Jones v. Sexton

Filing 28

MEMORANDUM OPINION: Based on the above reasoning, the petition will be DENIED and the case DISMISSED. No COA shall issue. A separate order will enter. Signed by District Judge J Ronnie Greer on 2/4/2014. (c/m to pro se petitioner) (RLC, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at GREENEVILLE
DANIEL H. JONES, #443638,
Petitioner,
v.
DAVID A. SEXTON, Warden,
Respondent.

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No. 2:11-cv-302
Greer/Inman

MEMORANDUM OPINION
State prisoner Daniel H. Jones brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2008 Sullivan County, Tennessee conviction for the possession
of .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, entered pursuant to a jury verdict, [Doc. 2]. Now
before the Court are respondent’s answer to the petition, [Doc. 16], copies of the state court record,
[Doc. 17, Addenda 1 - 2], and petitioner’s reply to the answer, [Doc. 18]. Thus, the case is ripe for
disposition. For the reasons which follow, the petition will be DENIED.
I. Standard of Review
A state criminal defendant may obtain federal habeas relief if he can demonstrate that he is
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Proceedings in the United States District Courts, a court is to determine, after a review of the entire
record whether an evidentiary hearing is required. If a hearing is not required, the district judge may
dispose of the case as justice dictates. After carefully reviewing the entire record, the Court finds
it unnecessary to hold an evidentiary hearing and, thus, will decide this case on the pleadings and
the record.

II. Factual and Procedural Background
The facts as presented by respondent in his answer are undisputed and were taken from the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision on direct review of petitioner’s conviction. See
State v. Jones, No. E2010-00016-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2347711, *1-*3 (Tenn. Crim. App. June
6, 2011).
On October 20, 2005, officers executing a search warrant for a residence in Kingsport,
Tennessee, found petitioner standing in the doorway of a bedroom located immediately to the right
of the front door. When the bedroom was searched, the officers found a Tic Tac box containing over
twenty-five rocks of crack cocaine under the mattress of the bed, a small bottle containing one rock
of crack cocaine under the mattress, and a tin in the pocket of a shirt in a closet containing three or
four rocks of crack cocaine. A plastic baggie containing crack cocaine was discovered in the
bathroom. As a result of these discoveries, petitioner and four other individuals were arrested and
taken to the police station. There, petitioner gave a statement, explaining that he visited the
residence on a daily basis, but denying that he either smoked or sold crack cocaine. Despite the
denial, petitioner was charged with the crack cocaine offense.
At trial, a witness (one of the five persons arrested at the residence) testified that the bottle
containing one gram of crack cocaine found in the bedroom belonged to her and that petitioner had
supplied her with the crack from a Tic Tac box, which he kept in his pants pocket. The witness
further testified that, when the officers arrived at the door, petitioner placed the Tic Tac box under
the mattress. The witness additionally stated that, about two weeks prior to the search, she had seen
petitioner with a Tic Tac box with cocaine in it and had seen him sell the cocaine contained in the
Tic Tac box in exchange for money.

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One of the officers involved in the search also testified that the number of the rocks of crack
cocaine contained in the Tic Tac box was more than a typical user would have in his possession.
A second individual arrested following the search testified that he had bought the rock of
crack cocaine contained in the plastic baggie located in the bathroom from petitioner and that
petitioner frequently kept his crack cocaine in a Tic Tac box. This witness stated that he had never
seen petitioner actually use crack cocaine.
On this and other evidence, petitioner was convicted as charged and received an eleven-year
prison sentence. He was unsuccessful in his direct review proceedings. State v. Jones, 2011 WL
2347711, perm. app. den., (Tenn. 2011).
III. Discussion
Petitioner alleges, as his sole ground for habeas corpus relief, that he was denied a full and
fair trial, equal protection, and due process of law when evidence of prior bad acts were admitted
to corroborate coerced testimony by witnesses. Respondent maintains, in his answer, that this
ground for relief was not exhausted properly in the state courts and that, due to the absence of any
available state court remedies, the claim has been procedurally defaulted.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1), a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus will not
be granted unless he has exhausted his available state court remedies, and he does so by "fairly
presenting" the substance of each of his federal constitutional claims to the state courts for
disposition. See Hannah v. Conley, 49 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995). Claims offered to state
courts in reliance solely on state law have not been fairly presented. Blackmon v. Booker, 394 F.3d
399, 400 (6th Cir. 2004). Thus, a claim must be offered on a constitutional basis—not merely as one
arising under state law. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-366 (1995) (“If state courts are

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to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely
be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution.”);
Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 451 (6th Cir. 2001) (merely raising a claim under state law does
not satisfy the exhaustion requirement); see also Casella v. Clemons, 207 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir.
2000) (To give the state courts a fair opportunity to pass on a constitutional claim, "[t]he trappings
of a federal claim must be likely to put a reasonable jurist on notice of the claim.").
A prisoner who has failed to present a federal claim in the state courts, and who is now
barred by a state procedural rule from returning with his claim to those courts, has committed a
procedural default. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991); Pudelski v. Wilson, 476 F.3d
594, 605 (6th Cir. 2009). Federal review of a procedurally defaulted claim is foreclosed, unless the
habeas petitioner can show cause to excuse his failure to comply with the state procedural rule and
actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732.
Respondent contends that this issue has been procedurally defaulted because, although it was
raised before the Court of Criminal Appeals, it was not raised as a federal constitutional violation
but only as a claim based on state law. Petitioner denies, in his response, that he committed a
procedural default, but his arguments do not actually address the particular default asserted by
respondent, i.e., failure to present a claim to the state court as a constitutional matter.
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s state court pleadings, (Addendum 2, Docs. 1, 4). In
petitioner’s brief on appeal to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, he argued that, under Rule
404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, the inclusion of the prior bad acts evidence was more
prejudicial than probative and that, for this reason, the evidence should have been ruled
inadmissible, (Id., Doc.1). Moreover, petitioner did not suggest that the evidentiary ruling he was

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challenging was not only a violation of state law, but denied him the due process and equal
protection of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The same holds true with respect to
petitioner’s brief supporting his application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme
Court, (Id., Doc. 4). Clearly, petitioner failed to raise the claim in the state courts as a constitutional
violation and may not do so now, absent a showing of cause and prejudice. Here, nothing of the sort
has been established, much less alleged, and federal review has been foreclosed by petitioner’s
procedural default.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the above reasoning, the petition will be DENIED and the case DISMISSED.
V. Certificate of Appealability
One final matter remains for discussion: whether to issue a certificate of appealability (COA)
should petitioner file a notice of appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Petitioner qualifies for
issuance of a COA if he has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right; he
makes such a showing by demonstrating that reasonable jurists might question the correctness of the
Court’s procedural ruling. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). The Court has found that
his claim was procedurally defaulted and that he had failed to make a showing of cause and
prejudice to overcome this obstacle. The Court now finds that reasonable jurists could not disagree
with the resolution of this claim and could not conclude that it is “adequate to deserve
encouragement proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). No COA shall
issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).
A separate order will enter.

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ENTER:
s/J. RONNIE GREER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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