Wallis v. Correction Corporation of America et al (TV1)

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION as set forth in following order. Signed by Chief District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 3/29/18. (c/m to Benjamin T Wallis, P.O. Box 491, Etowah, TN 37331) (ABF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
BENJAMIN T. WALLIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CORRECTION CORPORATION
OF AMERICA,
CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS,
HAMILTON COUNTY, and
CHRISTOPHER HOWARD,
Defendants.

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No.:

1:17-CV-111-TAV-DCP

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Benjamin T. Wallis, has filed a filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 1-1]. Plaintiff’s case was originally filed in the Hamilton County Circuit
Court as Civil Action Number 17C401, and was removed to this Court by Defendants on April
24, 2017 [Doc. 1]. Presently before the Court are the motion to dismiss, or in the alternative,
motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Correct Care Solutions (“CCS”) [Doc. 6],
and the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Correction Corporation of America
(“CCA”) and Christopher Howard [Doc. 17]. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s
complaint will be DISMISSED sua sponte, and the motion to dismiss, or in the alternative,
motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant CCS [Doc. 6], and the motion for summary
judgment filed by Defendants CCA and Howard [Doc. 17] will be DENIED as moot.
I.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Hamilton County Circuit

Court on March 16, 2017, for alleged violations of his civil rights occurring during his

confinement at the Silverdale Detention Facility (“Silverdale”) [Doc. 1-1 p. 2]. Plaintiff claims
that the Defendants acted in deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, violated the Tennessee Constitution, and that Defendants were negligent
to his health and safety [Id. at 2–15]. Initially, Plaintiff claims that on March 30, 2016, he was
attacked by several gang members after arriving at Silverdale [Id. at 2]. Plaintiff alleges that
he informed “Mr. Moon and Mrs. Allen” that he was in need of medical attention, but that they
failed to provide him with medical care [Id.]. Further, Plaintiff claims that from March 31 to
April 1, 2016, he continued to suffer extreme pain, and repeatedly became unconscious from
his injuries [Id.]. However, Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to receive medical care because
Defendant CCA failed to “hire enough staff to properly run the facility” [Id.]. Plaintiff claims
that he repeatedly informed CCA and CCS officials of his injuries, but failed to receive medical
care [Id. at 3].
Additionally, on April 2, 2016, Plaintiff claims that he lost consciousness and fell down
a flight of stairs, suffering severe injuries [Id. at 4]. After his fall, Plaintiff alleges that he was
assaulted by medical officials who neglected his health and safety [Id. at 5]. Ultimately,
Plaintiff claims that he was paralyzed from the neck down for several days due to the failure
of CCA and CCS staff to provide proper medical care [Id.]. Further, Plaintiff claims that CCA
and CCS officials assaulted him when they transported him to Erlanger Medical Center for
further treatment when security and medical officials threw Plaintiff out of his medically
necessary wheelchair [Id. at 8].
Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to properly train or supervise security and
medical personnel, which resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries [Id. at 10–14]. Additionally, Plaintiff
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claims that Defendants were responsible for the inhumane conditions in which he was
incarcerated, as several employees threatened and assaulted Plaintiff [Id.]. Lastly, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants acted in deliberate indifference to his health and safety because they
knew that he was receiving improper medical care [Id.].
II.

ANALYSIS
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen prisoner

complaints and sua sponte dismiss those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim
for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014,
1015–16 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Congress directed the federal courts to review or ‘screen’ certain
complaints sua sponte and to dismiss those that failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted [or] . . . sought monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.”). The
dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs dismissals for failure to
state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory
language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.
2010).
Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). However, “a district court must (1) view
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true.” Tackett v. M&G Polymers, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that they were
deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v. Barberton
Citizens Hospital, 134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23
F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992);
see also Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Section 1983 does not
itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of
constitutional guarantees found elsewhere.”). In other words, Plaintiff must plead facts
sufficient to show: (1) the deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured to her by the
United States Constitution or other federal law; and (2) that the individual responsible for such
deprivation was acting under color of state law. Gregory v. Shelby Cty., 220 F.3d 433, 441
(6th Cir. 2000).
However, Plaintiff previously filed a civil rights complaint in this Court raising
essentially the same claims raised in this case, concerning conduct occurring over the same
period of time, and brought against the same Defendants in the current case. See Wallis v.
Correction Corp. of America, et. al, No. 1:17-cv-61. That matter remains pending before the
Court.
“As between federal district courts, . . . though no precise rule has evolved, the general
principle is to avoid duplicative litigation.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). “Generally, a suit is duplicative if the claims, parties,
and available relief do not significantly differ between the two actions.” Serlin v. Aruthus
Anderson & Co., 3 F.3d 221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993). Faced with a duplicative suit, such as this
one, a federal court may exercise its discretion to stay or dismiss the suit before it, allow both
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federal cases to proceed, or enjoin the parties from proceeding in the other suit. See Smith v.
SEC, 129 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 1997).
With respect to duplicative suits, the Sixth Circuit has stated
“[S]imple dismissal of the second suit is [a] common disposition because
plaintiffs have no right to maintain two actions on the same subject in the same
court, against the same defendant at the same time.” Curtis v. Citibank, N.A.,
226 F.3d 133, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Missouri v. Prudential Health
Care Plan, Inc., 259 F.3d 949, 953–54 (8th Cir. 2001) (joining other courts that
have held a district court may dismiss one of two identical pending actions).
Twaddle v. Diem, 200 F. App’x 435, 438 (6th Cir. 2006) (alterations in original). “A complaint
is malicious when it ‘duplicates allegations of another [ ]federal lawsuit by the same
plaintiff.’” Skudnov v. U.S. Dep’t of HUD, No. 3:15-CV-100-JHM, 2015 WL 3892422, at *3
(W.D. Ky. June 24, 2015) (quoting Daley v. U.S. Dist. Court Dist. of Del., 629 F. Supp. 2d
357, 359–60 (D. Del. 2009)); see, e.g., Harris v. TDOC Comm’r, No. 3:16-cv-615, 2016 WL
6464480, at *2 (E.D. Tenn Nov. 1, 2016) (dismissing duplicative § 1983 complaint as
malicious). Accordingly, this Court will exercise its discretion to DISMISS this duplicative
§ 1983 complaint as malicious. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000) (“Federal
courts do, however, retain broad powers to prevent duplicative or unnecessary litigation.”).
III.

CONCLUSION
Although this Court is mindful that a pro se complaint is to be liberally construed,

Haines v Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 510–21 (1972), it is quite clear that Plaintiff’s complaint is
duplicative of another pending case before this Court, and thus the Court finds his claims to be
malicious under 28 U.S.C. §§ § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint
and the present action will be DISMISSED sua sponte. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss,
or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant CCS [Doc. 6], and the
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motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants CCA and Howard [Doc. 17] will be
DENIED as moot.1
Finally, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in
good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Fed. R. App. P. 24.
AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.

s/ Thomas A. Varlan
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Although the Court has denied Defendants’ respective motions, the Court notes that
Plaintiff’s complaint in Wallis v. Correction Corp. of America, et. al, No. 1:17-cv-61, is
substantively identical to the present action.
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