Moncier v. Jones et al (TV1)
Filing
75
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION - Signed by District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 1/30/2012. (KMK)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
KNOXVILLE DIVISION
HERBERT S. MONCIER,
)
)
)
)
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)
)
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Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY JONES, et al.,
Defendants.
No.:
3:11-CV-301
(VARLAN/SHIRLEY)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a civil action is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)
entered by United States Magistrate Judge C. Clifford Shirley, Jr. [Doc. 60].
The
undersigned referred various motions to the magistrate judge for disposition or report or
recommendation, as may be appropriate. In response to the R&R, defendants filed an
objection [Doc. 62], and plaintiff responded along with a motion to strike or, alternatively,
for a temporary restraining order pending expedited discovery [Doc. 67]. Defendants filed
a response to plaintiff’s response and motion [Doc. 71] and plaintiff replied [Doc. 73].
Plaintiff also filed two objections to the R&R [Docs. 63, 64]. Defendants filed responses to
those objections [Docs. 66, 65], and plaintiff replied [Docs. 68, 69]. Plaintiff later filed a
supplement to his objections [Doc. 74]. The Court has carefully reviewed these filings, along
with the record in this case, and for the reasons explained herein the Court will adopt in part
and reject in part the R&R and dismiss this case.
I.
Standard of Review
The Court must conduct a de novo review of portions of the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation to which a party objects unless the objections are frivolous, conclusive,
or general. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of
Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987); Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636,
637 (6th Cir. 1986).
“Objections disputing the correctness of the magistrate’s
recommendation, but failing to specify the findings believed to be in error are too general and
therefore insufficient.” Stamtec, Inc. v. Anson, 296 F. App’x 518, 519 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006)). The Court “may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations” made by the magistrate judge.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
II.
Background1
Before the magistrate judge were defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. 23], plaintiff’s
second and supplemental application for temporary injunction [Doc. 33], and plaintiff’s
supplemental application for temporary injunction [Doc. 41].2 Magistrate Judge Shirley
1
The Court presumes familiarity with the facts and circumstances underlying the R&R and
this case; however, the Court briefly outlines the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations
herein.
2
Also before the magistrate judge were plaintiff’s five motions to amend the complaint and
related motions to supplement [Docs. 14, 31, 36, 40, 44, 48]. Magistrate Judge Shirley granted these
motions and directed plaintiff to file a consolidated complaint consisting of the proposed
amendments. He also ruled that plaintiff not serve the proposed defendants in light of his
recommendation to the undersigned that all but one of plaintiff’s claims—that is, the claim for
injunctive relief against defendant Nancy Jones—be dismissed.
2
addresses them together in the R&R, and makes several findings to support his
recommendation that each motion be granted in part and denied in part.
First, Magistrate Judge Shirley finds that, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,3 the
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over all claims that seek to directly challenge the
decision of the Hearing Panel, as adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in its June 1,
2011 order of enforcement, which was a final decision that was rendered before this action
was commenced, because the claims constitute “as applied” constitutional challenges. In
making this finding, the magistrate judge concludes that, while plaintiff’s various
amendments “play with semantics and modify claims to confer jurisdiction on this Court, it
remains clear that [p]laintiff’s suit is, essentially, an action brought by a state-court litigant
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered, inviting this Court to
review and reject those judgments” [Doc. 60].
Second, Magistrate Judge Shirley determines that the Court has jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s claim that the probation terms in this case have been improperly modified by
defendant Nancy Jones, Disciplinary Counsel for the Board of Professional Responsibility
for the Tennessee Supreme Court, while plaintiff was serving his active suspension and
during the pendency of his probation because the claim does not require the Court to
determine that any state-court judgment was erroneously entered. He also finds the claim has
merit and that plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief on this ground should be granted. In
3
See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
3
so finding, the magistrate judge finds that the written ruling of the Tennessee Supreme Court
may not have been complied with because it stated the Board of Professional Responsibility
of the Tennessee Supreme Court (the “Board”) would assign a practice monitor and during
the hearing, counsel for defendants stated that defendant Jones, not the Board, chose the
practice monitor. Further, no relevant authority, he finds, provides defendant Jones with such
power.
Third, Magistrate Judge Shirley concludes that defendants and the proposed
defendants are immune, except as to prospective injunctive relief, because they all were
acting within their official capacities. He nevertheless finds, however, that the only
prospective injunctive relief warranted in this case is enjoining defendant Jones’s selection
of a practice monitor, her assignment of duties to the practice monitor, and her decisions
regarding the terms and conditions of the probation, pending selection and assignment of a
practice monitor by the Board consistent with the order of enforcement of the Tennessee
Supreme Court. Thus, he recommends dismissing all claims against all defendants and
proposed defendants, except for the claim for injunctive relief against defendant Jones.
Fourth, Magistrate Judge Shirley finds that the Younger abstention doctrine does not
require abstention in this case because during the hearing, counsel for defendants conceded
that there were no ongoing state judicial proceedings for purposes of applying the Younger
doctrine.
Finally, Magistrate Judge Shirley concludes that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear
plaintiff’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In so finding, he determines that plaintiff is
4
not in custody for purposes of habeas corpus relief in light of the statutory language and
because his own inquiry found cases that hold revocation of a license do not constitute being
“in custody” for purposes of habeas corpus review.
For all these reasons, the magistrate judge recommends that defendants’ motion to
dismiss [Doc. 23], plaintiff’s second supplemental application for temporary injunction [Doc.
23], and plaintiff’s supplemental application for temporary injunction [Doc. 41] be granted
in part and denied in part consistent with his findings. He further recommends that plaintiff
be allowed to pursue prospective injunctive relief to enjoin defendant Jones’s selection and
designation of the duties, terms, and conditions of operation of the practice monitor, until
such time as the Board complies with the order of enforcement of the Tennessee Supreme
Court and assigns a practice monitor and designates the terms of the monitoring. Finally, the
magistrate judge recommends that all of plaintiff’s other claims against defendant Jones and
any other defendant, proposed or actual, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and that all
other claims for injunctive relief be denied.
III.
Objections to the R&R
The Court first turns to plaintiff’s objection “to the portion of the [R&R]
recommending dismissal of certain of [p]laintiff’s claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine” [Doc. 64].4 Defendants assert that plaintiff’s argument “offers nothing new” [Doc.
4
The Court, as Magistrate Judge Shirley, does not undertake a discussion of plaintiff’s
lengthy arguments in light of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which directs the Court
to “secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding,” but notes
that it has reviewed and considered the entire record before it in reaching its conclusions on this
objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
5
66]. The Court agrees with defendants and finds that plaintiff’s objection reiterates the
arguments previously made and essentially objects to the correctness of the magistrate
judge’s findings and recommendation.
The Court has reviewed this portion of the R&R, the parties’ arguments, and the
relevant law, and determines that the magistrate judge fully considered the arguments
pertaining to application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Moreover, the Court agrees with
the magistrate judge’s analysis and findings regarding this issue. The Court further finds that
the issue raised in plaintiff’s supplement concerning this objection [Doc. 74] does not dictate
a different result regarding application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, the
Court hereby OVERRULES plaintiff’s objection regarding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
and finds that, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court lacks jurisdiction over
those claims that challenge the decision of the Hearing Panel imposed upon plaintiff, as
adopted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in its June 1, 2011 order of enforcement, a final
decision that was rendered before this action was commenced. Defendants’ motion to
dismiss in this respect will be granted.
The Court next turns to defendants’ objections. Defendants object to two findings of
Magistrate Judge Shirley [Doc. 62]. The first is the magistrate judge’s finding that
the selection of the practice monitor and assignment of duties to this
monitor by Defendant Jones did not comply with the Order of
Enforcement of the Supreme Court, and as a result, the undersigned
will recommend that the Court grant the Plaintiff’s request for
injunctive relief to the limited extent that it requests the probation be
enjoined pending the selection of a practice monitor and assignment of
duties to the monitor by the Board, rather than Defendant Jones.
6
[Id. at 17]. The second is the magistrate judge’s finding that
[a]t the hearing in this matter, counsel for the Defendants conceded that
there are no ongoing state judicial proceedings for purposes of applying
the Younger doctrine. [Doc. 58 at 150]. Thus, an essential criterion for
abstaining pursuant to Younger is not present, and the Court finds that
Younger abstention is not appropriate in this case.
[Id.]. Given that resolution of the second objection in defendant’s favor obviates the need
to resolve the first objection, the Court addresses it first.5
Regarding the second objection, defendants assert that at the hearing before
Magistrate Judge Shirley, counsel for defendants did not concede there were no ongoing state
judicial proceedings for purposes of applying Younger abstention but argued that the petition
to revoke probation filed against plaintiff6 constitutes an ongoing state judicial proceeding
for purposes of applying Younger. The Court agrees. A review of the transcript of the
hearing before the magistrate judge reveals the following colloquy:
5
The Court notes that although defendants originally argued that the Younger abstention
doctrine applies only with respect to plaintiff’s request for habeas corpus relief, [Docs. 24, 35],
defendants later modified their position, after plaintiff filed various motions to amend and
supplemental applications for injunctive relief, to argue that the Younger abstention doctrine applies
to all matters raised in plaintiff’s motions to amend and supplemental applications for injunctive
relief [Docs. 38, 46, 56]. Counsel for defendants clarified at the hearing before the magistrate judge
that it is their position that “everything up to the June 1 enforcement order is barred by RookerFeldman” and “[e]verything after that is barred by Younger” [Doc. 58 at 164]. Accordingly, given
that the Court has overruled plaintiff’s Rooker-Feldman objection, if Younger applies, the Court
need not address defendants’ objection regarding the magistrate judge’s finding with respect to
plaintiff’s claim that defendant Jones has improperly selected and imposed the conditions of the
practice monitor.
6
The petition to revoke probation was filed on September 9, 2011 with the Board [Doc. 621]. Defendants assert that the petition is based upon plaintiff’s resistance to the efforts of defendant
Jones in implementing the practice monitor condition of plaintiff’s probated suspension [Doc. 62].
7
THE COURT: In your positioning are there any state judicial
proceeding ongoing?
MR. WATTS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Which ones?
MR. WATTS: The petition to revoke probation. It is a brand
new petition, an original petition. It is as much on ongoing state
judicial proceeding as the original proceeding was. The Danner
case I have cited in my materials recognizes that. It also
recognizes the ability of the respondent attorney to raise
constitutional violations. He may certainly, as I have stated
several times in several papers, he can make all these arguments
to the Hearing Panel. He can have them reviewed by the trial
court and have them ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court.
If what the Board has done, or Ms. Jones has done, is
unconstitutional it’s certainly going to be a defense to the
revocation of his probation. You will notice that there is no
summary revocation of probation anywhere. In all likelihood by
the time we get through the Hearing Panel trial, the appeal to a
trial court which there almost certainly will be and a writ to the
Supreme Court, which there almost certainly may be, his
suspension will have run by then anyway.
THE COURT: Are there any other state judicial proceeding ongoing?
MR. WATTS: Not for Younger purposes, no.
THE COURT: For any other purposes?
MR. WATTS: For any purpose?
THE COURT: Yeah, are there any other state -MR. WATTS: You mean that he hasn’t filed or that he has filed?
THE COURT: Are there any state judicial proceedings ongoing
involving Mr. Moncier and the Board or Hearing Panel or Ms. Jones?
MR. WATTS: Yes.
8
THE COURT: All right. What are they?
MR. WATTS: Mr. Moncier just filed a late filed brief in his Knox
County Criminal Court habeas corpus proceeding that was on appeal to
the Court of Criminal Appeals even though the Supreme Court has
looked at that and dismissed it. He has filed Rule 59 and 60 motions in
the Davidson County Chancery Court in which he suggested that the
judge should recuse herself because she acknowledged that Ms. Jones’
job was difficult and unpopular. He also claims that there is no such
thing as sovereign immunity. Those are the two that I am involved with
and the two that I know something about. There are on -THE COURT: Those are essentially decided and over, but he has filed
post judgment actions?
MR. WATTS: Post trial court -- no, I mean, the Davidson County
matter was dismissed sua sponte at the hearing on the motion for
injunctive relief. He has now filed Rule 59 and 60 motions.
THE COURT: Those are post-judgment filings. Judgment has been
entered dismissing the case. The habeas case over here in the criminal
court, that has also been dismissed. He has filed a -MR. WATTS: Notice of appeal.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. WATTS: Younger requires exhaustion of state remedy. It is still
ongoing. There are still matters pending in, that I know of, in Davidson
County Chancery Court in another section under the Open Meetings
Act and the Public Records Act. Both of those issues were before
Judge Perkins. He has ruled on the Open Meetings Act. He has not yet
ruled on the Public Records Act. Mr. Moncier also has that same kind
of case still pending in Knox County, I believe. It is being handled by
someone else in our office. I am not familiar with the details on it.
THE COURT: Those two you contend don’t apply with regard to
Younger?
MR. WATTS: No, that’s not part of what the petition to revoke
probation will provide an ongoing proceeding for. I mean, they could
9
depending on what he comes up with as a defense. Those are
essentially very discrete matters, as compared to the broader
disciplinary matters.
[Doc. 58 at 149–52; see also Doc. 58 at 162 (defense counsel arguing that the petition to
revoke probation is an ongoing state judicial proceeding)].7 Accordingly, at the very least,
defendants asserted that the petition to revoke probation and plaintiff’s state habeas action
were ongoing state judicial proceedings that triggered application of Younger abstention.
Thus, the magistrate judge was in error to conclude otherwise, and defendant’s objection on
this ground will be SUSTAINED.
In light of this, the Court must determine whether Younger abstention applies in this
case as a result of the petition to revoke probation. “In Younger, the United States Supreme
Court counseled federal courts to abstain from enjoining certain pending state court criminal
proceedings.” Danner v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Tenn. Supreme Court, 277 F.
App’x 575, 576 (6th Cir. 2008). The doctrine “is borne out of a ‘proper respect for state
functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate
state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare
best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways.’” Id. (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). It has been
extended to apply to both ongoing state civil and administrative proceedings. Id. at 578
7
Although defense counsel appears to have also argued that Younger applies to preclude
review of plaintiff’s habeas claim, that argument is not made in defendants’ objections and thus will
not be addressed by the Court. [See, e.g., Doc. 24; Doc. 58 at 161, 164 (defense counsel arguing the
Younger doctrine precludes review of plaintiff’s habeas claim)].
10
(citations omitted). Pursuant to the doctrine, a federal court should abstain only when three
criteria are met:
(1) the underlying proceedings constitute an ongoing state judicial
proceeding; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and
(3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges
in the course of the underlying proceeding.
Id. (citing Loch v. Watkins, 337 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 2003); Tindall v. Wayne Cnty. Friend
of the Court, 269 F.3d 533, 538 (6th Cir. 2001).
Regarding the first Younger criterion, plaintiff asserts the petition to revoke probation
does not meet Younger’s requirements because the petition was initiated after this action was
commenced and after the Court denied injunctive relief; thus, he submits, “proceedings of
substance” have taken place and Younger cannot apply [Doc. 67].8 The Court does not agree.
Generally, in determining whether a state proceeding was ongoing, the Court must
look to the day of the federal complaint’s filing. See Loch, 337 F.3d at 578. If the state
proceeding was pending at the time of the filing, then the matter is “ongoing” for purposes
of Younger abstention. Loch, 337 F.3d at 578 (citing Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d 199,
204 (6th Cir. 1986)). “It remains pending until a litigant has exhausted his state appellate
remedies.” Id. (citations omitted). It is also true, however, that the Supreme Court has held
that the principles of Younger apply “in full force” if the state proceeding is filed before “any
proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court.” Hicks v.
8
The Court notes that plaintiff makes arguments concerning Younger in his objection to the
R&R regarding application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine [Doc. 64]. The Court further notes that
it has considered these arguments in connection with the analysis herein.
11
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Mandel v. Bradley, 432
U.S. 173 (1977).
The Court first observes that the petition to revoke was filed on September 9, 2011,
[Doc. 38], which is after the date this action was commenced, June 27, 2011 [Doc 1]. Thus,
the Court must determine whether any proceedings of substance on the merits had taken
place in this action prior to September 9, 2011. Although plaintiff maintains that the hearing
of and decision on plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief, which took place before September
9, 2011, was a proceeding of substance on the merits, the Court does not agree. In Hicks, the
Supreme Court found that the denial of a temporary restraining order did not consist of a
proceeding of substance on the merits. 422 U.S. at 338, 349–50. Moreover, although
defendants filed a motion to dismiss prior to September 9, 2011, the Court had not ruled on
the motion prior to September 9, 2011. “While the contours of what defines a proceeding
of substance have yet to be established by the Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit,” Kalniz
v. Ohio State Dental Bd., 699 F. Supp. 2d 966, 971 (S.D. Ohio 2010), at least one district
court in the Sixth Circuit has found that no proceeding of substance on the merits had
occurred where motions to dismiss were filed but not yet decided, id. at 971–72. Hence, the
Court finds the petition to revoke probation constitutes an ongoing state judicial proceeding
for purposes of Younger abstention.
With respect to the second criterion, “[t]here can be no serious question that the
regulation and discipline of attorneys is an important state function.” Danner, 277 F. App’x
12
at 579. Thus, the Court finds that the second element of the Younger abstention doctrine is
satisfied.
Regarding the third criterion,
Abstention is appropriate “unless state law clearly bars the interposition
of the constitutional claims.” The plaintiff bears the burden of showing
that state law barred presentation of his or her constitutional claims.
Once this third and final requirement is met, abstention is appropriate
“unless the plaintiff can show that one of the exceptions to Younger
applies, such as bad faith, harassment, or flagrant unconstitutionality.”
Id. (citing Squire v. Coughlan, 469 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff argues there is no adequate opportunity in the state revocation proceeding to
raise constitutional challenges, and even if there were, the Hearing Panel cannot fully address
them. Plaintiff, however, cites no authority for his contention and the Court therefore finds
that he has not met his burden of demonstrating that state law clearly bars presentation of his
constitutional claims. Moreover, it appears plaintiff has raised constitutional concerns as
defenses to the petition to revoke, and the petition itself recognizes plaintiff’s various attacks
on the practice monitor condition and the fact that plaintiff believes it to be unconstitutional
[See Docs. 56-2, 62-1, 71]. The Hearing Panel also has acknowledged plaintiff’s defenses
and has provided plaintiff an opportunity to take depositions of Board members and
defendant Jones and her staff regarding “issues relevant to the Petition to Revoke Probation
and the defenses raised by the Respondent” [Docs. 71, 71-1]. Even more, the Tennessee
Supreme Court Rules provide that the decision of the Hearing Panel is subject to review by
a trial court and the Tennessee Supreme Court, and the reviewing court may reverse or
13
modify the decision of the Hearing Panel on constitutional grounds. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, §
1.3. The third criterion is therefore satisfied, and the Court finds it should abstain from
hearing this matter unless one of the exceptions to Younger applies.
Plaintiff claims the exceptions for bad faith, harassment, and other unusual
circumstances apply here. See Squire, 469 F.3d at 555 (noting that “absent ‘bad faith,
harassment or any other unusual circumstance,’ federal-court abstention is appropriate”).
Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating one of the exceptions are present, and “[t]he
standard for evaluating claims of bad faith and bias is difficult to meet.” Deters v. Davis,
3:11-02-DCR, 2011 WL 127166, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 14, 2011) (citation omitted). Indeed,
the Sixth Circuit has narrowly interpreted the Younger exceptions. Gorenc v. City of
Westland, 72 F. App’x 336, 339 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s bad faith and harassment arguments are somewhat intertwined. Part of the
argument focuses on the assertion that defense counsel made factual representations to the
Court that plaintiff would be permitted to appear before the Board at its September 2011
meeting and that the practice monitor would not require disclosure of confidential,
privileged, or protected information of plaintiff, but then acted contrary to those
representations. Plaintiff also argues defendant Jones has harassed him by filing new ethics
complaints and that the Board has refused to hear his motions regarding these complaints.
Further, he claims the Board has harassed him by filing the petition to revoke probation as
a result of him filing this action.
14
The Court finds that none of plaintiff’s assertions rise to the level that warrants
application of the bad faith or harassment exceptions. First, it appears that plaintiff was not
afforded an opportunity to speak at the September 2011 meeting because of his alleged
actions, which caused the Board to file a petition to revoke his probation a week before that
meeting. Second, it appears that Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, § 1.6(c)(3), requires a
lawyer to reveal information relating to the representation of a client when disclosure is
necessary to comply with “other law,” which arguably includes the June 1, 2011 order of
enforcement. Third, the new ethics complaints appear to be based upon information received
from third persons, not defendant Jones’s own knowledge, and although plaintiff has filed
motions regarding these complaints, no formal disciplinary proceedings have begun with
respect to them. Finally, it seems the petition to revoke probation is not based upon
plaintiff’s filing of this action but that he has returned to the practice of law without a
practice monitor, allegedly in violation of the order of enforcement. Even more, although
plaintiff speculates about such, plaintiff has not demonstrated any improper motive or
purposes on the part of the Board or defendant Jones.9
It has been noted that “prosecution is only brought in bad faith if brought without a
reasonable expectation of success.” Deters, 2011 WL 127166, at *9 (citation omitted).
“[T]he subjective motivation of the prosecutor or bar counsel is central to the inquiry” and
the Court must ask “whether the bar, ‘at the time it instituted the disciplinary proceedings .
9
The Court recognizes plaintiff’s “Star Chamber” argument but does not find it persuasive
in demonstrating that an exception to the Younger doctrine exists here.
15
. . was driven by a retaliatory motive or by some other nefarious purpose.” Id. (citation
omitted). In light of this guidance and the discussion above, the Court finds plaintiff has not
demonstrated that the bad faith or harassment exception applies in this case. It further finds
plaintiff’s asserted “other unusual circumstance,” that is, that Tennessee has not
demonstrated any intent to comply with the United States Constitution, does not rise to the
level necessary to forgo application of the Younger doctrine.
In sum, the Court finds it appropriate to apply the Younger doctrine in this case with
respect to all claims not covered by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, save the habeas corpus
petition, and that defendant’s motion to dismiss in this respect should be granted. The Court
further concludes that such claims should be dismissed because in a case, as here, where the
plaintiff does not seek damages, if Younger applies, the proper course for this Court is to
dismiss without prejudice. Louisville Country Club v. Ky. Comm’n on Human Rights, 221
F.3d 1335, 1335 (6th Cir. 2000); cf. Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1075
(6th Cir. 1998) (holding that, when abstaining from damages claims, the proper course of
action is to stay rather than dismiss).
The Court next turns to plaintiff’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. As discussed,
the magistrate judge finds that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s petition. The
Court has reviewed plaintiff’s objections and determines that he has not made any specific
objection to this finding. Further, the Court has reviewed this portion of the R&R, the
parties’ arguments, and the relevant law, and determines that the magistrate judge fully
considered the arguments in this regard. Moreover, the Court agrees with the magistrate
16
judge’s analysis and findings regarding this issue. Defendants’ request to dismiss plaintiff’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus therefore will be granted.
In light of these findings and rulings, which address the entirety of plaintiff’s claims,
the Court finds it inappropriate to address the remainder of the R&R, defendant’s other
objection to the R&R, and plaintiff’s remaining objections to the R&R. Moreover, the
Court’s rulings render all other pending motions moot.10
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the Court will SUSTAIN defendants’ Younger
abstention objection [Doc. 62], OVERRULE plaintiff’s Rooker-Feldman objection [Doc.
64], ACCEPT IN PART AND REJECT IN PART the Report and Recommendation [Doc.
60] to the extent stated herein, and GRANT defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. 23] on the
basis of the Rooker-Feldman and Younger doctrines and because the Court does not have
jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. All other pending motions
and objections will be DENIED AS MOOT [Docs. 33, 41, 63, 67, 70]. This case will be
DISMISSED, and the Clerk of the Court will be DIRECTED to close this case.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
10
The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Sixth Motion for Leave to Amend and Supplement the
Complaint [Doc. 70], which was referred to the magistrate judge [Doc. 72], but such does not change
the Court’s analysis and conclusions herein.
17
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