Urling v. State of Tennessee et al (JRG2)
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Following a review of plaintiff's application and sworn statement, it is hereby ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, [Doc. 1], is GRANTED, and the plaintiff will be permitted to file this action without the prepayment of fees or security therefore. Because this Court has no jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim, it is hereby ORDERED that his case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by District Judge J Ronnie Greer on 07/31/2018. (Copy of Order mailed to Ian Lancelot Urling) (AMP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
IAN LANCELOT URLING,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE and
COFFEE COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
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No.
1:18-CV-98
MEMORANDUM OPINON AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court to address plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma
pauperis, [Doc. 1], and Motion for Return of Property. [Doc. 2]. Following a review of plaintiff’s
application and sworn statement, it is hereby ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion to proceed in
forma pauperis, [Doc. 1], is GRANTED, and the plaintiff will be permitted to file this action
without the prepayment of fees or security therefore. See U.S.C. § 1915.
A motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 is treated “as a civil action in
equity when the owner of the property invokes the Rule after the conclusion of his criminal
proceedings.” United States v. Oguaju, 107 F. App’x 541, 542 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing United States
v. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d 763, 768 (6th Cir. 2000)). Therefore, this Court must now screen plaintiff’s
Motion for Return of Property, functioning as a Complaint, [Doc. 1], and sua sponte dismiss those
claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who
is immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 609 (6th
Cir. 1997) (finding that § 1915(e)(2) applies to complaints filed in forma pauperis by prisoners
and non-prisoners alike), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). If
the complaint does not state a claim or is frivolous, malicious, or seeks damages from an immune
defendant, this suit must be dismissed. In performing its screening task, the Court bears in mind
that the pleadings of pro se litigants must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The Court examines plaintiff’s complaint in
light of these requirements.
This Court FINDS that this action is frivolous because this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the alleged controversy. In his complaint, [Doc. 1], the plaintiff alleges that
jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) states:
“A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by the
deprivation of property may move for the property’s return. The motion must be
filed in the district where the property was seized. The court must receive evidence
on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion. If it grants the motion, the
court must return the property to the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions
to protect access to the property and its use in later proceedings.”
Plaintiff is correct that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants this Court original jurisdiction “of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
Plaintiff’s claim states that his property was confiscated by the Coffee County Sheriff’s
Department, and that officials of Coffee County refused to return his property. [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff
never alleged that his seized property was at any time in the possession of a federal government
agent or agency. [Id.]. However, Rule 41(g) applies only to the federal government, not to state
or local actors. See United States v. Price, 841 F.3d 703, 707 (6th Cir. 2016) (“For the district
court to grant the [Rule 41] motion, however, the federal government must have itself possessed
the property at some point.”) (citing Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 491-92 (7th Cir. 2003)).
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The Court cannot order the state or local officials to return the property in question. See United
States v. Black, 2014 WL 3845411 at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 5, 2014) (citing Oguaju, 107 F. App’x
at 542-43). For this reason, Rule 41(g) cannot provide him with relief against the State of
Tennessee or the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department. Although plaintiff cites to 28 U.S.C. §
1331 and Rule 41(g), he does not state a claim under federal law. Because this Court has no
jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim, it is hereby ORDERED that his case is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
So ordered
ENTER:
s/J. RONNIE GREER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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