Mims v. Gillam et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: 1. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 4 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00.; 2. The custodian of Plaintiffs inmate trust account is D IRECTED to submit the filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above; 3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined and to the Cour t's financial deputy; 4. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983; 5. Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from entry of this Order to submit an amended co mplaint in accordance with the directives above. The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a § 1983 form for this purpose; 6. If Plaintiff fails to timely submit an amended complaint, this action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upo n which § 1983 relief may be granted and for failure to prosecute and comply with an order of the Court; and 7. Plaintiff must immediately inform the Court and Defendants or their counsel of record of any address changes in writing. Signed by District Judge Travis R McDonough on 10/12/2023. (BJL)*Mailed this memorandum and order with a blank 1983 to Shamonte Lutheaire Mims and mailed this memorandum and order to the custodian of inmate accounts at: TROUSDALE TURNER CORRECTIONAL CENTER 140 MACON WAY HARTSVILLE, TN 37074. **Sent ad hoc to the Court's Financial Deputy Clerks. 520778 Modified on 10/12/2023 (BJL).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT GREENEVILLE
SHAMONTE LUTHEAIRE MIMS
v.
MICHELLE GILLAM,
TYLER BROOKS, and
SULLIVAN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,

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Case No. 2:23-cv-133
Judge Travis R. McDonough
Magistrate Judge Cynthia W. Wyrick

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff, an inmate of the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center (“TTCC”), has filed (1)
a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that his religious materials were confiscated
by the Sullivan County Correctional Facility (“SCCF”) upon his arrival there on September 1,
2023 (Doc. 1) and (2) a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 4). For the reasons
set forth below, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motion, DISMISS this complaint because it
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983, and PERMIT Plaintiff to
file an amended complaint.
I.

FILING FEE
It appears from Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis that he cannot

pay the filing fee in one lump sum. Accordingly, this motion (Doc. 4) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff’s
inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 220 West Depot
Street, Suite 200, Greeneville, Tennessee 37743, as an initial partial payment, whichever is the
greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s inmate trust
account; or (b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in his inmate trust account

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for the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and
(B). Thereafter, the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account shall submit twenty percent
(20%) of Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account for
the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00), until the
full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)
has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). To ensure compliance with this feecollection procedure, the Clerk is DIRECTED to provide a copy of this Memorandum and
Order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined and
the Court’s financial deputy. This Order shall be placed in Plaintiff’s prison file and follow him
if he is transferred to another correctional institution.
II.

SCREENING
A.

Standard

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), district courts must screen prisoner
complaints and shall, at any time, dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a
claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A; Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard that the
Supreme Court set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule
12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial
PLRA review, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570).

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Formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim do not state a plausible
claim for relief. Id. at 681. Likewise, an allegation that does not raise a plaintiff’s right to relief
“above a speculative level” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570. But courts liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold them to a less stringent
standard than lawyer-drafted pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
A claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that a person acting under
color of state law deprived him a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
B.

Allegations of Complaint

Plaintiff, a “full time Muslim” who prays five times daily, was transferred to the SCCF
on September 1, 2023. (Doc. 1, at 3.) Upon his arrival at the facility, Lt. Gillam confiscated his
Koran and kufi1 cap. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff advised the SCCF staff that these were religious items,
but “they took them anyways” because Plaintiff “had a picture inside of [his] Koran that had
toothpaste on the back of the picture.” (Id.) Plaintiff told staff “what it was and they said they
didn’t care[,]” despite his repeated complaints. (Id.)
Aggrieved, Plaintiff filed the instant suit against Defendants Lt. Gillam, Sgt. Tyler
Brooks, and the SCCF on September 4, 2023,2 seeking $1 million and for “all Muslims to be able
to practice Islam without getting harassed.” (Id. at 5.)

1

A kufi “is a small, round, head covering with religious significance for Muslims.” Muhammad
v. Lynaugh, 966 F.2d 901, 902 n.1 (5th Cir. 1992).
2

A prisoner’s petition is deemed “filed” when it is submitted to prison officials for mailing. See
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 273 (1988) (holding pro se prisoner’s notice of appeal filed at
moment of delivery to prison authorities for forwarding to district court). Under Sixth Circuit
precedent, the date Plaintiff signed the document is typically deemed the date of handing it to the
prison authorities for mailing. Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff
signed his complaint on September 4, 2023, and therefore, the Court considers it filed as of that
date.
3
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C.

Analysis

First, the Court notes that to state a viable claim under § 1983 against an individual
Defendant, Plaintiff must allege that through their “own individual actions” each Defendant
“personally violated plaintiff’s rights under clearly established law.” Johnson v. Moseley, 790
F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff’s complaint contains no factual
allegations against Defendant Sgt. Tyler Brooks. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim against Defendant Brooks, and he will be DISMISSED.
Second, Plaintiff has named the SCCF as a Defendant, but a county detention facility is
not an entity subject to suit under § 1983. See Anciani v. Davidson Cnty. Sheriff Office, No.
3:19-cv-169, 2019 WL 1002503, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 28, 2019) (“It is well established that in
Tennessee federal courts, a sheriff’s office or police department is not a ‘person’ subject to suit
under 42 U.S.C. §1983.” (citing Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994))); Cage
v. Kent County Corr. Facility, No. 96-1167, 1997 WL 225647, at *1 (6th Cir. May 1,
1997) (“The district court also properly found that the jail facility named as a defendant was not
an entity subject to suit under § 1983.”). Accordingly, the SCCF will be DISMISSED.
Sullivan County itself, however, is a suable entity under § 1983, but only where Plaintiff
sets forth facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that a custom or policy of Sullivan
County caused a violation of his constitutional rights. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978). Here, Plaintiff alleges facts that allow a plausible inference that Defendant Lt.
Gillam confiscated his religious materials because of a policy or custom of Sullivan County
concerning inmate property. Therefore, the Court will consider whether Plaintiff’s allegations
are sufficient to state a claim against Sullivan County.

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Plaintiff’s allegations against Sgt. Gillam and Sullivan County implicate the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. “The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘Congress shall make no
law. . . prohibiting the free exercise’ of religion.’” Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Penn., 593
U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1876 (2021). This right is not without limitations, however, because
“the circumstances of prison life may require some restriction on prisoners’ exercise of their
religious beliefs.” Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920, 929 (6th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, a
prisoner’s rights may be reasonably restricted to accommodate “legitimate penological interests.”
O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89
(1987)).
Prisons must allow prisoners a reasonable opportunity to exercise their faith. Cruz v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972). To establish a free-exercise violation, Plaintiff must
establish that: (1) the belief or practice asserted is religious within his own “scheme of things,”
(2) his belief is sincerely held, and (3) Defendant’s behavior infringes upon this practice or
belief. Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1224–25 (6th Cir. 1987) (internal citations and citation
omitted). To be actionable, Defendants’ infringement must place “a substantial burden on the
observation of a central religious belief or practice[.]” Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989). And “the Supreme Court has made clear that the ‘substantial burden’ hurdle is high.”
Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 258 F. App’x 729, 734 (6th Cir.
2007). A burden is substantial where it (1) forces an individual to choose between following the
tenets of his religion and foregoing governmental benefits or (2) places “substantial pressure on
an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs[.]” Id. at 734.

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Plaintiff identifies as Muslim, and the Court assumes his religious beliefs are sincerely
held. The Court also has no question that reading the Koran and wearing a kufi are religious
practices. But Plaintiff has set forth no facts from which the Court could plausibly infer that the
denial of his personal copy of the Koran or a kufi cap substantially burdened his ability to
observe any central tenet of the Islamic faith.3 Therefore, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that
Defendants’ confiscation of these items violated his right to the free exercise of his religion.
Additionally, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit three days after arriving at the SCCF. (See
generally, Doc. 1.) And while it is unknown how long he remained there, the inmate accounting
information accompanying his motion to proceed in forma pauperis indicates that he remained
there less than two weeks, as he was housed at TTCC as of September 14, 2023. (See Doc. 4-1,
at 1.) Therefore, any deprivation Plaintiff experienced at the SCCF was temporary in nature and
of insufficient duration to constitute a substantial burden. See, e.g., Williams v. Bragg, 537 F.
App’x 468, 468–69 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding plaintiff did not establish substantial burden on his
religious exercise by “occasional cancellation” of religious services); Canell v. Lightner, 143
F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no substantial burden where inmate alleged that on
some occasions officials interfered with prayer). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged
a violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of his religion, and Plaintiff’s complaint
will be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Nonetheless, the Court will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to submit additional factual
allegations to support a finding that Defendants’ actions substantially burdened the observation
of some practice or belief central to Islam. Therefore, if Plaintiff wishes to further pursue this

3

For example, Plaintiff does not allege that he had no access to a Koran while at the SCCF, and
he does not allege that observation of his faith requires him to wear a kufi (or any headcover).
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action, he MUST file an amended complaint with a short and plain statement of facts setting
forth exactly how his religious beliefs or practices were substantially burdened within fourteen
(14) days of entry of this Order. See LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013)
(“Under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint even when the
complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA.”). The Clerk will be DIRECTED to mail
Plaintiff a § 1983 form for this purpose.
Plaintiff should avoid making legal arguments in his amended complaint, and he may not
include additional allegations that are unrelated to the confiscation of his Koran and kufi cap on
September 1, 2023, at the SCCF. Instead, he should merely inform the Court, for example, (1)
the reasons he was provided by Defendants for the confiscation of these materials; (2) the length
of time he was deprived of his Koran and kufi cap at the SCCF; and (3) how the deprivation of
these items infringed upon Plaintiff’s observation of the Islamic faith. Plaintiff is NOTIFIED
that the Court will only address the merits of Plaintiff’s claims that relate to his original
complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff SHALL NOT attempt to set forth in his amended complaint
any additional claims that do not relate to his original complaint, and he is advised that any such
claims will be DISMISSED. Further, Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that this amended complaint will
be the sole operative complaint that the Court considers, and therefore, it must be complete in
and of itself and must not refer to any previously filed allegations or pleadings.
Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that if he does not file an amended complaint by the deadline, the
Court will dismiss this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and
for failure to prosecute and comply with an order of the Court.
Finally, Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that the Court WILL NOT consider any other kind of
motion for relief until after the Court has screened the amended complaint pursuant to the PLRA,

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which the Court will do as soon as practicable. Accordingly, the Court will automatically deny
any motions filed before the Court has completed this screening.
III.

CONCLUSION
1.

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 4) is GRANTED;

2.

The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit the
filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above;

3.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the
custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined and
to the Court’s financial deputy;

4.

Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED because it fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under § 1983;

5.

Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from entry of this Order to submit an
amended complaint in accordance with the directives above. The Clerk is
DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a § 1983 form for this purpose;

6.

If Plaintiff fails to timely submit an amended complaint, this action will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted and
for failure to prosecute and comply with an order of the Court; and

7.

Plaintiff must immediately inform the Court and Defendants or their counsel of
record of any address changes in writing. Pursuant to Local Rule 83.13, it is the
duty of a pro se party to promptly notify the Clerk and the other parties to the
proceedings of any change in his address, to monitor the progress of the case, and
to prosecute or defend the action diligently. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13. Failure to
provide a correct address to this Court within fourteen (14) days of any change in
address may result in the dismissal of this action.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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