Tipton v. Jeremy

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: For the above reasons, the Court finds Plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis(Doc. 3) is GRANTED. However, the Court further finds that Plaintiff does not allege any factsthat rise to a constitutional v iolation due to delayed medical treatment. Thus, Plaintiff has failedto state any valid § 1983 claim against Defendant and her Complaint will be DISMISSED.AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL FOLLOW.Signed by District Judge Travis R McDonough on 10/18/2016. (DJH, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
AMY TIPTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORIZON JEREMY,
Defendant.

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Case No. 1:16-cv-299
Judge Travis R. McDonough
Magistrate Judge Christopher H. Steger

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Acting pro se, Amy Tipton, an inmate confined in the Bledsoe County Correctional
Complex, has submitted this civil rights complaint for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1),
as well as an application for leave to proceed without payment of fees or costs (Doc. 3).
I.

The Filing Fee
Plaintiff’s application to proceed without prepayment of fees (Doc. ) is GRANTED.

Nonetheless, because Plaintiff is an inmate, she is ASSESSED the filing fee of three hundred
and fifty dollars ($350). McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled
on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate
trust account at the institution where she now resides shall submit, as an initial partial payment,
whichever is the greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to
Plaintiff’s inmate trust account; or (b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in
her inmate trust account for the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B). Thereafter, the trust account custodian shall submit twenty
percent (20%) of Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to his trust account

for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds $10.00, until the full
filing fee of $350 has been paid to the Clerk’s Office. McGore, 114 F.3d at 607.
Payments should be sent to: Clerk, USDC; 900 Georgia Avenue, Room 309;
Chattanooga, TN 37402. To ensure compliance with the fee-collection procedure, the Clerk is
DIRECTED to mail a copy of this order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution
where Plaintiff is now confined. The Clerk is also DIRECTED to furnish a copy of this order to
the Court’s financial deputy. This order shall be placed in Plaintiff’s prison file and follow her if
she is transferred to another correctional institution.
II.

Screening the Complaint
Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss

those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant
who is immune. See, e.g., Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
In screening this complaint, the Court bears in mind that pro se pleadings filed in civil
rights cases must be liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Still, the pleading
must be sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), which simply means that the factual content pled by a
plaintiff must permit a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556).
The “facial plausibility” standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, but it
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal

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“governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A]
because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin,
630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).
III.

Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations
In general, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant provided inadequate medical treatment on two

separate occasions. First, Plaintiff claims that on February 18, 2016, at 1:00 a.m., she informed
Officer Young that her colostomy bag “busted.” (Doc. 1, at 4.) Officer Young then relayed the
information to Corporal Byrd, who notified Defendant, Nurse Jeremy, of Plaintiff’s need for
medical attention. (Id.) Plaintiff claims she was not provided with “new supplies” until over an
hour and a half after she initially informed Officer Young of her situation. (Id.) During her wait
to receive new supplies, Plaintiff asked Officer Young “every 5 to 10 minutes” to “find out
where the nurse was at.” (Id.) Plaintiff never saw the nurse; instead, the nurse gave the officer
on duty the supplies to give to Plaintiff. (Id.)
Then, on February 23, 2016, Plaintiff’s colostomy bag “busted” at 4:30 a.m. (Id. at 2.)
Again, Plaintiff informed Officer Young of her broken bag. (Id.) Again, Officer Young relayed
the information to Corporal Byrd, who notified Defendant, Nurse Jeremey. (Id.) Nurse Jeremey
told Plaintiff to wait for medical assistance “until 6:00 a.m. for the nurse to get [there].” (Id.) At
5:00 a.m., while on her way to shakedown, Plaintiff saw Nurse Connie and told her about her
broken bag. (Id.) Thereafter, Nurse Connie provided Plaintiff with her requested supplies. (Id.)
As a result of the two described instances in which Plaintiff suffered from a broke
colostomy bag, Plaintiff requests restitution for pain and suffering. (Id. at 6.)

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IV.

Analysis
The Eighth Amendment forbids prison officials from “unnecessarily and wantonly

inflicting pain” on an inmate by acting with “deliberate indifference” toward the inmate’s serious
medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Prison medical personnel or officials may
be deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs “in intentionally denying or
delaying access to medical care ....” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
Under the Estelle standard, a constitutional claim for denial of medical care has objective
and subjective components. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004).
The objective component requires proof the inmate is suffering from a sufficiently serious
medical need, such that “he [was] incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). To be sufficiently serious, the medical need must be either
(1) obvious to a layperson or (2) supported by medical evidence, like a physician’s diagnosis.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297–98 (1991)); Aswegan v.
Henry, 49 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1995). The subjective component requires proof that the
prison official acted with deliberate indifference. Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305, 312
(6th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at
835, but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of
causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. Under Farmer, “the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837; see also LeMarbe v. Wisneski, 266
F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir.2001). “Knowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances

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clearly indicating the existence of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference.”
Horn v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir.1994).
As the Supreme Court has held, the test for deliberate indifference is whether there exists
a “substantial risk of serious harm,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (emphasis added), and does not
require actual harm to be suffered. See also Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 189 n. 15 (2d
Cir.2003) (observing that “actual physical injury is not necessary in order to demonstrate an
Eighth Amendment violation” and declining to adopt a per se rule that such injury is required)
(citing in part Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)).
Here, Plaintiff complains that she was not provided medical care as quickly as she
wished. Plaintiff was suffering from a broken colostomy bag. A jury could find that Plaintiff’s
condition amounted to an obvious medical need. However, as noted, even where a prisoner
alleging a delay in medical treatment offers evidence to show that he had an obvious injury, there
is one additional showing to be made. He must also demonstrate that his need for medical care
was not addressed in a reasonable time. Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 899-900; Hubbard, 2006 WL
2787004, at *5 (citing Blackmore).
The Court’s research has revealed no Sixth Circuit case which establishes what is a
reasonable length of time within which to provide medical care for a prisoner’s obvious, serious
injury. Frazier v. Ramsey, No. 2:04-CV-265, 2006 WL 2981217, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 16,
2006). A reasonable time to delay medical care for a serious medical need depends upon the
circumstances in a given case. Id.
The Court does not find that the delay in treatment of one and one-half hour in the first
complained-of incident and one-half hour in the second complaint of incident posed a substantial
risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. The Court finds that Plaintiff was provided with her requested

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supplies to fix her broken colostomy bag within a reasonable time, thus, Plaintiff has failed to
establish the subjective component necessary to show a constitutional violation.
V.

Conclusion
For the above reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis

(Doc. 3) is GRANTED. However, the Court further finds that Plaintiff does not allege any facts
that rise to a constitutional violation due to delayed medical treatment. Thus, Plaintiff has failed
to state any valid § 1983 claim against Defendant and her Complaint will be DISMISSED.
AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL FOLLOW.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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