Dewalt v. Seal et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 4 ) is GRANTED; Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00; Accordingly, this action will be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U. S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; and The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT ORDER WILL ENTER.Signed by District Judge Travis R McDonough on 11/22/2024. (BJL)*Mailed to Albert Dewalt 00424946 and to the custodian of inmate accounts at MCCX MORGAN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX Post Office Box 2000 WARTBURG, TN 37887. *Sent to the Financial Deputy Clerks

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT CHATTANOOGA
ALBERT DEWALT,
Plaintiff,
v.
MELONIE SEAL, MICHAEL PARRISH,
FRANK STRADA, ARAMARK, and
SHAWN PHILLIPS,
Defendants.

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Case No. 1:24-cv-363
Judge Travis R. McDonough
Magistrate Judge Susan K. Lee

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, a Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) inmate housed in the Morgan
County Correctional Complex (“MCCX”), filed a pro se complaint for violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 alleging sexual assault during his MCCX confinement (Doc. 1) and a motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 4). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion (id.) will
be GRANTED, and this action will be DISMISSED.
I.

FILING FEE
It appears from Plaintiff’s motion and prisoner trust account documents (id.) that he

cannot pay the filing fee in one lump sum. Accordingly, his motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (id.) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff’s
inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 900 Georgia
Avenue, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402, as an initial partial payment, whichever is the greater
of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to his inmate trust account; or (b)

twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in his inmate trust account for the sixmonth period preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(b)(1)(A) and(B).
Thereafter, the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is directed to submit twenty percent
(20%) of his preceding monthly income (or income credited to his trust account for the preceding
month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00), until the full filing fee
of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to
the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
To ensure compliance with this procedure, the Clerk is DIRECTED to provide a copy of
this memorandum and order to both the custodian of inmate accounts at Plaintiff’s current
institution and the Court’s financial deputy. This order shall be placed in Plaintiff’s prison file
and follow him if he is transferred to another correctional institution.
II.

COMPLAINT SCREENING
A. Standard
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen prisoner

complaints and shall, at any time, sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious,
fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal
standard set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule
12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive a PLRA
review, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

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Formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim do not state a plausible
claim for relief. Id. at 681. Likewise, an allegation that does not raise a plaintiff’s right to relief
“above a speculative level” fails to state a plausible claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. However,
courts liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold them to a less stringent standard than lawyerdrafted pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
A claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that a person
acting under color of state law deprived him a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B.

Allegations

Plaintiff claims that between April and August of 2023, an unspecified female sexually
assaulted him in the coolers (Doc. 1, at 4). Plaintiff has sued (1) “Stewardess” Melonie Seal for
“sexual assault[]”; (2) TDOC Commissioner Frank Strada for failing to provide him with therapy
or help after the alleged sexual assault; and (3) Warden Michael Parrish, Warden Shawn Phillips,
and Aramark for “conspiracy to commit sexual assault.” (Id. at 4–6.) Plaintiff also appears to
seek to hold Wardens Parrish and/or Phillips liable under § 1983 for “allowing [Plaintiff] to be
punished for being sexually assaulted.” (Id. at 7.) As relief, Plaintiff requests compensatory and
punitive damages. (Id. at 8.)
C.

Analysis
1.

Defendant Seals

While it is somewhat unclear, reading the complaint as a whole in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, it appears that Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Seals sexually assaulted him
in the MCCX coolers. However, Plaintiff does not provide any facts to support this conclusory
assertion of assault, and it therefore fails to state a plausible claim upon which relief may be

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granted under § 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).
And to the extent that Plaintiff’s complaint may be liberally construed to seek to hold
Defendant Seals liable for someone else assaulting Plaintiff in the MCCX coolers, any such
allegation likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as Plaintiff does not
set forth any facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that this Defendant was personally
involved in or had any knowledge of the alleged sexual assaults, and this Defendant cannot be
liable for the acts of others based on her supervisory position. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (noting
that “our precedents establish . . . that Government officials may not be held liable for the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior”); Frazier v.
Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (providing that “a complaint must allege that the
defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights” to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted).
As such, Defendant Seals is DISMISSED.
2.

Defendant Strada

While Plaintiff has sued Defendant Strada for failing to ensure that Plaintiff received
therapy or other help after the alleged sexual assaults, Plaintiff again does not set forth facts
suggesting that this Defendant knew of the alleged sexual assaults and/or was responsible for
ensuring that Plaintiff received therapy or other assistance due to the alleged sexual assaults, and
this Defendant cannot be liable under § 1983 for the actions of others based solely on his
supervisory position. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Frazier, 41 F. App’x at 764.
Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under
§ 1983 as to Defendant Strada, and he is DISMISSED.

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3.

Defendants Aramark, Parrish, and Phillips

As set forth above, Plaintiff seeks to hold Warden Michael Parrish, Warden Shawn
Phillips, and Aramark for an alleged conspiracy to commit sexual assault. However, as
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding a conspiracy to commit sexual assault are wholly conclusory and
unsupported by any facts, they fail to state a plausible claim for § 1983 relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. As such, these claims are DISMISSED.
Plaintiff also appears to seek to hold Wardens Parrish and/or Phillips liable for “allowing
[Plaintiff] to be punished for being sexually assaulted.” (Id. at 7.) Again, however, Plaintiff
does not set forth any facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that either of these
Defendants knew of and/or was responsible for this alleged punishment, and these Defendants
cannot be liable under § 1983 for the actions of others based solely on their supervisory
positions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Frazier, 41 F. App’x at 764.
Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief under § 1983 against
Defendants Aramark, Parrish, and Phillips, and they are DISMISSED.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above:
1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 4) is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00;
3. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit the filing
fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above;
4. The Clerk is DIRECTED to provide a copy of this memorandum and order to the
custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined and the
Court’s financial deputy;
5. Even liberally construing the complaint in favor of Plaintiff, it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted under § 1983 as to any Defendant;

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6. Accordingly, this action will be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A; and
7. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good
faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
AN APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT ORDER WILL ENTER.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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