Hatley v. Simerly et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 22 MOTION to Appoint Counsel filed by Joseph Hatley. In light of the lack of objection to the request for extension, Plaintiff's motion [Doc. 22] is GRANTED in pa rt only to the extent that the request for an extension of ninety days to respond to discovery requests is granted nunc pro tunc as of the day it was filed. The Court finds that appointment of counsel is not warranted at this time and Plaintiff's motion [Doc. 22] is DENIED in part to the extent it seeks appointment of counsel. Signed by District Judge J Ronnie Greer on 11/14/2016. (C/M to pro se Plaintiff) (AMP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT GREENEVILLE
JOSEPH HATLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHNATHAN BROOKS SIMERLY,
Defendant.

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No. 2:14-CV-326-JRG-MCLC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is a pro se prisoner’s complaint for violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Before the Court is a motion to appoint counsel and for an extension of time to respond to
discovery filed by Plaintiff in which he states that he received discovery requests on June 1,
2016, but does not know how to complete the forms or have the requested information, is trying
to get money to pay for his disability records, and is still being treated for mental health issues
and the doctors need time to complete their diagnosis [Doc. 22]. Accordingly, Plaintiff requests
an extension of ninety days to respond to the discovery and for the Court to appoint an attorney
for him [Id.].
In light of the lack of objection to the request for extension, Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. 22]
is GRANTED in part only to the extent that the request for an extension of ninety days to
respond to discovery requests is granted nunc pro tunc as of the day it was filed.
Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, however, will be denied.

There is no “automatic”

constitutional right to counsel in a civil rights suit and, typically, counsel is only appointed in an
exceptional case. See Glover v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 1996) (observing that courts
in the Sixth Circuit do not appoint counsel for indigent and pro se prisoners in civil cases absent

truly extraordinary circumstances). The Court has carefully considered Plaintiff’s motion, his
ability to represent himself, the record as a whole, and the issues and complexity of this case, and
concludes that the appointment of counsel is not warranted here because there are no exceptional
circumstances to justify appointing counsel. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1993);
Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the Court finds that appointment
of counsel is not warranted at this time and Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. 22] is DENIED in part to
the extent it seeks appointment of counsel.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:

s/J. RONNIE GREER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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