) of the plaintiff’s
preceding monthly income (or income credited to the plaintiff’s trust account for the
preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00),
until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28
U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the
Sheriff of Bradley County to ensure that the custodian of the plaintiff’s inmate trust
account complies with that portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act relating to
payment of the filing fee. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this
Memorandum and Order to the Court’s financial deputy.

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The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in
good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
A separate judgment will enter.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._______
HARRY S. MATTICE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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