James v. The City of Knoxville, TN

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Because Plaintiff's claims are Heck-barred, Plaintiff's complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28. U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b) (1). AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER. Signed by District Judge Thomas W Phillips on 12/5/16. (JBR) Modified to reflect c/m on 12/5/2016 (JBR).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT GREENEVILLE
STANLEY A JAMES,
Plaintiff,

v.
THE CITY OF KNOXVILLE, TN,
Defendant.

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No. 2:16-CV-325-TWP-MCLC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Acting pro se, Stanley James, an inmate confined in the Hardeman County Correctional
Facility, has submitted this civil rights complaint for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 2],
as well as an application for leave to proceed without payment of fees or costs [Doc. 1] and a
motion to admit exhibits as evidence [Doc. 3].
Plaintiff claims that The City of Knoxville (“Defendant”) “fail[ed] to adequately train its
police officers regarding the Constitutional rights of criminal defendants” [Doc. 2 p. 5]. For the
reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be
GRANTED. However, no service shall issue, and this complaint will be sua sponte DISMISSED
and Plaintiff’s remaining motion will therefore be DENIED.
I.

The Filing Fee
Based on the financial data provided by Plaintiff, his application to proceed without

prepayment of fees [Doc. 1] is GRANTED. Nonetheless, because Plaintiff is an inmate, he is
ASSESSED the filing fee of three hundred and fifty dollars ($350). McGore v. Wrigglesworth,
114 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199
(2007). The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account at the institution where he now resides

shall submit, as an initial partial payment, whichever is the greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of
the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s inmate trust account; or (b) twenty percent (20%) of
the average monthly balance in his inmate trust account for the six-month period preceding the
filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B). Thereafter, the trust account custodian
shall submit twenty percent (20%) of Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to
his trust account for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds $10.00,
until the full filing fee of $350 has been paid to the Clerk’s Office. McGore, 114 F.3d at 607.
Payments should be sent to: Clerk, USDC; 220 W. Depot St., Suite 200; Greeneville, TN
37743. To ensure compliance with the fee-collection procedure, the Clerk is DIRECTED to mail
a copy of this order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now
confined. The Clerk is also DIRECTED to furnish a copy of this order to the Court’s financial
deputy. This order shall be placed in Plaintiff’s prison file and follow him if he is transferred to
another correctional institution.
II.

Screening the Complaint
Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss

those that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who
is immune. See, e.g., Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999).
In screening this complaint, the Court bears in mind that pro se pleadings filed in civil
rights cases must be liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Still, the pleading must be
sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007), which simply means that the factual content pled by a plaintiff must permit

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a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
The “facial plausibility” standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, but it
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The standard articulated in Twombly and Iqbal
“governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A] because
the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010).
To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege and show: (1) that he was deprived of
a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was
caused by a person acting under color of state law. Black v. Barberton Citizens Hosp., 134 F.3d
1265, 1267 (6th Cir. 1998). Both parts of this two-part test must be satisfied to support a claim
under § 1983. See Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff brings this § 1983 complaint against the City of Knoxville, asserting that the City
failed to adequately train its police officers which resulted in investigator, Andrew Boatmuan and
Lieutenant Kenny Miller concealing exculpatory material evidence in violation of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and its progeny.
III.

Claims Barred by Heck v. Humphrey
Plaintiff’s claim that Investigator Boatmuan and Lieutenant Miller withheld material,

discoverable evidence is barred by Heck because the claim necessarily implies the invalidity of
Plaintiff’s convictions and sentences. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Under Heck, a
plaintiff cannot pursue a § 1983 claim that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of

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a previous conviction or sentence, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate favorable termination of
the prior conviction or sentence. Id. at 487. The Supreme Court held:
[i]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would
render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
or call into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or
sentence that has not been invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 486-487 (footnote omitted).
Plaintiff’s sentence has not been favorably terminated as required by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Plaintiff does not allege, and nothing in the record before
the Court demonstrates, he has successfully challenged his conviction and sentence.
Here, success on Plaintiff’s claim would necessarily imply the convictions and
sentence are invalid because underlying his claim are the allegations that Investigator
Boatmuan and Lieutenant Miller withheld material exculpatory evidence resulting in his
illegal conviction. Plaintiff’s arguments, assuming they are true, are precisely the type
prohibited under Heck’s favorable termination rule, as relief on any claim alleged would
imply the invalidity of his conviction and sentence which have not been reversed or set
aside. See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1300 (2011) (noting Brady claims are outside
the province of § 1983).
IV.

Requested Relief Barred by Heck
Plaintiff does not specifically request the Court to invalidate his conviction and

release him from prison, even though, as previously stated, a finding in his favor on his
claim would necessarily imply that his convictions and sentences were invalid. Rather, he
seeks six-and-a-half million dollars and court costs and fees in monetary relief. Heck, as
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extended by Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (prisoner’s claim for injective
and monetary relief not cognizable under § 1983 as it necessarily implied invalidity of
good-time credits where he alleged deceit and bias on part of hearing officer), does not
permit money damages based on allegations that necessarily imply the invalidity of a
conviction or sentence. Because awarding relief to Plaintiff on any portion of his claims
would necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions and sentences, his claim for
money damages is not cognizable under § 1983.
V.

Conclusion
Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s claims are Heck-barred, Plaintiff’s complaint is sua sponte

DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28. U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.
ENTER:
s/ Thomas W. Phillips
___________
UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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