Machoka v. City of Collegedale et al (TV2)
Filing
61
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION as set forth in following order. Signed by District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 4/22/19. (ABF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
DAVID MACHOKA and
AGNES MACHOKA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF COLLEGEDALE and
KATHERINE COOPER,
Defendants.
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No.:
1:17-cv-203-TAV-CHS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This civil action is before the Court on defendants’ respective motions for summary
judgment [Docs. 31, 33]. Defendant Katherine Cooper moves for summary judgment on
plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim (“Count I”), and for dismissal or, alternatively,
summary judgment on plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim (“Count II”) [Docs. 31].
Defendant City of Collegedale moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ municipal
liability claim (“Count III”) [Docs. 33]. Plaintiffs responded in opposition to both motions
[Docs. 39, 40], and defendants replied [Docs. 45, 46]. For the reasons discussed below, the
Court will grant both motions.
I.
Background
Plaintiffs David and Agnes Machoka filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that defendants violated their constitutional rights while investigating and
prosecuting plaintiffs for elder abuse and neglect at Moraa’s Home for Seniors (“Moraa’s”)
in Collegedale, Tennessee.1 Defendant Katherine Cooper is a detective with the Collegedale
Police Department, an entity maintained and operated by defendant City of Collegedale (the
“City”).
Plaintiffs opened Moraa’s in 2010 as a licensed “Residential Home for the Aged.”
Between January and February of 2013, family members of two residents at Moraa’s
reported claims of alleged physical abuse and gross neglect by plaintiffs and plaintiffs’
friend, Ms. Margaret Adhiambo, to the Collegedale Police Department. Although Ms.
Adhiambo did not work at Moraa’s in a paid capacity, she assisted plaintiffs with work at
Moraa’s between January and March, 2013 [Doc. 33-3 pp. 13–14]. At that time, Moraa’s
had six elderly residents with a variety of ailments, including Alzheimer’s and dementia [Id.
pp. 5, 17].
After receiving the report of one family’s allegations on February 18, 2013,
defendant Cooper initiated an investigation. First, defendant Cooper contacted the family
by phone to discuss the allegations [Doc. 31-2, p. 3]. According to Cooper, the family
member was very upset in explaining the allegations of abuse upon her grandmother, G.M.,2
who had since been removed from Moraa’s by ambulance to the hospital [Id. p. 3]. The
family member informed Cooper that she had seen Ms. Adhiambo forcibly grab her
1
Unless otherwise noted, the information in this section is drawn from plaintiffs’ responses
to defendants’ statements of material facts [Docs. 39, 40]. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (noting that all facts and the inferences to be
drawn from them must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party).
The names of Moraa’s residents and their family members are kept confidential, as
required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-6-118.
2
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grandmother by the ankles and had instructed Ms. Adhiambo not to grab her that way [Id.
pp. 3–4; Doc. 40-7 p. 2].3 The family member also stated that the family was concerned
about G.M.’s hygiene and that she was not receiving pain medication [Doc. 31–2 p. 4; Doc.
40-7 p. 1]. During this conversation, Cooper was able to confirm with the nurse at the
hospital that G.M. had bruising on her ankles, was diagnosed with a serious infection, and
had not been taking pain medication [Doc. 31-2 pp. 3–4; Doc. 40-7 p. 1].
Following this conversation, Cooper consulted with an investigator with Adult
Protective Services (“APS”), who informed her that APS had already been aware of separate
allegations involving residents at Moraa’s [Doc. 31-2 p. 6; Doc. 40-7 pp. 2–3]. Together
with APS investigators, Cooper then visited Moraa’s on February 20, 2013. Ms. Adhiambo
was the only care provider present when they arrived [Doc. 31-2 p. 8; Doc. 40-7 p. 3].
Cooper and the APS investigators observed a number of troubling things during their visit,
including a resident suffering from Parkinson’s disease who asked investigators for help to
sit up because she was in pain, and another resident who was found attempting to eat a
stuffed animal [Doc. 40-7 pp. 2–3]. In particular, investigators were concerned that some
residents appeared to have difficulty moving, and that medications were not being properly
organized, labeled, and maintained [Doc. 31-2 p. 9; 40-7 p. 3]. Based on these concerns
3
The Court refers to statements by others throughout this opinion that could be considered
hearsay if offered at trial for the truth of the matter asserted. However, the Court uses these
statements primarily for their effect on defendant Cooper rather than for their truth. As such, these
statements are non-hearsay for purposes of their admissibility at trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(c);
Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 226 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[H]earsay evidence cannot be considered
on a motion for summary judgment.”).
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and others, APS investigators advised Cooper that more investigation would be needed, but
that they did not believe residents were in immediate danger [Doc. 40-7 p. 3].
The next day, Defendant Cooper met directly with G.M. Although G.M. suffered
from dementia and spoke broken English, she was able to recount her experience at Moraa’s
to Cooper [Doc. 40-7 p. 5]. She was visibly upset and told Cooper that Ms. Adhiambo had
grabbed her and caused her bruises [Id.]. She also stated that she had witnessed another
elderly female resident being thrown from a chair and forcibly held to a bed, and that she
had heard Ms. Adhiambo and defendant Agnes Machoka yell at residents [Id.].
On February 22, 2013, Cooper again met with investigators from APS, as well as a
nurse with the Tennessee Department of Health, to review the case and all related
documents, including medical records. During that meeting, APS advised Cooper about a
complaint against Moraa’s regarding another former resident, E.B. [Id. p. 6].
The
investigator relayed to Cooper allegations by E.B.’s daughter that critical blood-clotting
medication was missing from E.B.’s system, according to lab tests performed by her doctor
[Id.]. Cooper later confirmed this information with E.B.’s daughter, and advised that she
file a report with the Collegedale Police Department [Id.].
Cooper then spoke with the fire marshal, who also expressed concern based on a
prior inspection of Moraa’s [Id. pp. 7–8]. Cooper agreed to assist the marshal in conducting
a fire drill at Moraa’s on February 27, 2013. According to the fire marshal’s report, all
residents were evacuated to the designated staging area in under four minutes; however, this
“required wheelchairs for each resident and the assistance of [Moraa’s] staff” [Doc. 40-10].
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Specifically, the fire marshal observed that “[r]esidents could not evacuate without the help
of the staff,” and cited International Fire Code section 408.10 as requiring that residents in
the home be able to exit the building with minimal assistance [Id.]. The fire marshal was
also concerned that Moraa’s did not have a written fire evacuation plan [Id.]. These and
other issues led the marshal to opine that the conditions at Moraa’s presented “a life safety
hazard” [Id.].
Based on this investigation, and after consultation with the District Attorney’s
Office, Cooper prepared an Affidavit of Complaint against plaintiffs David and Agnes
Machoka [Doc. 40-9]. Based on this affidavit and a subsequent finding of probable cause,
plaintiffs were arrested on charges of abuse and neglect and released on bond on March 5,
2013 [Docs. 40-13; 31-10]. All residents were removed from Moraa’s, and the fire marshal
closed the facility after plaintiffs failed to remedy fire code violations [Doc. 31-7 pp. 14–
15]. Plaintiffs were indicted by the grand jury on two charges of willful abuse, neglect or
exploitation on August 8, 2013 [Doc. 7 p. 6]. However, the charges were later dismissed
on July 20, 2016 [Id. p. 7].
Plaintiffs now allege that defendant Cooper violated their Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by making false statements in the Affidavit of Complaint [Doc. 7 ¶¶ 18–
30]. Plaintiffs further allege that defendant City is liable for defendant Cooper’s acts by
virtue of its policy or custom that allowed for such acts and for its failure to adequately train,
supervise, and screen its employees [Id. ¶¶ 31–39].
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II.
Standard of Review
B.
Motion to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) sets out a liberal pleading standard. To survive
a motion to dismiss, a complaint needs only a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ‘in order to give [the opposing party] fair notice
of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Detailed
factual allegations are not required, but a party’s “obligation to provide the ‘grounds’” of
his relief “requires more than labels and conclusions.” Id. “[A] formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads the factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim
for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
B.
Motion for Summary Judgment Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
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is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears
the burden of establishing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 n.2 (1986); Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339
(6th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, all facts and the inferences to be drawn from them must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Burchett v. Kiefer, 301 F.3d 937,
942 (6th Cir. 2002).
“Once the moving party presents evidence sufficient to support a motion under Rule
56, the nonmoving party is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of allegations.” Curtis
ex rel. Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1421, 1423 (E.D. Tenn. 1991)
(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317). Likewise, the nonmoving party “cannot rely on the hope
that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact, but must present
affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary
judgment.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989) (internal
quotation marks omitted). That is, the nonmoving party must point to evidence in the
record upon which a reasonable finder of fact could find in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The genuine issue of fact must be material, in that
it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id.
The Court’s function at the summary judgment stage is limited to determining
whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper question
for the fact finder. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. Thus, the Court does not weigh the evidence
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or determine the truth of the matter. Id. at 249. The Court also does not search the record
“to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.” Street, 886 F.2d at 1479–
80. In short, “[t]he inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there
is a need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that
properly can be resolved only by a trier of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in
favor of either party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
III.
Defendant Cooper’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant Cooper moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ malicious
prosecution claim (“Count I”), arguing that plaintiffs cannot show that their arrest and
prosecution were without probable cause, or that Cooper knowingly or with reckless
disregard for the truth made material false statements in her Affidavit of Complaint. As for
plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment deprivation-of-liberty claim (“Count II”), Cooper moves
for dismissal for failure to state a claim, arguing that the Fourth Amendment rather than the
Fourteenth controls plaintiffs’ allegations, and as such that Count II is indistinguishable
from Count I. Alternatively, Cooper moves for summary judgment on Count II on the basis
that plaintiffs cannot show a violation of their procedural or substantive due process rights.
Finally, Cooper moves for summary judgment on both counts on qualified immunity
grounds. The Court will address defendant Cooper’s arguments as to each count in turn.
A.
Count I
In order to prevail on a civil rights claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs
are required to prove that (1) they were “deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or
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laws of the United States,” and (2) that they were “subjected or caused to be subjected to
this deprivation by a person acting under color of state law.” Gregory v. Shelby Cty., 220
F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000). Here, plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim in Count I is based on a theory
of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. In such a case, Sixth Circuit
precedent requires that plaintiffs also prove the following: (1) the defendant “made,
influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute” plaintiffs; (2) the criminal
prosecution lacked probable cause; (3) plaintiffs suffered a deprivation of liberty as a result
of the legal proceeding; and, (4) the criminal prosecution was resolved in plaintiffs’ favor.
Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308–09 (6th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiffs’ success on Count I hinges on the first two, interrelated elements.
“Probable cause is defined as reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima
facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” Id. at 306. In making a probable cause
determination, courts must “consider the totality of the circumstances and whether the facts
and circumstances of which [the defendant] had knowledge at the moment of the arrest
were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that [the defendant] had committed
an offense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the question of probable
cause relates to the first element of a malicious prosecution claim in that “police officers
cannot, in good faith, rely on a judicial determination of probable cause to absolve them of
liability when that determination was premised on an officer’s own material
misrepresentations to the court.” Id. at 312. Thus, to establish that the defendant “made,
influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute,” a plaintiff must present evidence
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that the defendant “(1) stated a deliberate falsehood or showed reckless disregard for the
truth and (2) that the allegedly false or omitted information was material to the court’s
finding of probable cause.” Id.
Here, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there was
probable cause to arrest plaintiffs on charges of physical abuse or gross neglect as defined
in Tenn. Code Ann. §71-6-102.4 There was, of course, a judicial determination of probable
cause in this case based on defendant Cooper’s Affidavit of Complaint [Doc. 31-9]. Cooper
also testified before the Hamilton County Grand Jury, which indicted plaintiffs on charges
of willful abuse or gross neglect [Doc. 7 ¶ 22]. Plaintiffs argue that these probable cause
determinations were tainted by a number of alleged material false statements that Cooper
made in her Affidavit and grand jury testimony.
Plaintiffs take issue with three statements in particular. First, plaintiffs allege that
defendant Cooper “falsely swore to the absence of critical medication in G.M. and E.B.’s
[medical] records” [Doc. 40 p. 11]. Second, plaintiffs argue that Cooper knowingly made
a false statement in stating that “medical records indicated bruising on [G.M.’s] ankles and
below her knee which was indicative of finger type markings due to being grabbed” [see
Docs. 40 pp. 11–12; 40-9 p. 1]. Finally, plaintiffs allege that defendant Cooper submitted
Plaintiffs were prosecuted under Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-6-119, which provides “(a) It is
an offense to knowingly, other than by accidental means, physically abuse an impaired adult if the
abuse results in serious mental or physical harm.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-6-102 defines “abuse or
neglect” to mean “the infliction of physical pain, injury, or mental anguish, or the deprivation of
services by a caretaker that are necessary to maintain the health and welfare of an adult or a
situation in which an adult is unable to provide or obtain the services that are necessary to maintain
that person's health or welfare.”
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false sworn statements when she stated that none of Moraa’s residents were ambulatory
and referred to a fire code that allegedly required that residents be able to exit the building
with minimal assistance [Docs. 40 p. 12; 40-9 pp. 2, 3]. However, even without the
statements to which plaintiffs object, the totality of the facts and circumstances of which
defendant Cooper was aware at the time of plaintiffs’ arrest were sufficient to warrant a
belief that plaintiffs had committed the offense charged. See Sykes, 625 F.3d at 306. Thus,
even if the statements were knowingly false—a matter the Court does not reach—the
statements were not material to the probable cause determination.
For example, plaintiffs do not dispute the truth of the following statements in the
Affidavit of Complaint: the granddaughter of one of the residents at Moraa’s stated that
she witnessed Ms. Adhiambo grab her grandmother by the ankles and shake her [Doc. 409 p. 1]. That same resident was taken to the hospital and found to be dehydrated, bruised,
and suffering from a serious urinary tract infection [Id.]. When interviewed, that resident
stated that she had been injured by Ms. Adhiambo, had witnessed another resident being
thrown from a chair and forcibly held to a bed, and heard defendant Agnes Machoka
verbally abuse residents [Id.]. She stated she was fearful of the caregivers at Moraa’s [Id.].
And finally, detectives and investigators for APS and the Department of Health witnessed
concerning things upon a visit to Moraa’s, including a resident asking for help to sit up
because she was in pain and another resident attempting to eat a stuffed animal [Id. p. 2].
Investigators also corroborated the statement about a resident being thrown from a chair
and held down, and were generally left with the impression that Moraa’s did not have the
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licensing, staff, or equipment required to care for the residents present [Id.]. This was the
information that defendant Cooper brought to the assistant district attorney—before she
had written the Affidavit of Complaint—who informed her that she had probable cause for
a case against plaintiffs approximately four days after Cooper began her investigation [Doc.
40-7 p. 4].
“[T]he point of Civil Rule 56 is to prevent claims from going to jury when the
court, after drawing all inferences in favor of the non movant . . . determines that no
reasonable jury could [find that no probable cause existed for the defendant’s arrest].”
Newman v. Township of Hamburg, 773 F.3d 769, 773 (6th Cir. 2014). Here, the material
facts supporting a probable cause determination—excluding those objected to by
plaintiffs—are not in dispute. Therefore, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that
would support the need for a trial on plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim. Because
probable cause existed for plaintiffs’ prosecution, summary judgment will be granted for
defendant Cooper on Count I.
B.
Count II
Count II of the Amended Complaint states another claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
this time for “deprivation of liberty under color of state law” [Doc. 7 pp. 7–8]. Specifically,
plaintiffs allege that defendant Cooper’s purported inclusion of false and misleading
information in her Affidavit of Complaint deprived plaintiffs of their right to “occupational
liberty”—that is, their right to work for a living [Id.]. Plaintiffs assert that they are
guaranteed this right under the Fourteenth Amendment [Id.; Doc. 40 p. 16].
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To the extent this claim alleges a violation of substantive due process, it is
foreclosed by Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). In that case, where the plaintiff
alleged his prosecution without probable cause deprived him of substantive due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that the plaintiff’s claims should instead
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. 510 U.S. at 273–75. Furthermore, several
circuits agree that claims alleging the deprivation of occupational liberty are not cognizable
under substantive due process. See, e.g., Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 428 (8th Cir.
1999) (citing cases from the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, as well as from various district
courts).
Nor was there a violation of procedural due process because those protections—if
implicated here at all—are coextensive with the Fourth Amendment.5 In Gerstein v. Pugh,
the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he Fourth Amendment [probable cause requirement]
was tailored explicitly for the criminal justice system, and its balance between individual
public interests always has been thought to define the ‘process that is due’ for seizures of
person or property in criminal cases . . . .” 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.27 (1975). Thus, where
probable cause exists for a criminal prosecution under Fourth Amendment standards,
5
Plaintiffs do not cite any case law to support their ability to allege a procedural due
process claim in this context. Various circuits have indeed held that there is a cause of action for
deprivation of “occupational liberty” under procedural due process. See Singleton, 176 F.3d at
428. However, cases addressing this issue largely involve at-will government employees suing
their employer or employees who otherwise have some statutory right to continued employment.
See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341 (1976). Plaintiffs provide no support for their assumption that they hold a protected right that
would provide a basis for a procedural due process claim such as the one they apparently allege.
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procedural due process has also been satisfied under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gehl
Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1538 (10th Cir. 1995).
The Sixth Circuit used that same reasoning in Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls,
where the plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim consisting of claims under the Fourth
Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clause. 395 F.3d at 313. There,
the court held that although the officers involved did not have probable cause to arrest the
plaintiff under the Fourth Amendment, the plaintiff’s reliance on the Due Process Clause
was “misplaced . . . because it is the Fourth Amendment which establishes procedural
protections in this part of the criminal justice area.” Id. “[B]ecause the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require any additional procedures beyond those
mandated by the Fourth Amendment,” the court affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on the plaintiff’s due process claim. Id. Similarly, because there was
probable cause for plaintiffs’ prosecution here, as explained above, summary judgment will
be granted for defendant Cooper on Count II.
C.
Qualified Immunity
Based on the foregoing analysis, defendant Cooper is also entitled to qualified
immunity. “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages
unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the
challenged conduct.” Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati, 468 Fed. App’x 491, 493 (6th Cir.
2012) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011)). Since defendant Cooper
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has pled the defense of qualified immunity [Doc. 14 p. 9], the burden shifts to plaintiffs to
“show that [Cooper] violated a right so clearly established ‘that every reasonable official
would have understood that what [s]he [was] doing violated that right.’” Id.
As set forth above, plaintiffs cannot meet this burden. Both a judge and grand jury
determined that probable cause existed to believe plaintiffs had committed physical abuse
or gross neglect [Docs. 31-9; 7, ¶ 22]. Based on the undisputed facts in the record, plaintiffs
could not negate this probable cause determination. Accordingly, defendant Cooper did not
violate any clearly established constitutional or statutory right, and she is entitled to
qualified immunity as a result.
IV.
Defendant City of Collegedale’s Motion for Summary Judgment
A municipality may be sued under § 1983 where an officer’s unconstitutional actions
are caused by the municipality’s official policy or custom. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs.,
of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). However, “[t]here can be no Monell
municipal liability under § 1983 unless there is an underlying unconstitutional act.” Wilson
v. Morgan, 277 F.3d 326, 340 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S.
796, 799 (1986)). Because the Court will grant summary judgment for defendant Cooper,
there is no unconstitutional act that would support imposing Monell liability on the City.
Therefore, the Court will also grant summary judgment for the City on Count III of the
Amended Complaint.
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V.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, defendants’ motions for summary judgment [Docs.
31, 33] will be GRANTED. A separate order will follow. The Clerk will be DIRECTED
to CLOSE this case.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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