Bean et al v. Teague et al

Filing 65

ORDER in which Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 41 is DENIED, the Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to file a Sur Reply 56 is DENIED AS MOOT, and the Defendants' Motion for an Extension of time to file a Reply to the Response in Opposition to the Statement of Material Facts 51 is DENIED. Signed by District Judge Thomas W Phillips on April 3, 2013. (AYB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
ROBERT BEAN, JACQULEEN AXLEY,
CARL S. BIVENS, MALCHIAH D.
BIVENS, JAMES T. BRYANT, RAYMOND,
DAVID CLINE, JIMMY R. CLINE,
ROBERT W. COUCH, GARY FREEMAN,
CHARLES GIBSON, JOEL HOLLINGSHEAD,
JOE MCNABB, MICHAEL D. MILLSAPS
RALPH MOSER, FLOYD SHAFFER,
SAMEUL O. SMITH, JR., WILLIAM M.
STEWARD, III and DONNY WATTENBARGER
Plaintiffs,
v.
STEVE TEAGUE, individually and in his
Official capacity as MONROE COUNTY
ROAD SUPERINTENDENT, and MONROE
COUNTY, TENNESSEE
Defendants.

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No. 3:10-cv-440
(Phillips)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I.

Introduction
This matter comes before the Court concerning the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment [Doc. 41] and the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to file a Sur Reply. [Doc. 56]. For the
reasons that will follow, the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to file a Sur Reply [Doc. 56] is
DENIED AS MOOT, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 41] is DENIED
and the Defendants Motion for an Extension of time to file a Reply to the Response in
Opposition to the Statement of Material Facts [Doc. 51] is DENIED.

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II.

Statement of the Facts
For the purposes of the present Motion, the following facts are taken from the Plaintiffs’

Response in Opposition to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 48], and all
disputed facts are construed in the Plaintiffs’ favor.
This lawsuit concerns Defendants’ September 1, 2010 decision not to rehire 18
employees of the Monroe County, Tennessee Highway Department (the “Road Department” or
“Department”).
Until September 1, 2010, each of the 18 Plaintiffs worked for the Monroe County Road
Department. Combined, Plaintiffs had worked for the Department for more than 78 years.
Individually, each Plaintiff had worked for the Department for the length of time set forth below:
Jacquleen Axley
Robert Bean
Carl S. Bivens
James T. Bryant
Raymond David Cline
Jimmy R. Cline
Robert W. Couch
Gary Freeman
Charles Gibson
Joel Hollingshead
Joe McNabb
Michael D. Millsaps
Ralph Moser
Floyd Shaffer
Samuel O. Smith, Jr.
William M. Stewart, III
Donny Wattenbarger

Approximately 5.5 years
Approximately 7 years
Approximately 6 years
At least approximately 2 months
Approximately 7.5 years
Approximately 2 years
At least approximately 5.5 years
Approximately 3 years
Approximately 4 years and 7 months
Approximately 5.5 years
Approximately 1 year
Approximately 4 years
Approximately 5 months
Approximately 6 years
Approximately 8 years
Approximately 2 years
Approximately 5 years

Plaintiffs were not employed by Monroe County in policymaking positions. Rather, they
were employed as manual laborers. During the summer of 2010, Defendant Steve Teague ran for
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Road Superintendent as the Republican challenger to incumbent Democrat Phillip Axley. In the
weeks leading up to the August 5, 2010 election, Plaintiffs actively supported Axley’s campaign
for reelection.
Plaintiffs supported Axley in various different ways, including, without limitation:
displaying Axley campaign signs in their front yards; distributing Axley campaign signs to
supporters; displaying Axley campaign bumper stickers on their vehicles; distributing Axley
campaign literature; attending Democratic rallies; attending county events as Axley supporters;
speaking with family, friends and acquaintances about Axley; distributing refreshments to Axley
poll workers; traveling from polling site to polling site offering to work the polls while Axley
volunteers took breaks; working the polls on election day for Axley; and voting for Axley. While
working the polls on election day, many of the Plaintiffs saw and spoke with the Defendant
Teague.
Teague defeated Axley on August 5, 2010 by a margin of approximately 2,000 votes,
Axley’s term as Road Superintendent ended on August 31, 2010. During the weeks between the
August 5 election and Teague’s first day as Road Superintendent, Teague posted a notice at the
Road Department stating that any Road Department employee who hoped to continue working at
the Department during his term in office should submit an application. Ten Plaintiffs submitted
an application to Teague, and Teague interviewed two of them. Teague did not extend offers of
employment to any of the Plaintiffs.
Although the remaining eight Plaintiffs did not submit applications, they all wanted to
continue working for the Road Department under Teague. Plaintiffs David Cline and Charles
Gibson did not submit applications because they did not believe they were required to do so to

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continue working for the Road Department. Plaintiff Jimmy Cline did not submit an application
because he believed it was only a rumor that Teague would terminate his employment. Plaintiffs
Joseph McNabb and Michael Millsaps did not submit applications before September 1, 2010
because Teague had not yet assumed office, although they attempted to submit applications on
September 1, 2010. Plaintiffs Jacquleen Axley, Ralph Moser, and William Stewart, III did not
submit applications because they were told Teague would not employ them.

On Axley’s last day in office, August 31, 2010, Axley gave each Plaintiff a separation
notice, which he explained they could use to apply for unemployment benefits if Teague did not
employ them in the Road Department. Axley did not intend to fire Plaintiffs by giving them
separation notices. Rather, Axley did not know whether Teague would be employing all of the
current Road Department employees, and he hoped to expedite the unemployment benefits
process for those who lost their jobs. On the morning of Teague’s first day in office, September
1, 2010, all but four of the Plaintiffs went to the Road Department prepared to work. Teague met
the Plaintiffs in the parking lot of the Road Department, told them he did not have any work for
them, and asked them to leave the premises. Teague also chose on that day not to extend offers
of employment to the remaining four plaintiffs, despite his knowledge that they all sought and
desired continued employment with the Road Department.
Also on September 1, 2010, Teague hired 10 new employees, and by the following
Monday Teague had hired 2 additional new employees. In total, Teague hired 12 new employees
by September 7, 2010. Among those employees were individuals who actively supported Teague
in his campaign by speaking to family and friends and by distributing campaign literature,

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individuals who voted for Teague, individuals who had worked for Teague’s father, Ralph
Teague, when he had been Road Superintendent, and other longtime friends and associates of the
Teague family.
On September 1, 2010, Teague also rehired approximately 14 Road Department
employees, the majority of whom had worked for Teague’s father, Ralph Teague, when he had
been Road Superintendent.25
By his own admission, Teague had no firsthand knowledge of the financial condition of
the Road Department prior to September 1, 2010. On Teague’s first day in office, the Road
Department budget had a positive balance of $803,838.29. Later that month, the County
Commission approved a 2.00% raise for all Monroe County employees. Moreover, according to
Phillip Axley, who had been Road Superintendent for 8 years, the Road Department budget for
the following year had been approved before Teague took office, and there was no budget reason
to terminate Plaintiffs’ employment.
As Road Superintendent, Teague is the primary decision maker over employment in the
Road Department.

III.

Summary Judgment Analysis
1.

The Standard

Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “The moving party
bears the initial burden of production.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
“After the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must
present some ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Jakubowski v. Christ

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Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 200 (6th Cir. 2010 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986)).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Hamilton v. Starcom Mediavest Grp., Inc., 522 F.3d
623, 627 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986)). The central issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter
of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. “[I]f the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient
showing on an essential element of the case with respect to which the nonmovant has the burden,
the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.” Palmer v. Cacioppo, 429
Fed. App’x 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 405 (6th Cir.
2001)).
Here, as the Defendants filed the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will construe
all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs; furthermore, the Defendants will need
to prove that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the Defendants are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id.
2. Summary Of The Issues
The Plaintiff charges three counts: 1) Mr. Teague violated the Plaintiff’s First
Amendment Rights by retaliating against the Plaintiff’s because of their political endorsement of
an opposition candidate, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) that Monroe County, Tennessee
violated the Plaintiff’s First Amendment Rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and, 3) that the
Defendants violated the Plaintiffs’ equal protection rights to property under the Fourteenth

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Amendment by denying employment to the Plaintiffs because of their political endorsement of
an opposition candidate, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc.81 at ¶42-48].
The Sixth Circuit has held that there are three elements to a retaliation claim under
§1983: (1) the plaintiff was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) the defendant's
adverse action caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary
firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) the adverse action was motivated at
least in part as a response to the exercise of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. In addition, the
Supreme Court has held that the constitutionally-protected speech of government employees
must touch upon a matter of public concern. See, Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563,
(1968)(writing on balancing the interests of government employees, as citizens, "in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."); See also, Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (holding that the First amendment protects from retaliation
government employees who speak on matters of public concern.); See also, Jenkins v. Rock Hill
Local Sch. Dist., 513 F.3d 580, 587, (6th Cir. Ohio 2008)(finding that “Beyond those limited
extensions, applying ‘the public concern test outside the public employment setting would
require us to rend it from its animating rationale and original context.’”) (internal citations
omitted). Here, there is no dispute that the Plaintiffs were speaking on matters of public concern.
3. A Material Fact Exists

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The most simple and obvious material dispute is the reason why Mr. Teague either fired
or refused to rehire 1 the Plaintiffs. The Defendants’ state of mind is a fact is for the jury, not the
Court, to resolve.
4. Qualified Immunity
The Defendants argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity is without merit.
The present suit alleges a bad faith constitutional deprivation, which, if taken to be true, pierces
any qualified immunity defense. Qualified immunity, also known as “good faith” immunity, does
not extend to those who knowingly, or in bad faith, violate the constitutional rights of another.
See, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982)(writing that qualified immunity is designed
to shield government officials from actions "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known");
see also, Gantz v. Wayne County Sheriff's Office, (writing that “Qualified immunity shields
government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 2331 (6th Cir. Ky. 2013)(citing Harlow, 457 U.S. 818 (6th
Cir1982)).

5. Municipality As A Party
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs cannot sue Monroe County since the Plainitffs
cannot show that Monroe County instituted a policy or custom that resulted in an injury to the

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The Sixth Circuit has held that a government’s failure to rehire, like a government’s decision to fire, constitutes an
adverse action for the purposes of a § 1983 action. Faughender v. City of North Olmsted, 927 F.2d 909, 912 (6th
Cir.1991) (reversing a district court’s granting of summary judgment, the circuit court held that “a failure to rehire is
treated no differently than a firing under [Supreme Court Precedent].”)

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Plaintiffs. The Defendants write in the Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Summary
Judgment that,
A local government is liable as an entity only when the
government itself has committed a constitutional violation, not
when the violation was committed by one of its employees….none
of Teague’s alleged decisions/non-decisions on individual
Plaintiffs…could be deemed the result or traced to any act or
omission of Monroe County, Tennessee…In other words, Plaintiffs
cannot show that any decision Mr. Teague made or did not make
during August 2010 was a direct result of a policy or custom of
Monroe County, Tennessee.

[Doc. 42 at 9-11].
A municipality or other local government may be liable under § 1983 if the governmental
body itself “subjects” a person to a deprivation of rights or “causes” a person “to be subjected” to
such deprivation. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S.
Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978). But, under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for
“their own illegal acts.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed. 2d
452 (1986) (citing Monell, 436 U.S., at 665-683, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611). They are not
vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees' actions. See id., at 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.
Ed. 2d 611; Canton, 489 U.S., at 392, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412; Board of Comm'rs of
Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1997) (collecting
cases).
Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments under § 1983 must prove
that “action pursuant to official municipal policy” caused their injury. Monell, 436 U.S., at 691,
98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611; see Id., at 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611. Official
municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its

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policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force
of law. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (U.S. 2011) (citing Pembaur, supra, at 480481, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-168, 90
S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). These are “action[s] for which the municipality is actually
responsible.” Pembaur, supra, at 479-480, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452.
Here, the Plaintiffs allege that,
Teague has final authority to make personnel decisions for the
Road Department. Specifically, Defendants have conceded that
‘Mr. Teague is the primary decision maker over employment in the
Monroe County Road Department.’ Accordingly, given his role as
[policymaker] Teague acts on behalf of Monroe County and is
legally capable of binding Monroe County when he make
unconstitutional hiring and firing decisions, as he did for Plaintiffs.
[Doc. 48 at 21]. As cited above, official municipal policy includes the decisions of government
lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to
practically have the force of law. The Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Teague used the power of his
office, including policymaking, budget setting, and his powers to employ and terminate
employment to wage a political war against the Plaintiffs. Whether there is truth the Plaintiffs’
claim is a matter to be decided by a jury.

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VII.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 41] is

DENIED, the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to file a Sur Reply [Doc. 56] is DENIED AS
MOOT, and the Defendants Motion for an Extension of time to file a Reply to the Response in
Opposition to the Statement of Material Facts [Doc. 51] is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:

s/ Thomas W. Phillips
United States District Judge

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