Vaughn v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of (TWP2)
Filing
10
MEMORANDUM OPINION: this action will be DISMISSED without prejudice for want of prosecution pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on February 18, 2020. (AYB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
MELINDA RENEA VAUGHN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner
of Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 1:18-CV-78
REEVES/STEGER
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Melinda Renea Vaughn, filed this social security appeal on April 27, 2018. On
January 7, 2020, Vaughn was ordered to show cause in writing within 14 days why this case should
not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. [Doc. 8]. Vaughn has not responded to the Court’s order.
Consequently, this action will be DISMISSED pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)
for want of prosecution and for failure to comply with the court’s order.
I.
BACKGROUND
Vaughn, through counsel, filed this social security appeal on April 27, 2018 and moved for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. [Doc. 1, 2]. The Court granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, [D. 5], and summons were issued on May 7, 2018 [Doc. 6]. Along with the issuance of
summons, the Court issued a notice, informing Vaughn that, although the United States Marshal
would effectuate service, since she had been granted in forma pauperis status, she was nonetheless
responsible for the preparation of service packets for each defendant. [Doc. 7]. The notice
contained instructions on how to prepare the service packets, and where to send the packets. [Id.].
As of January 7, 2020, Vaughn had not filed the required service packets and was ordered
to show cause in writing within 14 days why this case should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute. Vaughn has not responded to the Court’s order.
II.
ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) “confers on district courts the authority to dismiss
an action for failure of a plaintiff to prosecute the claim or to comply with the Rules or any order
of the Court.” Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dep’t, 529 F.3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Knoll v. AT&T, 176 F.3d 359, 362–63 (6th Cir. 1999)); see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S.
626, 630 (1962) (recognizing “the power of courts, acting on their own initiative, to clear their
calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties
seeking relief”); Carpenter v. City of Flint, 723 F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled
that a district court has the authority to dismiss sua sponte a lawsuit for failure to prosecute.”).
“The power to invoke this sanction is necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition
of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the District Courts.” Link v. Wabash
R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962).
In determining whether a Rule 41(b) involuntary dismissal is warranted, the court considers
four factors:
(1) whether the party’s failure is due to willfulness, bad faith, or
fault; (2) whether the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed
party’s conduct; (3) whether the dismissed party was warned that
failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) whether less
drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was
ordered.
Schafer, 529 F.3d at 737 (citation omitted). “‘Although typically none of the factors is outcome
dispositive, . . . a case is properly dismissed by the district court where there is a clear record of
2
delay or contumacious conduct.’” Id. Because dismissal without prejudice is a relatively lenient
sanction as compared to dismissal with prejudice, the “controlling standards should be greatly
relaxed” for Rule 41(b) dismissals without prejudice where “the dismissed party is ultimately not
irrevocably deprived of his [or her] day in court.” Muncy v. G.C.R., Inc., 110 F. App’x 552, 556
(6th Cir. 2004) (citing Nwokocha v. Perry, 3 F. App’x 319, 321 (6th Cir. 2001)).
The Court will review each factor in turn.
A. Fault
A plaintiff demonstrates bad faith, willfulness, or fault when they “display either an intent
to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard for the effect of [plaintiff’s] conduct on those
proceedings.” Wu v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Even
absent bad faith, failure to comply with court orders reflects “willfulness and fault” for purposes
of Rule 41(b). See, e.g., Lannom v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:18-CV-00069, 2019 WL 5101168, at
*2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2019); Hatcher v. Dennis, No. 1:17-cv-01042, 2018 WL 1586235, at *1
(W.D. Tenn. Mar. 30, 2018); Malott v. Haas, No. 16-13014, 2017 WL 1319839, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Feb. 8, 2017).
Here, it is clear that Vaughn’s failure to comply with the Court’s Show Cause Order is due
to her own willfulness and fault. Vaughn was informed that, though she received in forma pauperis
status, she was responsible for the preparation of service packets. [Doc. 7]. It has now been twentyone months since that notice was issued, and Vaughn has not returned the service packets or
inquired further if she was unclear on the service packet requirements.
B. Prejudice
“A defendant is prejudiced by a plaintiff’s dilatory conduct if the defendant is ‘required to
waste time, money, and effort in pursuit of cooperation which [the plaintiff] was legally obligated
3
to provide.’” Carpenter, 723 F.3d at 707 (second alteration in original) (quoting Harmon v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 110 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also Schafer, 529 F.3d at 739 (same).
Here, because service was not issued, the Court can discern no significant prejudice to the
defendant based on Vaughn’s failure to comply with the Court’s order, and this factor in and of
itself would not weigh in favor of dismissal.
C. Prior Notice
Whether a party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal “is a ‘key
consideration’” in the Rule 41(b) analysis. Schafer, 529 F.3d at 740 (quoting Stough v. Mayville
Cmty. Sch., 138 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 1998).
Here, the record reflects that Vaughn was expressly warned that, should she fail to timely
comply with the Court’s show cause order, her complaint would be dismissed for failure to
prosecute without further notice. [Doc. 7].
D. Other Sanctions
Dismissal without prejudice balances the Court’s interest in “sound judicial case and
docket management” with “the public policy interest in the disposition of cases on their merits.”
Muncy, 110 F. App’x at 557 n.5.
Here, the Court finds that alternative sanctions would not be effective. Vaughn’s failure
to respond to the show cause order strongly suggests that any further attempts to prod her into
compliance with the Court’s orders and instructions through the imposition of a lesser sanction
than dismissal would be futile. Vaughn was given the necessary instructions to allow the United
States Marshal to effectuate service, but she has not done so and has not monitored the progress
of the case.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the relevant factors weigh in favor of
4
an involuntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 41(b) based upon plaintiff’s noncompliance with the court’s previous order. Schafer, 529 F.3d at 736.
III.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this action will be DISMISSED without
prejudice for want of prosecution pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
ORDER TO FOLLOW.
____________________________________________
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?