Zarate v. Woods et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION: Although this Court is mindful that a pro se complaint is to be liberally construed, Haines v Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 51021 (1972), it is quite clear that Plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation of any constitut ionally protected right, privilege, or immunity, and therefore, the Court finds his claims to be frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Plaintiff's complaint [Doc. 4] and the present action will be DISMISSED sua sponte for fai lure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. Signed by District Judge J Ronnie Greer on 12/18/2017. (Copy of Memorandum Opinion mailed to Jamie Zarate) (AMP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
JAMIE FRANCISCO ZARATE,
Plaintiff,
v.
TERRY WOODS and
JOE FOWLER,
Defendants.
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No. 1:17-cv-260-JRG-SKL
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s pro se amended complaint for violation of civil rights
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 4]. On October 26, 2017, the Court screened Plaintiff’s original
complaint and found that “[w]hile Plaintiff’s complaint as stated does not state a claim upon which
relief may be granted as filed against these Defendants, some of Plaintiff’s allegations could state
a claim, if amended” [Doc. 3 at 9]. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint
to “identify as Defendant(s) the members of the medical staff at the Hamilton County Jail
responsible for denying him his prescribed medication, and what relief Plaintiff is requesting with
regard to this constitutional violation” [Id.]. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint on
November 22, 2017 [Doc. 4].
Plaintiff’s amended complaint must also be screened to determine whether it states a claim
entitling Plaintiff to relief or is frivolous or malicious or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A. For the reasons discussed
below, Plaintiff’s complaint [Doc. 4] will be DISMISSED sua sponte for a failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under § 1983.
I.
BACKGROUND
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff brings suit against Defendants Hamilton County,
Hamilton County Jail, and Hamilton County Jail Medical Staff [Doc. 4 at 1]. Plaintiff asserts that
the Hamilton County Jail Medical Staff “refuse[] to provide me the right medication even when
they know I have to be on that medication” [Id. at 3]. Plaintiff claims that he has been denied the
proper medication several times, and that the “Hamilton County Jail” has “fail[ed] to do anything
about this issue,” even when Plaintiff has spoken to jail officials [Id.]. Lastly, Plaintiff asserts that
jail and medical officials have claimed “for the last 5 years,” that they do not have to provide him
with medication prescribed by a doctor [Id. at 4]. Plaintiff requests $1,850,000 in monetary
damages [Id. at 5].
II.
ANALYSIS
A.
Screening Standard
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen prisoner
complaints and sua sponte dismiss those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for
relief or are against a defendant who is immune. See Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1015–16
(6th Cir. 1999) (“Congress directed the federal courts to review or ‘screen’ certain complaints sua
sponte and to dismiss those that failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
[or] . . . sought monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.”). The dismissal
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure state a claim under
[28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the
language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive
an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
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true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). However, “a district court must (1) view the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v.
M&G Polymers, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466
(6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
B.
§ 1983 Standard
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he was deprived of
a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v. Barberton Citizens Hospital,
134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir.
1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Braley v. City of
Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional
rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found
elsewhere."). In other words, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show: (1) the deprivation of
a right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the United States Constitution or other federal
law; and (2) that the individual responsible for such deprivation was acting under color of state
law. Gregory v. Shelby Cty., 220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s complaint in its current
form fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 1
C.
Proper Defendants
Plaintiff has brought suit against Hamilton County, the Hamilton County Jail, and the
Hamilton County Jail Medical Staff [Doc. 4 at 1]. At the outset, the Hamilton County Jail is a
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Courts in the Sixth Circuit have rejected heightened or lower pleading standards for §
1983 claims and instead found that Twombly and Iqbal plausibility pleading standards govern. See
e.g., Hutchison v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 685 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751 (M.D.
Tenn. 2010) (“In context of Section 1983 municipal liability, district courts in the Sixth Circuit
have interpreted Iqbal’s standards strictly.”).
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building and not a suable entity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 688–90 (finding that in a suit against a local government unit, only “bodies politic” are
“persons” who are amenable to be sued under § 1983); Cage v. Kent County Corr. Facility, No.
96-1167, 1997 WL 225647, at *1 (6th Cir. May 1, 1997) (stating that “[t]he district court also
properly found that the jail facility named as a defendant was not an entity subject to suit under §
1983”); see also Taylor v. Hamilton County Jail, No. 1:15–cv–261, 2015 WL 5882811, at *2
(E.D. Tenn. Oct. 8, 2015) (holding the Hamilton County Jail is not a suable entity within the
meaning of § 1983).
Similarly, the Hamilton County Jail Medical Staff is not a “person” subject to suit within
the terms of § 1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 689–690 n.53; see also Hix v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr.,
196 F. App'x 350, 355 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding “that the defendant medical departments are
not ‘persons’ under § 1983”); Anderson v. Morgan County Corr. Facility, No. 3:14–cv–516, 2015
WL 7281665, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 17, 2015) (finding that the jail medical staff is a non-suable
entity under § 1983). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Hamilton County Jail and
Hamilton County Jail Medical Staff fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under §
1983.
Plaintiff has also brought suit against Hamilton County. To succeed on a § 1983 claim
against a municipal entity, such as Hamilton County, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) his harm
was caused by a constitutional violation; and (2) the municipality itself was responsible for that
violation, generally because of a policy, custom, pattern or practice of the municipal defendant
that caused Plaintiff’s injury. Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Monell,
436 U.S. at 691 (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor—
or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
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theory.”). Plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the county itself, and show that
the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy. See Garner v. Memphis
Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 363–64 (6th Cir. 1993). To succeed on a municipal liability claim, a
plaintiff must establish that his or her constitutional rights were violated and that a policy or custom
of the municipality was the “moving force” behind the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. Powers
v. Hamilton Cty. Pub. Def. Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592, 606–07 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Monell, 436
U.S. at 694).
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Hamilton County had an established custom or
policy of deliberate indifference relevant to Plaintiff’s medical care. For § 1983 purposes, a
“custom” is a “practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy,
is so permanent and well-settled” as to have the force of law. Cash v. Hamilton Cty. Dep't of Adult
Prob., 388 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir. 2004). Although Plaintiff claims that he has not been provided
medication while incarcerated at the Hamilton County Jail, Plaintiff makes no allegations from
which it could be inferred that a county custom or policy was the “moving force” behind the
alleged failure to provide his medication. See Powers, 501 F.3d at 606–07; see also Huffer v.
Bogen, 503 F. App’x 455, 462 (6th Cir. 2012) (dismissing a § 1983 claim against a county
defendant when the complaint “failed to identify any policy or custom that resulted in a
constitutional violation”); Broyles v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. 08–1638, 2009 WL 3154241, at
*2 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 2009) (“[B]are allegations of a custom or policy, unsupported by any evidence,
are insufficient to establish an entitlement to relief”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against
Hamilton County fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983.
III.
CONCLUSION
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Although this Court is mindful that a pro se complaint is to be liberally construed, Haines
v Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 510–21 (1972), it is quite clear that Plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation
of any constitutionally protected right, privilege, or immunity, and therefore, the Court finds his
claims to be frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Plaintiff’s complaint [Doc. 4] and
the present action will be DISMISSED sua sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Finally, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good
faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.
ENTER:
s/J. RONNIE GREER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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