Aguilar v. Hubbell Lenoir City, Inc
Filing
44
FINAL JUDGMENT ORDER, entered by the Clerk, finding that Plaintiff will not suffer "plain legal prejudice" as a result of the dismissal of Defendant's counterclaims without prejudice. It is ORDERED that Defendant' ;s motion to dismiss 43 is GRANTED, whereby Defendant's remaining counterclaims for conversion and breach of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. All outstanding matters having been resolved, it is further ORDERED that final judgment in this action on behalf of Defendant in the amount of $116,555.06 is ENTERED. Signed by District Judge Thomas W Phillips on June 7, 2012. (mailed to Ms. Aguilar) (AYB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
MICHELLE AGUILAR,
Plaintiff,
v.
HUBBELL LENOIR CITY, INC.,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 3:09-cv-406
(Phillips)
FINAL JUDGMENT ORDER
I.
Introduction
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Hubbell Lenoir City, Inc.’s Motion
to Dismiss Defendant’s Remaining Counterclaims Without Prejudice, [Doc. 43], wherein Defendant
requests that the Court dismiss without prejudice all remaining counterclaims in this case and enter
final judgment on behalf of Defendant in the amount of $116,555.06.
Plaintiff filed this retaliatory discharge action in Circuit Court in Loudon County,
Tennessee on August 6, 2009. [Doc. 1.] Defendant timely removed the action to this Court on
September 11, 2009. Id. On September 21, 2009, Defendant filed its Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint
and asserted counterclaims against Plaintiff for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and constructive trust.
[Doc. 3.] On October 14, 2009, Plaintiff filed her Answer to Defendant’s counterclaims. [Doc. 5.]
The Court entered a Scheduling Order on April 20, 2010. Defendant served
interrogatories and requests for production on Plaintiff on May 5, 2010. Plaintiff failed to respond
to that discovery, and Defendant filed a Motion to Compel [Doc. 8.] In response, Plaintiff’s counsel
filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, alleging that Plaintiff was not communicating with her
counsel or cooperating in efforts to respond to pending discovery. [Doc. 14.] On October 13, 2010,
the Court granted Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion to withdraw and Plaintiff began proceeding as a pro
se litigant in this matter. [Doc. 19.] Her last known contact information was provided to the Court.
Id. Despite Defendant’s multiple attempts to contact Plaintiff, and despite Plaintiff’s receiving notice
of a telephone conference and copies of the multiple motions and orders detailed below, Plaintiff
has not entered an appearance or participated in this case since her counsel’s withdrawal.
On March 11, 2011, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel and for Sanctions. [Doc.
24.] By order on March 23, 2011, the Court granted Defendant’s motion, instructed Plaintiff to
respond to Defendant’s interrogatories and requests for production by April 4, 2011, and
admonished Plaintiff that failure to comply with the Order may be “treated a contempt of court, and
may result in further just orders designating facts established, striking pleadings, dismissing this
action or invoking any of the other remedies afforded under Rule 37(b).” [Doc. 26.]
On May 26, 2011, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Plaintiff’s Failure to
Prosecute, or in the Alternative, Failure to Comply with Discovery Order. [Doc. 34.] The Court
granted such motion on September 16, 2011, therein dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant. [Doc. 41.] On May 26, 2011, Defendant also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as
to its counterclaims against Plaintiff. [Doc. 36.] On September 16, 2011, the Court granted summary
judgment to Defendant on its counterclaims for breach of contract, but denied summary judgment
on Defendant’s counterclaims for conversion and breach of the implied covenants of good faith and
fair dealing, as well as Defendant’s request for pre- and post-judgment interest. [Doc. 42.] The Order
awarded Defendant the sum of $116,555.06, representing $114,761.06 in damages plus $1,794.00
-2-
previously awarded to Defendant as the discovery sanction on Plaintiff. Id. Defendant filed the
instant motion to dismiss its remaining counterclaims on May 10, 2012. [Doc. 43.]
II.
Analysis
Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when an answer
or a motion for summary judgment has been served, and not all of the parties who have appeared
will stipulate to dismissal, claims may be dismissed “only by court order, on terms that the court
considers proper.” Unless a court’s order states otherwise, a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is without
prejudice. Id. Rule 41(a)(2) applies with equal force to “a dismissal of any counterclaim, crossclaim,
or third-party claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(c).
“Whether dismissal should be granted under the authority of Rule 41(a)(2) is within
the sound discretion of the district court.” Grover by Grover v. Eli Lilly and Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718
(6th Cir. 1994). “The purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is to protect the nonmovant . . . from unfair
treatment.” Jones v. W. Reserve Transit Auth., 455 Fed. App’x 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Universal-MCA Music Pub., Inc., 583 F.3d 948, 953 (6th Cir. 2009)). In
determining whether a nonmovant would be unfairly treated, a district court must look to whether
the nonmovant would suffer “‘plain legal prejudice’ as a result of a dismissal without prejudice, as
opposed to facing the mere prospect of a second lawsuit.” Grover, 33 F.3d at 718 (citing Cone v.
W.V. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 217 (1947); Kovalic v. DEC Int’s, Inc., 855 F.2d 471, 473
(7th Cir. 1988)).In assessing “plain legal prejudice,” the court considers “the [nonmovant’s] effort
and expense of preparation for trial, excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the [movant]
in prosecuting the action, insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal, and whether a
-3-
motion for summary judgment has been filed by the [nonmovant].” Jones, 455 Fed. App’x at 643
(citing Grover, 33 F.3d at 718). “These factors are not an ‘exclusive or mandatory list,’ and district
courts need not analyze each factor or limit its consideration to these factors alone.” Wakerley v.
Billings, 2011 WL 5826028, *2 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 18, 2011) (quoting Rosenthal v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 217 Fed. App’x 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Although Plaintiff has failed to challenge Defendant’s request for voluntary
dismissal, the Court finds it appropriate to consider the four factors to determine whether Plaintiff
will suffer “plain legal prejudice” as a result of the dismissal of Defendant’s counterclaims without
prejudice. It is evident that Plaintiff expended little effort in preparing for trial, as she has not
entered an appearance or participated in this case since the fall of 2010. Though this case has been
pending for almost three years, Plaintiff’s failure to participate in discovery left this litigation “still
in its infancy.” Comm. Cent. Bank v. Mortgage Now, Inc., 2012 WL 882892, *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
14, 2012) (“[T]he case has not yet concluded discovery, let alone approached trial. Thus, significant
funds have not been expended in defending against the Counter Complaint and Third Party
Complaint which would contribute to a finding of plain legal prejudice if the case were dismissed.”).
See also Maldonado v. Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 65 Fed. App’x 955, 957 (6th Cir. 2003)
(affirming a denial of a Rule 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss that was filed when “discovery in this matter
was closed . . . [and] defendants were almost certain to move for summary judgment”). Plaintiff’s
failure to respond to Defendant’s multiple motions—including a Motion to Compel and for
Sanctions [Doc. 24], a Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 34], and a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.
36]—further suggests that Plaintiff has not been dilatory in engaging in discovery, preparing her
-4-
case, or defending against Defendant’s counterclaims. See Rosenthal, 217 Fed. App’x at 502.
Plaintiff never filed a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment in this action.
Conversely, Defendant has been diligent in defending against Plaintiff’s claims and
prosecuting its counterclaims; since the filing of this action in state court in 2009, Defendant has
timely litigated this action and diligently attempted to contact Plaintiff regarding her failure to
participate in discovery. See [Doc. 24]. Defendant exhibited no bad faith in filing multiple motions
to bring this action to a conclusion. Finally, there is sufficient reason for Defendant to request
dismissal of its counterclaims, as dismissal serves Defendant’s interest in obtaining an enforceable
final judgment in this case and the Court’s interest in resolving its cases in a timely manner.
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons contained herein, the Court finds that Plaintiff will not suffer “plain
legal prejudice” as a result of the dismissal of Defendant’s counterclaims without prejudice. It is
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss [Doc. 43] is GRANTED, whereby Defendant’s
remaining counterclaims for conversion and breach of the implied covenants of good faith and fair
dealing are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. All outstanding matters having been resolved,
it is further ORDERED that final judgment in this action on behalf of Defendant in the amount of
$116,555.06 is ENTERED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
ENTERED AS A JUDGMENT
s/ Debra C. Poplin
CLERK OF COURT
s/ Thomas W. Phillips
United States District Judge
-5-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?