Adams v. Lewis et al
Filing
55
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER.Defendants motion to dismiss 35 is DENIED, and Defendants are ORDERED to file a response to Plaintiffs Amended Complaint within twenty-one (21) days of entry of this Order. The Clerk is DIRECTED to lift the stay of these proceedings and place this case on the active docket. The parties are ORDERED to file any desired updates or supplements to the pending motion for a protective order 49 within twenty-one (21) days of entry of this Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee on 1/26/23. (c/m Christopher Adams #328180 TROUSDALE TURNER CORRECTIONAL CENTER WD218 140 MACON WAY HARTSVILLE, TN 37074) (ADA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
CHRISTOPHER ADAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
RANDALL LEWIS,
LISA HELTON, and
SHAWN PHILLIPS,
Defendants.
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No.:
1:22-CV-125-SKL
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Christopher Adams, an inmate in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”)
proceeding pro se in a civil rights action, alleges that he was subjected to a retaliatory prison
transfer [Doc. 10]. Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s operative complaint for
failure to state a claim [Doc. 35], Plaintiff has filed a response opposing the motion [Doc. 52], and
Defendants have filed a reply [Doc. 54]. Having fully considered the parties’ arguments and the
applicable law, the Court finds that Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be denied.
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. When considering a plaintiff’s claims, all factual allegations in
the complaint must be taken as true. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007).
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II.
RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS OF AMENDED COMPLAINT
Relevant remaining factual allegations, which are taken as true, include that around
September 17, 2021, Plaintiff received his annual reclassification hearing, wherein it was
determined that he would remain at a minimum-security inmate at the Bledsoe County
Correctional Complex (“BCCX”) and continue participation in the Tennessee Rehabilitative
Initiative in Correction program [Doc. 10 p. 4]. However, on October 4, 2021, Plaintiff and
twenty-six other inmates, many of whom Plaintiff knew to have disciplinary histories unlike him,
were transferred from the BCCX to the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center (“TTCC”) [Id. at 3,
5].
In the weeks and months leading up to his transfer, Plaintiff had made a series of verbal
grievances to various BCCX officials, including Defendant Randall Lewis [Id. at 1-2]. Moreover,
Plaintiff won a civil judgment against Defendants’ colleague in 2020, and had also filed suits
against TDOC Commissioner and the Tennessee Board of Parole [Id.]. Despite an earlier history
of openly discussing prison procedures around Plaintiff, BCCX officials, including Defendant
Lewis, became “aloof” toward Plaintiff after he won his civil judgment and began pursuing other
litigation/grievances [Id. at 4-5].
Plaintiff was informed by a hub officer worker and a chain bus worker that BCCX unit
managers were contacted by an institutional investigator on October 1, 2021, inquiring as to
whether they had any “troublesome inmates to get rid of” [Id. at 5-6]. The investigator contacted
Defendant Lewis with that inquiry, and Defendant Lewis “gave them [Plaintiff’s] name because
of his protected activities” [Id. at 6]. Had Defendant Lewis not given Plaintiff’s name to the
investigator, Plaintiff “would not have been transferred.” [Id.]. Moreover, Plaintiff had assisted
BCCX’s bus staff “on and off since 2006” and, based on his personal observation, inmates
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transferred for population management typically had a history of disciplinary problems or a history
of filing lawsuits and/or grievances [Id. at 5].
On the day of Plaintiff’s transfer, many officers expressed surprise to see Plaintiff being
transferred, as Plaintiff was not a disciplinary problem or security threat [Id. at 6]. Plaintiff
obtained a copy of the October 4, 2021, transfer list through a public records request and learned
from a hub office worker that he was the only inmate of twenty-seven transferees with no
disciplinary history [Id. at 5]. Plaintiff knows of many inmates who have been allowed to remain
at their assigned facilities indefinitely, and the only difference between himself and those inmates
is Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights [Id. at 4].
As a result of his transfer to TTCC, Plaintiff lost, among other things, personal property, a
high-wage job assignment, and the ability to participate in various educational, recreational, and
faith-based programs [Id. at 2-3]. Plaintiff contends that his personal safety has also been
compromised by the transfer, as TTCC “is one of the most, or the most, dangerous and least
privileged prison in the state” [Id. at 3 (emphasis in original)].
III.
ANALYSIS
In order for Plaintiff to establish that his transfer to BCCX was a retaliatory response that
violated his First Amendment rights, Plaintiff must allege (and ultimately prove) that (1) he
“engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against [him] that would deter a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal
connection between elements one and two — that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in
part by the plaintiff’s protected conduct.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999)
(citations omitted).
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As to the first element, the parties do not appear to dispute that Plaintiff has alleged that he
engaged in protected conduct or that the filing of non-frivolous grievances serves as protected First
Amendment conduct, Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 264 (6th Cir. 2018), as may the filing of
non-frivolous lawsuits against prison officials.
Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 395-96.
Instead,
Defendants’ motion is premised on two arguments: (1) Plaintiff’s lateral transfer does not qualify
as an adverse action; and (2) Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Defendant Lewis had the
personal involvement in his transfer required to support a claim under § 1983 [Doc. 35].
Specifically, Defendants argue that a lateral prison transfer “cannot rise to the level of an
adverse action because it would not deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of his
First Amendment rights.” Smith v. Yarrow, 78 F. App’x 529, 543 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing cases)
(internal quotation marks omitted). They submit that an exception to this general rule is applicable
only when a prisoner makes a showing that Defendants were aware of “foreseeable, negative
consequences” that “inextricably followed” as a result of the transfer. Jones v. Caruso, 421 F.
App’x 550, 553 (6th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).
Defendants maintain that Plaintiff cannot
demonstrate that Defendants were aware of any such consequences as a result of his transfer.
In considering Defendants’ arguments, the Court first notes that Jones was dismissed on
summary judgment after the parties had been provided an opportunity to factually develop their
cases. Additionally, Jones cautions whether a retaliatory action is sufficiently adverse is a question
of fact. Jones, 421 F. App’x at 553 (citing Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 703-04 (6th Cir.
2005)). Moreover, because “there is no justification for harassing people for exercising their
constitutional rights,” the deterrent effect “need not be great to be actionable.” Thaddeus – X, 175
F.3d at 398; see also Zilich v. Longo, 34 F.3d 359, 364 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Retaliation by public
officials against the exercise of First Amendment rights is itself a violation of the First
Amendment.”) (citation omitted).
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Turning to the relevant allegations, Plaintiff alleges that as a result of his prison transfer,
he lost property; a high-wage job; participation in rehabilitative, cognitive behavioral programs;
lenient access to the library, the hobby shop, and recreational opportunities; and was subjected to
a more violent prison environment [Doc. 10 at 2-3]. The Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged an adverse action. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding transfer
to facility with more restrictions and fewer privileges adverse); Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d
693, 701-02 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding loss of job and transfer to facility further away from attorney
to constitute an adverse action); Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 604 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding adverse
punishment includes confiscating property and legal papers); Pasley v. Conerly, 345 F. App’x 981,
985 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding threat to have prisoner moved so that he would lose job, when
combined with threat to have prisoner moved to location where family could not visit, to constitute
an adverse action); and Reynolds v. Green, 25 F. App’x 256, 261 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding adverse
action where prisoner was transferred from facility where he could “come and go with permission”
to one where he could not).
This does not end the Court’s inquiry, however, as Plaintiff’s allegations must also
plausibly allege that the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by his protected conduct.
Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399. Here, Plaintiff alleges that he made a series of grievances in the
weeks and months leading up to his transfer. Plaintiff maintains that he underwent an annual
reclassification hearing two weeks before his transfer, and that, as a result of that hearing, he was
classified to remain at BCCX and continue participating in programs there. Plaintiff has also
alleged that population management and administrative transfers typically affect inmates that
unlike him, have disciplinary and/or security threat histories. The Court finds these allegations,
construed most favorably to Plaintiff, support an inference of retaliatory motive. See King v.
Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686, 695-96 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting “temporal proximity between protected
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conduct and retaliatory acts” historically found to “creat[e] an inference of retaliatory motive”);
Hill, 630 F.3d at 475 (“[B]ecause of the difficulty in producing direct evidence of an official’s
retaliatory motive, circumstantial evidence can suffice. This circumstantial evidence can include
the disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals or the temporal proximity between the
prisoner’s protected conduct and the official’s adverse action.”) (citation and internal citation
omitted).
Finally, the Court addresses Defendants’ claim that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged
Defendant Lewis’ personal involvement in constitutional wrongdoing so as to support the
remaining claim against him in his individual capacity. Respectfully disagreeing, Plaintiff has
claimed that on October 1, 2021, Defendant Lewis gave Plaintiff’s name to an institutional
investigator for transfer to a prison with less favorable conditions because of Plaintiff’s protected
conduct [Doc. 10 p. 6]. These facts, if proved, would demonstrate that Defendant Lewis was
involved in Plaintiff’s allegedly retaliatory transfer. See, e.g., King, 680 F.3d at 695 (holding
officer liable for foreseeable consequences of actions even if ultimate harm is executed by another)
(citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Defendant Randall
Lewis took an adverse action against him in retaliation for protected activities, and Plaintiff’s claim
survives Defendants’ motion.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. 35] is DENIED, and
Defendants are ORDERED to file a response to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint within twentyone (21) days of entry of this Order.
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The Clerk is DIRECTED to lift the stay of these proceedings and place this case on the
active docket. The parties are ORDERED to file any desired updates or supplements to the
pending motion for a protective order [Doc. 49] within twenty-one (21) days of entry of this Order.
SO ORDERED.
ENTER.
Susan K. Lee
s/
SUSAN K. LEE
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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