Jordan v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company (TWP2)

Filing 145

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 133 Motion for Attorney Fees; adopting Report and Recommendations re 142 Report and Recommendations. After thorough consideration of the Report and Recommendation [Doc. 142], Defendan t's Objections [Doc. 143], and the record as a whole, the Court finds that the Report and Recommendation properly analyzes the issues presented. For the reasons set out in the Report and Recommendation, which are incorporated by reference herein , it is hereby ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation [Doc. 142] is ADOPTED, and Jordan's Motion for Attorneys Fees is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Accordingly, the Court AWARDS Jordan $51,203.75 in attorney's fees. See Order for details. Signed by District Judge Clifton L Corker on 03/31/2023. (CAT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
CHATTANOOGA DIVISION
BETH NICHOLE JORDAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INS. CO.,
Defendant.

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1:16-CV-00023-DCLC-CHS

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company’s
(“RSL”) Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [Doc. 143]. Plaintiff
Beth Nicole Jordan responded [Doc. 144]. This matter is now ripe for resolution. For the reasons
stated below, RSL’s Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [Doc. 142]
is OVERRULED.
I.

BACKGROUND
Between 2008 and 2009, Jordan, a nurse anesthetist, contracted Lyme disease while

camping, which resulted in various medical complications [Doc. 91, pg. 1]. In 2009, under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), Jordan applied for long-term disability
benefits through her employer’s employee benefit plan [Doc. 100-1, pg. 3]. RSL, the administrator
of the plan, initially found Jordan “Totally Disabled,” approved her claim, and disbursed benefits
from October 15, 2009, through October 15, 2015 [Id., pg. 23]. After those initial five years of
payments, the plan’s definition of “Totally Disability” changed and, on May 15, 2015, RSL
notified Jordan that it would terminate her benefits at the end of the initial period because she no
longer met the definition of total disability [Id., pg. 5].

Jordan appealed this determination through RSL’s internal appellate-review process [Id.].
As allowed by its plan, RSL requested Jordan undergo an independent medical examination
(“IME”) [Id., pgs. 5-6]. After some scheduling conflicts and disagreements between the parties,
Jordan filed the instant suit without attending the IME and prior to receiving RSL’s final decision
on her internal appeal [Doc. 91, pg. 3]. On January 24, 2018, the Court concluded that Jordan
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, remanded her claim to RSL, and ordered her to
attend an IME, so RSL could render a final benefits determination [Docs. 91, 92]. Importantly,
the Court noted that Jordan requested remand to conduct an IME as an alternative remedy in her
pleadings [Doc. 91, pg. 11]. Jordan specifically noted that the Court could order RSL to conduct
an IME within a set time frame and render a decision within so many days after the completion of
the IME [Doc. 91, pg. 11].
After completing the IME following the Court’s first remand of Jordan’s claim, RSL
partially approved her claim, extending benefits through August 1, 2016, but denied her request
for payments beyond that date [Doc. 100-1, pgs. 6-7]. In its decision letter, RSL noted that an
Administrative Law Judge with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) had determined that
Jordan possessed the ability to perform sedentary work [Id., pg. 7].
Jordan timely appealed this determination. On January 8, 2019, RSL sent Jordan a letter
affirming the denial of her request for benefits beyond August 1, 2016 [Doc. 100-1, pgs. 23-30].
In reaching its determination, RSL asserted that it evaluated the records of Jordan’s treating
physicians and “the statements from the appeal letter.” [Id., pgs. 25-26]. On May 8, 2020, the
Court issued its Second Remand Order [Doc. 114]. The Court found that RSL had not considered
Jordan’s statements from her appeal letter that clarified her academic schedule [Id., pg. 13-15].
The Court noted that RSL did not substantially comply with 29 U.S.C. § 1133’s “full and fair

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review” requirement and that RSL failed to explain why it adopted certain doctors’ opinions over
others in its review [Id., pgs. 14-16].
During the second remand, Jordan attempted to submit additional evidence to RSL in
support of her claim for benefits [Doc. 116]. RSL declined to consider that new evidence, asserting
that the scope of the Court’s Second Remand Order did not require reopening the administrative
record [Doc. 117]. The Court issued an order clarifying its Second Remand Order [Doc. 118].
The Court denied Jordan’s request to reopen the record and explained that its Second Remand
Order “specifically pointed out two areas of consideration” for RSL to provide its reasoning [Id.,
pgs. 2-3].
Following the Court’s clarification, RSL issued its last decision on January 15, 2021 [Doc.
123-1]. RSL reaffirmed its previous determination that Jordan was not totally disabled as of
August 1, 2016 [Id., pgs. 9-10]. Both RSL and Jordan then moved for judgment on the pleadings
[Docs. 123, 125]. The Court granted RSL’s motion for judgment and denied Jordan’s motion
[Doc. 130]. Jordan appealed the Court’s order shortly thereafter [Doc. 132]. Jordan also moved
for attorney fees [Doc. 133]. In her motion for attorney fees, Jordan argued that her motion was
timely and that she was eligible for an award of attorney’s fees [Doc. 134, pgs. 1-9]. According
to Jordan, she obtained two remands and won two motions to compel, which made her eligible for
her attorney’s fees [Doc. 134, pg. 2].
Jordan next argued that under the Sixth Circuit’s five-factor test from Sec’y of Dep’t of
Labor v. King, 775 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1985), for awarding attorney’s fees in ERISA cases, she is
entitled to such an award [Doc. 134, pgs. 2-9]. First, Jordan asserted that RSL’s conduct makes it
highly culpable for the amount of fees Jordan incurred [Doc. 134, pg. 3]. Second, Jordan argued
that RSL had the capacity to pay an award of attorney’s fees [Doc. 134, pg. 4]. Third, she asserted

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that denial of her motion for attorney’s fees would encourage plan administrators to deny benefits
and force plaintiffs to court [Doc. 134, pgs. 4-5]. Fourth, Jordan argued that the discovery she
obtained from RSL in this case “has already been used in several other matters against [RSL] to
prove that it intentionally withholds certain emails from ERISA claim files.” [Doc. 134, pg. 5].
Lastly, Jordan asserted that the merits of her position outweighed RSL’s because the Court twice
remanded her claim for RSL to conduct further review [Doc. 134, pgs. 5-6].
Using the lodestar method, Jordan requested fees for: (1) 230 “partner-level” attorney hours
at a rate of $450 per hour; (2) 1.4 associate attorney hours at a rate of $325 per hour; (3) 33.5 hours
of paralegal time at a rate of $125 per hour; and (4) the $400 filing fee paid to file this case [Doc.
134, pg. 6]. In total, Jordan sought an award of $108,542.50 [Doc. 134, pg. 6]. She contended
that the hourly rates she sought for each amount of time expended on this case was a reasonable
market rate [Doc. 134, pgs. 6-7].
RSL responded that Jordan was not eligible for attorney’s fees because she did not achieve
any success on the merits [Doc. 138, pg. 2]. It stated that the Court’s first remand was based on
Jordan’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies and that the Court’s second remand was
for a procedural defect rather than a “merit-based” defect [Doc. 138, pgs. 2-3]. RSL next argued
that even if Jordan were eligible, she is not entitled to her attorney’s fees [Doc. 138, pg. 3]. RSL
contended that the Court’s first and second remands were not evidence of culpability [Doc. 138,
pgs. 3-4]. It asserted that Jordan’s attorney displayed bad faith by serving requests for broad
discovery and maintaining a blog that detailed the proceedings in this case [Doc. 138, pg. 4].
Additionally, RSL noted that Jordan’s attorney filed disciplinary complaints against RSL’s
attorneys for alleged discovery malfeasance [Doc. 138, pg. 4].

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Next, RSL conceded that it had the ability to pay an award of attorney’s fees [Doc. 138,
pg. 5]. But it argued that an award of attorney’s fees would not provide any deterrent effect
because the Court’s remands were based on the need for RSL “to further explain its decision.”
[Doc. 138, pg. 5]. Similarly, RSL argued that there was no common benefit or resolution of a
significant legal issue from this case because Jordan did not cite the other cases in which RSL’s
failure to produce emails was used [Doc. 138, pg. 5]. RSL further stated that merits of its position
outweighed the merits of Jordan’s position because the Court’s first remand was due to Jordan’s
own failure to exhaust her administrative remedies [Doc. 138, pgs. 5-6]. RSL next argued that
Jordan’s requested amount of fees was unreasonable and that Jordan claimed excessive fees for
the work performed by her attorney [Doc. 138, pgs. 6-9].
Jordan replied that she achieved some success on the merits of her claim for benefits and
is eligible for attorney’s fees [Doc. 140, pgs. 1-3]. She asserted that in its first remand, the Court
granted one of her alternative requests for an IME on a strict timeline [Doc. 140, pgs. 2-3]. Jordan
stated the Court’s second remand found that RSL’s review process “to be fraught with errors” and
arbitrary and capricious [Doc. 140, pg. 3]. She contended that although the Court denied her
motion for judgment following the second remand, winning that second remand was success on
the merits to qualify her for attorney’s fees [Doc. 140, pg. 3]. Jordan next replied that RSL’s
culpability outweighs her own because of its failure to turn over emails during discovery that the
Court later ordered RSL must produce to her [Doc. 140, pg. 4]. She further argued that awarding
her attorney’s fees would prevent insurers from withholding evidence in ERISA cases [Doc. 140,
pg. 7]. Jordan conceded that she cannot identify other cases where the discovery obtained in this
litigation was used [Doc. 140, pgs. 7-8]. Jordan next asserted that she prevailed on four out of the
five “major contested issues” during this case and that the Court’s latest ruling denying her motion

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for judgment should not detract from her other successes [Doc. 140, pg. 8]. Lastly, Jordan argued
that her hourly rate and hours expended calculations are reasonable [Doc. 140, pgs. 8-14].
The magistrate judge recommended that the Court grant in part and deny in part Jordan’s
motion for attorney’s fees [Doc. 142]. The magistrate judge first found that Jordan was eligible
for attorney’s fees because the Court remanded her case to RSL for failing to provide a full and
fair review under ERISA [Doc. 142, pg. 7]. Next, the magistrate judge reasoned that Jordan was
entitled to some of her attorney’s fees [Doc. 142, pg. 7]. The magistrate judge stated that the Court
found a flaw in the integrity of RSL’s review of Jordan’s claim when it remanded her claim for a
second time [Doc. 142, pgs. 8-12]. The magistrate judge rejected RSL’s claim that Jordan’s
attorney was more culpable than RSL because none of RSL’s arguments bore on “either party’s
culpability which led to the need to remand this case to [RSL] a second time.” [Doc. 142, pgs.
9-12]. The magistrate judge next found that RSL had the ability to pay an award of attorney’s fees
to Jordan and that an award of attorney’s fees would deter RSL in the future from acting
negligently in reviewing claims for benefits [Doc. 142, pg. 12]. The magistrate judge further found
that Jordan’s claim did not implicate novel or significant legal questions [Doc. 142, pg. 13].
Additionally, the magistrate judge stated that the merits of the parties’ positions weighed in
Jordan’s favor because she obtained a second remand [Doc. 142, pg. 13].
Considering the factors as a whole, the magistrate judge reasoned that the Court should
award Jordan some of her attorney’s fees but not all because her success was limited [Doc. 142,
pg. 14]. The magistrate judge found that Jordan should recover for work her attorney performed
before the Court’s first remand because that work had to be done to secure her additional benefits
[Doc. 142, pg. 14]. Similarly, the magistrate judge reasoned that Jordan should recover fees for
the work her attorney performed between the first and second remand but not for work performed

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after the second remand because the Court ultimately denied Jordan’s motion for judgment after
the second remand [Doc. 142, pg. 14]. The magistrate judge further recommended the Court award
Jordan attorneys’ fees for the drafting of the motion for attorney’s fees [Doc. 142, pg. 14].
The magistrate judge next found that the reasonable hourly rate for the “partner-level”
hours Jordan’s attorney worked was $350 per hour for the work he performed between 2016 and
2019, and $375 per hour for the work he performed from 2020-2022 [Doc. 142, pg. 15-17]. The
magistrate judge concluded that Jordan’s attorney worked a total of 127.4 hours during those time
periods, resulting in an award of $48,210 using the rates above [Doc. 142, pg. 17]. The magistrate
judge next recommended that the Court award Jordan $900 for three hours of work her attorney’s
associate performed at a rate of $300 per hour [Doc. 142, pg. 17]. The magistrate judge also found
that Jordan could recover fees for 16.75 hours of paralegal time at a rate of $125 per hour, for a
total of $2,093.75 [Doc. 142, pgs. 17-18]. The magistrate judge recommended that the Court
award Jordan a total of $51,203.75 for her attorney’s fees [Doc. 142, pg. 18].
RSL now objects to the magistrate judge’s recommendations [Doc. 143]. Jordan responded
to RSL’s objections [Doc. 144]. This matter is now ripe for resolution.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
The Court must conduct a de novo review of portions of the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendations to which specific objections are made unless the objections are frivolous,
conclusive, or general. See 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of
Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987); Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637
(6th Cir. 1986). Only specific objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations
need be considered; general objections or objections raised prior to the report and

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recommendations are waived. See VanDiver v. Martin, 304 F. Supp. 2d 934, 937 (E.D. Mich.
2004); Smith, 829 F.2d at 1373.
III.

ANALYSIS
RSL makes two primary objections. First, it objects to Jordan’s eligibility for attorney’s

fees. Second, RSL objects to the magistrate judge’s findings as to the five-factor test used in King.
For ease of reference, the Court addresses each objection in turn.
A.

Whether Jordan is eligible for an award of attorney’s fees
To be eligible for an award of attorney’s fees in an ERISA case, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that she achieved “some degree of success on the merits.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard
Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 255 (2010). “Trivial success on the merits” or a “purely procedural
victory” will not establish a plaintiff’s eligibility for attorney’s fees. Id. Instead, a plaintiff can
establish eligibility “if the [C]ourt can fairly call the outcome of the litigation some success on the
merits without conducting a ‘lengthy inquiry into the question of whether a particular party’s
success was “substantial” or occurred on a “central issue.”’” Id. (internal quotations omitted and
alterations adopted).
RSL contends that the Court’s first remand order was based on Jordan’s actions and that
the first remand cannot support an award of fees [Doc. 143, pgs. 3-4]. RSL urges the Court to
assume that the claim result would have been the same if Jordan had attended her IME as initially
scheduled and that Jordan’s attorney did not necessarily have to perform the work that lead to the
first remand [Doc. 143, pgs. 3-5]. RSL next characterizes the second remand as a “purely
procedural victory” that did not address the central issue in this case [Doc. 143, pgs. 4-5].
Jordan responds that the magistrate judge properly found that she was eligible for
attorney’s fees because the magistrate judge based the award of fees on RSL’s behavior during

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discovery [Doc. 144, pg. 2]. Jordan notes that the parties spent a significant amount of time
resolving discovery disputes, which would have been unnecessary if RSL “simply responded to
[Jordan’s] discovery requests.” [Doc. 144, pg. 3]. Next, Jordan argues that the Court granted her
alternative request for relief in its first remand order by requiring RSL to conduct an IME within
a strict timeline [Doc. 144, pg. 4]. Jordan asserts that because of the first remand, she eventually
obtained more than half of the benefits at issue in this case [Doc. 144, pg. 4]. Jordan further argues
that fees for obtaining the second remand are appropriate because the Court found RSL’s decision
was arbitrary and capricious [Doc. 144, pg. 5].
Here, the magistrate judge properly found that Jordan was entitled to an award of attorney’s
fees because of her success in obtaining two remands from the Court, one of which led to a decision
for additional benefits by RSL. RSL’s objection that the first remand cannot support an award of
fees misses the mark. Although the Court found that Jordan failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies before filing the instant suit, the Court noted that Jordan had asked for a remand to
conduct the IME on a strict timeline in the alternative [Doc. 91, pg. 11]. The Court’s order then
granted a form of relief that Jordan sought, which lead RSL to later give her additional benefits for
some of the time period at issue [Docs. 91, pg. 11; 100-1, pgs. 6-7] . RSL’s decision to grant
Jordan additional benefits cannot be characterized as a “trivial success,” and the Court need not
scour the record to determine that the additional benefits Jordan received after the first remand
were substantial. Id. The Court cannot speculate as to what would have happened if Jordan had
not filed the instant suit and instead pursued an IME first, as RSL suggests. The Court is confined
to the record in determining whether Jordan achieved some success on the merits of her claim, and
the record supports such a finding. See id. (reasoning that a court should not conduct “a lengthy
inquiry” to determine a party’s relative success).

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Similarly, RSL’s characterization of the Court’s second remand as a “purely procedural
victory” does not encapsulate the Court’s finding that RSL failed to give Jordan the “full and fair
review” to which she was entitled [Doc. 100-1, pgs. 13-15]. Indeed, the Court determined RSL’s
process so lacking that it failed to satisfy the arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review [Doc.
100-1, pgs. 13-15]. The Court’s second remand gave Jordan “another shot” at her claimed benefits,
which was a “success on the merits because [her] case was remanded for further consideration[.]”
McKay v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 428 F. App’x 537, 546 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotations omitted). As with the first remand, such a victory by Jordan cannot be called “trivial.”
RSL’s objection is OVERRULED in this respect.
B.

Whether the magistrate judge properly analyzed the King factors
When analyzing a motion for attorney’s fees under ERISA, the district court must consider:

(1) the degree of the opposing party's culpability; (2) the opposing party's ability to satisfy an
award of attorney's fees; (3) the deterrent effect of an award on other persons under similar
circumstances; (4) whether the party requesting fees sought to confer a common benefit on all
participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or resolve significant legal questions regarding
ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the parties' positions. King, 775 F.3d at 669. RSL objects
only to the magistrate judge’s report as to the first and fifth factors under King [See Doc. 143].
RSL argues that its purported negligence in providing Jordan a full and fair review of her
claim does not show that they were more culpable [Doc. 143, pg. 6]. RSL notes its “overall good
faith in dealing with [Jordan] is reflected in the fact that it changed its initial decision” after the
first remand [Doc. 143, pg. 6]. Jordan responds that RSL’s behavior in this case justified the
magistrate judge’s finding that the culpability factor weighed in Jordan’s favor [Doc. 144, pg. 6].

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In analyzing this factor, the magistrate judge emphasized that the Court found a flaw in the
“integrity” of RSL’s review in its second remand [Doc. 142, pg. 8]. The magistrate judge
characterized the Court’s second remand as necessary to correct substantive flaws in RSL’s review
[Doc. 142, pg. 8]. The record supports the magistrate judge’s explanation of the Court’s second
remand and his conclusions regarding RSL’s culpability [Doc. 100-1, pgs. 14-16]. RSL’s assertion
that it acted in good faith because it changed its decision following the Court’s first remand does
not undercut its behavior that the magistrate judge noted in his report and recommendation. If
anything, its conduct after it awarded additional benefits to Jordan shows a disregard for the
strictures of administrative review that ERISA requires. And as the Court noted above, the second
remand was a success on the merits for Jordan and shows the importance of RSL’s conduct in its
review preceding the second remand. See McKay, 428 F. App’x at 546 (internal quotations
omitted). Accordingly, RSL’s objection is OVERRULED in this respect.
RSL next contends that the magistrate judge incorrectly found the relative merits’ of the
parties’ positions weighed in favor of Jordan because he focused only on the second remand [Doc.
143, pg. 6]. Jordan responds that RSL’s objection should be overruled because the magistrate
judge tailored his recommendation to award fees only for areas where she clearly was successful
or areas where the balance of the merits skews in her favor [Doc. 144, pg. 7].
The magistrate judge narrowly tailored his recommendation for attorney’s fees only to the
phases of litigation in which the record demonstrated Jordan’s success. His focus on the second
remand as emblematic of the strength of Jordan’s position was warranted because of the Court’s
finding that RSL failed to provide Jordan “full and fair review” of her claim. As detailed in the
magistrate judge’s report, Jordan also obtained favorable rulings in the first remand and on a
number of discovery issues [Doc. 142, pgs. 2-4, 8-10]. The magistrate judge correctly focused on

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the merits of each parties’ position as they related to the successes that Jordan obtained throughout
the course of litigation. Further, the record supports the magistrate judge’s analysis because
Jordan’s positions during litigation repeatedly prevailed over RSL’s positions over the course of
six years. The second remand shows that Jordan’s position deserved greater weight than RSL’s
because the Court concluded that RSL’s review of Jordan’s claim failed to surpass even the notably
lenient arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review [See Doc. 100-1, pgs. 13-16]. Accordingly,
RSL’s objection is OVERRULED in this respect.1
IV.

CONCLUSION
After thorough consideration of the Report and Recommendation [Doc. 142], Defendant’s

Objections [Doc. 143], and the record as a whole, the Court finds that the Report and
Recommendation properly analyzes the issues presented. For the reasons set out in the Report and
Recommendation, which are incorporated by reference herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the
Report and Recommendation [Doc. 142] is ADOPTED, and Jordan’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees
is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Accordingly, the Court AWARDS Jordan
$51,203.75 in attorney’s fees.2
SO ORDERED:
s/ Clifton L. Corker
United States District Judge

1

RSL argues in passing that awarding Jordan attorney’s fees would not deter negligent
conduct because ERISA plans are complex and mistakes can be made by administrators [Doc. 143,
pgs. 5-6]. But the magistrate judge’s report details behavior that goes beyond mere negligence.
[See Doc. 142, pgs. 9-12]. Moreover, an award of attorney’s fees can deter the behavior detailed
in the report and recommendation by requiring to RSL to be more diligent in future litigation.
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Jordan asks for an additional amount in fees because of her response to RSL’s objections.
The Court finds that the magistrate judge accounted for those fees when he recommended awarding
fees for Jordan’s initial motion for attorney’s fees [Doc. 142, pg. 14]. Accordingly, the Court
declines to increase Jordan’s award further.
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