Reagan v. State of Tennessee et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Plaintiff's motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Docs. 1 and 5] will be GRANTED. Plaintiff will be ASSESSED with the filing fee. Even liberally construing the complaint in favor of Plaintiff, it f ails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, this action will therefore be DISMISSED. AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT ORDER WILL ENTER. Signed by District Judge Harry S Mattice, Jr on 11/6/2019. (AML) M/O mailed to Jacob Reagan and Custodian of Inmate Accounts at Silverdale Detention Center. Emailed to Court Financial Deputy.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
JACOB REAGAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE,
CHATTANOOGA MAYOR, HAMILTON
COUNTY SHERIFF, CORE CIVIC, CEO
MR. HEINIKER, and JUDGE WEBB,
Defendants.
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No.: 1:19-CV-261-HSM-CHS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Court is in receipt of a pro se prisoner’s complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
[Doc. 2] and two motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Docs. 1 and 4]. For the reasons
set forth below, Plaintiff’s motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Docs. 1 and 4] will be
GRANTED, Plaintiff will be ASSESSED the filing fee, and this action will be DISMISSED
because the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983.
I.
FILING FEE
It appears from his motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis that Plaintiff lacks
sufficient financial resources to pay the filing fee. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915,
these motions [Docs. 1 and 4] will be GRANTED.
Because Plaintiff is an inmate in the Silverdale Detention Center, he will be ASSESSED
the civil filing fee of $350.00.
The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account will be
DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 900 Georgia Avenue, Chattanooga,
Tennessee 37402, as an initial partial payment, whichever is the greater of: (a) twenty percent
(20%) of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s inmate trust account; or (b) twenty percent
(20%) of the average monthly balance in his inmate trust account for the six-month period
preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1) (A) and (B). Thereafter, the
custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is directed to submit twenty percent (20%) of
Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account for the
preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00), until the full
filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been
paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
To ensure compliance with this fee-collection procedure, the Clerk will be DIRECTED to
mail a copy of this memorandum and order to the Warden of Silverdale Detention Facility and the
custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined, and this order shall
be placed in Plaintiff’s prison file and follow him if he is transferred to another correctional
institution. The Clerk also will be DIRECTED to furnish a copy of this order to the Court’s
financial deputy.
II.
SCREENING STANDARD
Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss
any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant
who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A); Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d
1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) and in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals
for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant
statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain
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sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Courts liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). Allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a plaintiff might later establish
undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and do not state a plausible claim,
however. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Further, formulaic and conclusory recitations of the
elements of a claim which are not supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009).
III.
ANALYSIS
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he “was fals[e]ly charged by and through 18-1512 –
obstruction, racial hate federal hate malicious prosecution in an official capacity and liberty
interest was take[n] repe[a]tedly” [Doc. 2 p. 1]. Plaintiff further states that this represents “a
proven history of this Mayor, Andy Burke, and corrupt HCSO Jimmy Hammonds as they team up
with Core Civic Silverdale and violate overcrowding laws laid down in the United States
Constitution” [Id.]. Plaintiff therefore seeks an injunctive relief hearing, a jury trial, and a referral
to the United States Attorney’s Office for “civil rights, criminal racketeering, human trafficking,
[and] money laundering” upon a favorable verdict, ten million dollars, and for Defendants to be
found guilty “both personally and professionally” [Id.].
First, it appears that Plaintiff alleges that he was falsely charged with unnamed crimes due
to malicious prosecution and that Silverdale Detention Center, where he is incarcerated, is
overcrowded. These allegations are conclusory and formulaic and do not allow the Court to
plausibly infer that the alleged overcrowding has violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and/or
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that any named Defendant was personally involved in any malicious prosecution or false charge
against Plaintiff, however. As set forth above, formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements
of a claim which are not supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a plausible claim for
relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009).
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief under § 1983 based on convictions for which
he is incarcerated, in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that an
action for damages for an alleged unconstitutional conviction or for “harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a state conviction or sentence invalid” cannot be maintained
unless the prisoner can show that his conviction or sentence has been “reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id.
at 486–87. In other words, “§ 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove
the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement” are not considered “appropriate vehicles for
challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Id. at 486.
The Heck rule therefore bars claims where a favorable judgment would necessarily imply
the invalidity of a prisoner’s confinement. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005)
(holding that “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the
relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct
leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily
demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration). As such, any such claim must be
asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Id. at 78 (noting that “a prisoner in state custody cannot use a §
1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his confinement’” but instead must seek federal
habeas corpus relief) (citations omitted).
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Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks relief based on convictions for which he is
incarcerated, nothing in the complaint allows the Court to plausibly infer that Plaintiff’s underlying
convictions have been invalidated, and Heck bars any such claims.
Also, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to have Defendants prosecuted for the various crimes
that he alleges that they have committed, “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in
the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
Thus, these requests for relief are not cognizable under § 1983.
Accordingly, even liberally construing the complaint in favor of Plaintiff, it fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above:
1.
Plaintiff’s motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Docs. 1 and 5] will be
GRANTED;
2. Plaintiff will be ASSESSED with the filing fee and the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate
trust account at the institution where he now resides will be DIRECTED to submit the
filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above;
3. The Clerk will be DIRECTED to send a copy of this memorandum opinion and the
accompanying order to the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account at the institution
where he now resides, the Warden of Silverdale Detention Center, and the Court’s
financial deputy;
4. Even liberally construing the complaint in favor of Plaintiff, it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted under § 1983;
5. Accordingly, this action will therefore be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A); and
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6. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good
faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT ORDER WILL ENTER.
ENTER:
/s/ Harry S. Mattice, Jr._______
HARRY S. MATTICE, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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