Compton v. Eastman Credit Union
Filing
58
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER; for the reasons set forth, the defendants motion for summary judgment 43 is GRANTED as to all counts. Accordingly, the plaintiffs case is hereby DISMISSED. Signed by District Judge J Ronnie Greer on 2/6/12. (KDO)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT GREENEVILLE
RITA JOYCE COMPTON
v.
EASTMAN CREDIT UNION
)
)
)
)
)
No. 2:09-CV-56
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The Defendant Eastman Credit Union (“ECU”) has filed a motion for summary
judgment, [Doc. 43]. ECU raises several arguments as to why it is entitled to
summary judgment. These arguments include: (1) the plaintiff has failed to establish
a prima facie case of age and gender discrimination; (2) the defendant has articulated
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment; (3)
the plaintiff cannot establish pretext; and (4) the plaintiff cannot support her retaliation
theory. The plaintiff responded, and the matter is ripe for review. The plaintiff
concedes that she cannot support a theory of retaliation. Therefore, such claim is
DISMISSED. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED in respect to the
Title VII gender discrimination claim and the ADEA claim.
I. FACTS
The parties agree on the following facts. ECU hired the plaintiff on May 1,
2000. She worked for ECU until her termination on November 23, 2005. During her
employment she received good evaluations, some promotions and increases in pay.
While working in 2004, she learned that one of ECU’s members, Dewey
Shaffer, began an affair with plaintiff’s neighbor. One of Mr. Shaffer’s neighbors
gave his unlisted telephone number to the plaintiff. She did not retrieve this
information from ECU’s records. The plaintiff used that number to contact Mr.
Shaffer’s wife and inform her of the affair. When she spoke with Mrs. Shaffer, she
identified herself as an ECU employee. Also, the plaintiff provided the telephone
number to her sister. In addition, the plaintiff accessed Mr. Shaffer’s account to
discern when he would come in to conduct business at ECU.
Mr. Shaffer complained to Debra Bridwell, a Vice President at ECU, in
November 2005. During this same time frame, an ECU employee called the ECU
hotline and reported a potential timesheet falsification by the plaintiff. As a result of
Mr. Shaffer’s complaint, Ms. Bridwell met with the plaintiff to discuss the issue
regarding Mr. Shaffer. Plaintiff did not deny any of the allegations in regards to Mr.
Shaffer’s complaint.
Days later, on November 22, 2005, the plaintiff met again with Ms. Bridwell
and Larry Fannon. At this meeting they discussed the timesheet falsification
allegation. She was advised that a Disciplinary Review Committee (“DRC”) would
convene, and she could participate if she wished. The committee met that afternoon,
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and the plaintiff attended part of the meeting. She informed the committee that she
would not cease calling Mr. Shaffer. She only conceded that she would not make any
calls to him from ECU.
The DRC decided to terminate her employment. Plaintiff returned to ECU the
next day on November 23, 2005, and she was told of the committee’s decision. The
plaintiff alleges that she was replaced by co-worker, Amanda Hobbs. Ms. Hobbs was
born on May 4, 1975. She further alleges that the DRC knew her age on the day it
decided to terminate her employment.1
The defendant argues that the plaintiff’s actions in regards to Mr. Shaffer
“clearly violated ECU’s expectation that member information would be kept
confidential, that an employee would not act in a way as to create the appearance that
confidentiality had been breached, nor would an employee conduct herself in such a
way as to cast a questionable shadow on ECU.” See [Doc. 43-5, pages 300-305].
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
1
This Court will not consider the plaintiff’s allegation that ECU employee Bridget Light used
ECU’s records to retrieve a member’s telephone number in order to contact the member’s wife and
report to her on the conduct of her husband because it has been stricken. See [Doc. 56].
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Civ. P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the
facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Nat’l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis,
Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence, judge
the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine
issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To
refute such a showing, the non-moving party must present some significant, probative
evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material factual dispute. Id.
at 322. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252;
McClain v. Ontario, Ltd., 244 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). This Court’s role is
limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury
could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49; Nat’l
Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907. If the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient
showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of
proof, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
If this Court concludes that a fair-minded jury could not return a verdict in favor of
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the non-moving party based on the evidence presented, it may enter a summary
judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52; Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339,
1347 (6th Cir. 1994).
The party opposing a Rule 56 motion may not simply rest on the mere
allegations or denials contained in the party’s pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
Instead, an opposing party must affirmatively present competent evidence sufficient
to establish a genuine issue of material fact necessitating the trial of that issue. Id.
Merely alleging that a factual dispute exists cannot defeat a properly supported motion
for summary judgment. Id. A genuine issue for trial is not established by evidence
that is “merely colorable,” or by factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary.
Id. at 248-52.
III. ANALYSIS
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination under the ADEA and Title VII. She can meet this burden by proving
that (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) she was replaced
by someone outside of her protected class or that other similarly situated employees
outside of her protected class were treated better. See Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964
F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
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792, 793 (1973)).
First, regarding the Title VII gender discrimination claim, the plaintiff has
failed to allege that she was replaced by a male employee, i.e. someone outside of her
class. She also fails to allege that a male, similarly-situated employee was treated
differently. As such, she has failed to establish a prima facie case of gender
discrimination. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to this
claim is GRANTED.
Second, regarding the ADEA claim, the plaintiff seems to be proceeding under
the first method for proving the fourth element, i.e. that she was replaced by a younger
individual, Ms. Hobbs.2 The defendant does not dispute this element of the prima
facie showing in it’s Reply. See [Doc. 53]. Instead, ECU reiterates it’s argument that
the plaintiff has failed to meet the third element that she was qualified for the position
because she violated ECU’s polies. ECU mainly relies upon a Seventh Circuit case
to support its argument. The Court declines to resolve that issue.
The Court will assume, arguendo, that the plaintiff has established a prima facie
case. Thus, the burden shifts to the defendant employer to set forth “some legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s discharge.”
2
Cooley v. Carmike
The plaintiff asserted in her affidavit that Brenda Light, a younger employee, was treated
differently. However, this assertion was hearsay and has been stricken. [Doc. 56].
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Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325, 1329 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Phelps v. Yale Security,
Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1024 (6th Cir. 1993). The Court FINDS that ECU has set forth
a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its termination of the plaintiff, that is, that
the plaintiff was discharged for violating its policies.
Accordingly, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the legitimate
reason proffered by the defendant was merely a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). In order to make out
a case for pretext, the plaintiff employee must show:
Either (1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2)
that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate his
discharge, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate
discharge.
Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F. 3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994)
(quoting McNabola v Chicago Transit Authority, 10 F. 3d 501, 513 (7th Cir. 1993)).
The plaintiff has failed to set forth material proof that the defendant’s legitimate
non-discriminatory reason is pretextual. The only evidence offered by the plaintiff
regarding pretext is a situation regarding ECU employee Brenda Light. However, the
United States Magistrate Judge found this to be hearsay, and it was stricken from the
record, [Doc. 56]. In addition, the plaintiff insisted that she would not cease to contact
ECU member Mr. Shaffer about the affair. ECU claims this violated their policies,
and the plaintiff has offered no supportable discriminatory reason for the termination.
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As such, the defendant’s motion in regard to the ADEA claim is GRANTED.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
is GRANTED as to all counts.
Accordingly, the plaintiff’s case is hereby
DISMISSED.
ENTER:
s/J. RONNIE GREER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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