Brumlow v. Hamilton County et al (RLJ2)

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge R Leon Jordan on 2/13/19. (JBR, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
CHATTANOOGA DIVISION

WILLIAM STEPHEN BRUMLOW,
Plaintiff,
v.
HAMILTON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al.,
Defendants.

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No. 1:16-CV-394

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This civil action is before the Court for consideration of the motion for summary
judgment filed by Defendants Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department (“HCSD”) and
Hamilton County, Tennessee [doc. 18] and the motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendant Jim Hammond and the John Doe defendants [doc. 20]. Plaintiff has responded
[doc. 24].

Oral argument is unnecessary, and the motion is ripe for the court’s

determination.
Plaintiff has filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that the
defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference to
his safety and failing to protect him from other inmates while he was incarcerated. Plaintiff
also raises claims under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“TGTLA”),
T.C.A. § 29-20-101, et seq. For the reasons that follow, the motions will be granted and
the case will be dismissed.

I.

BACKGROUND

On August 31, 2015, Plaintiff was an inmate in custody at the Hamilton County jail.
[Doc. 24-1 at 1]. That morning, Plaintiff was being transported from the jail to a court
hearing in the Hamilton County General Sessions Court. [Doc. 24-1 at 1]. Corrections
Deputy Jorge Araiza was in charge of escorting the detainees from the jail to the court that
morning. [Doc. 19-1 at 1]. In the course of his transport to the court, Plaintiff was placed
on an elevator with other inmates who were being moved from the court holding area in
the basement of the building to either the second or third floor. [Doc. 19-1 at 1; Doc. 24-1
at 2]. Plaintiff alleges that, after several inmates were instructed to board the elevator, the
elevator was “completely full,” with at least 12 inmates already in the elevator. [Doc. 24-1
at 2]. However, Deputy Araiza contends that, while there were a number of detainees on
the elevator, there was room for two or three more individuals. [Doc. 19-1 at 2]. Inmate
Dmarquis Bell was then instructed to board the elevator, and Plaintiff and several others
shouted that there was no more room on the elevator. [Doc. 24-1 at 2]. Mr. Bell boarded
the elevator nonetheless. [Doc. 24-1 at 2]. After Mr. Bell boarded the elevator, he swung
with his handcuffed hands and hit Plaintiff in the face. [Doc. 19-1 at 2; Doc. 24-1 at 1-2].
Plaintiff never informed Deputy Araiza that he and Mr. Bell had any prior history,
or that he felt that his safety was threatened in any way by Mr. Bell. [Doc. 19-1 at 2]. After
Deputy Araiza witnessed the assault, he immediately removed Mr. Bell from the elevator
and secured him in a cell in the court holding area. [Doc. 19-1 at 2]. Thereafter, he moved
Plaintiff to the court holding area office and began administering first aid, including
cleaning the wound with an antibacterial solution and holding pressure on the wound with
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gauze. [Doc. 19-1 at 2]. Deputy Araiza then determined that Plaintiff needed additional
medical care, and Plaintiff was taken back to the jail to receive medical treatment. [Doc.
19-1 at 3]. Jeff Williams, the nurse manager of the Hamilton County jail clinic, treated
Plaintiff for his injuries. [Doc. 19-6 at 1-2]. Specifically, Mr. Williams cleaned Plaintiff’s
injuries, then sealed the two lacerations by applying Dermabond, a wound closure
adhesive. [Doc. 19-6 at 2]. Mr. Williams states that the use of Dermabond without stiches
indicates that the wounds were superficial enough as to not require both stitches and
Dermabond. [Doc. 19-6 at 3]. Mr. Williams also applied Neosporin to an abrasion that
Plaintiff received in the attack. [Doc. 19-6 at 3]. After he received medical care, Plaintiff
returned to the court holding area, and was taken before a judge for his hearing. [Doc. 19-1
at 3]. Mr. Bell was later criminally charged for his assault of Plaintiff. [Doc. 19-5 at 2-4].
Plaintiff was seen again by the jail clinic on September 1, 2015, for an unrelated issue, and
did not raise any further concerns about his injuries from the assault. [Doc. 19-6 at 3].
Plaintiff asserts that he learned, after his release, that he had a broken nose and a pinched
nerve in the back of his neck as a result of the assault. [Doc. 24-1 at 1].
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendants’ motions are brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,
which governs summary judgment. Rule 56(a) provides in pertinent part: “The court shall
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). The procedure set out in Rule 56(c) requires that “[a] party asserting that a fact
cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
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This can be done by citation to materials in the record, which include depositions,
documents, affidavits, stipulations, and electronically stored information. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1)(A). Additionally, a party may “show[] that the materials cited do not establish the
absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).
After the moving party has carried its initial burden of showing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact in dispute, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
present specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). “The ‘mere possibility’ of
a factual dispute is not enough.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.
1992) (quoting Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir. 1986)). Moreover,
mere conclusory and unsupported allegations, rooted in speculation, are insufficient to
meet this burden. Bell v. Ohio State Univ., 351 F.3d 240, 253 (6th Cir. 2003).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must present
probative evidence that supports its complaint. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249-50 (1986). The non-moving party’s evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in that party’s favor. Id. at 255. The court determines whether
the evidence requires submission to a jury or whether one party must prevail as a matter of
law because the issue is so one-sided. Id. at 251-52.

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III.

ANALYSIS

A. Hamilton County’s Section 1983 Liability
1. Claims Against Hamilton County
Hamilton County cannot be held liable pursuant to § 1983 for constitutional torts
committed by its officers and employees based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.
There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983 for municipalities and governmental
entities. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv.of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978);
Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 752 (6th Cir. 2006).
Instead, “it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made
by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.”
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. For the county to have liability under § 1983, a plaintiff is
required to demonstrate that the county, through its deliberate conduct, was the “moving
force” behind the alleged violation of his federal constitutional rights. Id. A municipal
policy or custom cannot be shown by one instance of misconduct. Thomas v. City of
Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 432-33 (6th Cir. 2005). However, an unlawful policy or
custom may be shown by a policy of inadequate training or supervision. Ellis ex rel.
Pendergrass v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455 F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006).
In order to succeed on a failure to train theory, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the
training was inadequate for the tasks performed; (2) the inadequacy was the result of the
municipality’s deliberate indifference; and (3) the inadequacy was closely related to, or
actually caused, the injury at issue. Id. However, “[t]hat a particular officer may be
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unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city, for the officer’s
shortcomings may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program.” City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1989). In Ellis, the Sixth Circuit identified two
instances in which a finding of deliberate indifference would be appropriate: “(1) where
the training lapse occurs despite ‘foreseeable consequences’ that will flow from the lapse;
and (2) where the training lapse occurs despite ‘repeated complaints’ to the municipality
about the issues that should have been dealt with in training.” Lee v. Metro.Gov’t of
Nashville and Davidson Cty., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1124 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) (quoting
Ellis, 455 F.3d at 700-01).
In this case, it is not entirely clear from the complaint what policy or procedure
Plaintiff believes that the employees of Hamilton County were insufficiently trained on.
Plaintiff’s response to the motions for summary judgment appears to indicate that HCSD
officers were insufficiently trained on the HCSD’s own policy regarding the transport of
inmates inside a facility, which states that inmates should not enter an elevator without an
officer. [Doc. 24 at 3]. However, there is no evidence of “repeated complaints” about
HCSD officers leaving inmates unattended in elevators. Consequently, Plaintiff must
proceed under a “single incident” theory.
The Supreme Court has stated that deliberate indifference is “a stringent standard of
fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence
of his action.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). Plaintiff has provided no
evidence, in response to the motions for summary judgment, indicating that HCSD officers
were not actually trained on the Department’s inmate-transport policies, but rather, relies
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on the fact that the policy was not followed at the time of his attack. The parties do not
dispute that no officer was on the elevator at the time that Plaintiff was attacked. However,
such a single incident of failure to follow a policy is insufficient to support a failure to train
claim. See Canton, 489 U.S. at 390-91.
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding failure to train ultimately amount to conclusory
allegations, without any supporting facts regarding what training HCSD officers did or did
not receive, and what further training was necessary. It is significant that there is no
evidence of past complaints regarding inmate transportation in the record. While a history
of past conduct is not necessary to establish municipal liability, courts are more inclined to
find a “custom” when there has been a history of complaints or similar behavior. See
Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of
failure to train.”).
Given the lack of evidence in the record supporting Plaintiff’s claims, and the fact
that federal courts should generally refrain from “second-guessing municipal
employee-training programs,” Canton, 489 U.S. at 391-92, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
against Hamilton County will be dismissed with prejudice.
2. Claims against HCSD
Federal district courts have routinely held that sheriff’s departments are not subject
to liability under § 1983. See Mathes v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson Cty., No.
3:10-cv-496, 2010 WL 3341889, at *1-2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010) (providing an
extensive list of Tennessee federal district courts finding that sheriff’s departments in
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Tennessee are not subject to liability under § 1983). A county sheriff’s department is not
a legal entity separate from its parent county. Pruitt v. Lewis, No. 06-2867, 2007 WL
4293037, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 6, 2007). Instead, if a plaintiff is able to establish any
liability under Monell, it is the county, not the sheriff’s department, that would be liable.
Walker v. Union Cty., No. 13-102-DUB-HBG, 2013 WL 1912936, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. May
8, 2013). Accordingly, for the same reasons that the § 1983 claims against Hamilton
County are dismissed, the § 1983 claims against the HCSD, which are themselves claims
against Hamilton County, are dismissed.
3. Claims Against Sheriff Hammond and John Doe Defendants in their Official
Capacities
Likewise, Plaintiff’s suit against Sheriff Hammond, and the John Doe employees of
the Sheriff’s Department, in their official capacities, are nothing more than a suit against
Hamilton County. See e.g., Leach v. Shelby Cty., 891 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (6th Cir. 1989)
(“[The plaintiff’s] suit against the Mayor and the Sheriff of Shelby County in their official
capacities is, therefore, essentially and for all purposes, a suit against the County itself.”);
Petty v. Cty. of Franklin, 478 F.3d 341, 349 (6th Cir. 2007) (“To the extent that [the
plaintiff’s Section 1983] suit is against [the sheriff] in his official capacity, it is nothing
more than a suit against Franklin County itself.”). Therefore, the § 1983 claims against
Sheriff Hammond and the John Doe defendants, in their official capacities, will be
dismissed for the same reason as discussed above.

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B. Section 1983 Claims Against Sheriff Hammond
Supervisory liability, distinct from municipal liability, cannot be imposed in a
§ 1983 action based on a theory of respondeat superior without proof of personal
involvement. Taylor v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 1995).
“Supervisory liability under § 1983 does not attach when it is premised on a mere failure
to act; it must be based on active unconstitutional behavior.” Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d
889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A supervisor is not liable
under § 1983 for failing to train unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific
incident or misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum a
plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly
acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Everson v. Leis, 556
F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The central question,
therefore, is whether Sheriff Hammond “implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly
acquiesced” in the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. For purpose
of this analysis, the Court will assume, without deciding, that the John Doe defendants
engaged in unconstitutional conduct.
Notably, Plaintiff appears to allege that Sheriff Hammond failed to properly train
the John Doe defendants on maintaining safety during the transport of prisoners on
elevators. However, a general failure to train claim has been routinely rejected by the Sixth
Circuit as a means to impose liability on a supervisor in his or her individual capacity.
Dillingham v. Millsaps, 809 F. Supp. 2d 820, 845 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 2011) (citing Ontha
v. Rutherford Cty., 222 F. App’x 498, 503-05 (6th Cir. 2007)).
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Absent personal

involvement in the underlying unconstitutional act, the attempt to hold municipal
supervisors liable in their individual capacities for their alleged failure to adequately train
employees improperly conflates a § 1983 claim of individual supervisory liability with one
of municipal liability. Harvey v. Campbell Cty., 453 F. App’x 557, 563, (6th Cir. 2011).
Generally, there are two ways of imposing supervisory liability: (1) a pattern of conduct;
or (2) a truly egregious single incident. Dillingham, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 846 (citing Ontha,
222 F. App’x at 504-05). Because, as discussed previously, Plaintiff has failed to establish
a pattern of similar incidents, Sheriff Hammond will only be liable if there was “essentially
a complete failure to train the police force, or training that is so reckless or grossly negligent
that future police misconduct is almost inevitable or would properly be characterized as
substantially certain to occur.” Ontha, 222 F. App’x at 504 (quoting Hays v. Jefferson Cty.,
668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted)).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is
simply no evidence that Sheriff Hammond encouraged or authorized the alleged actions of
the John Doe defendants. Additionally, Plaintiff has produced no evidence, beyond
circumstantial evidence that policy was not followed on a single incident, that Sheriff
Hammond failed to train HCSD officers on any HCSD policy. Plaintiff has failed to cite
any specific affirmative act by Sheriff Hammond that would subject him to liability.
Accordingly, the § 1983 claims raised against Sheriff Hamond in his individual capacity
will be dismissed with prejudice. Furthermore, because Sheriff Hammond cannot be held
liable as a supervisor, there is no need to determine whether Sheriff Hammond is entitled
to qualified immunity. See Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 244 (6th Cir. 2007) (“If
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there is no constitutional violation, then the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim fails as a matter of law
and the defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment and does not need qualified
immunity.”).
C. Section 1983 Claims against John Doe Defendants
The court concludes that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims brought against unnamed officers
and staff of the HCSD, in their individual capacities must be dismissed with prejudice.
After filing his complaint, Plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence to take discovery and
conduct a reasonable investigation to promptly determine the actual names of the John
Does. Plaintiff has not timely made a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) for leave to
amend his complaint to correctly identify John Does by their real names. Moreover,
Plaintiff has not timely effected service of process upon the individual defendants
identified in the complaint by the pseudonym John Doe as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
Section 1983 itself does not contain a statute of limitations. Where Congress does
not specify a period of limitations in a federal statute for bringing a civil action, the court
is required to apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations provided under the
laws of the State of Tennessee. Eidson v. State of Tennessee Dep’t of Children’s Serv., 510
F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). Id. The statute of limitations accrues and commences to
run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the
complaint. Id.
Any cause of action that Plaintiff may have against John Does in their individual
capacities under § 1983 accrued, at the latest, on August 31, 2015, the date when Plaintiff
was attacked. Consequently, Plaintiff had one year from August 31, 2015, within which
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to file suit on his § 1983 claims. On August 31, 2016, the statute of limitations expired on
any cause of action that Plaintiff may have against John Does in their individual capacities
under § 1983 and such claims are now time-barred. Plaintiff did not timely amend his
complaint prior to August 31, 2016 to identify John Does by their real names and add them
as defendants to this action.
Where a plaintiff is temporarily unable to ascertain a defendant’s actual name, the
plaintiff may initially file a complaint that names an unknown defendant by using a “John
Doe” appellation or similar pseudonym. Smith v. City of Chattanooga, No. 1:08-cv-63,
2009 WL 3762961, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2009). However, simply identifying an
unknown defendant in a complaint by the pseudonym of John Doe is not enough to
commence a civil action against that unknown defendant. Id. A civil action cannot be
commenced against a fictious party such as an unknown John Doe. Bufalino v. Michigan
Bell Tel. Co., 404 F.2d 1023, 1028 (6th Cir. 1968). Until the plaintiff files an amended
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 that identifies and adds or joins a John Doe defendant
by his true name, the John Doe allegations in the complaint are mere surplusage. Pierce v.
Hamblen Cty., No. 2:09-cv-34, 2009 WL 2996333, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009). A
civil action is commenced against a John Doe defendant when the complaint is amended
under Rule 15 to specifically name and identify that defendant by his true name and the
plaintiff effects service of process upon that named defendant in compliance with Rule 4.
The unknown John Does in Plaintiff’s complaint have never been properly joined in this
lawsuit and served with process.

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At this juncture it is too late for Plaintiff to make a motion pursuant to Rule 15(a)
for leave to amend his complaint to identify John Does by their real names and add or join
them as individual defendants in this case. The scheduling order provides that the deadline
for joinder of additional parties is 150 days before trial, which has expired. [Doc. 12 at 5].
Moreover, a motion to amend the complaint under Rule 15 at this point in time
would be futile. The federal civil rights claims brought against John Does in their
individual capacities under § 1983 are time-barred by the statute of limitations. New party
defendants may not be added to a complaint after the statute of limitations has run. If
Plaintiff were to attempt to amend his complaint to identify John Does by their real names,
the amendment would not relate back under Rule 15(c)(1) to the date when the original
complaint was filed for purposes of applying the statute of limitations.
Rule 15(c) provides that an amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the
original pleading when the amendment changes the party or the naming of a party against
whom a claim is asserted if the party to be brought in by amendment “knew or should have
known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the
proper party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). A plaintiff’s lack of knowledge
pertaining to an intended defendant’s identify does not constitute a “mistake concerning
the proper party’s identity” within the meaning of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). Cox v. Treadway,
75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996). Amending a complaint to add or substitute a named
defendant for an unknown John Doe defendant is considered a change in parties, not a mere
substitution of parties. Id. The Sixth Circuit has held that Rule 15(c) was not intended to
protect a plaintiff who does not know the identity of defendants and does not bother to
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ascertain the defendants’ identities within the limitations period. Smith v. City of Akron,
476 F. App’x 67, 69 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, any attempt to amend the complaint to name
the John Doe defendants at this juncture would not relate back, and therefore, the claims
would be barred by the statute of limitations.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s claims against John Does are also dismissed on the
alternative ground that Plaintiff failed to identify them by their real names and effect
service of process upon them within 120 days from the filing of the original complaint as
required by Rule 4(m). Dubose v. City of Morristown, No. 2:07-cv-115, 2009 WL
1766008, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. June 22, 2009). Accordingly, all § 1983 federal civil rights
claims brought against unnamed John Does officers in their individual capacities are
dismissed with prejudice.
D. Supplemental Jurisdiction
All that remains for consideration in this action are the pendent state law claims that
the Plaintiff has raised, namely, his claims under the TGTLA. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(2), a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over
pendent state law claims if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.”

That being the case here, the court will decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining state law claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment [docs. 18, 20] will be GRANTED. The court will DECLINE to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s pendent state law claims, and those claims will
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be REMANDED to the state court. Plaintiff’s federal claims are DISMISSED. An order
consistent with this opinion will be entered.

s/ Leon Jordan
United States District Judge

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