Grogg v. State of Tennessee et al
Filing
56
MEMORANDUM OPINION: Plaintiff's complaint [Doc. 1] and the present action will be DISMISSED sua sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. Signed by District Judge J Ronnie Greer on 07/02/2018. (Copy of Memorandum mailed to Audie Grogg) (AMP)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT GREENEVILLE
AUDIE GROGG,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF TENNESSEE, JUDGE JERRY
R. BECK, A.D.A. J. PARSONS, D.A.
BARRY STAUBUS, BRISTOL
TENNESSEE POLICE DEP’T, BRYAN
HESS, SGT. MIKE STILLS, and
SHERIFF of SULLIVAN COUNTY,
TENNESSEE,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No.
2:15-CV-299-JRG-MCLC
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This pro se prisoner’s civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was previously
dismissed by this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A for the failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted [Doc. 26 at 6]. Plaintiff then appealed the dismissal of his
claims to the Sixth Circuit, which vacated the Court’s previous judgment, and remanded Plaintiff’s
case “for the district court’s consideration of the facts that [Plaintiff] was acquitted on the charge
underlying his probation violation and that he was reinstated on parole” [Doc. 47 at 4]. For the
reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s complaint will be DISMISSED sua sponte for the failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1983.
I.
BACKGROUND
In his complaint, Plaintiff challenges the revocation of his probation in July 2014 [Doc. 1
at 4]. The Sixth Circuit summarized the procedural history of Plaintiff’s criminal case, stating that
“following his nolo contendere pleas to charges of making a false report, driving under the
influence, and failure to appear, [Plaintiff] was sentenced on September 12, 2013 to a total of four
years of imprisonment, but was granted probation the same day” [Doc. 47 at 1]. However, in
March of 2014, Plaintiff was indicted for the charge of filing a false police report, which
constituted a probation violation [Id.]. Plaintiff’s probation was revoked on July 17, 2014, and
Plaintiff was ordered to serve his previously imposed four-year sentence [Id.].
Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on November 2, 2015, alleges that his probation was “illegally
revoked” because several of his constitutional rights were violated during the revocation
proceedings and resulting imprisonment [Doc. 1 at 4]. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the charge
was based on a “bogus police report, affidavit of complaint and arrest warrant,” he did not receive
a preliminary hearing on the violation, was denied his rights to a speedy trial, was not able to testify
and call witnesses for his defense, and faced prosecutorial misconduct through the denial and
destruction of exculpatory evidence [Id.]; see also [Doc. 5 at 2]. In his complaint, Plaintiff requests
the “reversal of the illegal revocation,” an order requiring that he be tried for the probation
violation and be provided an expert witness to perform voice analysis, and seeks restitution for the
alleged unconstitutional imprisonment for the parole violation [Id.].
Shortly after the complaint was filed, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), the Court reviewed the complaint to determine whether it was frivolous, malicious,
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or sought monetary relief from a defendant
immune from such relief [Doc. 26]. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court held that Plaintiff’s requests for retrial and revocation were not cognizable under §
1983, and dismissed these claims without prejudice [Id. at 5]. Additionally, the Court held that
Plaintiff’s request for restitution was not yet ripe, and, further, would be precluded by Heck v.
2
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (holding that a complaint seeking damages for an alleged
unconstitutional conviction could not be maintained unless the plaintiff demonstrated that the
conviction had been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid) [Id. at 6]. Therefore, on
April 29, 2016, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for the failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted [Id.].
Plaintiff then appealed the dismissal of his claims to the Sixth Circuit. However, in his
brief on appeal, Plaintiff also “presented documentation from the Sullivan County, Tennessee,
Criminal Court that appears to demonstrate that a jury found him not guilty of the filing-a-falsereport charge in February 2016, and, on April 29, 2016—the same day the district court dismissed
his complaint—the trial court granted [Plaintiff’s] request to be reinstated to probation and ordered
that he be released from custody, effective immediately” [Doc. 47 at 2–3]. Therefore, the Sixth
Circuit stated that because Plaintiff’s claims “related to the validity of his conviction and
imprisonment on the probation violation,” and the Court was not previously aware that Plaintiff
was found not guilty of the charge underlying his probation violation, “the district court should be
the first to consider whether the information that has come to light offers [Plaintiff] any potential
relief” [Id. at 3].
II.
SCREENING STANDARD
Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss
those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief or are against a defendant who
is immune. See Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1015–16 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Congress directed
the federal courts to review or ‘screen’ certain complaints sua sponte and to dismiss those that
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted [or] . . . sought monetary relief from a
defendant immune from such relief.”). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court
3
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007) “governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA,
a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). However,
“a district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M&G Polymers, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he was deprived of
a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Black v. Barberton Citizens Hospital,
134 F.3d 1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998); O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 995 (6th Cir.
1994); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992); see also Braley v. City of
Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Section 1983 does not itself create any constitutional
rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found
elsewhere."). In other words, Plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show: (1) the deprivation of
a right, privilege, or immunity secured to him by the United States Constitution or other federal
law; and (2) that the individual responsible for such deprivation was acting under color of state
law. Gregory v. Shelby Cty., 220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000).
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Applicability of Heck
The Court previously held that Plaintiff’s request for restitution for the alleged
unconstitutional confinement was not ripe, and was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
4
486–87 (1994) [Doc. 26 at 5]. Under Heck, a state prisoner may not bring a § 1983 suit for
damages or equitable relief challenging his probation revocation until the revocation “has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has
been called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S.
at 487; see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81–82 (2005) (“[A] state prisoner’s §
1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable
relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal
prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of
confinement or its duration.”); Corsetti v. McGinnis, 97 F.3d 1451 (Table), 1996 WL 543684, at
*1 (6th Cir. Sept. 24, 1996) (applying Heck in the context of a challenge to the revocation of
probation).
However, Plaintiff has called into question the validity of the charge underlying his
probation violation by demonstrating that he was found not guilty of the filing-a-false-report
charge which resulted in the revocation of his probation. Therefore, Heck does not serve as a bar
to Plaintiff’s claims for damages challenging his probation revocation, and the Court will screen
Plaintiff’s various claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A.
B.
Improper Defendants
At the outset, Plaintiff has brought suit against the State of Tennessee, a non-suable entity
under § 1983 who is immune from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 340–45 (1979); Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 1986). The
Eleventh Amendment has been construed to prohibit citizens from suing their own states in federal
court. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987); Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Further, the sovereign immunity
5
protected by the Eleventh Amendment also extends to claims for injunctive relief and other forms
of equitable relief. See Lawson v. Shelby Cty., Tenn., 211 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he
[Eleventh] Amendment prohibits suits against a ‘state’ in federal court whether for injunctive,
declaratory or monetary relief.”). The only exceptions to a State’s immunity are: (1) if the State
has consented to suit; or (2) if Congress has properly abrogated a State’s immunity. S & M Brands,
Inc. v. Cooper, 527 F.3d 500, 507 (6th Cir. 2008). Neither of these exceptions applies to § 1983
suits against the State of Tennessee. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (reaffirming that
Congress did not abrogate states’ immunity when it passed § 1983); Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d
879, 881 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting that Tennessee has not waived immunity to suits under § 1983).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under §
1983 against the State of Tennessee.
Additionally, Defendant Bristol, Tennessee Police Department is not a “person” subject to
suit within the terms of § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 688–90 (finding
that in a suit against a local government unit, only “bodies politic” are “persons” who are amenable
to be sued under § 1983). The Sixth Circuit and courts in this district have previously held that a
county police department is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983. See Matthews v. Jones, 35
F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that a county police department was not an entity which
may be sued under § 1983); Watson v. Grainger Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 3:16-cv-169, 2016 WL
1611119, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 21, 2016) (holding “the Grainger County Sheriff’s Department .
. . is not a ‘person’ subject to suit” under § 1983). Thus, because the Bristol Police Department is
not an entity that is subject to suit in a § 1983 action, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted against this Defendant.
6
Lastly, Plaintiff fails to allege the personal involvement of several Defendants, specifically
Defendants Stills and Staubus. Additionally, Plaintiff’s sole claims against the Sullivan County
Sheriff are that the “judicial system in Sullivan County . . . is a bad joke” [Doc. 5 at 2]. A
defendant’s personal involvement in the deprivation of constitutional rights is required to establish
their liability under § 1983. Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Miller v. Calhoun
Cty., 408 F.3d 803, 817 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005).
Further, it is a basic pleading requirement that a
plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient
allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764
(6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree
of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each
alleged violation of constitutional rights). Generous construction of pro se complaints is not
limitless; indeed, a court need not assume or conjure up claims that a pro se litigant has not pleaded.
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004). However, despite the fact that Plaintiff fails
to allege the personal involvement of Defendants Stills, Staubus, or the Sullivan County Sheriff,
the Court will address Plaintiff’s substantive claims against these Defendants due to the illegible
nature of Plaintiff’s complaint.
C.
Due Process Claims
Plaintiff claims that he was denied his right to a speedy trial, the right to testify on his own
behalf, the right to call witnesses, and the right to effective counsel during his probation revocation
hearing [Doc. 5 at 1]. In the context of a probation revocation hearing, due process requires that a
defendant be afforded a hearing before the final decision on revocation is made. See Black v.
Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612 (1985). The hearing is intended to provide the probationer with the
7
“opportunity to be heard and show, if he can, that he did not violate the conditions, or, if he did,
that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation does not warrant revocation.” Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972). A defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard in
person, and to present witnesses and documentary evidence. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 782 (1973); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(2) (noting that during a revocation hearing, the
probationer must be allowed to have counsel, given notice of the alleged charges, and allowed to
present evidence).
Plaintiff brings suit against Judge Beck based upon his role in Plaintiff’s probation
revocation hearing [Doc. 5 at 1]. However, Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Beck are barred by
judicial immunity. Judges, in the performance of their judicial functions, are absolutely immune
from civil liability. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 363 (1978); Bright v. Gallia Cty., 753 F.3d 639, 648–49 (6th Cir. 2014). Judicial
immunity is abrogated only when a judge is not acting in a judicial capacity, or when the judge
acts in the absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12. Additionally, the doctrine of
absolute judicial immunity protects judges from requests for injunctive relief as well as monetary
damages. See Kipen v. Lawson, 57 F. App’x 691, 691 (6th Cir. 2003); Newsome v. Merz, 17 F.
App’x 343, 345 (6th Cir. 2001)).
In the present case, Judge Beck is entitled to judicial immunity for Plaintiff’s claims
stemming from the probation revocation hearing. Judge Beck was acting in a judicial capacity
during the probation revocation hearing. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12; Humphrey-Fitts v. Duke,
No. 3:12-cv-877, 2012 WL 3991699, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 11, 2012) (holding “the judge is
absolutely immune” from plaintiff’s claims regarding probation revocation hearing). Plaintiff has
not alleged, and no facts exist in the complaint from which to infer, that the probation revocation
8
hearing which Judge Beck presided over lacked jurisdiction. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s due process claims fail to state a claim for relief under § 1983.
D.
False Arrest/False Imprisonment Claims
Plaintiff claims that he was illegally imprisoned on a charge “that everyone was [and] is
aware of [his] absolute innocence . . . due to the issuance of a bogus police report . . . [and] falsified
government documents” [Doc. 5 at 1]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hess cannot provide a copy
with Plaintiff’s signature of the allegedly false report [Id. at 4]. The Court interprets Plaintiff’s
allegations as asserting that he was falsely arrested for the charge of filing of a false report, and
then subsequently falsely imprisoned due to his probation being revoked.
Claims of false arrest and false imprisonment under § 1983 overlap, with false arrest being
a subset of false imprisonment. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). A false arrest claim
requires a plaintiff to show that the underlying arrest lacked probable cause. See, e.g., Brooks v.
Rothe, 577 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating for a wrongful arrest claim to succeed
under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the police lacked probable cause); Gumble v. Waterford
Twp., 171 F. App’x 502, 507 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mark v. Furay, 769 F.2d 1266, 1269 (7th
Cir.
1985)) (“[T]he
existence
of
probable
cause
for
an
arrest
totally
precludes
any section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution,
regardless of whether the defendants had malicious motives for arresting the plaintiff.”).
Generally, probable cause exists when the police have “reasonably trustworthy information
. . . sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was
committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). “Probable cause determinations
involve an examination of all facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge at the time of
an arrest.” Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999). “In general, the
9
existence of probable cause in a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one
reasonable determination possible.” Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995).
Where an arrest is made pursuant to a grand jury indictment, “the finding of an indictment,
fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of
probable cause for the purpose of holding the accused to answer.” Radvansky v. City of Olmsted
Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 307 n.13 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 877 (6th
Cir. 2002)). Nonetheless, an “after-the-fact grand jury involvement cannot serve to validate a prior
arrest.” Id.
Additionally, an exception exists when a defendant “knowingly or recklessly
present[s] false testimony to the grand jury to obtain the indictment.” Sanders v. Jones, 845 F.3d
721, 731 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Webb v. U.S., 789 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir. 2015)).
However, the Sixth Circuit recently held that “even if independent evidence establishes
probable cause against a suspect, it would still be unlawful for law-enforcement officers to
fabricate evidence in order to strengthen the case against that suspect.” Webb v. United States,
789 F.3d 647, 670 (6th Cir. 2015); see, e.g., King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 587–88 (6th Cir.
2017) (holding that pre-indictment nontestimonial acts that were material to the prosecution of a
plaintiff could rebut the presumption of probable cause established by an indictment if an officer
acted “knowingly or recklessly” in making false statements that were material to the prosecution).
Plaintiff claims that he was indicted due to a “bogus police report, affidavit of complaint
and arrest warrant” [Doc. 1 at 4]; see also [Doc. 5 at 2]. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Hess cannot provide a copy with Plaintiff’s signature of the allegedly false report [Doc.
5 at 4]. However, Plaintiff fails to allege that any Defendant acted “knowingly or recklessly” in
making false statements that were material to the prosecution. See King, 852 F.3d at 587–88 (citing
Webb, 789 F.3d at 660). Allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a plaintiff might later
10
establish undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and do not state a plausible claim
for relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Further, formulaic and
conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim which are not supported by specific facts are
insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009).
Plaintiff also fails to allege that any Defendant presented any testimony at all to the grand
jury, let alone false testimony. Rather, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the judicial system in
Sullivan County “is a joke,” and seemingly claims that the indictment was obtained as a result of
“the issuance of a bogus police report” [Doc. 5 at 1].
Ultimately, Plaintiff’s complaint
“acknowledges that the grand jury found the existence of probable cause.” See Gonzalez v.
Kovacs, 686 F. App’x 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2017) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s
claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution); see, e.g., Smith v. Buttry, 111 F. App’x 372, 374
(6th Cir. 2004) (holding the trial court properly found “[t]hat the criminal charges against [the
plaintiff] were later dismissed does not expunge the original finding of probable cause by the grand
jury”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s false arrest and imprisonment claims fail to state a claim for relief
under § 1983, as Plaintiff fails to allege that any Defendant made false statements that were
material to the prosecution [Doc. 1 at 4]. See, e.g., King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 587–88 (6th
Cir. 2017).
E.
Malicious Prosecution Claims
Plaintiff claims that Defendants Parsons and Staubus destroyed exculpatory evidence, and
that Defendant Parsons committed a Brady violation [Doc. 5 at 2]; see Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that a prosecutor’s withholding of exculpatory evidence violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
Therefore, the Court construes Plaintiff’s
allegations as asserting malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth Amendment.
11
“The Sixth Circuit ‘recognize[s] a separate constitutionally cognizable claim
of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment,’ which ‘encompasses wrongful
investigation, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration.’” Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308
(6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 715–16 (6th Cir. 2006)). Ultimately,
“[i]ndividuals have a clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious
prosecution.” King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 582–83 (6th Cir. 2017). However, a malicious
prosecution claim under § 1983 is not limited to the institution of proceedings, but also includes a
claim for “continued detention without probable cause.” See Mills v. Barnard, 869 F.3d 473, 480
(6th Cir. 2017) (citing Sanders v. Jones, 845 F.3d 721, 728 (6th Cir. 2017) (internal citation
omitted)).
A plaintiff in a malicious prosecution case must prove four elements: “(1) a criminal
prosecution was initiated against the plaintiff and the defendant made, influenced, or participated
in the decision to prosecute; (2) there was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution;
(3) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty, as understood under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, apart from the initial seizure; and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the
plaintiff's favor.” King, 852 F.3d at 580. Despite its name, “malicious prosecution” does not
require a showing of malice, and “might more aptly be called ‘unreasonable prosecutorial
seizure.’” Id. (quoting Sykes, 625 F.3d at 310).
Similar to false arrest and imprisonment claims, a grand-jury indictment creates a
presumption of probable cause in malicious prosecution cases. See, e.g., Higgason v. Stephens,
288 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir. 2002); Barnes, 449 F.3d at 716 (holding “the finding of an indictment,
fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of
probable cause”). An exception to this rule exists where “‘defendants knowingly present false
12
testimony to the grand jury’ to obtain an indictment.” Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli, 830 F.3d 388, 398
(6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Martin v. Maurer, 581 F. App’x 509, 511 (6th Cir. 2014)). Further, “[t]he
existence of an indictment is . . . not a talisman that always wards off a malicious-prosecution
claim.” Mills v. Barnard, 869 F.3d 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2017). As the Court previously noted, “even
if independent evidence establishes probable cause against a suspect, it would still be unlawful for
law-enforcement officers to fabricate evidence in order to strengthen the case against that
suspect.” Webb, 789 F.3d at 670; see, e.g., King, 852 F.3d at 587–88 (holding that pre-indictment
nontestimonial acts that were material to the prosecution of a plaintiff could rebut the presumption
of probable cause established by an indictment if an officer acted “knowingly or recklessly” in
making false statements that were material to the prosecution).
In the present case, Plaintiff was indicted for the charge of filing a false police report, which
constituted a probation violation [Doc. 47 at 1]. While this indictment creates a presumption of
probable cause, Plaintiff claims that he was indicted due to a bogus police report, and that
Defendant Hess cannot provide a copy with Plaintiff’s signature [Doc. 5 at 1]. As the Court noted
with respect to Plaintiff’s false arrest claims, Plaintiff fails to allege that any Defendant acted
“knowingly or recklessly” in making false statements that were material to the prosecution. See
King, 852 F.3d at 587–88 (citing Webb, 789 F.3d at 660).
Further, Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants Parsons and Staubus destroyed exculpatory
evidence are speculative and conclusory, as he fails to allege what exculpatory evidence was
withheld. It is well-established that conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a civil rights
claim under § 1983. See, e.g., Maldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 390–91 (6th Cir. 2009)
(dismissing malicious prosecution claim where the plaintiff made only vague and conclusory
allegations of false evidence); Geeter v. Cooper, No. 2:12–CV–15364, 2012 WL 6214419, at *2
13
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2012) (summarily dismissing Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims as
conclusory); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009) (holding formulaic and
conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim which are not supported by specific facts are
insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).
Lastly, Defendants Parson and Staubus, as prosecutors, are absolutely immune from suit
for actions taken in initiating and pursuing criminal prosecutions because that conduct is
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 430–31 (1976). “A prosecutor’s decision to initiate a prosecution, including the decision
to file a criminal complaint or seek an arrest warrant, is protected by absolute immunity.” Howell
v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 344, 351 (6th Cir. 2012). Further, prosecutors are absolutely immune from
allegations of non-disclosure or suppression of exculpatory information. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–
31 (holding absolute immunity protected a prosecutor from allegations that he used false testimony
and
suppressed
material
evidence
in
order
to
obtain
a
conviction); see
also Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[P]rosecutors have absolute
immunity from civil liability for the non-disclosure of exculpatory information at trial.”).
Ultimately, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims fail to state a claim for relief under § 1983.
III.
CONCLUSION
Although this Court is mindful that a pro se complaint is to be liberally construed, Haines
v Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 510–21 (1972), it is quite clear that Plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation
of any constitutionally protected right, privilege, or immunity, and therefore, the Court finds his
claims to be frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. Plaintiff’s complaint [Doc. 1] and
the present action will be DISMISSED sua sponte for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this
14
action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.
ENTER:
s/J. RONNIE GREER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?