Lemarr v. Campbell County Sheriff's Department et al

Filing 4

MEMORANDUM OPINION: Accordingly, this action will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, sua sponte, for want of prosecution. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. Therefore, should Plaintiff file a notice of appeal, he will be DENIED leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Signed by District Judge J Ronnie Greer on 1/03/2018. (Copy of Memorandum Opinion mailed to Casey Lynn Lemarr) (CAT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT GREENEVILLE
CASEY LYNN LEMARR,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAMPBELL COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT and MEDICAL STAFF,
Defendants.

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No. 2:17-cv-183-JRG-MCLC

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This pro se prisoner’s civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was filed on October 10,
2017 [Doc. 2]. On November 15, 2017, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order, screening
the complaint to determine whether, inter alia, the pleading failed to state a claim which would
entitle Plaintiff to relief under § 1983 [Doc. 3]. The Court found that it was “unable to properly
screen Plaintiff’s complaint . . . because the precise nature of his claims are unclear,” and the Court
was “therefore unable to determine whether Plaintiff states a claim” [Id. at 3]. Thus, the Court
ordered Plaintiff to complete a proper § 1983 form complaint within thirty (30) days of the entry
of the Court’s order [Id. at 4].
More than thirty days have passed, and Plaintiff has failed to amend his complaint or
otherwise respond to the Court’s order. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) gives this Court the
authority to dismiss a case for “failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules
or any order of the court.” See, e.g., Nye Capital Appreciation Partners, L.L.C. v. Nemchik, 483
F. App’x 1, 9 (6th Cir. 2012); Knoll v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 176 F.3d 359, 362–63 (6th Cir. 1999).
Involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) “operates as an adjudication on the merits.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 41(b); see Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962) (“The authority of a federal trial
court to dismiss a plaintiff’s action with prejudice because of his failure to prosecute cannot
seriously be doubted.”). The Court examines four factors when considering dismissal under Rule
41(b):
(1) whether the party’s failure is due to willfulness, bad faith or fault; (2) whether
the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed party’s conduct; (3) whether the
dismissed party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and
(4) whether less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was
ordered.
Wu v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2005).
As to the first factor, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s failure to respond or comply can be
attributed to his own willfulness or fault. Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint, despite
being instructed by the Court to do so. Pursuant to Local Rule 83.13, it is the duty of a pro se party
to promptly notify the Clerk and the other parties to the proceedings of any change in his or her
address, to monitor the progress of the case, and to prosecute or defend the action diligently. E.D.
Tenn. L.R. 83.13. “Pro se status does not exempt a plaintiff from the requirement that he comply
with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Thorpe v. Ragozzine, No. 1:07-cv-155,
2008 WL 1859878, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 23, 2008) (citing Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 171
(5th Cir. 1991)). Accordingly, the Court finds that the first factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
The second factor does not weigh in favor of dismissal; as the Defendants have not been
served, they have not been prejudiced by the delay. However, the third factor clearly weighs in
favor of dismissal, as Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court’s Order, despite being expressly
warned of the possible consequences of such a failure. Finally, the Court finds that alternative
sanctions would not be effective. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis;
therefore, the Court has no indication that Plaintiff has the ability to pay a monetary fine. The

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Court thus concludes that, in total, the factors weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s action with
prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).
Accordingly, this action will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, sua sponte, for want
of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–
31 (1962) (recognizing the court’s authority to dismiss a case sua sponte for lack of prosecution);
White v. City of Grand Rapids, 34 F. App’x 210, 211 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that a pro se
prisoner’s complaint “was subject to dismissal for want of prosecution because he failed to keep
the district court apprised of his current address”); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir.
1991). The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith
and would be totally frivolous. See Fed. R. App. P. 24. Therefore, should Plaintiff file a notice of
appeal, he will be DENIED leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed.
R. App. P. 24.
AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.
ENTER:

s/J. RONNIE GREER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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