Lawson v. Hancock County Jail et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: This is a fee-paid pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by a plaintiff who was incarcerated in the Hancock County jail when the pleading was filed, but who since has been released f rom jail. Because plaintiff has paid the filing fee, the screening procedures in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which apply to prisoners who are proceeding in formapauperis, do not apply to him. The Hancock County jail is DISMISSED as a defendant. Acco rdingly, this action, in which it is alleged that plaintiff was denied medical care while he was confined in the Hancock County jail, will proceed to service against the two remaining defendants, Hancock County Sheriff Leamon Maxey and Nurse Cathy Jones. (C/M). Signed by District Judge J Ronnie Greer on 8/8/2014. (LMC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at GREENEVILLE

DARRELL L. LAWSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
HANCOCK COUNTY JAIL,
SHERIFF LEMAN MAXEY, and
CATHY JONES (Nurse),
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 2:14-cv-109
Greer/Inman

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

This is a fee-paid pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by a
plaintiff who was incarcerated in the Hancock County jail when the pleading was filed, but who
since has been released from jail. Because plaintiff has paid the filing fee, the screening
procedures in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which apply to prisoners who are proceeding in forma
pauperis, do not apply to him. Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
However, the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A that authorize the dismissal of
fee-paid prisoner complaints seeking relief from a governmental entity, officer, or employee do
apply in this case. Dismissal under these provisions is appropriate where the allegations in the
complaint are frivolous or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court
concludes that, since the plaintiff has named the Hancock County jail as a defendant and since
the jail is a building and not a suable entity under § 1983, see Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 688-90 (1978), the allegations asserted against this defendant fail to state
a claim. The allegations also are legally frivolous because contentions against a building lack an

arguable legal or factual basis. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). For these reasons,
the Hancock County jail is DISMISSED as a defendant.
Section 1915A also allows sua sponte dismissal of fee-paid prisoner complaints that
contain allegations that are so attenuated and insubstantial as to divest a court of jurisdiction.
Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1198 (2000). The
remaining allegations in this pro se complaint, liberally construed, are not of this kind and cannot
be dismissed under § 1915A.
Plaintiff’s submission of the filing fee also impacts service of process in this case. When
a plaintiff has been granted pauper status, the United States Marshals Service must serve process
upon the defendants, thus relieving a plaintiff of his burden to serve process. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(d); Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(2). Because this plaintiff is not proceeding in forma pauperis, 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d) does not apply. And because section 1915(d) does not apply, plaintiff himself
must serve a copy of the complaint and summons upon the defendants in compliance with the
appropriate procedural rules. See Byrd v. Stone, 94 F.3d 217, 219 (1996).
Accordingly, this action, in which it is alleged that plaintiff was denied medical care
while he was confined in the Hancock County jail, will proceed to service against the two
remaining defendants, Hancock County Sheriff Leamon Maxey and Nurse Cathy Jones.

ENTER:

s/J. RONNIE GREER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2