Poole v. State of Tennessee

Filing 5

ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations re 3 Report and Recommendations ; denying 1 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the case.Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 1/18/2018. (SAC, )Order mailed to Poole.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at CHATTANOOGA
ANTHONY POOLE,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE,
Defendant.

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Case No. 1:17-cv-77
Judge Mattice
Magistrate Judge Steger

ORDER
For the reasons stated herein, the Court will ACCEPT and ADOPT Magistrate
Judge Steger’s Report and Recommendation [Doc. 3]. Plaintiff’s objection to the Report
and Recommendation [Doc. 4] is OVERRULLED. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to
Proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1] is DENIED and the above styled action is
DISMISSED.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Anthony Poole, brought this suit alleging the State of Tennessee violated

his constitutional rights by coercing him into a child support agreement. [See Doc. 2 at
2]. Magistrate Judge Steger, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), recommended the
action be dismissed due to the claims being barred by Tennessee’s Eleventh Amendment
state immunity. [Doc. 3 at 3]. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a letter objecting to the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendations. [Doc. 4] Therein, Plaintiff argues Tennessee is
not immune in this suit because it participates in programs passed as part of the Social
Security Act, and he further cites multiple irrelevant statutes, ranging from the Federal
Tort Claims Act to the criminal code.

II.

ANALYSIS
The Court reviews the objected portions of the Report and Recommendation de

novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Steger’s legal
conclusions regarding Eleventh Amendment immunity in this context. To support his
arguments, Plaintiff cites to multiple statutes and law. Each will be addressed in turn.
a.

Social Security Act

Tennessee has not waived its immunity nor has immunity been abrogated by an
act of Congress. There are two primary ways a state can lose the constitutional immunity
it otherwise enjoys. First, and most obvious, a state can consent to suit or waive its
immunity. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Alternatively,
Congress can abrogate state immunity via the enforcement powers found in the
Constitution’s Reconstruction Amendments. Id. Congress does not, however, have the
authority to abrogate state immunity under its Article I powers, including its commerce
and spending powers. See e.g. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999). Because the
Social Security Act and its subsequent additions and amendments are passed under
Congress’ spending power, Congress has not, and indeed cannot, abrogate state
immunity pursuant to those laws. See e.g. id.
Tennessee’s participation in Social Security programs is not an implicit waiver of
its immunity. Plaintiff claims Tennessee’s participation in Social Security Programs,
which he claims involves “child-support programs,” subjects it to liability in this suit.
The Court is not inclined to agree. “The mere fact that a State participates in a program
through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the
State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the
State to be sued in the federal courts.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)

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(holding a state’s participation in Social Security programs does not constitute a waiver
of its immunity). Accordingly, Tennessee is not liable to Plaintiff because it participates
in Social Security programs.
b.

Various Statutes Cited

Plaintiff cites the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) as a valid waiver of immunity.
[See Doc. 4 at 2] (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674). Plaintiff is correct, that statute does involve a
waiver of immunity; however, it pertains to the United States government waiving its
sovereign immunity in the limited context of tort actions committed by its agents. See
28 U.S.C. § 2674. As such, the Court finds the FTCA is inapplicable here. Next, Plaintiff
cites various criminal statutes under Title 18 of the US Code. [See id. at 1]. This being a
civil case, those criminal statutes are irrelevant to this case. Finally, Plaintiff cites 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as abrogating Tennessee’s immunity. [See id. at 2]. However, states, like
Tennessee, are not “persons” under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 65 (1989). Further, even if Tennessee were a “person” under that statute, § 1983
is not sufficiently clear to constitute a valid abrogation of state immunity. See id.
(holding “[t]he language of § 1983 [] falls far short of satisfying” the requirement that
Congressional abrogation of state immunity be unequivocal) (“Congress, in passing §
1983, had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity…”).
III.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Report and Recommendation [Doc. 3] is ACCEPTED and

ADOPTED, Plaintiff’s objections [Doc. 4] are OVERRULLED, Plaintiff’s Motion to
proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1] is DENIED, and the case is hereby DISMISSED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to close the case.

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SO ORDERED this 18th day of January, 2018.

/s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._______
HARRY S. MATTICE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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