Adams v. Lewis et al

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM & ORDER, Plaintiff's motion 19 is GRANTED only to the extent that a claim of retaliatory transfer against Defendants Shawn Phillips and Lisa Helton in their respective official capacities will be permitted to proc eed. The Clerk is DIRECTED to add Shawn Phillips and Lisa Helton as official capacity Defendants in this action and to send a Plaintiff service packet (a blank summons and USM 285 form) for each. Plaintiff is ORDERED to complete the service packet s and return them to the Clerk's Office within twenty-one (21) days of entry of this Order. All other relief requested in Plaintiff's motion 19 is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Travis R. McDonough on 7/20/22. (c/m Christopher Adams #328180 TROUSDALE TURNER CORRECTIONAL CENTER WD218 140 MACON WAY HARTSVILLE, TN 37074 with service packets) (ADA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
CHRISTOPHER ADAMS,

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Plaintiff,
v.
RANDALL LEWIS,
Defendant.

Case No. 1:22-cv-125
Judge Travis R. McDonough
Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff, a Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) inmate currently housed at
the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center (“TTCC”), has filed a motion asking the Court to
amend its June 10, 2022 Memorandum and Order to reinstate in this action the official-capacity
Defendants named in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, and to Order the United States Marshals
Service (“USMS”) to serve Defendants with process (Doc. 19). For the reasons articulated
below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that he was transferred from the Bledsoe County

Correctional Complex (“BCCX”) to TTCC in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment
Rights, and that as a result, he has suffered various negative consequences, including the loss of
his job through Tennessee Rehabilitative Initiative in Correction (“TRICOR”). (See generally
Doc. 10.) After screening the Amended Complaint in compliance with the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court permitted Plaintiff to proceed in this action only
against Defendant Randall Lewis in his individual capacity (Doc. 11, at 10). Plaintiff’s claims

against Defendants Luke Burns and Alan Lewis in their individual capacities were dismissed,
and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Alan Lewis, Lisa Helton, and Shawn Phillips in their
official capacities were dismissed. (Id. at 11.)
Aggrieved by the Court’s decision, Plaintiff filed the instant motion requesting that his
official-capacity claims for prospective injunctive relief against Defendants TRICOR Plant
Manager Alan Lewis, TDOC Commissioner Lisa Helton, and BCCX Warden Shawn Phillips be
permitted to proceed, as Defendant “Randall Lewis does not have the authority to carry out any
TDOC related injunctive relief should such be ordered by the Court, and [Plaintiff] cannot be
made whole” absent the inclusion of those Defendants. (Doc. 19, at 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff
maintains that TDOC and BCCX have a long-standing custom of retaliating against inmates for
the exercise of their First Amendment rights, and that this custom is evidenced by lack of
meaningful investigations in relation to retaliatory transfers and failure to discipline offending
subordinates. (Doc. 19, at 4; Doc. 10, at 8.) He maintains that Defendants Helton and Phillips
have a statutory duty to act on behalf of their respective institutions, and he adds that he cannot
be made complete without restoration to his TRICOR job, which also requires the inclusion of
Defendant Alan Lewis in this suit. (Doc. 19, at 4, 6.)
II.

GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiff asks the Court to amend its prior Order screening the Amended Complaint

pursuant to Rule 52(b), or, alternatively, Rule 46, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc.
19, at 1.) However, the Court has not entered a judgment in this action, and, therefore, Rule
52(b) does not apply. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b) (providing party may request Court make
additional findings after entry of judgment). Further, Rule 46 addresses trial procedure and is
not an appropriate vehicle to request relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 46 (abolishing need for formal
exceptions to court rulings or orders); Retamar-Lopez v. Bd. of Educ. of the Dublin City Sch.
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Dist., No. 2:13-CV-0161, 2013 WL 12130342, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 23, 2013) (citing
McDonald v. Village of Palatine, No. 08-C-5435, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24838, at *3 (finding
that the court was not required to consider a “Rule 46” motion, which was in substance a motion
for reconsideration of a court’s ruling)).
The Court may, however, reconsider interlocutory orders under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b). Rodriguez v. Tenn. Laborers Health & Welfare Fund, 89 F. App’x 949, 959
(6th Cir. 2004); Palmer v. Bagley, 330 F. App’x 92, 105 (6th Cir. 2009) (observing, in a habeas
case, that a district court can revise a non-final order under Rule 54(b) “at any time prior to final
judgment”). Rule 54(b) states:
[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all
the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the
action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the
entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and
liabilities.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Accordingly, the Court will consider whether Plaintiff should be afforded
relief under Rule 54(b).
III.

ANALYSIS
Plaintiff claims that Defendants are necessary parties under Rule 19(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a person “subject to service of process and whose
joinder will not provide the court of subject-matter jurisdiction must be joined as a party if, in
that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A) (internal punctuation omitted). The Court finds well taken Plaintiff’s
argument that, should he be successful in ultimately proving that he was subjected to a retaliatory
transfer, he will not be able to obtain prospective injunctive relief absent the inclusion of an
official-capacity Defendant with the authority to provide the ordered relief.

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Under the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908), a state official
may not be sued for prospective injunctive relief unless that official has some connection with
the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional action. See, e.g., Allied Artists Picture Corp. v.
Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 665 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1982) (quoting 209 U.S. at 157). Therefore, the Court
now considers each named Defendant’s connection with the allegedly unconstitutional transfer
and whether his or her inclusion in this suit would be necessary to provide any ordered relief.
As the Court noted in its previous Order, “Plaintiff has not alleged any facts from which
the Court could infer that Defendant Alan Lewis took any affirmative action in this case to
initiate or execute Plaintiff’s allegedly retaliatory transfer.” (Doc. 11, at 8.) Plaintiff’s loss of
his TRICOR job was merely a consequence of his transfer, not a retaliatory act performed by
Alan Lewis. Nonetheless, Plaintiff insists that Alan Lewis is a required party in this action
because neither Defendants Helton nor Phillips have authority to compel Plaintiff’s reinstatement
to the TRICOR program at BCCX. (Doc. 19, at 6.) However, Plaintiff has no constitutional
right to employment or a property right to his wages. See, e.g., Carter v. Tucker, 69 F. A’ppx
678, 680 (6th Cir. 2003). Therefore, even if Plaintiff is successful in his retaliation suit, it would
not demand his reinstatement to the TRICOR position. Therefore, Alan Lewis is not a necessary
party to this action, and Plaintiff’s motion as to this Defendant will be DENIED.
The Court finds, however, that it is reasonable at this early stage of proceedings to
determine that Defendants Phillips and Helton are required Defendants for the purposes of
prospective injunctive relief. Phillips, as BCCX Warden, ostensibly oversees prisoner placement
and transfers within that institution. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-1-104(b) (“The custody, welfare,
conduct and safekeeping of the inmates shall be the responsibility of the warden, who will
examine into the affairs of the institution daily to assure that proper standards are maintained.”).
Defendant Phillips does not, however, have any authority to order the TTCC Warden to
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reclassify Plaintiff, even if Plaintiff is successful in this suit. Therefore, the inclusion of
Commissioner Lisa Helton also appears to be necessary to ensure that a reclassification occurs if
one is ultimately ordered. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-3-603(a) (providing TDOC
Commissioner with “the immediate charge of the management and government of the
institutions of the department”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion will be GRANTED as to
Defendants Helton and Phillips, and the Court’s June 10, 2022 screening order is REVISED to
add as Defendants Shawn Phillips in his official capacity and Lisa Helton in her official capacity.
However, Plaintiff is not proceeding as a pauper or a seaman, and thus, is not entitled to
have USMS serve process on Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1916. This
Court previously denied Plaintiff’s motion for the Court to order USMS to serve process in this
case (Doc. 14), and the Court finds no good cause exists to revisit that determination.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request that USMS be ordered to serve process in this action will be
DENIED.
IV.

CONCLUSION
As set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 19) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED

IN PART as follows:
1.

Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED only to the extent that a claim of retaliatory
transfer against Defendants Shawn Phillips and Lisa Helton in their respective
official capacities will be permitted to proceed;

2.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to add Shawn Phillips and Lisa Helton as officialcapacity Defendants in this action and to send a Plaintiff service packet (a blank
summons and USM 285 form) for each;

3.

Plaintiff is ORDERED to complete the service packets and return them to the
Clerk’s Office within twenty-one (21) days of entry of this Order;

4.

At that time, the summonses will be signed and sealed by the Clerk and returned
to Plaintiff for service;

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5.

Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond to the complaint within twenty-one
(21) days from the date of service. If any Defendant fails to timely respond to the
complaint, it may result in entry of judgment by default against that Defendant;

6.

All other relief requested in Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED; and

7.

Plaintiff is ORDERED to immediately inform the Court and Defendants their
counsel of record of any address changes in writing. Pursuant to Local Rule
83.13, it is the duty of a pro se party to promptly notify the Clerk and the other
parties to the proceedings of any change in his or her address, to monitor the
progress of the case, and to prosecute or defend the action diligently. E.D. Tenn.
L.R. 83.13. Failure to provide a correct address to this Court within fourteen (14)
days of any change in address may result in the dismissal of this action.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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