Ridge v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION. For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby: (1) ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the magistrate judges report and recommendation (Doc. 33); (2) DENIES Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (Doc. 22); (3) GRANTS the Commissioners motion for summary judgment (Doc. 31); and (4) AFFIRMS the Commissioners finding that Plaintiff is not disabled under theSocial Security Act. Signed by District Judge Travis R McDonough on 6/18/2019. (BDG)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
CATHY DARLENE RIDGE,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
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Case No. 1:18-cv-109
Judge Travis R. McDonough
Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment (Docs. 22, 31). The Court
referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule
72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a report and recommendation. On May 10, 2019,
Magistrate Judge Lee entered a report and recommendation, recommending that the Court:
(1) deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment; (2) grant the Commissioner’s motion for
summary judgment; and (3) affirm the Commissioner’s finding that Plaintiff is not disabled
under the Social Security Act. (See generally Doc. 33.) Plaintiff timely filed objections to
Magistrate Judge Lee’s report and recommendation (Doc. 34).1 For the reasons stated below, the
Court will: (1) ACCEPT and ADOPT the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (Doc.
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The Commissioner did not timely file a response to Plaintiff’s objections. Thereafter, the Court
ordered the Commissioner to file a response to Plaintiff’s objections within fourteen days. (Doc.
35.) Rather than file a substantive response to Plaintiff’s objections, as directed by the Court, the
Commissioner filed a notice that she “rests her case and relies on her previously filed brief in
support of her motion for summary judgment.” (Doc. 36.) The Court recommends that in future
cases the Commissioner file a response which addresses the substance of any objections.
33); (2) DENY Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 22); (3) GRANT the
Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 32); and (4) AFFIRM the
Commissioner’s finding that Plaintiff is not disabled under the Social Security Act.
I.
BACKGROUND
In her report and recommendation, Magistrate Judge Lee detailed the procedural and
factual background underlying this matter. The parties have not objected to Magistrate Judge
Lee’s recitation of the facts, and the Court finds that the facts set forth in the report and
recommendation are accurate. Accordingly, for the purposes of reviewing Plaintiff’s objections
to Magistrate Judge Lee’s report and recommendation, the Court ADOPTS BY REFERENCE
the facts set forth in the report and recommendation (Doc. 33).
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must conduct a de novo review of those portions of the report and
recommendation to which objections are made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In doing so,
the Court’s standard of review is essentially the same as the magistrate judge’s—review is
limited to determining whether the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) findings are supported by
substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Brainard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla” and means “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971). If supported by substantial evidence, the Court must affirm the ALJ’s
findings, even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion. Jones v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 475 (6th Cir. 2003).
2
Although the Court is required to engage in a de novo review of specific objections, if the
objections merely restate the arguments asserted in Plaintiff’s earlier motion, which were
addressed by the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the Court may deem those
objections waived. See VanDiver v. Martin, 304 F. Supp. 2d 934, 937 (E.D. Mich. 2004). “A
general objection, or one that merely restates the arguments previously presented is not sufficient
to alert the court to alleged errors on the part of the magistrate judge. An ‘objection’ that does
nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested resolution, or simply
summarizes what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term is used in this
context.” Id. The Sixth Circuit has also explained that:
A general objection to the entirety of the magistrate’s report has the same effects
as would a failure to object. The district court’s attention is not focused on any
specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the magistrate
useless. The functions of the district court are effectively duplicated as both the
magistrate and the district court perform identical tasks. This duplication of time
and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to
the purposes of the Magistrates Act.
Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
III.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff raises two objections to Magistrate Judge Lee’s report and recommendation.
First, Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge erred in finding that the ALJ’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) determination is supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ did not
properly consider Plaintiff’s mental limitations. (Doc. 34, at 1–4.) Second, Plaintiff argues that
the magistrate judge erred in finding that the ALJ properly considered Dr. Goewey’s findings of
Plaintiff’s physical limitations in his RFC determination. (Id. at 4–6.)
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A.
Whether the ALJ Properly Considered Plaintiff’s Mental Limitations in
Determining Her Residual Functional Capacity
The Social Security Administration determines eligibility for disability benefits by
following a five-step process.2 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). As relevant here, at Step Three of
the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ is tasked with considering the medical severity of the
claimant’s impairments. If an impairment meets or equals a listing, the ALJ will find that the
claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The ALJ must also determine a
claimant’s RFC, or her ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis
despite limitations from his impairments, before considering Step Four. See § 404.1520(e).
When making an RFC assessment, “the ALJ must consider limitations and restrictions imposed
by all of [the] individual’s impairments, even those that are not severe.” Kirkland v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 528 F. App’x 425, 427 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fisk v. Astrue, 253 F. App’x 580, 583
(6th Cir.2007); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523.
In Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, she argued that the ALJ’s RFC
determination was not supported by substantial evidence, because the ALJ did not properly
consider Plaintiff’s mental limitations. (See Doc. 23, at 8–11.) In her report and
recommendation, Magistrate Judge Lee addressed and rejected this exact argument, reasoning
that,
[w]hile the ALJ could have done a more thorough job articulating exactly why
she found the record did not support any mental limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC,
either as a result of Plaintiff’s mental health diagnoses or the combined effect of
all her impairments, her decision makes clear why she reached her determination,
and I FIND that determination is supported by substantial evidence. . . . . To
require remand for the ALJ to explain, again, that Plaintiff’s anxiety and
depression, while medically determinable, did not impact her ability to perform
medium unskilled or skilled work would serve no purpose.
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A more detailed explanation of this process can be found in Magistrate Judge Lee’s report and
recommendation. (See Doc. 33, at 3–4.)
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(Doc. 33, at 11.) The report and recommendation also points to three statements by the ALJ that
support that she considered Plaintiff’s mental impairments beyond Step Two: (1) the ALJ stated
her RFC assessment was “based on all the evidence with consideration of the limitations and
restrictions imposed by the combined effects of the claimant’s medically determinable
impairments” (id. at 8 (citing Tr. at 16)); (2) the ALJ stated at the end of Step Two that “the
following [RFC] assessment reflects the degree of limitation I have found in the ‘paragraph B’ in
mental function analysis” (id. at 9 (citing Tr. at 15)); and (3) the ALJ stated, in determining
whether Plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work at Step Four, that Plaintiff
“does not have any mental limitations that would preclude the performance of skilled or semiskilled work” (id. at 9 (citing Tr. at 19).)
Plaintiff now raises this same argument in her objections to Magistrate Judge Lee’s report
and recommendation. Specifically, Plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s first two statements listed
above as boilerplate language insufficient to properly account for the ALJ’s failure to explain her
reasoning. (Doc. 34, at 2.) Although the Sixth Circuit has cautioned that use of boilerplate
language alone may be insufficient to explain an ALJ’s findings, Cox v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
615 F. App’x 254, 260 (6th Cir. 2015), such use does not undermine an ALJ’s RFC
determination “premised on more than mere boilerplate assertions [which] demonstrate[s]
meaningful engagement with the facts presented in the record,” Norris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
461 F. App’x 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2012). In addition to use of these two “boilerplate” statements,
the ALJ went on to describe, at Step Four, that, Plaintiff had been prescribed Celexa, which,
according to Plaintiff, “fairly controlled her symptoms[,]” and that:
[i]n comparing the claimant’s [RFC] with the physical and mental demands of
[Plaintiff’s past work] I find that the claimant is able to perform it as actually and
generally performed. All these jobs are at the medium exertional level or lower,
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and the claimant does not have any mental limitations that would preclude the
performance of skilled or semi-skilled work.
(Tr. at 19 (emphasis added).) Moreover, as pointed out by Magistrate Judge Lee’s report and
recommendation, “mild limitations do not require incorporation into an RFC assessment.”
Shamsud-Din v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-CV-11818, 2017 WL 3574694, at *6 (E.D. Mich.
July 24, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 16-CV-11818, 2017 WL 3531438
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2017). And, although an ALJ’s failure to explain how a claimant’s mild
psychological limitations affect the RFC assessment may, in some cases, constitute reversible
error, that is not the case here. Id. As Magistrate Judge Lee reasoned,
On the one hand, the ALJ did not explicitly explain in the RFC analysis that
Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression caused no functional limitations and why she
came to that conclusion . . . . On the other hand, the ALJ’s well-supported step
two analysis reflects her conclusion that Plaintiff simply did not have any mental
health functional limitations which would interfere with Plaintiff’s ability to
work. The ALJ also explicitly stated that conclusion at step four, if not during the
RFC assessment which technically happens between steps three and four. In the
RFC assessment, the ALJ also mentioned that Plaintiff’s symptoms were wellcontrolled with her anxiety medication.
(Doc. 33, at 11.) As a result, Magistrate Judge Lee found that, “to require remand for the ALJ to
explain, again, that Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression, while medically determinable, did not
impact her ability to perform medium unskilled or skilled work would serve no purpose.” (Id.)
The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Lee’s well-reasoned report and recommendation
affirming the ALJ’s decision with respect to this objection. Accordingly, this objection is
OVERRULED.
B.
Whether the ALJ Adequately Explained Her Failure to Incorporate a
Limitation From Dr. Goewey
In her motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argued that the ALJ failed to incorporate a
limitation from Dr. Goewey, the only opinion of record, without properly explaining why she did
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not include it in her RFC determination. (Doc. 23, at 11–14.) In her report and recommendation,
Magistrate Judge Lee addressed and rejected this exact argument, reasoning that,
While the ALJ did not explicitly reject Dr. Goewey’s opinion that Plaintiff could
only sit for one hour, stand for 30 minutes, and walk for 30 minutes, the ALJ did
implicitly reject it. As the Commissioner argues, the ALJ discussed other
evidence pertaining to this sort of limitation. Specifically, the ALJ discussed
Plaintiff’s testimony that she experienced cramps and pain after prolonged sitting
or standing, and the ALJ cited to Plaintiff’s Function Report, wherein Plaintiff
reported she could only walk about 50 yards before needing to stop and rest for 10
to 15 minutes. The ALJ also explained why she did not credit those claims,
including the fact that Plaintiff “engages in a number of activities such as
horseback riding and cave exploring that are inconsistent with her allegations of
disabling musculoskeletal impairments,” as well as Plaintiff’s limited treatment
history, and Plaintiff’s reports of, at most “mild” to “moderate” symptoms of
pain. The ALJ then goes on to describe supporting medical evidence, including
repeated findings of normal gait, largely normal knee exams, and improvement
with medication. Moreover, the ALJ only assigned Dr. Goewey’s opinion partial
weight—indicating the ALJ was rejecting certain aspects of Dr. Goewey’s
opinion.
(Doc. 33, at 17 (internal citations omitted).) Plaintiff now raises this same argument in her
objections to Magistrate Judge Lee’s report and recommendation. Specifically, Plaintiff argues
that: (1) it is “absurd to assume that [the ALJ] would have implicitly rejected” the sit/stand
limitation when he explicitly rejected other discrepancies between Dr. Goewey’s opinion and the
RFC; (2) that a case cited by the magistrate judge, Boseley v. Commissioner of Social Security,
397 F. App’x 195 (6th Cir. 2010), does not apply to this case; and (3) the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation does not adequately explain why the ALJ failed to address objective
medical evidence that existed to support Plaintiff’s postural and manipulative limitations. (Doc.
34, at 5–6.)
With respect to Plaintiff’s first argument, courts have routinely concluded that, in making
certain findings, ALJs are implicitly rejecting other evidence. See Marmon v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 774 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir. 1985) (“In recognizing this pain but concluding that
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appellant did not suffer from a severe impairment, the Secretary implicitly rejected appellant’s
testimony alleging severe pain.”) Moreover, an ALJ “is not required to discuss every piece of
medical opinion evidence.” Karger v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 414 F. App’x 739, 753 (6th Cir.
2011). The Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s contention that it would be “absurd” to conclude that
the ALJ implicitly rejected the sit/stand limitation while explicitly rejecting other such
discrepancies in this case. This is not a case in which the ALJ’s opinion leaves us “no way of
knowing or even reasonably inferring” what the ALJ’s though process was, id. at 754, because,
as described by Magistrate Judge Lee above, the ALJ discussed other evidence pertaining to this
sort of limitation which supports an implicit rejection of the sit/stand limitation. The Court will
not seek to further divine a hidden meaning from the ALJ’s opinion.
Plaintiff’s second argument is that Boseley v. Commissioner of Social Security, 397 F.
App’x 195 (6th Cir. 2010), does not apply to this case. (Doc. 34, at 5.) Although Plaintiff
correctly points out that the underlying factual scenario in Boseley differs from that present here,
Magistrate Judge Lee does not attempt to compare the facts of these two cases. Instead, the
report and recommendation cites this case only for the proposition that the “ALJ was not . . .
required to discuss each piece of data in her decision, so long as she considered ‘the evidence as
a whole and reached a reasoned conclusion.’” (Doc. 33, at 18 (quoting Boseley, 397 F. App’x at
399).) This is a well-established proposition and can be found in any number of decisions. See,
e.g., Karger, 414 F. App’x at 753 (noting that an ALJ “is not required to discuss every piece of
medical opinion evidence”). Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation does not
adequately explain why the ALJ failed to address objective medical evidence that existed to
support Plaintiff’s postural and manipulative limitations. In other words, Plaintiff argues that the
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ALJ “cherry picked” from the available evidence to support her outcome. Magistrate Judge Lee
addressed and rejected this argument, finding that:
Plaintiff has not “persuasively shown that the ALJ erred in conducting [the]
difficult task” of weighing the record evidence. The ALJ acknowledged
Plaintiff’s osteoarthritis, finding it was a severe impairment, and she discussed it
in detail in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ also mentioned Dr. Goewey’s
finding of a reduced range of motion in Plaintiff’s shoulders. It is worth noting
that, despite Plaintiff’s reduced range of motion and osteoarthritis, Dr. Goewey
found Plaintiff could lift and carry up to 100 pounds occasionally, and up to 50
pounds frequently. Plaintiff does not point to any evidence the ALJ ignored or
failed to consider in evaluation Plaintiff’s postural and manipulative limitations
(or lack thereof). The weight the ALJ assigned to that evidence is reasonable, and
should not be disturbed. Moreover, as the ALJ found, the x-rays of Plaintiff’s
right hand and shoulder “revealed no significant degenerative changes, no
evidence of dislocation, normal soft tissue, and no acute fracture or aggressive
lesion.” This evidence provides adequate support for the ALJ’s decision to reject
Dr. Goewey’s postural and manipulative limitations.
(Doc. 33, at 20 (internal citations omitted).) Aside from an assertion that she disagrees with the
magistrate judge’s conclusion, Plaintiff presents no new objections on this point. The Court
agrees with Magistrate Judge Lee’s well-reasoned report and recommendation affirming the
ALJ’s decision with respect to this objection. Accordingly, this objection is OVERRULED.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby: (1) ACCEPTS and ADOPTS the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (Doc. 33); (2) DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 22); (3) GRANTS the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 31); and (4) AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s finding that Plaintiff is not disabled under the
Social Security Act.
AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT WILL ENTER.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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