Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. Claiborne Heavy Hauling, LLC et al

Filing 142

ORDER ACCEPTING IN WHOLE the Report and Recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). Claiborne's objections 140 are OVERRULED. It is ORDERED, for the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation, which the Court adopts and incorporates into its ruling, that Appolo Fuels' motion for attorney's fees 132 is GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Pamela L Reeves on July 11, 2016. (AYB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
APPOLO FUELS, INC.
Plaintiff,
v.
CLAIBORNE HEAVY HAULING,
CLAIBORNE CONTRACTORS, LLC,
and TODD T. CLAIBORNE, all d/b/a
CLAIBORNE CONTRACTORS,
Defendants.

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No. 3:11-CV-467-PLR-CCS

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation filed by United States Magistrate
Judge, C. Clifford Shirley, regarding Appolo Fuels’ motion for attorney’s fees.

[R. 139].

Claiborne objected to the Magistrate Judge’s findings in the R &R. [R. 140]. Claiborne
argued that Appolo failed to meet its burden of proving that any of its claimed fees and costs
were incurred due to “liability imposed or sought to be imposed” by third parties under the
contract. Claiborne also stated that Appolo failed to meet its burden to prove its reasonable fees
and costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(h). Finally, Claiborne argued that
Appolo cannot receive attorney’s fees because it was required to offer proof regarding the
amount of fees at trial.
Appolo responded in opposition. [R. 141].

Appolo stated that this Court must only

review the R & R for “clear error” or “manifest injustice” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(b) because Claiborne did not object to the rate, amount, or reasonableness of the attorney’s
fees.

For the reasons below, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s analysis, and
Claiborne’s objections will be OVERRULED.

The Report and Recommendation will be

ACCEPTED IN WHOLE, and the underlying motion for attorney’s fees will be GRANTED.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must conduct a de novo review of portions of the magistrate judge's R & R to
which a party objects unless the objections are frivolous, conclusive, or general. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370,
1373 (6th Cir. 1987); Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986). The Court “may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Only objections that are specific are entitled to de novo review. Mira, 806 F.2d at 637
(“The parties have the duty to pinpoint those portions of the magistrate's report that the district
court must specially consider.”). A general objection, or one that merely restates the arguments
previously presented, does not sufficiently identify alleged errors on the part of the magistrate
judge. Howard v. Sec ‘y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). An
objection that does nothing more than disagree with a magistrate judge's findings, “without
explaining the source of the error,” is not considered a valid objection. Id. In fact, “[a] district
court should only review for clear error where a party makes perfunctory arguments to engage
the district court in rehashing the same arguments set forth in the original petition.” Brooks v.
Invista (Koch Indus.), 528 F.Supp.2d 785, 788 (E.D. Tenn. 2007). “A party's failure to object is
accepted as agreement with the conclusions of the magistrate judge. Id. (citing Thomas v. Arn,
474 U.S. 140, 149–50, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985)).
Specific objections enable the Court to focus on the particular issues in contention.
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Howard, 932 F.2d at 509. Without specific objections, “[t]he functions of the district court are
effectively duplicated as both the magistrate and the district court perform identical tasks. This
duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs
contrary to the purposes of the Magistrate's Act.” Id.
II.

ANALYSIS

The Court is reluctant to even address Claiborne’s objections because they merely restate
prior arguments. See Howard, 932 F.2d at 509. Claiborne does not object to the magistrate
judge’s findings as to the amount of attorney fees or how the fees were computed; rather,
Claiborne squanders judicial resources by disguising its objections as a motion to reconsider the
Court’s prior findings. For the following reasons, Claiborne objects that Appolo is not entitled to
attorney fees: the contract does not allow for attorney fees, Appolo failed to comply with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and Appolo failed to offer proof of its claimed fees at trial. Those
arguments, however, were already considered and denied by the Court. Claiborne’s arguments
are thus interred, and the Court sees no reason to exhume them now for reconsideration.
In a prior order, this Court ordered that “Appolo Fuels, Inc. recover from defendants
Claiborne Heavy Hauling, LLC, Claiborne Contractors, LLC, and Toddy Claiborne damages in
the amount of $579,293.99 plus costs of this action and attorney fees, the amount to be
determined by further order of the Court.” [R. 129]. The Court’s previous order is the law of the
case, and the ruling does not fall within any of the three exceptional circumstances.
The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that “when a court decides upon a rule of law, that
decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.”
Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 538 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Scott v. Churchill, 377
F.3d 565, 569-70 (6th Cir. 2004).

The doctrine bars reconsideration of a previously-decided
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issue unless one of the following “exceptional circumstances” exists: “(1) where substantially
different evidence is raised on subsequent trial; (2) where a subsequent contrary view of the law
is decided by the controlling authority; or (3) where a decision is clearly erroneous and would
work a manifest injustice.” Id. (citing Hanover Ins. Co. v. Am. Eng'g Co., 105 F.3d 306, 312 (6th
Cir. 1997)). Rather than argue that any of the exceptions apply to this case, Claiborne instead
makes the same, previously-rejected arguments they made before. The Court rejected those
arguments once and will do so again now. After careful review of its prior order, the Court finds
nothing in the record to show that its decision in awarding attorney fees was somehow clearly
erroneous. See id.
In light of the Court’s prior ruling as well as the absence of any exceptional
circumstances, the Court finds that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies.

Accordingly, the

Court’s prior order governs, and Appolo is entitled to attorney fees. Seeing no other objections
to the R & R, the Court will ACCEPT the magistrate’s recommendation and will REJECT
Claiborne’s objections.
III.

CONCLUSION

After careful review, the Court is in complete agreement with Magistrate Judge Shirley’s
conclusion that Appolo Fuels’ motion for attorney’s fees [R. 132] should be GRANTED. The
Court thus ACCEPTS IN WHOLE the Report and Recommendation under 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). Claiborne’s objections [R. 140] are
OVERRULED. It is ORDERED, for the reasons stated in the Report and Recommendation,
which the Court adopts and incorporates into its ruling, that Appolo Fuels’ motion for attorney’s
fees [R. 132] is GRANTED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
A S S
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