Smith v. City of Knoxville, Tennessee et al
Filing
33
ORDER granting 15 18 23 defendant Sterling P. Owen IV, Don Jones,and David B. Rausch's motions to dismiss, and Sterling P. Owen IV, Don Jones, and David B. Rausch are hereby DISMISSED as defendants in this action. Signed by District Judge Thomas W Phillips on August 28, 2012. (mailed to Mr. Smith) (AYB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
CARLTON E. SMITH,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE,
JOEL ASCENCIO, STERLING P. OWEN, IV,
DAVID B. RAUSCH, DON JONES, B. MULLANE
and other Unknown Officers,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 3:11-CV-419
(Phillips)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Carlton Smith has brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violation of his constitutional rights arising out of his arrest by officers of the Knoxville Police
Department on August 27, 2010.
Smith has also alleged several tort claims based on
Tennessee law for false imprisonment, official oppression, and malicious prosecution.
Defendants Sterling P. Owen IV, Don Jones and David B. Rausch have
moved to dismiss Smith’s claims against them in their individual capacities stating that the
complaint fails to allege facts which could support a claim for which relief can be granted.
Defendants also move the court to dismiss them in their official capacities as those claims
are redundant to the claims asserted against the City of Knoxville. For the reasons which
follow, the defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted.
Factual Allegations
The factual allegations are taken from plaintiff’s complaint. On August 27,
2010, at approximately 2:22 a.m., Smith was walking along the sidewalk of Cumberland
Avenue in Knoxville, to get something to eat from the Pilot gas station. Smith had a
backpack over his shoulder. Dustin Risdon, with whom Smith had no familiarity or
association, was walking ahead of Smith and appeared to be visibly intoxicated. At one
point, Risdon stumbled off the sidewalk and into the path of oncoming traffic. Smith ran to
the aid of Risdon and pulled him back on the sidewalk to safety. This action drew the
attention of Officer Joel Ascencio of the Knoxville Police Department. Officer Ascencio was
accompanied by an unknown officer of the Knoxville Police Department. When Officer
Ascencio drew near, he recognized Smith as a local homeless individual, and commanded
Smith to approach. Smith alleges that Officer Ascencio began to harass him. Smith
asserted his constitutionally protected right to remain silent, which Smith alleges angered
Officer Ascencio.
Smith next alleges that Officer Ascencio began to threaten him with arrest if
he did not stop asserting his constitutionally protected rights. Eventually, Officer Ascencio
turned his attention to Risdon and placed him under arrest for public intoxication. Officer
Ascencio then excused Smith and Smith picked up his backpack to leave. As he began
-2-
to leave, Officer Ascencio told Smith to “hold on.” Smith alleges that due to their show of
force and police authority, he did not feel free to leave. Smith informed Officer Ascencio
that the backpack was his and had been in his possession when the officers arrived.
Risdon confirmed that the backpack did not belong to him, nor had he been in possession
of it. Smith alleges that the backpack contained his personal effects and thyroid medication
and he could not leave the backpack behind.
Smith alleges that Officer Ascencio seized both his person and the backpack
in violation of Smith’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure and
false imprisonment. Officer Ascencio asked Smith if there was anything in the backpack
with Smith’s name on it. Smith confirmed that he had medication in the backpack with his
name on it. Officer Ascencio asked Smith if he could search the backpack. Asserting his
constitutionally protected right to be free from illegal search, Smith replied that he did not
want Officer Ascencio searching through his property. Officer Ascencio continued to
request permission from Smith to search the backpack, and Smith continued to refuse
permission to search his backpack.
When Smith stated that he was just going to take his backpack and leave, he
was not allowed to do so. Instead, Officer Ascencio called a member of the canine unit to
see if the canine would hit on the backpack and continued to restrain Smith. Smith alleges
that Officer Ascencio did not have an objectively reasonable suspicion that the backpack
contained evidence of a crime or wrongdoing, and he had no right to detain Smith. Smith
-3-
offered to show Officer Ascencio the medication, but Officer Ascencio refused to let him
reach inside the backpack.
Officer B. Mullane of the Knoxville Police Department arrived on the scene
with a canine at approximately 2:40 a.m. Office Mullane led the canine past the backpack
multiple times without the canine hitting on the backpack. Smith alleges that Officer
Mullane reached down toward the backpack and signaled the canine to hit on the
backpack. A moment later, Officer Mullane threw the canine’s training/reward ball onto the
backpack. The officers then stated that the canine had made a positive hit on the
backpack, and arrested Smith for disorderly conduct. When the officers searched the
backpack, Smith alleges they did not find anything illegal; however, the officers did find
medication bearing Smith’s name. Upon searching Smith’s person, a pipe was found in his
right front pocket. On August 27, 2010, Smith was charged for possession of drug
paraphernalia and disorderly conduct. Since Smith was on probation at the time, these
new charges were used to file a warrant for violation of probation. Smith was imprisoned
at the Knox County Detention Facility from August 27, 2010 until November 1, 2010.
On November 1, 2010, Judge Charles Cerny of the General Sessions Court
for Knox County, Tennessee, dismissed the charges of possession of drug paraphernalia
and disorderly conduct against Smith for failure to prosecute, and also dismissed the
violation of probation warrant that had been filed against Smith. Smith alleges that the City
of Knoxville, through its police department, Sterling P. Owen IV, David B. Rausch, and Don
-4-
Jones, “permitted, encouraged, tolerated and ratified a pattern and practice of
unreasonably and unconstitutionally detaining individuals for the purpose of bringing a
canine to the scene when no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists;” and
“permitted, encouraged, tolerated, and ratified a pattern and practice of unreasonably and
unconstitutionally arresting individuals on the pretext of an offense such as disorderly
conduct without probable cause.” Smith further alleges that “the failure of the defendants
Sterling P. Owen IV, David Rausch, Don Jones, and the City of Knoxville to provide
adequate training and supervision to police officers as to the proper and lawful use of
authority to detain and arrest individuals, amounts to gross negligence and deliberate
indifference to the life and liberty of the citizens of the City of Knoxville, Tennessee.”
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
requires the court to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
accept all the complaint’s factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff
undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to
relief. Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 475 (6th Cir.) cert. denied,
498 U.S. 867 (1990). The court may not grant such a motion to dismiss based upon a
disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations. Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th
Cir. 1990); Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that courts should not
weigh evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses). The court must liberally construe
the complaint in favor of the party opposing the motion. Id. However, the complaint must
-5-
articulate more than a bare assertion of legal conclusions. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy
Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1988). “[The] complaint must contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some
viable legal theory.” Id. (citations omitted).
In Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), the Supreme Court
readdressed the pleading requirements under the Federal Rules. The Court stressed that,
although a complaint need not plead “detailed factual allegations,” those allegations “must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Id. at 1964-65. “The factual
allegations, assumed to be true, must do more than create speculation or suspicion of a
legally cognizable cause of action; they must show entitlement to relief.” League of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, No. 03-5306, 2007 U.S.App. LEXIS 20556, at * 6 (6th Cir.
Aug. 28, 2007) (citing Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). Further, the Court observed that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does require a “showing” that the plaintiff is entitled
to relief and that this substantive threshold is not achieved by conclusory assertions.
Twombly, at 1965 n. 3. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 establishes a “liberal
system of notice pleading,” E.E.O. C. v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851 (6th
Cir.2001), “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Twombley, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
-6-
Analysis
Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State” subjects another to “the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws.” 42 U.S.C. §
1983. In order to prevail on such a claim, a § 1983 plaintiff must establish (1) that there
was the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and (2) that the deprivation was
caused by a person acting under color of state law. Whittstock v. Mark A. Van Sile, Inc.,
330 F.3d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 2003). Section 1983 is not the source of any substantive right,
but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.
Gardenshire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 310 (6th Cir. 2000). It is not enough for a complaint
under § 1983 to contain mere conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct by persons
acting under color of state law. Some factual basis for such claims must be set forth in the
pleadings. Chapman v. City of Detroit, 808 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1986).
Defendants Owen, Jones and Rausch assert that the complaint fails to state
a claim against each of them in their individual capacities. In order for these defendants
to be held liable in their individual capacities, the complaint must demonstrate that they
personally condoned, encouraged, or participated in the conduct that allegedly violated
Smith’s rights. Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1989). A supervisor must have
“at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the misconduct.” Hays
v. Jefferson Co., 668 F.3d 869, 872 (6th Cir. 1982). Conclusory allegations are not enough.
-7-
The complaint must establish “a causal connection between the misconduct complained
of and the official sued.” Dunn v. State of Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 128 (6th Cir. 1982).
In response to defendants’ motions to dismiss, Smith has filed a response
stating:
In the instant case, the plaintiff alleges that Knoxville police
officers, Sterling P. Owen and Don Jones, illegally detained the
plaintiff, deprived him of his liberty, illegally and without just
cause searched his person and property and later released
him. The defendant’s [sic] allege that the plaintiff has failed to
state a claim that would entitle him to relief and that they are
entitled to their motion to dismiss. The defendants are wrong
on both counts. Stated simply, the defendant [sic] has alleged
a deprivation of his constitutional rights that would entitle him
to relief if proven, therefore as a matter of right, under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(B)(6), the plaintiff is entitled to
proceed in his action against defendants Owen and Jones.
Here, Smith as not offered any factual allegations that defendants Owen,
Jones or Rausch personally condoned, encouraged, or participated in his arrest or
prosecution. While Smith raised numerous claims about his detention and arrest on
November 27, the only specific allegations against these defendants are that they were
responsible for the training and supervision of the officers involved. Smith offers no facts
regarding how these defendants were personally and directly involved in any conduct that
allegedly violated his rights. To the extent that Smith seeks to hold defendants liable in
some type of supervisory capacity, that claim fails as respondeat superior is not a sufficient
basis for the imposition of liability in § 1983 actions. See Polk Co. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
-8-
325 (1981). Liability of supervisory personnel must be based on more than merely the right
to control employees. Hays, 668 F.2d at 872. The law requires that there must be a direct
casual link between the acts of individual officers and the supervisory defendants. Id.
Smith’s allegations that defendants “permitted, encouraged, tolerated and ratified a pattern
or practice [of constitutional violations],” are nothing more than legal conclusions couched
as factual allegations, which are insufficient to state a cause of action against these
defendants under § 1983. Ashcraft, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
In addition, the court finds Smith’s conclusory allegation that defendants’
failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference is unsupported by any facts in the
complaint. Deliberate indifference to the duty to train exists where “inadequate training is
obvious, and the inadequacy [of the procedure] is likely to result in the violation of
constitutional rights.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). A claim is
inadequately pleaded if it consists only of “conclusions and formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964. Moreover, the factual
allegations contained in the complaint, when taken as true, “must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Id. Here, Smith’s complaint contains no facts to
support his legal conclusions and does no more than track the elements of a cause of
action. Id.
As such, it is insufficient to state a claim against these defendants in their
individual capacities, and is subject to dismissal.
-9-
Turning to defendants motions to dismiss the claims against them in their
official capacities, the court finds the motions well taken. All of Smith’s claims against the
defendants in their official capacities as agents or employees of the City of Knoxville are
redundant to the claims against the City. As stated by the Supreme Court, a claim against
an individual government official in his official capacity is “only another way of pleading an
action against the entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978)). As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to
respond, an official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit
against the entity. Id. at 166. Likewise, Tennessee courts have held that an action against
a government official in his official capacity under state law is treated as an action against
the governmental entity. See Greenhill v. Carpenter, 718 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn.Ct.App.
1996) (citing Cox v. State, 399 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tenn. 1965)). The complaint alleges
claims under both federal and state law against defendants Owen, Jones and Rausch
which are totally duplicative of the claims against the City of Knoxville. Therefore, the
claims against these individuals in their official capacities will be dismissed as well.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing reasons, defendant Sterling P. Owen IV, Don Jones,
and David B. Rausch’s motions to dismiss [Docs. 15, 18, 23] are GRANTED, and Sterling
P. Owen IV, Don Jones, and David B. Rausch are hereby DISMISSED as defendants in
this action.
-10-
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
s/ Thomas W. Phillips
United States District Judge
-11-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?