Barker v. Colvin

Filing 21

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 14 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denying 19 Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings [Doc. 14] is GRANTED IN PART to the extent it seeks re mand to the Commissioner and DENIED IN PART to the extent it seeks anaward of benefits; The Commissioners motion for summary judgment [Doc. 19] is DENIED; and The Commissioners decision denying benefits is REVERSEDand REMANDED pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g).. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan K Lee on 6/17/2016. (BDG, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
DARLENE S. BARKER,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
)
Defendant.
)

No. 1:15-cv-262-SKL

ORDER
Plaintiff Darlene S. Barker (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). Each party
moved for a judgment [Docs. 14 & 19] with supporting briefs [Docs. 15 & 20]. For the reasons
stated below, (1) Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings [Doc. 14] shall be GRANTED
IN PART to the extent it seeks remand to the Commissioner and DENIED IN PART to the
extent it seeks an award of benefits; (2) the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment
[Doc. 19] shall be DENIED; and (3) the decision of the Commissioner shall be REVERSED
and REMANDED pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff filed her application for DIB in May 2012, alleging disability since July 28, 2010

(Transcript [Doc. 11 (“Tr.”) 10, 162). After Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially (Tr. 111-15)
and on reconsideration (Tr. 119-20), she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”). The ALJ held a hearing on July 31, 2014, during which Plaintiff was represented by an
attorney, and Plaintiff amended her onset date to May 7, 2012 (Tr. 33, 35). The parties agreed
that Plaintiff’s insured status expired on June 30, 2014 (Tr. 12, 34), making the relevant time

period for consideration from May 7, 2012 through June 30, 2014. The ALJ issued a decision on
September 10, 2014, in which the ALJ determined Plaintiff was not under a “disability” as
defined in the Social Security Act (“SSA”) (Tr. 10-21). On August 4, 2015, the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s timely request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner (Tr. 1-4). Plaintiff timely filed the instant action [Doc. 2].
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

Education and Employment Background

Plaintiff was born in 1959 and was 54 on her date last insured, which is defined as an
individual closely approaching advanced age, and 55 on the date of her hearing. ( Tr. 19, 34-35).
She had a tenth grade education and past work as a sales clerk and small engine assembler at the
time of her hearing (Tr. 36, 56-57).
B.

Medical Records

In her Disability Report, Plaintiff alleged disability due to back surgery, numbness in her
left hand and left leg, headaches/migraines, depression, and nerves (Tr. 209). Only select
portions of Plaintiff’s medical records will be addressed within the respective sections of the
Court’s analysis below, but all relevant records have been reviewed.
C.

Hearing Testimony

The Court has carefully reviewed the transcript of the hearing testimony. While it is not
necessary to summarize the testimony herein, the testimony will be addressed as appropriate
within the respective sections of the Court’s analysis below.
III.

ELIGIBILITY AND THE ALJ’S FINDINGS
A.

Eligibility

“The Social Security Act defines a disability as the ‘inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
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can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.’” Schmiedebusch v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 536 F. App’x 637,
646 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)); see also Parks v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 413
F. App’x 856, 862 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). A claimant is disabled
“only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.”
Parks, 413 F. App’x at 862 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).

The Social Security

Administration determines eligibility for disability benefits by following a five-step process. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). The five-step process provides:
1) If the claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, the claimant is
not disabled.
2) If the claimant does not have a severe medically determinable
physical or mental impairment—i.e., an impairment that
significantly limits his or her physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities—the claimant is not disabled.
3) If the claimant has a severe impairment(s) that meets or equals one
of the listings in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of the regulations and
meets the duration requirement, the claimant is disabled.
4) If the claimant’s impairment does not prevent him or her from
doing his or her past relevant work, the claimant is not disabled.
5) If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, the claimant
is not disabled.
Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 2009). The claimant bears the
burden to show the extent of his or her impairments, but at step five, the Commissioner bears the
burden to show that, notwithstanding those impairments, there are jobs the claimant is capable of
performing. See Ealy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2010).

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B.

The ALJ’s Findings

At step one of the process, the ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in any substantial
gainful activity since May 7, 2012, the amended alleged onset date through the date she was last
insured, June 30, 2014 (Tr. 12). At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: post-operative degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, sleep apnea, and
headaches (Tr. 12-15). At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have any impairment or
combination of impairments to meet or medically equal any presumptively disabling
impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, including Listing 1.04 (Tr. 15). The
ALJ determined Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a reduced
range of light work with a sit/stand option at about “30 minute-1 hour intervals;” no climbing of
ladders, ropes and scaffolds; occasional performance of postural activities; avoidance of
concentrated exposure to hazards; and limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks (Tr. 15-19). At
step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work (Tr. 19).
After considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found there
were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy which Plaintiff could
perform (Tr. 19-20). In determining there was other work Plaintiff could perform, the ALJ used
the Medical-Vocational guidelines (“Grids”) as a framework for decision making and obtained
the testimony of a Vocational Expert (“VE”) (Tr. 19-20). These findings led to the ALJ’s
determination that Plaintiff was not under a disability at any time during the relevant period (Tr.
20-21).
IV.

ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred (1) in mechanically applying the Grids because

Plaintiff’s 55th birthday was only ten days after her date last insured and there was evidence of
significant additional vocational adversities warranting the ALJ’s use of this higher age category;
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(2) in failing to find Plaintiff is limited to sedentary work and therefore disabled under the Grids;
and (3) in failing to properly consider and evaluate all of the evidence, specifically evidence
from her treating chiropractor and evidence regarding her obesity under Social Security Ruling
02-01p (“SSR 02-01p”).
A. Standard of Review
A court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision unless it rests on an incorrect legal
standard or is unsupported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); McClanahan v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence
is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”

McClanahan, 474 F.3d at 833 (internal citations omitted).

Furthermore, the

evidence must be “substantial” in light of the record as a whole, “tak[ing] into account whatever
in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 388 (6th Cir.
1984) (internal citations omitted). If there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s
findings, they should be affirmed, even if the court might have decided facts differently, or if
substantial evidence would also have supported other findings. Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 780,
782 (6th Cir. 1996); Ross v. Richardson, 440 F.2d 690, 691 (6th Cir. 1971). The court may not
re-weigh evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility. Garner, 745
F.2d at 387. The substantial evidence standard allows considerable latitude to administrative
decision makers because it presupposes “there is a ‘zone of choice’ within which the
Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference.” McClanahan, 474 F.3d at 833
(quoting Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001)).
The court may consider any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been
cited by the ALJ. Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). The court
may not, however, consider any evidence which was not before the ALJ for purposes of
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substantial evidence review. Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir. 2001). Furthermore,
the court is under no obligation to scour the record for errors not identified by the claimant,
Howington v. Astrue, No. 2:08-CV-189, 2009 WL 2579620, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 18, 2009)
(stating that assignments of error not made by claimant were waived), and arguments not raised
and supported in more than a perfunctory manner may be deemed waived, Woods v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 1:08-CV-651, 2009 WL 3153153, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2009) (citing
McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1997)) (noting that conclusory claims of
error without further argument or authority may be considered waived).
B. Obesity
Addressing Plaintiff’s final claim of error first, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in
failing to properly consider and evaluate evidence regarding her obesity and the exacerbating
effects of obesity on her other physical conditions. Defendant responds that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s impairments despite his failure to explicitly discuss
Plaintiff’s obesity. Although Plaintiff raises several other claims of error on appeal, her obesityrelated claim of error is sufficient for the Court to conclude that the ALJ’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, remand is proper.
True, the ALJ need not discuss every aspect of the record or explain every finding at
length; rather, the ALJ must “articulate with specificity reasons for the findings and conclusions
that he or she makes” to facilitate meaningful judicial review. Bailey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
1999 WL 96920, *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
however, the Court has the power to remand a case to the Commissioner if there is insufficient

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evidence on the record and additional fact-finding is required. Faucher v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1994).1
Plaintiff cites SSR 02-01p2 and regulations at 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1 §
1.00Q3 for the proposition that obesity is a genuine medical condition which must be considered
in making a disability determination. Plaintiff also asserts SSR 02-01p requires an ALJ to
explain how consideration of obesity impacted the ALJ’s conclusion on disability.

The

Commissioner acknowledges the ALJ did not explicitly address obesity in rendering his
decision, but argues he was not required to do so under the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of SSR
02-01p.
SSR 02-01p offers guidance on how obesity is to be assessed in conjunction with other
impairments. See Norman v. Astrue, 694 F. Supp. 2d 738, 741-42 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (“[T]his is
more than a requirement that the ALJ mention the fact of obesity in passing . . . .”). There are

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Under a Sentence Four remand, additional evidence may be taken on rehearing by an ALJ.
Faucher, 17 F.3d at 174. Sentence Four provides appropriate relief when the evidence on record
is insufficient and further fact-finding by an ALJ is necessary. Id. at 175-76 (“[W]hen there is
not substantial evidence to support one of the ALJ’s factual findings and his decision therefore
must be reversed, the appropriate remedy is not to award benefits. The case can be remanded
under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration.”). There is a second type of
remand not at issue here under Sentence Six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), whereby the court may order
additional evidence to be taken upon a showing that there is (1) material new evidence and (2)
good cause such evidence was previously omitted from the record. Faucher, 17 F.3d at 174.
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SSR 02-01p provides in pertinent part: “The combined effects of obesity with other
impairments may be greater than might be expected without obesity. For example, someone
with obesity and arthritis affecting a weight-bearing joint may have more pain and limitation
than might be expected from the arthritis alone.” 2002 WL 34686281, at *6 (Sept. 12, 2002).
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Listing 1.00Q (Effects of obesity) provides in pertinent part: “The combined effects of obesity
with musculoskeletal impairments can be greater than the effects of each of the impairments
considered separately. Therefore, when determining whether an individual with obesity has a
listing-level impairment or combination of impairments, and when assessing a claim at other
steps of the sequential evaluation process, including when assessing an individual’s residual
functional capacity, adjudicators must consider any additional and cumulative effects of
obesity.”
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three levels of obesity that correlate with Body Mass Index (“BMI”) levels. Level I includes
BMIs of 30.0-34.9, Level II includes BMIs of 35.0-39.9, and Level III, which includes BMIs
equal to or greater than 40, is considered “‘extreme’ obesity and represent[s] the greatest risk for
developing obesity-related impairments.” SSR 02-01p, 2002 WL 34686281, at *2. As recently
held by the Sixth Circuit,
Obesity commonly leads to, and often complicates, chronic
diseases of the cardiovascular, respiratory, and musculoskeletal
body systems. For example, someone with obesity and arthritis
affecting a weight-bearing joint may have more pain and limitation
than might be expected from the arthritis alone. The ALJ also must
specifically take into account the effect obesity has upon the
individual’s ability to perform routine movement and necessary
physical activity within the work environment, and consider how
fatigue may affect the individual’s physical and mental ability to
sustain work activity—especially in cases involving sleep apnea.
Shilo v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 600 F. App’x 956, 959 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
As pointed out by Plaintiff, her state agency consultative psychological evaluation report
dated October 8, 2012, included the notation that “[h]er physical presentation is remarkable for
morbid obesity” (Tr. 306). The agency consultative “all systems” examination dated October 10,
2012, noted Plaintiff was five feet two inches tall and weighed 167 pounds (Tr. 313). Other
records of her height and weight measurements are consistent with obesity (for example, height
of 62.5 inches while weighing 171 pounds with a BMI of 30.8 on November 26, 2013 and
February 25, 2014) (Tr. 546-548). On reconsideration, Plaintiff’s obesity was reported to be
“non-severe” without further explanation (Tr. 480). The ALJ gave the opinions set forth in the
reconsideration “great weight” without mentioning or explaining any obesity considerations (Tr.
19). On the date of her hearing, upon questioning by the ALJ, Plaintiff reported a weight loss
and said she currently weighed 149 pounds (Tr. 37).
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The Commissioner appears to concede that (1) Plaintiff was obese (non-severe) during
the relevant period, and (2) that the ALJ did not explicitly discuss obesity in rendering his
decision. The Commissioner argues obesity was not a focus of Plaintiff’s claim for DIB and
remand is not appropriate because the ALJ relied on the opinions of consultative examiners and
physicians who considered Plaintiff’s obesity in making their assessments. To support this
argument, the Commissioner cites to Bledsoe v. Barnhart, 165 F. App’x 408 (6th Cir. 2006) and
Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. App’x 435, 443 (6th Cir. 2010), which held SSR 02-01p
does not require a particular “mode of analysis,” but only requires the ALJ, while analyzing the
five steps, to evaluate obesity as one factor affecting the severity of the impairments.
In Bledsoe, the Sixth Circuit offered practical assistance in applying SSR 02-01p finding
that the ALJ had properly considered the claimant’s obesity by making “explicit mention of [the
claimant’s] obesity in his finding of facts” and by “credit[ing] an expert’s report that considers
obesity.” Bledsoe, 165 F. App’x at 412; see also Coldiron, 391 F. App’x at 443 (applying the
same analysis). Both Coldiron and Bledsoe held that as long as the ALJ relies on opinions of
physicians or consultative experts who took the claimant’s obesity into account in rendering such
opinions, there is no need for the ALJ to detail separately his or her own consideration.
Coldiron, 391 F. App’x at 443; Bledsoe, 165 F. App’x at 412. Unlike in this case, however, the
ALJs in both Coldiron and Bledsoe explicitly discussed the claimants’ obesity in their findings of
fact. Coldiron, 391 F. App’x at 443; Bledsoe, 165 F. App’x at 412. In contrast, here the ALJ did
not mention Plaintiff’s obesity in his discussion of the medical evidence, in his RFC
determination, or anywhere else in his decision. This complete omission of any mention of
Plaintiff’s obesity in the ALJ’s decision distinguishes Plaintiff’s case from Coldiron and
Bledsoe.

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There is nothing of record to indicate the ALJ actually considered Plaintiff’s obesity in
combination with other impairments at all stages of the sequential evaluation as required by the
plain language of SSR 02-01p. This omission by the ALJ renders it impossible to tell if he
properly considered Plaintiff’s obesity during the relevant period. Rule SSR 02-01p requires an
ALJ to “explain how [he] reached [his] conclusions on whether obesity caused any physical or
mental limitations,” SSR 02–01p, 2002 WL 34686281, at *7, but the ALJ failed to do so in this
case.4
The Commissioner also relies on Nejat v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., which held “[g]iven
[claimant’s] failure to list obesity in his application and the scant evidence of obesity in the
record, the ALJ properly evaluated this alleged condition.” 359 F. App’x 574, 577 (6th Cir.
2009) (citing Pena v. Chater, 76 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The [ALJ] is under no
‘obligation to investigate a claim not presented at the time of the application for benefits and not
offered at the hearing as a basis for disability.’”)). Given that the ALJ asked Plaintiff how much
she weighed and even commented on her recent weight loss during the hearing, the ALJ likely
was cognizant of Plaintiff’s obesity during the relevant time period. Unlike in this case, in Nejat
the ALJ acknowledged a doctor’s diagnosis of obesity in his decision, but adjudged it unreliable
in light of the conflicting findings of other physicians. Id.
While there is no medical opinion of record that Plaintiff is significantly limited because
of her obesity, the complete exclusion of any mention of Plaintiff’s obesity makes it impossible
4

The Commissioner also cites Lyons v. Astrue, No. 3:10-CV-502, 2012 WL 529587 (E.D. Tenn.
Feb 17, 2012), in support of her position that the ALJ did not need to make any explicit analysis
or findings regarding Plaintiff’s obesity in his decision. In Lyons, however, the court noted “that
the ALJ discussed parts of the record which contain[ed] findings regarding [the claimant’s]
obesity and the recommendation that she lose weight” and from this discussion the court was
able to conclude “that the ALJ properly assessed the impact of [the claimant’s] obese condition
on other systems through his assessment of her limitations.” 2012 WL 529587, at *4. Here, as
previously discussed, the Court is unable to determine whether the ALJ properly assessed the
impact of Plaintiff’s obesity at the five stages of the sequential evaluation process.
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for the Court to tell if the ALJ actually considered this condition in formulating the RFC. Given
the complete omission of any mention of Plaintiff’s obesity (or how Plaintiff’s sleep apnea or
other impairments may have been compounded by her obesity) in the ALJ’s decision, the Court
finds the ALJ erred by failing to consider the impact of this condition as required by SSR 0201p. See Shilo, 600 F. App’x. at 959 (“Obesity . . . must be considered throughout the ALJ’s
determinations, ‘including when assessing an individual’s residual functional capacity,’ precisely
because ‘the combined effects of obesity with other impairments can be greater than the effects
of each of the impairments considered separately.’”) (quoting SSR 02-01p, 2002 WL 34686281,
at *1). In Shilo, a case the Commissioner did not address, the Sixth Circuit noted that while
obesity is no longer considered a “listed impairment” by the SSA, the effect of obesity on
Plaintiff’s ability to work must be specifically considered. Shilo, 600 F. App’x at 959. Although
the ALJ is not obligated to employ any “particular mode of analysis” when assessing the impact
of a Plaintiff’s obesity as argued by the Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit explained the ALJ must
do more than merely “mention the fact of obesity in passing.” Id.
Here, the ALJ did not even mention obesity in passing. The administrative hearing
reflects only a brief mention of Plaintiff’s weight, which was when the ALJ asked Plaintiff how
much she weighed and commented on her recent weight loss. While the ALJ found Plaintiff had
severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and sleep apnea—conditions
affected by obesity—he failed to give any indication he considered Plaintiff’s obesity at any
stage of the five-step process. The Court concludes that Plaintiff is not requesting a particular
mode of analysis; rather, Plaintiff is requesting that the ALJ engage in any analysis of Plaintiff’s
obesity and its potentially aggravating effect on Plaintiff’s back and sleep apnea conditions.
Because the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence as a result of the
ALJ’s failure to even mention Plaintiff’s obesity under the circumstances of this case, remand is
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necessary so that the Commissioner can provide clarity regarding the issues addressed herein.
The Court emphasizes, however, that no particular result is dictated on remand.
C. Borderline Age and Other Issues
Plaintiff also raised several other issues in her appeal to this Court, including the
propriety of the ALJ’s consideration of the evidence from Plaintiff’s chiropractor. Because such
determinations may be impacted by a proper consideration and explanation of Plaintiff’s obesity,
the Court will not address the other issues raised by the parties with one exception, which is the
borderline age issue raised by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues the ALJ should have considered the impact of her additional vocational
adversities in analyzing her borderline age situation and should have applied the higher age
category to find her disabled.

The Commissioner agrees that Plaintiff’s claim presents a

borderline age situation. As a result, the Commissioner further agrees that the ALJ was not to
apply the age categories mechanically and was to consider whether to use the older age category
after evaluating the overall impact of all the factors of Plaintiff’s case under 20 C.F.R. §
404.1563(b).

The Commissioner argues, however, that although the ALJ was to consider

whether to use the older age category, he was not required to explain his reasoning in his
decision. The Commissioner thus argues the ALJ properly used Plaintiff’s chronological age
without elaboration regarding why he did so.
As the parties appear to agree, nothing requires the ALJ to explicitly discuss a borderline
age situation in his decision. See e.g., Bowie v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 539 F.3d 395, 400 (6th Cir.
2008) (holding 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b) “does not impose a per se procedural requirement to
address borderline age categorization explicitly in every borderline case”). “Although an ALJ
does not have a procedural obligation to address a claimant’s borderline age situation in his
opinion or explain his reasons for arriving at a particular age categorization, lack of an
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explanation may in some cases mean that the ALJ’s ultimate decision is not supported by
sufficient evidence.” Id. at 400-01.
Given that this matter is being remanded so that the ALJ can properly consider and
discuss Plaintiff’s obesity, the Court concludes it would be advisable on remand for the ALJ to
include an explicit discussion of Plaintiff’s borderline age situation even though such an explicit
consideration is not required in every case.
V.

CONCLUSION
Having carefully reviewed the administrative record and the parties’ arguments, it is

ORDERED that:
1) Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings [Doc. 14] is
GRANTED IN PART to the extent it seeks remand to the
Commissioner and DENIED IN PART to the extent it seeks an
award of benefits;
2) The Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. 19] is
DENIED; and
3) The Commissioner’s decision denying benefits is REVERSED
and REMANDED pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
s/fâátÇ ^A _xx
SUSAN K. LEE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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