Robinson v. Department of HR
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION: Based on the above, Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983 and this action will therefore be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) . As such, Plaintiff's motion for discovery [Doc. 5] is hereby DENIED AS MOOT. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. Signed by District Judge J Ronnie Greer on 04/15/2019. (Copy of Memo mailed to Keith Robinson) (AMP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
KEITH A. ROBINSON,
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Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HR,
Defendant.
No. 1:19-CV-00090-JRG-CHS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a pro se prisoners’ complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter is now
before the Court for screening of the complaint pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”). For the reasons set forth below, no process shall issue and this action will be
DISMISSED.
I.
SCREENING STANDARD
Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and shall, at any time,
sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are
against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A); Benson
v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme
Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA,
a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Courts
liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he was
deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Braley v. City of Pontiac,
906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that “Section 1983 . . . creates a right of action for the
vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”).
II.
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at Bradley County Justice Center.
Although not
verbatim, Plaintiff’s complaint in this action is similar to his complaint filed in a case previously
dismissed by this Court 1.
Here, Plaintiff argues that his previous case (Robinson, 1:17-CV-332) should have been
handled at an earlier time [Doc. 1 p. 2]. Plaintiff further contends that he “did[ ] not sign a waiver
to be indited [sic]” [Doc. 1 p. 2]. He asserts that his police report was inaccurate due to
discrimination and/or prejudice [Id.]. Plaintiff also argues that his charges “should have been
concurrent with other charges” [Id.]. Plaintiff’s only request for relief is that his record be
expunged [Id.].
III.
ANALYSIS
The right to expungement of state records is not a federal constitutional right. Duke v.
White, 616 F.2d 955, 956 (6th Cir. 1980). It appears that Plaintiff is, in effect, seeking to use 42
U.S.C. § 1983 as a vehicle for making a collateral attack on his state criminal conviction. That is
to say, he is seeking to use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a substitute for a habeas corpus petition. This, he
cannot do. Plaintiff’s request to expunge his record 2 is not an available remedy under § 1983. See
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2
See Robinson v. State of Tennessee, 1:17-CV-332 (E.D. Tenn. April 17, 2018).
Plaintiff, however, does not indicate what specific records he seeks to have expunged and why.
2
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (“[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state
prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement . . . even though such a claim may
come with the literal terms of § 1983.”); See also, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegation that his sentence “should have been concurrent with other
charges” fails to state a cognitive claim under § 1983 as it directly relates to the length or duration
of his imprisonment. This claim will be DISMISSED.
Moreover, “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter
the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state
conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005). Thus, should his allegations of an unsigned waiver or inaccurate police
report imply the invalidity of his current confinement or its duration, § 1983 relief is unavailable.
Consequently, Plaintiff’s claims asserted under § 1983 will be DISMISSED.
Further, Plaintiff’s claim that his previous case pending in the Eastern District of Tennessee
“should have been handled at a[n] earlier time” fails to allow the Court to plausibly infer any
violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, this claim will also be DISMISSED.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under § 1983 and this action will therefore be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). As such, Plaintiff’s motion for discovery [Doc. 5] is hereby DENIED AS
MOOT.
The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith
and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.
ENTER:
s/J. RONNIE GREER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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