Motavelez v. Byrd
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION finding that for the reasons set forth in this Order, even liberally construing the complaint in favor Plaintiff, it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983 and this action wi lltherefore be DISMISSED. To the extent that Plaintiff is an inmate in the Hamilton County Jail,2 he is herewith ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the Sheriffof Hamil ton County to ensure that the custodian of Plaintiffs inmate trust account complies with that portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act relating to payment of the filing fee, to the extent that Plaintiff is incarcerated as set forth above. The Cler k is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the Courts financial deputy. Signed by Chief District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 12/14/2017. Clerk performed service as directed as well as sent a copy of this M&O to Carlos Motavelez.(MDG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
CARLOS MOTAVELEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER BYRD,
Defendant.
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No.:
1:16-CV-508-TAV-CHS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Court is in receipt of a pro se prisoner’s complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 2]
and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1]. It appears from the motion for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the
filing fee. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis [Doc. 1] is GRANTED. For the reasons set forth below, however, no process
shall issue and this action will be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted under § 1983.
I.
Screening Standard
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen prisoner
complaints and shall, at any time, sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious,
fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(A), 1915A; Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
The dismissal
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007), “governs dismissals for failure state a claim
under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the
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language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to
survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Courts liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil
rights cases and hold them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he was
deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v. Barberton
Citizens Hosp., 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d
990, 995 (6th Cir. 1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992); see
also Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that “Section 1983 does
not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of
constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”).
II.
Allegations of the Complaint
In his complaint, Plaintiff states that Defendant Officer Byrd had an argument with one
of his cellmates [Doc. 2 p. 5]. Plaintiff further alleges that, since this argument, he has been able
to feel tension with Defendant and that Defendant has been harassing the whole cell and looking
for any reason to “start crap against all of [them]” [Id.]. Plaintiff specifically asserts that on one
occasion the night before he drafted the complaint, Defendant brought them razors and told them
that “she should not even want to give [them] ra[z]ors for the rac[i]st comments [they] make,”
though Plaintiff states that they had not made bad comments [Id.]. Plaintiff further alleges that
Defendant told Plaintiff and his cellmates that they “need to pray because [they] have the devil
inside [them]” [Id.]. Plaintiff claims that this statement offends him, that he and his cellmates
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have been praying for as long as he has been in the jail, and that they have never been in trouble
before [Id.]. In his request for relief, Plaintiff states that he wants the jail officials to take action
and states that he and others are being discriminated against for their race, color, religion, and for
“the case they have as inmates” [Id. at 5]. Plaintiff therefore seeks one million dollars and states
that he would love to have citizenship [Id.].
III.
Legal Analysis
Plaintiff’s allegations do not allow the Court to plausibly infer that Defendant has
discriminated against Plaintiff or violated his constitutional rights in any way. The Equal
Protection Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To state an equal protection claim,
a plaintiff must show that he was intentionally discriminated against based on his membership in
a suspect class. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Booher v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
843 F.2d 943, 944 (6th Cir. 1988) (a plaintiff must show that he “was victimized because of
some suspect classification, which is an essential element of an equal protection claim”). Also,
the plaintiff must prove that he was treated differently from those who are similarly situated to
him. Washington, 426 U.S. at 270 n.21.
While Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant discriminated against him and others,1
the specific factual allegations do not support this conclusory allegation or any plausible
inference of discrimination. First, it appears from the specific statements in the complaint that
Plaintiff cannot assert the rights of other prisoners. Newsom v. Norris, 88 F.2d 371, 381
(6th Cir. 1989) (holding that a “a prisoner who initiates a civil action challenging certain
conditions at a prison facility in his individual capacity is limited to asserting alleged violations
of his own constitutional rights and . . . lacks standing to assert the constitutional rights of other
prisoners”). Thus, any such claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and
will be DISMISSED.
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the alleged mistreatment by Defendant resulted from one of Plaintiff’s cellmates getting into an
argument with Defendant, rather than any suspect classification. Even if the Court liberally
construes Plaintiff’s complaint as alleging that Plaintiff and his cellmates were members of a
suspect class and that the alleged mistreatment resulted from that classification, however,
Plaintiff only alleges that Defendant verbally harassed him and his cellmates. This is insufficient
to allege a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Jones v. Porter, No. 99-1326, 2000 WL
572059, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954–55 (6th Cir. 1987))
(holding that verbal harassment and idle threats are insufficient to establish an equal protection
claim, as they do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation).
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, even liberally construing the complaint in favor Plaintiff,
it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983 and this action will
therefore be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.
To the extent that Plaintiff is an inmate in the Hamilton County Jail,2 he is herewith
ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B), the
custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is directed to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District
Court, 800 Market Street, Suite 130, Knoxville, TN 37902, as an initial partial payment,
whichever is the greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to
Plaintiff’s inmate trust account; or (b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in
his inmate trust account for the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint. 28
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Plaintiff’s complaint states that he is incarcerated in the Hamilton County Jail [Doc. 1 p.
2]. The current address listed in Plaintiff’s complaint [Doc. 2 p. 3] appears to be a private
address rather than the Hamilton County Jail address, however. Accordingly, if Plaintiff is not
incarcerated, he should not to be assessed the filing fee.
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U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B). Thereafter, the trust account custodian shall submit twenty
percent (20%) of Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to his trust account
for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds $10.00, until the full
filing fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk’s Office. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199 (2007).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the Sheriff
of Hamilton County to ensure that the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account complies with
that portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act relating to payment of the filing fee, to the
extent that Plaintiff is incarcerated as set forth above. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to
forward a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the Court’s financial deputy.
The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith
and would be totally frivolous. See Fed. R. App. P. 24.
AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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