Hall v. Newton et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Because the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Section 1983, the Court DISMISSES this action. The Court GRANTED Plaintiff's first motion for leave to proceed in f orma pauperis [Doc. 3 ] and DENIED the second [Doc. 4 ] as moot; The Court ASSESSED Plaintiff the civil filing fee of $350.00. An appropriate judgment shall enter.Signed by District Judge Katherine A Crytzer on 9/24/2024. (BJL)*Mailed to Daniel Richard Hall, III 26949 and to the Custodian of Inmate Accounts at SULLIVAN COUNTY DETENTION CENTER PO BOX 610 BLOUNTVILLE, TN 37617.*Sent to the Court's Financial Deputy Clerks.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT GREENEVILLE
DANIEL RICHARD HALL, III,
Plaintiff,
v.
CO NEWTON, CO CALDWELL, and
KINGSPORT CITY JAIL,
Defendants.

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No.

2:24-CV-11-KAC-CRW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, an inmate in the Sullivan County Detention Center, has filed (1) a pro se
complaint for violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 [Doc. 1] and (2) two substantively identical motions for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Docs. 3, 4]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
(1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s first motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 3] and DENIES
the second [Doc. 4] as moot and (2) DISMISSES the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which Section 1983 relief may be granted.
I.

MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner bringing a civil action may

apply for permission to file suit without prepaying the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). It
appears from Plaintiff’s first motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 3] that he cannot
pay the filing fee in one lump sum. Accordingly, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court GRANTS
that Motion [Doc. 3], and the Court DENIES his second motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis [Doc. 4] as moot.
Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The Court DIRECTS the custodian
of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 220 West Depot

Street, Greeneville, Tennessee 37743, as an initial partial payment, whichever is the greater of: (a)
twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s inmate trust account; or (b)
twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in his inmate trust account for the six-month
period preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B). Thereafter, the
custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is directed to submit twenty percent (20%) of
Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account for the
preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00), until the full
filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been
paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
To ensure compliance with this fee-collection procedure, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk
to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution
where Plaintiff is now confined. The Court also DIRECTS the Clerk to furnish a copy of this
Memorandum and Order to the Court’s financial deputy. This Memorandum and Order shall be
placed in Plaintiff’s prison file and follow him if he is transferred to another correctional
institution.
II.

COMPLAINT SCREENING
A.

Screening Standard

Under the PLRA, a district court must screen a prisoner complaint and sua sponte dismiss
any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant
who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d
1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for
failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory
language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v.
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Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA,
a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a plaintiff might later establish
undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and do not state a plausible claim.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Further, formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of
a claim that are not supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. However, the Supreme Court has instructed that courts should liberally
construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less stringent standard than
“formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
B.

Allegations

Plaintiff claims that the last five times he has been arrested, “they” have refused to provide
him with a mat, bed, and blanket, and have instead let “[him] sit on the hard concrete,” where he
“freeze[s] to death” [Doc. 1 at 3-4]. Plaintiff has sued Correctional Officers Newton and Caldwell
and the Kingsport City Jail [Id. at 1, 3]. As relief, he asks the Court to ensure that he gets a mat,
bed, and blanket if he gets arrested again [Id. at 5].
C.

Analysis

A claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that a “person”
acting “under color of” state law deprived him of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is unclear from the
Complaint whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or an inmate at the time of the incidents in the
Complaint. And this status makes a difference in the applicable law. If Plaintiff was a pretrial
detainee, the Fourteenth Amendment would apply to his Section 1983 claims. See Lawler as next

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friend of Lawler v. Hardeman Cnty., Tenn., 93 F.4th 919, 926 (6th Cir. 2024). If, instead, he was
an inmate, the Eighth Amendment would apply. See id. For purposes of screening Plaintiff’s
Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff was most likely a pretrial detainee when he was arrested and
the Court presumes that he is entitled to the arguably greater protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment1.
A conditions-of-confinement claim has both an objective and a subjective component.
Spencer, 449 F.3d at 728. The objective element requires an allegation of a “sufficiently serious”
deprivation. Id. It is well established that “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable
prisons.” Rhodes v. Chapman 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Thus, only allegations of “extreme
deprivations” that deny a prisoner “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” support a
cognizable conditions-of-confinement claim. Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992)
(citations and quotations omitted). As to the subjective element, a jail official may not punish a
detainee through deliberate indifference to the conditions of his confinement. See Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017). A jail official is
deliberately indifferent to a pretrial detainee’s conditions of confinement if he acts “deliberately”
and “recklessly ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious
that it should be known.’” Brawner v. Scott Cnty., 14 F.4th 585, 596 (6th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)). “Conditions-of-confinement cases are
highly fact-specific.” Lamb v. Howe, 677 F. App’x 204, 209 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

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See Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 727 (6th Cir. 2006) abrogated on other grounds
by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (describing the protections of the Due Process Clause to be
“similar if not greater” than those under the Eighth Amendment) (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1998)); see also Griffith v. Franklin Cnty., Ky., 975 F.3d 554, 566
(6th Cir. 2020).
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Here, while Plaintiff sued Defendants Newton and Caldwell, Plaintiff does not allege or
set forth any facts indicating that either of these correctional officers has ever been personally
involved in denying him a mat, blanket, and bed [See Doc. 1]. As such, the Complaint fails to
state a Section 1983 claim against these Defendants. See Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762,
764 (6th Cir. 2002) (providing that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally
involved in the alleged deprivation of federal rights” to state a claim).
And Defendant Kingsport City Jail, this is not an entity subject to suit under Section
1983. See Marbry v. Corr. Med. Serv., No. 99-6706, 238 F.3d 422, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000)
(holding that “the Shelby County Jail is not an entity subject to suit under §1983”). Notably, the
City of Kingsport, which runs the Kingsport Jail, is an entity subject to suit under
Section 1983. But Plaintiff alleges no facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that this
municipality may be liable under Section 1983 for the incidents in his Complaint. See Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 708 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining a municipality
can only be held liable for harms that result from a constitutional violation when that underlying
violation resulted from “implementation of [its] official policies or established customs”).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations that unspecified officers have denied him a mat, blanket,
and bed during his past five admissions to (presumably) the Kingsport City Jail do not state a
conditions-of-confinement claim against any Defendant in this action. The Complaint includes no
allegations allowing the Court to infer that any specified Defendant acted “deliberately” and
“recklessly ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that
it should be known.’” See Brawner, 14 F.4th at 596 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836). Because
the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Section 1983, the
Court DISMISSES this action

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III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above:
1. The Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s first motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis [Doc. 3] and DENIED the second [Doc. 4] as moot;
2. The Court ASSESSED Plaintiff the civil filing fee of $350.00;
3. The Court DIRECTED the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account to submit
the filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set for above;
4. The Court DIRECTED the Clerk to provide a copy of this Memorandum and Order
to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined
and to the Court’s financial deputy;
5. Even liberally construing the Complaint in favor of Plaintiff, it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this action
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

Further, the Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith
and would be totally frivolous. See Fed. R. App. P. 24. Should Plaintiff file a notice of appeal, he
is DENIED leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24.
An appropriate judgment shall enter.
SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
/s/ Katherine A. Crytzer
KATHERINE A. CRYTZER
United States District Judge

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