Anderson v. Centurion et al
Filing
4
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER re: IFP Applications and dismissed/severed plaintiffs. Signed by District Judge R Leon Jordan on 4/22/15. (ADA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
at GREENEVILLE
CHARLES MONTAGUE, et. al.,
Plaintiffs,
V.
DERRICK SCHOFIELD, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 2:14-cv-292
Judge Jordan
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
This is a prose civil rights action and proposed class action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as reimbursement of all costs and fees,
including attorney fees (Doc. 2). The complaint purportedly contained the signatures of onehundred, eighteen (118) prisoners, who are housed in the Northeast Correctional Complex
(NECX) in Mountain City, Tennessee. 1
I.
Procedural History
On December 10, 2014, the Court entered a deficiency order (Doc. 46), observing that
not all the listed prisoner plaintiffs had signed the complaint, that others who had signed the
complaint had not been captioned as plaintiffs, that some had submitted in forma pauperis
motions, that no plaintiff had paid a full filing fee, and that there were additional problems with
1
The complaint identified one-hundred, forty-two (142) prisoners as party plaintiffs, with seven
prisoners being named twice in that section. Seventeen prisoners who were named as plaintiffs
did not sign the complaint. Only those prisoners who purportedly signed the complaint are
included in the total of 118 plaintiffs. Though Terry Clifton, Thomas Elder, Keithen Jones, and
Tedrick Napier affixed two separate signatures to the complaint, these four individuals have only
been counted once as signatories to the pleading.
the pleadings which needed to be addressed by the plaintiffs. The Court set a thirty-day deadline
for correcting all cited deficiencies. The order was mailed to all prisoners who were identified as
plaintiffs in the complaint.
Twelve inmates who were listed as plaintiffs did not receive the order. The copies of the
order which were mailed to them at the NECX were returned to the Court by the postal
authorities, with the faces of the envelopes which contained those copies variously marked as
follows, "Not at this Facility," "Return to Sender by TDOC," "Refused by Inmate," "Will Not
Sign," "Unable to Forward," "Inactive, or Paroled"(Docs. 49, 51- 56, 62-66).
Five prisoners, who were named as plaintiffs, responded to the deficiency order by filing
notices under penalty of perjury, disclaiming that they signed the complaint, ever desired to be
plaintiffs in the lawsuit, or authorized anyone to include them as plaintiffs (Docs. 50, 60-61, 84,
and 96).
Thirteen prisoners who had failed to proffer a filing fee or an in forma pauperis
application have responded to the deficiency order by submitting the paperwork necessary for a
pauper determination. These thirteen prisoners join the sixteen prisoners who filed in forma
pauperis applications prior to the deficiency, and it is these twenty-nine prisoners who both have
signed the complaint and submitted in forma pauperis applications who will be considered to be
plaintiffs. These are the twenty-nine plaintiffs:
1) Charles Montague, 2) John Anderson, 3)
Gregory Bowman, 4) Ronald Brewer, 5) Larry Brown, 6) Nikos Burgins, 7) Patrick Champion,
8) L. Churchwell, 9) Milton Cooper; 10) Carlos Eaton, 11) Orlando Fields, 12) David Lackey,
13) Craig Majors, 14) Aaron Malone, 15) Leon McKissack, 16) Victor D. McMiller, Sr., 17)
William Newby, 18) Norman Page, 19) Jose Perez, 20) Baron Pinkney 21) Samuel Ramsey, 22)
2
Darrell Swinney, 23) Kevin Tate, 24) Octavious Taylor, 25) Walter Webb, 26) Hugh Williams,
27) Ricardo Wiggins, 28) Tony Williams, and 29) Odell Wisdom.
All other prisoners are DISMISSED as plaintiffs in this lawsuit for want of prosecution,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), due to their failures to respond to the deficiency order, their failures to
correct the cited deficiencies in the pleading, or their failures to sign the complaint or submit in
forma pauperis applications, or due to their notices and disclaimers.
II.
Class Action
Plaintiff Montague has submitted an implied request, pursuant to Rule 23, to have this
lawsuit certified as a class action "for the prompt dispatch of business," noting the
"cohesiveness/ unity on the part of the plaintiffs/class members" (Doc. 95, p. 1). An action
cannot be certified as a class action, unless the prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2551, 180 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2011) (citing General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147, 161, 102 S. Ct. 2364 (1982). There are four prerequisites in Rule 23(a): (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
First of all, the plaintiffs, including plaintiff Montague, who seeks to represent the class,
have failed to define the putative class of prisoners who would pursue this lawsuit. Nor can the
Court discern from the allegations set forth in the complaint the identity of the proposed class of
prisoners. Thus, it is unclear as to whether the class in this case would encompass some prisoners
in the NECX; all prisoners in the NECX; some TDOC prisoners; all TDOC prisoners; or some
3
entirely different group of inmates, for example, Muslim inmates. "To maintain a class action,
the existence of the class must be pleaded and the limits of the class must be defined with some
specificity." Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 381 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Wilson v.
Zarhadnick, 534 F.2d 55, 57 (5th Cir.1976)).
The pleading does not conform to this
requirement.
Nor has the fourth prerequisite for class certification, i.e., that the representative parties
must protect the interests of the class fairly and adequately, been satisfied, since plaintiff
Montague proposes himself as the representative party.
adequately represent a class."
Ordinarily, "pro se prisoners cannot
Ziegler v. Michigan, 59 F. App'x 622, 624 (6th Cir. 2003).
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has affirmed a district court's denial of class certification in a proposed
class action by pro se prisoners, stating that "no representative party was available because pro se
prisoners are not able to represent fairly the class." Palasty v. Hawk, 15 F. App'x 197, 200 (6th
Cir. 2001) (citing Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000)
and Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir.1975)); Inmates, Washington Co. Jail v.
England, 516 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Tenn. 1980), aff'd, 659 F.2d 1081 (1981).
Therefore, because there is no adequate representative party, the Court DENIES class
action certification to the plaintiffs in this suit. See Johnson v. Brown, 581 F. App'x 777, 781
(11th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court's denial of pro se prisoner's motion for class
certification since 28 U.S. C. § 1654, the section which allows parties to proceed pro se, provides
"a personal right that does not extend to the representation of the interests of others") (quoting
Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 873 (11th Cir. 2008)). The Court turns now to the twenty-
nine pending informapauperis applications. See McGore, 114 F.3d 604 ("When an inmate seeks
pauper status, the only issue is whether the inmate pays the entire fee at the initiation of the
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proceeding or over a period of time under an installment plan [since p]risoners are no longer
entitled to a waiver of fees and costs.").
III.
Severance
Some district courts in this circuit sever the claims of each pro se plaintiff in a multi-
prisoner lawsuit, such as the instant action. See Ward-El v. Heyns, No. 13-13595, 2013 WL
4776114, at *1 n.l (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2013) (listing cases).
One factor which cuts against allowing multiple prisoners to advance their claims in a
single lawsuit is that a prison population is constantly in flux. Id., 2013 WL 4776114, at *3
(noting that "jail populations are notably transitory, making joint litigation difficult") (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
That factor is present here, as evidenced by
correspondence returned to the Court by the postal authorities upon the transfer, release or parole
of the putative plaintiff- addressee.
Another problem is that, although pleadings must be signed by all parties, not all pro se
prisoner plaintiffs in multi-prisoner lawsuits will sign pleadings, motions, and other papers filed
in the litigation. Rule ll(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every pleading,
written motion or other paper be signed by every party who is unrepresented. The Rule 11
requirement is a problem here, as plaintiff Montague has filed several motions and notices signed
only by himself, but which have been submitted on behalf of other plaintiffs (Docs. 3 -5, 9-11,
14, 57, 73, and 95).
Since plaintiff Montague is not a class representative or a lawyer, any
pleadings, motions or papers he signs on behalf of other inmates are not properly before the
Court and, to the extent that any of these filings on behalf of other plaintiffs remain pending,
they will not be considered.
5
A related problem is that allowing multi-prisoner lawsuits often results in pleadings being
filed on behalf of plaintiffs without their consent. See Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F.Supp. 2d 743,
780 (E.D.Mich. 2009). Here, too, this is a problem. As observed previously, several putative
plaintiffs have filed sworn notices disavowing that they signed the complaint or that they
authorized anyone else to sign it for them.
Yet another difficulty encountered in multi-prisoner lawsuits is that some inmates may be
subject to the three-strikes rule in 28 U.S.C. § 191 S(g), 2 which precludes a prisoner who is
subject to that rule from proceeding in a suit in forma pauperis, unless he is alleging that he is in
imminent danger of serious physical injury. See Taylor v. First Med. Mgmt., 508 F.App'x 488,
493 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that "actions should be determined and strikes allocated on a
prisoner-by-prisoner basis" and that "a holding otherwise would undermine the purpose of the
PLRA: it would allow prisoners to join their cases in the hopes of finding one claim with merit
among them, thereby avoiding strikes"). That circumstance is present in this case also.
Another complication arises in a lawsuit involving multiple prisoner plaintiffs, where
most or all are permitted to proceed in forma pauperis and where each plaintiff pays only a prorata share of a single filing fee-the fee assessment and collection process would present an
administrative nightmare. See Jones, No. 05CV07-JHM, 2005 WL 1175960, at*4 (noting the
"enormous bookkeeping implications for both Clerk's offices and prison financial offices"
entailed by allowing each prisoner to pay a portion of the filing fee).
The filings in the instant case underscore this point. Plaintiff Montague submitted a
check in the amount of $3.00 as a "partical [sic] payment towards the filing fee" (Doc. 47). The
2
Under § 1915(g), a prior civil case or appeal brought in federal court qualifies as a strike, if it
is dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
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check was returned to him by the Clerk's office, and in response, he wrote the Court a letter
stating that "[t]his enclosed check is a filing fee payment for this case, and there are around 141
plaintiffs on the suit. Please do not send the $3.00 check back to me a second time, but accredit
[it] towards the filing fee .... "(Doc. 48). 3
Based on the reasoning of the courts which have severed the claims of prisoners in multiplaintiff civil lawsuits, see e.g., Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F.Supp. 2d 743, 780 (E.D.Mich.
2009); Jones v. Fletcher, No. 05CV067-JMH, 2005 WL 1175960 (E.D. Ky. May 5, 2005), the
Court has determined that the wiser course of action is to sever the claims of each plaintiff,
except for plaintiff Montague's claims. See Proctor, 661 F.Supp. 2d at 754, 781-82 (severing the
improperly-joined claims and pro se prisoner plaintiffs because allowing the claims to advance
as a group would be "unwieldy and impossible to manage"); Jones, 2005 WL 1175960, at *4 (5
(severing all pro se prisoners' claims in a multi-plaintiff suit, save those of the lead plaintiffs);
but see Ward-El v. Heyns, No. 13-13595, 2013 WL 4776114, (E.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2013)
(dismissing multi-prisoner complaint without prejudice to the plaintiffs filing individual
complaints); Spencer v. Bynum, No. 2:13-13056, 2013 WL 4041870, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 8,
2013) (dismissing a multi-prisoner pro se civil rights based on many deficiencies, including
misjoinder of parties, without prejudice to the individual plaintiffs filing complaints on their own
behalf).
3
If each of the 141 prisoners to which Montague refers paid a proportionate share of the $3 50
filing fee, Montague's share would be only $2.48, meaning that his $3.00 check would represent
an overpayment of his portion of the filing fee and that the Clerk would be tasked with
processing a refund of any overpayment of the filing fee. Apparently, plaintiff Montague
"mistakenly assumed that he, and not the Court had the authority to determine who would pay
the filing fee" id., 2005 WL 1175960, at*4, and how much each prisoner would pay. That
authority resides in this Court. Likewise, plaintiff Swinney submitted a $3.00 check, which
similarly was returned to him (Docket Entry of Dec. 24, 1014).
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Accordingly, it is ORDERED that this action is deemed to have been brought only by
plaintiff Charles Montague; that the other twenty-eight plaintiffs are not joined as parties in this
civil rights lawsuit; and that the claims of those other twenty-eight plaintiffs are SEVERED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to open new cases for each of those twenty-eight other
plaintiffs. The Clerk shall place a copy of the complaint, this memorandum and order, and any
other filings made by that specific plaintiff into each plaintiffs newly-opened case. To promote
judicial economy and the wise allocation of resources, each newly-opened case should be
assigned the undersigned district judge. Each plaintiff will be afforded an opportunity to file an
amended complaint alleging how the events or conditions set forth in the complaint have violated
that specific plaintiffs constitutional rights.
IV.
Filing-Fee Issue
As noted, each of the twenty-nine plaintiffs has filed a motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. If their motions are granted, the question becomes whether they pay a pro rata
portion of a single filing fee or whether each is responsible for a full filing fee of $350.
In resolving this issue, the Court is mindful that "(t]he intent of the [PLRA] was to deter
frivolous and vexatious prisoner litigation by exposing prisoners to the same financial risks and
considerations faced by other litigants." In re Alea, 286 F.3d 378, 380 (6th Cir. 2002); see also
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 109 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that one of the
purposes of the PLRA, was to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits by prisoners); Riley v.
Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906, 917 (6th Cir. 2004) ("One of Congress' purposes in passing the PLRA was
to reduce the large number of frivolous prisoner lawsuits being filed in federal courts."); Hadix v.
Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 845 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Congress may have reasonably believed that many
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of these claims involved trivial or frivolous allegations, particularly when compared to the relief
sought in civil rights litigation brought on behalf of non-incarcerated plaintiffs.").
Because the claims of each plaintiff have been severed and because the Court finds that
allowing the plaintiffs to proceed upon each plaintiffs payment of a pro rata share of a single
filing fee would disserve the purpose behind the enactment of the PLRA, the Court agrees with
the reasoning of those courts that the problems encountered in allowing a case to proceed as a
multi-prisoner civil action counsel against the assessment of a single filing fee. See Hubbard v.
Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that the PLRA, enacted to deter frivolous
lawsuits by prisoners, does not allow multiple prisoners to join claims in a single § 1983 action
so as to split filing fees but requires payment of the full filing fee by each individual prisoner);
Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that while the PLRA does not
prohibit joinder of claims by prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis, it does not allow split filing
fees so that each prisoner plaintiff must pay the full filing fee); Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852
(7th Cir. 2004) (same).
A. Assessment
Accordingly, the applications to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee submitted
by plaintiffs:
1) Charles Montague, 2) John Anderson, 3) Gregory Bowman, 4) Ronald Brewer,
5) Larry Brown, 6) Nikos Burgins, 7) Patrick Champion, 8) L. Churchwell, 9) Milton Cooper;
10) Carlos Eaton, 11) Orlando Fields, 12) David Lackey, 13) Craig Majors, 14) Aaron Malone,
15) Leon McKissack, 16) Victor D. McMiller, Sr., 17) William Newby, 18) Norman Page, 19)
Jose Perez, 20) Baron Pinkney 21) Samuel Ramsey, 22) Darrell Swinney, 23) Kevin Tate, 24)
Octavious Taylor, 25) Walter Webb, 26) Hugh Williams, 27) Ricardo Wiggins, 28) Tony
Williams, and 29) Odell Wisdom are GRANTED (Docs. 1, 12-13, 15-18, 21-25, 37, 40, 42, 44,
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58, 67-68, 71-72, 77-78, 82, 88-89, 97 and 99); the duplicate applications to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee submitted by plaintiffs McKissack, Brewer, and Lackey are
DENIED as MOOT (Docs. 86, 92, and 94); and each of these plaintiffs is ASSESSED the full
filing fee of three hundred and fifty dollars ($350). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1). (For reasons which
appear below, plaintiff Patrick Champion's in forma pauperis application is considered
separately from the other plaintiff's applications.)
B. Fee Collection Procedures
The custodian(s) of plaintiffs Burgins' and Malone's inmate trust accounts at the
institution where each now resides is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court twenty
percent (20%) of each of these plaintiff's preceding monthly income credited to the account, but
only when the amount in the account exceeds ten dollars ($10), until the full $350 fee has been
paid to the Clerk of Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 4
The custodian of the trust accounts of the other plaintiffs, with the exception of plaintiff
Champion, shall submit, as an initial partial payment, whichever is the greater of: (a) twenty
percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to each plaintiffs' inmate trust account; or (b)
twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in each plaintiff's inmate trust account for
the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(l)(A) and (B).
Thereafter, the custodian shall submit twenty percent (20%) of each plaintiff's preceding
monthly income (or income credited to his trust account for the preceding month), but only when
such monthly income exceeds $10.00, until the full filing fee of $350.00 has been paid to the
4
Typically, a prisoner is assessed an initial partial filing fee, but plaintiffs Burgins and Malone
have zero (0) balances in their trust accounts (Docs. 22 and 89). An initial partial filing fee is not
required when a prisoner possesses no funds in his trust account, though he "is still obligated to
pay the full filing fee when money does become available." McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944 (6th
Cir. 2013).
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Clerk's Office.
Id. All payments should be mailed to: Clerk's Office, USDC; 220 W. Depot
Street, Suite 200; Greeneville, TN 37743.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail copies of this Order to the custodian of inmate trust
accounts at the NECX and to the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction,
Derrick D. Schofield, to ensure compliance with the fee assessment procedures outlined herein.
The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the
Court's financial deputy.
C. Three-Strikes Rule (Plaintiff Champion)
As to the application to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee submitted by
plaintiff Patrick Champion, the Court has checked the U. S. Party-Case Index in Pacer (Public
Access to Court Electronic Records), which lists the parties who are or who have been involved
in federal litigation. The index also indicates whether any of a party's prior cases have been
dismissed and sets forth the basis for the dismissal. Performing this task is important because, as
noted previously, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding in a case informa
pauperis if he has filed three prior civil actions or appeals in a federal court which have been
dismissed as frivolous, malicious or for failure to state a claim, unless the prisoner is alleging
that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.
Records in the Party-Case Index indicate that plaintiff Champion is a "three strike filer
subject to the restrictions contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)." Champion v. Conley, No. 13-2034STA-tmp (W.D.Tenn. Sept. 24, 2013) (Order of Sept. 24, 2013, dismissing his case without
prejudice under § 19 l 5(g) ).
Therefore, plaintiff Champion's application to proceed in forma
pauperis is DENIED (Doc. 30), and unless, within thirty (30) days of the date on this order, he
submits the full $350 filing fee, his case will be DISMISSED without prejudice.
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V.
Screening
Though this case now contains only the claims of plaintiff Montague, the pleading was
drafted in such a way that it is nearly impossible to detail the allegations made only with respect
to plaintiff Montague. Be that as it may, the pleading must still be screened because, under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua
sponte dismiss those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a
defendant who is immune. See, e.g., Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
Responding to a perceived deluge of frivolous lawsuits, and, in
particular, frivolous prisoner suits, Congress directed the federal
courts to review or "screen" certain complaints sua sponte and to
dismiss those that failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, that sought monetary relief from a defendant immune
from such relief, or that were frivolous or malicious.
Id. at 1015-16 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A).
In screening
complaints, the Court bears in mind the rule that pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases must
be liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Still, the complaint must be sufficient "to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007), which simply means the factual content pied by a plaintiff must permit a court "to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court examines the
complaint in light of those requirements.
VI.
Review of the Complaint
The pleading is disorganized, confusing, overlapping, and repetitive and contains a
hodgepodge of allegations. Of necessity, the Court has broadly construed the contentions and has
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grouped together similar claims, which are scattered throughout the pleading, in an attempt to
bring order to the body of claims.
A. General Claims of Unconstitutional Conditions and Violations of Rights
1. Allegations
Defendants TDOC Commissioner Schofield and Warden McAllister should have known
that placing rival gang members in the same units and allowing these rivals to engage in
recreation at same time would lead to gang violence. Plaintiffs are now locked down, due to
gang violence, though they were not issued disciplinary reports and had nothing to do with gang
violence.
Also, inmates cannot perform legal research-a violation of their right of access to the
courts. Plaintiffs' religious programs have been eliminated. The square footage in single or
double-occupancy cell is 24 to 35 square feet. Inmates' hot pots-items which are listed as
approved for an inmate to possess-have been seized pursuant to a policy. 5
The medical delivery system is minimally adequate, and there are problems with delays
in rendering medical care and in the provision of follow-up medical care, prescriptions, and
medically-prescribed diets. Prisoners' ailments are misdiagnosed and inmates' families must
pressure NECX authorities to provide proper medical treatment for their relatives. The provision
of medical attention to inmates is mismanaged. For example, sick call for inmates occurs at the
same time as inmates are eating in the dining hall, which causes some prisoners to miss the
opportunity to obtain medical attention in response to sick call requests and makes inmates'
access to medical care both cumbersome and difficult.
2. Law & Analysis
5
This claim is duplicated on page 30 of the complaint.
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The Eighth Amendment proscribes cruel and unusual punishments. A punishment is cruel
and unusual when it inflicts unnecessary and wanton pain. Included among such punishments
are those which are totally lacking in penological justification. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 346 (1981). An Eighth Amendment claim is composed of two parts: an objective
component, which requires plaintiff to show a "sufficiently serious" deprivation, and a
subjective component, which requires a showing of a sufficiently culpable state of mind -one of
deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 and 842 (1994).
Where prison conditions are concerned, a sufficiently serious deprivation is one "so grave
that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.
In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today's
society chooses to tolerate." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (emphasis in original).
Deliberate indifference is illustrated by a prison official who acts or fails to act despite
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 82.
"Deliberate indifference is more than negligence and approaches intentional wrongdoing."
Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials "take reasonable reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33 (quoting Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527 1984)).
a) Gang Violence
Plaintiff does not appear to be alleging that he either was subjected to gang violence or
was himself involved in gang violence, as indeed he maintains that he had nothing to do with
gang violence. Plaintiff seemingly is complaining about being locked down unjustly for the
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gang violence in which others engaged, but in which he himself did not participate. If that is
plaintiffs true claim, he fails to state a claim of constitutional import.
Plaintiff has no constitutionally protected interest in not being locked down for gang
violence, regardless of whether or not he participated in that misconduct. Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (finding that an inmate has no liberty interest in being free of a restraint
unless it imposes an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life"); see also Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 430 F.3d 795, 804 (6th Cir. 2005)
(observing that "a transfer to a maximum security facility with more burdensome conditions is
within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to
impose"). A valid conviction allows a state constitutionally to deprive a criminal defendant of
his liberty, confine him in a prison and subject him to its rules so long as conditions of
confinement fall within the parameters of the sentence imposed. See Montanye v. Haymes, 427
U.S. 236, 242 (1976).
Being placed on lock-down status, even though plaintiff finds it burdensome, is "within
the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose."
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 478 (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)). Plaintiff has no
constitutional claim in this regard.
b) First Amendment (Access to Courts)
Plaintiffs allegation that inmates' right of access to courts is infringed upon by their
inabilities to perform legal research implicates the First Amendment. A prisoner has a First
Amendment right "to petition the Government for redress of grievances," and this includes a
right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977). In order to succeed on
a claim for denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must show that he has actually been impeded
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in his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim regarding his conviction or conditions of
confinement. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996).
This means that a plaintiff "must plead and prove prejudice stemming from the asserted
violation. Plaintiffl] must demonstrate, for example, that the [alleged infringement of his right]
caused such actual injury as the late filing of a court document or the dismissal of an otherwise
meritorious claim." Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Lewis).
Plaintiff has not alleged that he has been prejudiced in filing this instant suit or has
suffered any "litigation related detriment" to this case or any pending state criminal proceedings.
See id. Thus, because plaintiff has not shown that he has sustained an actual injury in his efforts
to litigate a non-frivolous claim, he fails to state a claim for denial of his right of access to the
courts.
c) First Amendment (Free Exercise of Religion)
Plaintiff's contention that religious programs at the NECX have been cut likewise
implicates the First Amendment.
While incarcerated, prisoners retain certain constitutional
rights, including their First Amendment right to exercise their religious beliefs, Cruz v. Beto, 405
U.S. 319 (1972); Thompson v. Kentucky, 712 F.2d 1078, 1080 (6th Cir. 1983), subject to
reasonable restrictions and limitations by prison officials. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482
U.S. 342, 350-53 (1987); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 88-93 (1987). "A prisoner alleging that
the actions of prison officials violate his religious beliefs must show that the belief or practice
asserted is religious in the person's own scheme of things and is sincerely held." Flagner v.
Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
McCoy v. Celeste, No. 87-3500, 1988 WL 1358, *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 1988) (no free exercise
claim is stated, "unless a prisoner can show that he has a sincerely held belief, deeply rooted in
his religion"). And it is "[ o]nly after a prison inmate shows a sincere belief that his or her
16
religion requires the practice at issue does the court move on to determining whether the prison's
actions restricting the practice are valid." Barhite v. Caruso, 377 F. App'x. 508, 510-511 (6th
Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff has offered no allegations of fact whatsoever to support that the curtailment of
religious programs has violated his right freely to practice his religion. Again, he states no claim
with respect to the TDOC 's diminished support, financial or otherwise, for prison religious
programs.
d) Space Limitations
In his next claim, plaintiff contends that the square footage in single- or doubleoccupancy cell has been reduced to 24 to 35 square feet. Again, plaintiff offers no allegations at
all to show how these space restrictions amount to a constitutional violation. To the extent that
plaintiff is attempting to make out an implied claim for overcrowded conditions of confinement,
prison overcrowding, in and of itself, is not unconstitutional. Owens v. Campbell, No. 98-6770,
1999 WL 1023690, at*l (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 1999) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 34748 (1981 )). Of course, if overcrowded conditions cause an inmate to be denied the minimal
civilized measure of life's basic needs, such as food, warmth, or exercise, this would be
impermissible under the Eighth Amendment. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 304 (1991).
Here, plaintiff has not demonstrated the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need
to sustain his claim of overcrowding. Thus, this claim fails entirely.
e) Due Process (Hot Pots)
Plaintiff maintains, in this claim, that hot pots, which are on the TDOC list of approved
items, have been seized pursuant to a policy. In broadly construing the claim, the Court deems
that plaintiff is alleging that a hot pot which he owned was seized in violation of his right to due
process of law.
17
However, to state a claim for violation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must show
he has no meaningful state post-deprivation remedies available or that such remedies are
ineffective to protect his property rights. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539 (1981), overruled
on other grounds by Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062,
1064 (6th Cir. 1983).
In this case, the plaintiff has failed to make such a showing, since he may contest the
seizure of his hot pot through the institutional grievance procedure, see Jones v. Burton, No. 054084, 173 F.App'x 520, 522 (7th Cir. 2006); by filing a claim under Tennessee's Governmental
Tort Liability Act; by filing a common law action for conversion; or by petitioning TDOC for a
declaratory order and, if that petition fails, by filing an action for a declaratory order in the
Davidson County Chancery Court. See Blackmon v. Norris, 775 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1989).
f) Medical Claims
Plaintiffs claims about general inadequacies in the medical delivery system at the NECX
do not encompass any allegation that he himself had a serious medical need to which a defendant
showed deliberate indifference-a requirement for stating a constitutional medical mistreatment
claim. Estelle v. Gamble, 404 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Insofar as plaintiff bases any of his claims
upon the impingement of the rights of other inmates, he lacks standing to present them. An
inmate must assert his own rights, not those of other inmates. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 166 (1990).
In sum, none of the above allegations state viable constitutional claims.
B. Person Safety Issues (Compl., p. 11) 6
6
These claims are duplicated on page 31 of the complaint.
18
1. Allegations
Shortcomings in inmates' custody levels lead inmates in minimum custody to "face the
distinct possibility of assaults and/or sexual rape at the hands of other inmates [and t]here is one
guard per shift for each housing unit" (Doc. 1, p. 11 ). Furthermore, the problems encountered by
medium security inmates "are not much different" (Id.). Among the predicaments confronted by
inmates designated as "close custody" is that this custody level represents "a higher security risk
of escape or antisocial behavior" than that posed to inmates who are classified as medium
security. Furthermore, inmates classified to close custody are housed in the same units as those
classified as minimum and medium custody levels.
Protective custody level is intended to
segregate vulnerable inmates from those in the general population, and such segregated inmates
are not allowed in the same cell or in the same exercise area with other inmates.
2. Law & Analysis
The Constitution does not guarantee an inmate any particular custody level in prison.
Ford v. Harvey, 106 F. App'x 397, 399 (6th Cir. 2004) (observing that "a prisoner does not have
a constitutional right to placement in any particular prison, or in a particular security
classification") (citing Glim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983), and Montanye v. Haymes,
427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)). 7 Plaintiff has no claim based upon his custody level, whatever his
level of custody. To the extent that plaintiffs claims are constructed on assertions of the rights
of other inmates, he has no constitutional standing to bring them. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 166.
As to plaintiffs contention regarding physical assaults by other inmates, prison officials
have a constitutional duty to protect prisoners who are committed to their care from the violent
7
One caveat is in order. Transfer to a "supermax" prison, where the conditions are substantially
more onerous than any other form of incarceration, does impose on an inmate an atypical and
significant hardship, so as to violate due process. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). No
issue concerning a supermax prison has arisen in this case.
19
acts of other prisoners. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833-34. An inmate's allegation that correctional
authorities have failed to protect him from an assault by another inmate may state an Eighth
Amendment claim under § 1983. Id.
As noted, plaintiff has not identified the custody level to which he has been classified,
nor offered any allegations of fact to show that he himself is in danger of an assault. And of
course, plaintiff cannot assert the rights of other inmates who may face attacks due to their
custody levels. Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim under the Eight Amendment.
C. Overcrowding & Staffing (Compl., pp. 13-16) 8
1. Allegations
Inmates are denied opportunities to exercise on the NECX ball field, though the denial of
exercise in this location was not justified by any extreme climate conditions. Beds were added to
top tier cells at the NECX, in disregard of the designated capacity of the prison.
Housing
inmates in such close quarters incites violence and, thus, violates the settlement agreement in
Grubbs v. Bradley, 821 F.Supp. 496 (M.D.Tenn. 1993).
TDOC has instituted a Tier Management System (TMS), which requires that each cell be
unlocked manually with a key, which is solely in the possession of the unit manager. This
procedure will create a bottle neck at the pod door when all inmates exit their cells.
The
congestion of inmates at the pod door likewise poses a fire hazard. The TMS also limits law
library access and provides no avenue for inmates to seek extended hours of law library use.
Further, pursuant to the TMS, computers were removed from the law library and were not
replaced, impeding inmates' access to the courts.
8
These claims essentially are duplicated or re-alleged on page 32 of the complaint.
20
Also, under the TMS, inmates now are housed on the main compound and all are
classified, overtly or covertly, as close custody, whereas the pre-TMS system separately housed
prisoners who had minimum restricted, medium, close, and maximum security custody
designations. Many assaults and tensions stem from the placement of close security inmates
with inmates in the general prison population who have been classified to lesser security levels.
2. Law & Analysis
a) Eighth Amendment (Exercise)
Prisoners enjoy a right to exercise, within certain parameters. "It is generally recognized
that a total or near-total deprivation of exercise or recreational opportunity, without penological
justification, violates Eighth Amendment guarantees." Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 289
(6th Cir. 1983). However, the Sixth Circuit has not established a set a constitutional minimum
amount of exercise for prisoners. Rogers v. Jabe, 43 F .3d 1082, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995).
Here, plaintiff has not alleged that he actually was denied an opportunity to exercise, only
that he was not permitted to exercise on the ball field, in the location wherein he desired to
exercise. The allegations, as they have been framed by plaintiff, are not based on a violation of
any constitutionally-recognized right to exercise in a specific venue, and they therefore do not
state a claim under § 19 83.
b) Grubbs v. Bradley Claims
The allegations regarding possible violations of the settlement agreement in Grubbs v.
Bradley, a case litigated in the Middle District, are improperly brought in this Court. The Court
lacks jurisdiction over all such claims, and any and all such claims asserted in this category or in
any of the following categories are DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.
c) TMS Claims
21
Plaintiffs contentions concerning the TMS and the impact this management policy has
had on the cell door locking system, the law library, and custody levels cannot proceed. This is
so because class action certification has been denied and, absent such certification, plaintiffs
claims challenging the TMS are limited to instances in which his own constitutionally-protected
rights were violated. See, e.g., Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 381 (6th Cir.1989). No such
contentions are contained within this claim. Therefore, plaintiffs assertions about the problems
incurred due to the implementation of the TMS, as presented in this "Overcrowding and
Staffing" category of claims, do not state a claim for relief.
D. Assertions Involving Plaintiff Montague (Compl., pp. 14-19, 22, 33)
1.
Allegations
Implementation of the TMS affects plaintiff Montague adversely by limiting his time in
the law library to one to two hours per day, space permitting; by eliminating four computers in
the law library; by replacing the former classification system with a different and more
dangerous one to inmates; by reducing or entirely eliminating religious programs; by lowering
the caloric content of his diet and the square footage in his cell; and by causing sleep disruptions,
in that he is awakened by an officer at 10:00 PM and required to move and is awakened again for
the 5:30 AM "head count" and required either to sit up in bed or to stand up. The TMS is beset
by numerous problems, which in combination may amount to cruel and unusual punishment.
Montague suffers from an unidentified skin problem, but has had his medications stopped.
Plaintiff Montague and other Muslim inmates are not permitted to purchase Halal prayer
oil from a vendor other than Union Supply, who is the vendor TDOC has approved.
approved vendor is the only vendor from which inmates may order Halal prayer oil.
3. Law & Analysis
22
This
To the extent plaintiffs allegations involve any future effect the TMS might have on him,
any such allegations are speculative. The Supreme Court has cautioned that "[e]specially where
governmental action is involved, courts should not intervene unless the need for equitable relief
is clear, not remote or speculative." Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, Cal., 333 U.S.
426, 431 (1948). Allegations which are based on conjecture, rather than any true detriment to
plaintiff caused by the implementation of the TMS, do not present a case or controversy over
which the Court has jurisdiction. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,158 (1990) ("Allegations
of possible future injury do not satisfy the requirements of Art. III [standing].")
The current effects allegedly inflicted on plaintiff by virtue of the implementation of the
TMS are the reductions in law library access, the number of calories in his diet, and the square
footage in his cell and the sleep deprivation causes by nighttime interruptions for head counts.
Again, for reasons noted with respect to previous claims, plaintiff has not pled viable
constitutional claims.
a) Restricted Access to the Law Library/ Computer Removal
While there is no freestanding right to a law library, Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, a prisoner
has a right to meaningful access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977).
However, as the Court has already found, plaintiff has not shown prejudice to any efforts to
pursue a non-frivolous legal claim regarding his conviction or conditions of confinement
litigation and, thus, he fails to state a claim with regard to his claim of diminished hours in the
prison law library or the removal of computers. Pilgrim, 92 F.3d at 416 (citing Lewis).
b) Food Claim
Under the Eighth Amendment, prisoners must be provided meals nutritionally sufficient
to sustain their normal health. Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1977); Smith v.
23
Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 1977) (inmates must be provided "well-balanced meal,
containing sufficient nutritional value to preserve health"). Plaintiff maintains that the caloric
content of the food he is served falls below minimum standards and that the food, on this basis
alone, is constitutionally inadequate. Nonetheless, he has failed to indicate that, due to the
reduced number of calories provided in his diet, he has lost weight or has suffered any other
adverse effects which impacted his well-being. Absent contentions such these, there is nothing
factual from which the Court can reasonably infer that the food plaintiff is being served falls
below the constitutional nutritional floor. These contentions also fail to state a § 1983 claim.
c) Inadequate Cell Space
The assertion regarding the reduced square footage in plaintiffs cell, for reasons
explained earlier in this opinion, see supra, Claim V.A.2, "General Claims of Unconstitutional
Conditions and Violations of Rights," fail to state a claim for relief under § 1983.
d) Inadequate Sleep
To the extent that plaintiff is challenging the 5:30 AM head count which requires him to
sit up in bed or stand up and, thereby, interrupts his sleep, is not a claim which this Court can
entertain. The Supreme Court has instructed that "[p ]rison administrators ... should be accorded
wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their
judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional
security." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979). And it likewise has observed that "the
operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive
Branches of our Government, not the Judicial." Id. at 548. Because the operation of a prison is
an extraordinarily difficult endeavor, which measures to adopt to address a prison's security
24
concerns is a matter assigned to the sound discretion of the institutional officials. See Block, 468
U.S. at 591.
Unquestionably, security is a primary concern of prison administrators. "[C]entral to all
other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections
facilities themselves." Bell, 441 U.S. at 546-47 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823
(1974)). Undoubtedly, head counts of inmates are measures designed to preserve institutional
security. Walker v. Nunn, 456 F. App'x 419, 423 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that "daily counts were
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests"); Holly v. Woolfolk, 415 F.3d 678, 680
(7th Cir. 2005) (citing to a state law mandating three daily headcounts as a security measure);
Mahaffey v. Major, No. 3:06-3383-SB-JRM, 2008 WL 759086, at *7 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2008)
(noting the "legitimate, non-punitive purpose of maintaining security at the detention center by
having accurate headcounts").
Any attack on the early morning head count itself, regardless of any sleep disruption it
causes to plaintiff, is a matter best left to the prison administrators who decide whether, when,
and how to conduct reasonable head counts.
That said, the Court recognizes that "sleep is critical to human existence." Walker v.
Schult, 71 7 F .3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2013 ).
And a claim regarding sleep deprivation could
plausibly amount to an Eighth Amendment claim. Garrett v. Thaler, 560 F. App'x 375 (5th Cir.
2014) (finding that inmate had plausibly alleged a denial of one of life's necessities by claiming
that his four hours of scheduled sleep were interrupted by head counts, causing "negative longterm health effects" and that he was forced to choose between eating and sleeping).
Here, however, there are no allegations which rise to the level of a sufficiently serious
deprivation and none to show that any defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiffs need
25
for adequate sleep. Therefore, plaintiff fails to establish that the 5:30 AM head count impinged
on his constitutional rights. This claim too fails to state a viable § 1983 claim.
e) Medical Claim
Plaintiffs assertion involving the termination of medications used to treat his skin
problem resulting from "Mod Poisoning" falls within the scope of the Eighth Amendment (Doc.
1, p. 22).
Deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes an
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and, therefore, a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
Plaintiff has not identified the nature of his skin problem, beyond explaining that it was
"Mod Poisoning from SCCF prison." In addition, plaintiff has not indicated which, if any,
defendant knew that his medication was being discontinued and, having drawn the inference of a
substantial risk to plaintiffs health from the withdrawal of the medication, failed to take action
to address or ameliorate the potential harm.
Absent an allegation from which to infer that
plaintiff has a serious medical need and that a defendant possessed a culpable state of mind,
plaintiff has not stated an Eighth Amendment claim.
f) First Amendment (Free Exercise-Halal Oil)
The final contention in this category, that Halal oil must be purchased from a TDOCapproved vendor, does not state a First Amendment violation. "An inmate who challenges the
constitutionality of a prison regulation or policy that limits the practice of religion must first
establish that it infringes upon a sincerely held religious belief." Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d
1545, 1550 (8th Cir. 1996 (citing Hill v. Blackwell, 774 F.2d 342-43 (8th Cir. 1985)). And it is
"[o]nly after a prison inmate shows a sincere belief that his or her religion requires the practice at
26
issue does the court move on to determining whether the prison's actions restricting the practice
are valid." Barhite v. Caruso, 377 F. App'x 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
There are no assertions of fact to show that plaintiffs First Amendment free exercise
rights have been infringed upon. For example, plaintiff has not explained how the source of his
prayer oil, rather than the application of prayer oil to his body, comprises a tenet of his belief
system nor has he shown how his inability to purchase prayer oil from a different vender
transgressed a sincerely held belief in the Islamic faith. Notably, plaintiff does not claim that he
cannot obtain prayer oil or that prayer oil had been proscribed altogether, but only that he
dislikes being limited to purchasing prayer oil from one authorized vendor.
The free exercise clause shelters an inmate from violations of his sincerely held religious
beliefs, but it does not prohibit a policy which hinders his ability to buy prayer oil from his
choice of vendors.
See Davis v. Powell, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1232 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (finding
that a prisoner did "not have a constitutional right to a vendor of his choice" for his purchase of
prayer oil"); Thomas v. Little, No. 07-1117-BRE/egb, 2009 WL 193873, at *5 (W.D.Tenn. July
6, 2009) (holding that a prisoner who challenged the same TDOC authorized-vendor policy
possessed no constitutional entitlement to order prayer oil from a vendor of his own choosing);
Kensu v. Cason, No. 1:91-CV-300, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5468, at *45--47 (W.D.Mich. Mar.
29, 1996) (approving a prison policy providing that religious oil must be ordered from the state
approved vendor, which sold only Moroccan oil, based on a failure to establish any meaningful
religious difference between Muslim and Buddhist oils).
The Court concludes that plaintiff has not stated a claim which would entitle him to relief
under § 1983.
D. Assertions as to Other Prisoners (Compl., pp. 21-22, 27-28, 33-34)
27
Daniel Banks, who is not one of the twenty-nine plaintiffs in this suit, has medical
problems which have gone untreated.
Plaintiff Daniel Swinney has experienced medical
problems, which have not been timely treated.
Also, plaintiff Swinney's medications were
stopped without reason, and he was informed that he should purchase his medications from the
commissary. Two other unidentified inmates respectively have a hernia and a tom rotary cuff,
but neither of them has been scheduled for surgery. Likewise, an inmate whose body contains a
bullet has not had surgery scheduled or performed to excise the bullet. Obstacles exist which
bars inmates who are in wheelchairs from obtaining access to showers. And Stephen Wlodarz,
an inmate who uses a wheelchair, fell in the shower, exacerbating a hip problem, and he
experienced a lengthy delay in securing medical attention for his hip. Inmate Wlodarz is not a
plaintiff in this lawsuit.
As observed, plaintiff may not assert the rights of any other prisoner, as he lacks standing
to do so. See Whitmore, v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 166 (1990). Of course, plaintiff Swinney
may assert any of the claims he may have in his amended complaint.
E. Injuries Resulting from the Alleged Constitutional Violations (Compl., p. 21)
All plaintiffs have suffered mental and emotional distress as a result of the conditions,
treatment, and events alleged herein.
As noted earlier, plaintiff lacks standing to present
allegations as to the mental and emotional injuries suffered by other inmates. See Whitmore, 495
U.S. at 166. To the extent that plaintiff has alleged that he himself has sustained mental and
emotional injuries, the Court has not found that he has stated any viable constitutional claims
and, absent a constitutional violation, any injuries to plaintiff, emotional or otherwise, are not
recognizable claims.
D. Relief Sought (Com pl., pp. 34-37)
28
1. Injunction
The pleading requests issuance of an injunction, directing the defendants: 1) to stop the
part of TMS related to security levels and housing, or to house minimum security units in the
general population and close security inmates in separate housing facilities at all TDOC
facilities; 2) to eliminate the 5:30 AM head count, to ensure that TDOC inmates' sleep is not
disrupted; 3) to fix cell door locks and to maintain them in good working order; 4) to assure that
the square footage in each cell complies with the performance-based standards established by the
American Correctional Association and to convert cells originally designed as single cells, which
were remodeled to house a second inmate, back to their original design as single cells; 5) to
refrain from forcing inmates who dislike each other to share cells; 6) to furnish inmates with a
2,300 calorie a day diet; and 7) to place TDOC under federal control for violating the settlement
agreement in Grubbs v. Bradley and for the other constitutional abridgments alleged herein.
Granting an injunction depends upon four factors-whether a plaintiff is likely to succeed
on the merits; whether he will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction; whether
the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and whether the injunction would serve the
public interest. Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 305 F.3d 566, 573
(6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). It is a plaintiffs burden to prove that he is entitled to this
relief. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
Plaintiff cannot show he is entitled to this relief because Court has not found any
constitutional violations to have been alleged in the pleading.
Furthermore, he has not alleged
that he will suffer an irreparable injury if the prison continues to be managed under the TMS.
Defendant officials would be harmed if the TMS were enjoined from further application in
NECX, as they have a paramount interest in operating that prison effectively, safely, and
29
efficiently.
The public also has an interest in the safe and cost-effective operation of state
prisons, but also has an interest in ensuring that inmates committed to the care of TDOC are
treated humanely and have their dietary and medical needs met. Three factors weigh against an
injunction and the fourth is a draw. Therefore, plaintiffs request for an injunction is DENIED
(Doc. 2).
2. Declaratory Relief
Likewise, the complaint asks for declaratory relief, specifically a declaration that
Commissioner Schofield and Warden McAllister have violated state and federal law and the
settlement agreement in Grubbs v. Bradley. The pleading also seeks a declaration that the TMS
is preempted by state law and that TDOC' s use of TMS in its prisons violates state law and the
settlement agreement in Grubbs v. Bradley.
Because the Court has already determined that it lacks jurisdiction over alleged violations
of the settlement agreement in Grubbs v. Bradley, the Court declines to issue an order with
respect to any alleged violation of that the settlement agreement. Likewise, because plaintiff has
not stated any constitutional claims, the Court exercises its discretion to DENY plaintiffs
requests for declaratory relief, with respect to the TMS or other purported federal law violations.
Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111, 111 (1962).
VII.
Pending Motions
Plaintiff Montague has filed a motion to alter or amend the deficiency order, under Rule
59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of all inmates who signed the complaint
(Doc. 57).
A second motion, also filed by plaintiff Montague, asks the Court to issue an
injunction, to direct service of process on the defendants, and to order the defendants to perform
psychological evaluations and interviews upon the entire NECX inmate population, so as to
30
determine whether the implementation of the TMS and other conditions of confinement alleged
in the complaint has caused the population of inmates to suffer from anxiety disorders,
depression, physical health problems and stress (Doc. 95). As noted, because plaintiff Montague
is not a lawyer or a class representative and because he cannot file motions on behalf of other
inmates, the Court will not consider the motions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (providing that parties
may conduct their cases personally or by counsel). The Clerk is DIRECTED to strike the
motions (Docs. 57 and 95).
VIII. Conclusion
The plaintiff has failed to state a constitutional claim in this pleading. However because
the complaint was drafted under the premise that it would proceed as a class action and
because the Court has denied the request for class certification, the Court will allow plaintiff
Montague to amend his complaint. See LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir.
2013) ("Under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even
when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA. "). Therefore, unless within
twenty (20) days from the date on this order, plaintiff amends his complaint to state a claim
entitling him to relief under§ 1983, the Court will DISMISS this case with prejudice.
The Court also will DISMISS the newly-opened cases of plaintiffs: 1) John Anderson,
2) Gregory Bowman, 3) Ronald Brewer, 4) Larry Brown, 5) Nikos Burgins, 6) L. Churchwell,
7) Milton Cooper; 8) Carlos Eaton, 9) Orlando Fields, 10) David Lackey, 11) Craig Majors,
12) Aaron Malone, 13) Leon McKissack, 14) Victor D. McMiller, Sr., 15) William Newby,
16) Norman Page, 17) Jose Perez, 18) Baron Pinkney 19) Samuel Ramsey, 20) Darrell
Swinney, 21) Kevin Tate, 22) Octavious Taylor, 23) Walter Webb, 24) Hugh Williams, 25)
Ricardo Wiggins, and 26) Tony Williams, unless within twenty (20) days from the date on
31
this order, each plaintiff amends his complaint to state a claim entitling him to relief under §
1983.
Finally, the Court GRANTS plaintiff Odell Wisdom's motion to voluntarily dismiss his
lawsuit (Doc. 93), and ORDERS that his case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
LEONJO AN
UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE
32
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