Douglass v. Berke et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds the Proposed Agreed Consent Judgment and Decree [Doc. 24-1] is fair, reasonable, adequate, and consistent with the public interest. Therefore, the parties& #039; Joint Motion [Doc. 24] is GRANTED. The Court will APPROVE AND ENTER the Proposed Agreed Consent Judgment and Decree [Doc. 24-1]. See Memorandum Opinion and Order for details. Signed by District Judge Clifton L Corker on 09/17/2020. (CAT)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
CHATTANOOGA DIVISION
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TURKEISHA DOUGLASS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ANDY BERKE, MAYOR; and CITY OF
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE,
1:20-CV-00101-DCLC
Defendants
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the parties’ Joint Motion to Enter Agreed Consent
Judgment and Decree [Doc. 24]. For the reasons stated below, the parties’ Joint Motion [Doc. 24]
is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Turkeisha Douglass (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against the City of
Chattanooga and Andy Berke, the Mayor of Chattanooga (“Defendants”) on April 17, 2020,
alleging a violation of her federal civil rights under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Tennessee Constitution [see Doc. 1]. In her Complaint,
Plaintiff alleged that on or about April 2, 2020, Mayor Berke issued Executive Order 2020-06, a
“shelter at home” order prohibiting gatherings of ten or more people [Id. at ¶ 11]. However,
EO 2020-06 exempted essential businesses providing goods and services exclusively through
curbside pickup, drive-through shipment, or delivery, so long as residents adhered to social
distancing requirements to the extent possible [Id.]. Plaintiff attends the First Church of the
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Nazarene, located within the city limits of Chattanooga, Tennessee, and she planned to attend the
church’s Easter service on April 12, 2020, which would have been a drive-through service in which
attendees would stay in their cars and listen to a live broadcast of the service over their radios [Id.
at ¶¶ 13-14].
Plaintiff alleged that on April 10, 2020, Mayor Berke issued a directive relating to
EO 2020-06 that churches were prohibited from holding drive-in worship services on Easter
Sunday [Id. at ¶ 16]. In response to Mayor Berke’s directive, Plaintiff’s church, along with many
other places of Christian worship, cancelled their planned Easter Sunday drive-in worship services
[Id. at ¶ 24]. Plaintiff alleged that as a result of Mayor Berke’s directive, “churches were singled
out while no other drive-thru businesses or services were affected as long as they adhered to
mandated social distancing,” which irreparably impeded the fundamentally held religious beliefs
of Plaintiff and many others [Id. at ¶¶ 25-26].
Plaintiff alleged causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-1-407
for deprivation of the rights of free exercise of religion and freedom of assembly [Id. at ¶¶ 27-47].
Plaintiff sought a permanent injunction restraining Defendants, their officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, and any persons in active concert or participation with them, from
enforcing or complying with Mayor Berke’s directive banning drive-in church services; a
judgment declaring that Defendants unlawfully burdened Plaintiff’s religious free exercise and
assembly rights in violation of both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the
Tennessee Constitution; attorneys’ fees and costs; and such other and further relief as the Court
deemed just and proper [Id. at pg. 10-11]. The parties have since reached a resolution of this matter
and now ask the Court to enter an agreed consent decree [Doc. 24].
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II.
STANDARD
“A consent decree is essentially a settlement agreement subject to continued judicial
policing.” Pedreira v. Sunrise Children’s Servs., Inc., 802 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983)). Consent decrees differ from private
settlements in two important respects: “First, when a court enters a consent decree, it retains
jurisdiction to enforce the decree. . . . Second, a consent decree puts ‘the power and prestige of
the court behind the compromise struck by the parties.’” Id. (citations omitted). When deciding
whether to approve and enter a proposed consent decree, a district court must consider “whether
the decree is ‘fair, adequate, and reasonable, as well as consistent with the public interest.’” United
States v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov’t, 591 F.3d 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2010). The consent
decree must arise out of and resolve a dispute that is within the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
come within the general scope of the case as determined by the pleadings, and “further the
objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based.” Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of
Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) (citation omitted).
III.
ANALYSIS
After reviewing the Proposed Agreed Consent Judgment and Decree [Doc. 24-1], the Court
finds it is fair, reasonable, adequate, and consistent with the public interest. The Proposed Agreed
Consent Judgment and Decree provides:
In the event Defendants do not abide by their assurance that they will both not ban
drive thru church services which are conducted in the manner approved by
Governor Lee, and abide by Governor Lee’s future Executive Orders regarding the
need to facilitate and contain COVID-19 and to provide for the free expression and
exercise of religion as protected by the Constitution of the United States of America
and of the State of Tennessee Plaintiff may petition to reopen this case for
appropriate proceedings.
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[Id. at pg. 3-4]. Both parties are represented by counsel and stated they had telephone conferences
to discuss the resolution of this action and have agreed to the resolution of this action in the manner
set forth in the Proposed Agreed Consent Judgment and Decree [Doc. 24, pg. 1]. The parties
further state their belief that the Proposed Agreed Consent Judgment and Decree is fair, reasonable,
and in the public interest [Doc. 24-1, ¶ 8]. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367, and the Court finds it has the authority to order the relief
requested. See, e.g., Adams & Boyle, P.C. v. Slatery, 956 F.3d 913, 930 (6th Cir. 2020) (affirming
the district court’s issuance of a preliminary injunction enjoining the State of Tennessee from
enforcing EO-25 as applied to “procedural abortions”); see also Tabernacle Baptist Church, Inc.
of Nicholasville v. Beshear, --- F.Supp.3d ----, No. 3:20-CV-00033-GFVT, 2020 WL 2305307, at
*6 (E.D. Ky. May 8, 2020) (granting a temporary restraining order enjoining the State of Kentucky
“from enforcing the prohibition on mass gatherings with respect to any in-person religious service
which adheres to applicable social distancing and hygiene guidelines”).
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds the Proposed Agreed Consent Judgment and
Decree [Doc. 24-1] is fair, reasonable, adequate, and consistent with the public interest. Therefore,
the parties’ Joint Motion [Doc. 24] is GRANTED. The Court will APPROVE AND ENTER the
Proposed Agreed Consent Judgment and Decree [Doc. 24-1].
SO ORDERED:
s/ Clifton L. Corker
United States District Judge
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