Cooper v. White et al (TVV)
Filing
94
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 3/31/15. (c/m)(JBR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
RALPH BYRD COOPER, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
PAUL WHITE, et al.,
Defendants.
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No.:
3:12-cv-76-TAV-CCS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This pro se prisoner’s civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is before the
Court on defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. 72]. Plaintiff has responded
in opposition [Docs. 78, 79], and defendants have replied [Doc. 80]. Plaintiff is in the
custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, and the remaining defendants are
Anderson County, Tennessee; Anderson County Sheriff Paul White; and Detention
Facility Chief Avery Johnson.
Plaintiff makes the following claims and arguments in his amended complaint and
in response to defendants’ motion: that he was not provided with adequate medical
treatment; that he was not provided with access to a handicap-equipped shower; that he
was permitted to shower only one time in seven days; and that his rights under the
Americans with Disabilities Act were violated by the same conduct giving rise to his
federal civil rights claims. Having reviewed the parties’ submissions and relevant law,
the Court will grant defendants’ motion.
I.
Background
Plaintiff was most recently booked into the Anderson County Detention Facility
(“Detention Facility”) on November 12, 2010 [Doc. 74 p. 1].
During the booking
process, plaintiff possessed a pair of crutches and informed officers that he was blind in
one eye and suffered from diabetes [Id.]. According to defendants, plaintiff did not
provide any medical reason for why he needed the crutches and did not request any
special accommodation [Id. at 1–2]. Plaintiff claims he stated that he needed the crutches
because he is diabetic and on medication for high blood pressure and high cholesterol
[Doc. 78 p. 3].
However, on the form titled “Inmate Booking/Medical Screening
Questions,” plaintiff answered no to the question, “Do you have a serious medical
condition that may require attention while you are here?” and in the box for “List All
Medical Conditions,” plaintiff only mentioned his diabetes and blindness in one eye
[Doc. 72-2 p. 6].
And having reviewed the facility’s records, Detention Facility
Lieutenant Richard Parker noted that plaintiff had been incarcerated at the facility on
thirteen separate occasions and that there is no record of him requesting or being
provided with handicapped accommodations during any of his prior periods of
incarceration at the facility [Doc. 72-1 ¶¶ 2–4, 7]. Plaintiff admits this [Doc. 78 p. 5].
Housing assignments at the Detention Facility are based upon the nature of the
crime(s) committed by the inmate [Doc. 74 p. 2]. Because plaintiff was convicted of
aggravated rape, he was housed in the facility’s maximum security housing unit, Unit 4,
2
in Cell 406 [Id.]. Only after being escorted to his cell did plaintiff request to be housed in
a handicap-equipped cell [Doc. 72-1 ¶ 7]. The facility promptly addressed plaintiff’s
complaint, even though plaintiff had the opportunity to raise the issue at his intake
medical screening. The following day, November 13, 2010, plaintiff was moved to Cell
405, equipped with a shower, and was provided with a metal folding chair to use while
showering [Doc. 74 p. 2]. Plaintiff claims these actions demonstrate that defendants were
aware that he could not stand in the shower and that there was a problem [Doc. 78 p. 4].
The Detention Facility has no record of any complaints, requests, incidents, or
accidents involving plaintiff and his use of the shower between November 13, 2010, and
November 19, 2011 [Doc. 74 p. 2]. Plaintiff, however, claims that every day he asked
one of the sergeants on duty when he would be moved to a unit with a handicap shower
so that he would not “keep almost falling getting in and out” of the in-cell shower [Doc.
78 p. 5]. Then, on November 19, 2011, Detention Facility officers and medical staff
responded to an emergency call regarding plaintiff, who claimed that he slipped and fell
while attempting to exit the shower [Doc. 74 p. 2]. Plaintiff was immediately transported
to the emergency room at a local hospital [Id.].
After being treated, plaintiff was cleared to return to the Detention Facility that
same day, November 19, 2011 [Id.]. Emergency room reports indicate that plaintiff
suffered no fractures or dislocations from his fall [Id. at 3]. Plaintiff submitted several
3
medical requests following his return to the Detention Facility, which were addressed by
Dr. Townsend or other members of the medical staff [Id. at 3–4].1
Because plaintiff was housed in a different cell in the maximum security unit upon
his return, which did not have a shower, plaintiff’s shower time was determined by the
established schedule for the communal showers in the unit [Id. at 3]. If an inmate refused
to take a shower during his allotted time, he forfeited the opportunity to shower that day
[Id.]. As plaintiff states, the communal showers in the unit did not have any handicap
accommodations [Doc. 78 p. 6]. According to defendants, for seven consecutive days
following plaintiff’s return to the facility, plaintiff voluntarily refused his opportunity to
shower and made no written or verbal requests for shower accommodations [Doc. 74 p.
3]. Reports documented plaintiffs’ refusals but made no mention of any request for
accommodations [See, e.g., Doc. 72-5 p. 1 (“Inmate Ralph Cooper refused his hour
1
The following allegations from the amended complaint are plaintiff’s view of the events
that followed his return from the emergency room. Upon his return, former defendant Dr.
Charles Townsend ordered the crutches to be taken from plaintiff, and plaintiff had to crawl on
the cell floor to get around [Doc. 20 p. 9]. Defendant Townsend also ordered his wheelchair
taken, to be used only when he was out of his cell [Id.]. Defendant Townsend took more than a
week to follow up on his injuries, and defendant Townsend refused to give plaintiff the pain
medication prescribed by the emergency room doctor [Id. at 10]. When plaintiff finally saw
defendant Townsend and complained of continuing chronic pain, defendant Townsend did not
examine him but simply stated it was because he was obese and needed to lose weight [Id. at 10–
11]. Defendant Townsend also disregarded the emergency doctor’s order that if plaintiff's pain
continued he should return to the emergency room [Id. at 11]. On December 7, 2011, plaintiff
filed a request for pain medication and a request to be seen by a back and spine doctor, both of
which were denied by defendant Townsend [Id. at 12]. Plaintiff filed another request for pain
medication and outside consultation, which was denied by defendant Townsend [Id.]. On
January 16, 2012, plaintiff filed a medical grievance concerning his pain and the denial of
medication, which defendant Townsend answered, stating that all plaintiff wanted was pain pills,
which are for acute injuries and not chronic pain [Id. at 13].
The Court granted Dr. Charles Townsend’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that plaintiff
relied only on his own unsubstantiated claims that he suffered injury from a delay in treatment
and from the doctor’s refusal to give him pain medication [Doc. 55 p. 9].
4
out.”)]. According to plaintiff, he did not “refuse” the opportunity [Doc. 78 p. 7].
Plaintiff claims that every night he said he needed to be taken to a different housing unit
to use a handicap shower but those requests were denied [Id.]. Then on December 1,
2011, at plaintiff’s request, plaintiff was escorted to a different housing unit to access the
handicap-equipped shower located in that unit [Doc. 74 p. 3].
II.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issues of material fact
exist. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 n.2 (1986); Moore v. Philip Morris
Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 1993). All facts and all inferences to be drawn
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);
Burchett v. Kiefer, 301 F.3d 937, 942 (6th Cir. 2002).
Yet, “[o]nce the moving party presents evidence sufficient to support a motion
under Rule 56, the nonmoving party is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of
allegations.” Curtis Through Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., 778 F. Supp. 1421, 1423
(E.D. Tenn. 1991) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317). To establish a genuine issue as to
the existence of a particular element, the nonmoving party must point to evidence in the
record upon which a reasonable finder of fact could find in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty
5
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The genuine issue must also be material; that is, it
must involve facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id.
The Court’s function at the point of summary judgment is limited to determining
whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper
question for the factfinder. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The Court does not weigh the
evidence or determine the truth of the matter. Id. at 249. Nor does the Court search the
record “to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C.
Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479–80 (6th Cir. 1989). Thus, “the inquiry performed
is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for a trial—whether, in
other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a
finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
III.
Analysis
“To state a successful claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs ‘must identify a
right secured by the United States Constitution and the deprivation of that right by a
person acting under color of state law.’” Adair v. Charter Cnty. of Wayne, 452 F.3d 482,
491–92 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 935 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th
Cir. 1992)).
Here, plaintiff’s amended complaint makes claims under the Eighth
6
Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act.2 The Court will address plaintiff’s
claims in turn.
A.
Eighth Amendment Medical Needs Claim
The Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual punishment obliges
correctional authorities to provide medical care for prisoners’ serious medical needs. To
state a claim under § 1983 in the medical context, “a prisoner must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Thus, “[a] constitutional claim for
denial of medical care has objective and subjective components.”
Blackmore v.
Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004).
The objective component requires the alleged deprivation to be sufficiently
serious. “’[T]he inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm.’” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). “If there is an obvious need for
medical treatment, then the court must determine whether the delay in securing that care
was reasonable.” Cain v. Irvin, 286 F. App’x 920, 927 (6th Cir. 2008). “If, however, the
injury is not apparent or relatively minor, . . . a plaintiff must provide ‘medical evidence’
demonstrating that the delay in treatment resulted in additional injury.” Id.
2
Because plaintiff has been transferred from the Anderson County Detention Facility to
the Northeast Correctional Complex, his requests for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot.
See Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 65 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that
inmate’s request for injunctive relief against alleged violation of his religious rights was moot
after inmate was transferred from prison).
7
The subjective component requires the inmate to show that a prison official
possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind—that is, deliberate indifference to inmate
health or safety. Brown, 207 F.3d at 867. “Put simply, ‘deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding
that risk.’” Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 875 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 836). Negligence is not sufficient. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835–38 (“With
deliberate indifference lying somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and
purpose or knowledge at the other . . . .”).
It is undisputed that plaintiff was provided with prompt medical treatment after his
alleged fall on November 19, 2011. Therefore, plaintiff’s medical treatment claim is
limited to his perceived delay in care upon his return to the Detention Facility. Plaintiff
argues that he experienced pain and lost use of his legs upon returning to the facility from
the emergency room. In support, he has submitted a copy of a Detention Facility log
book page noting that plaintiff’s criminal court appearance on November 21, 2011, two
days after the fall, was “reset due to [plaintiff’s] being unable to walk” [Doc. 79-1 p. 50].
The log also shows, however, that plaintiff was taken “to see Mobile Imaging” that same
day [Doc. 80-1 p. 1]. Plaintiff had complained of joint pain in his leg, and Dr. Townsend
referred plaintiff to Mobile Imaging, which found “[n]o radiographic evidence of acute
fracture or dislocation” [Doc. 80-2 p. 1].
Plaintiff also relies on his unsubstantiated claims that he suffered from a delay in
treatment, the emergency room doctor’s instructions to return if the pain becomes severe,
8
and the findings of an MRI performed on plaintiff’s spine on July 12, 2012 [Doc. 78 p.
10; Doc. 84 p. 7; Doc. 79-1 p. 49]. Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes that
plaintiff has failed to submit sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to the
objective component.
As defendant points out, plaintiff’s medical requests and
grievances from the relevant period do not mention any alleged inability to walk and
instead focus entirely on plaintiff’s desire to obtain pain medication above and beyond
what he was already receiving [Doc. 73 p. 4 n.4]; see also Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d
462, 477 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating that verifying medical evidence of an exacerbated injury
is necessary to establish the objective prong for non-obvious complaints of a serious need
for medical care).
The available evidence does not create a genuine dispute that the Detention
Facility delayed, let alone unreasonably delayed, in caring for a condition “so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize the need for medical treatment.” Burgess,
735 F.3d at 476; Cain, 286 F. App’x at 927. Nor does it create a genuine dispute that
plaintiff’s condition deteriorated because of any alleged delay. See Napier v. Madison
Cnty., 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that “‘[a]n inmate who complains that
delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying medical
evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment
to succeed’” (quoting Hill v. Dekalb Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1188 (11th Cir.
1994))); Rumsey v. Martin, 28 F. App’x 500, 502 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiff
inmate’s claim failed because he did not submit “medical evidence which clearly shows
9
that his condition deteriorated because of a delay in filling his prescriptions”). When
plaintiff fell and when he complained of leg pain, he was promptly taken to the
emergency room and to Mobile Imaging, respectively. Moreover, the MRI report does
not appear to make any findings regarding deterioration due to delay [See Doc. 79-1].3
Even assuming plaintiff could establish the objective prong—a detrimental effect
due to delay, plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence that could support a
finding that either defendant White or Johnson acted with a sufficiently culpable mental
state.4 Plaintiff has not provided sufficient evidence that either defendant White or
Johnson was aware of facts from which he could infer that plaintiff was at substantial risk
of serious harm, let alone that either defendant actually drew such an inference. See
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Although plaintiff contends that he filed several medical
requests and a medical grievance relating to his care upon his return from the emergency
room, he does not allege that either defendant White or Johnson was aware of those
requests. And even accepting plaintiff’s allegation that defendant White saw crutches in
plaintiff’s cell on at least one occasion, the Court finds that such an observation, standing
alone, is insufficient to create a genuine dispute as to deliberate indifference. In fact,
3
A medical need can also be “sufficiently serious if it has been diagnosed by a physician
that has mandated treatment.” Burgess, 735 F.3d at 476. The Court, however, does not find that
the record in this case, including the emergency room doctor’s notes [Doc. 79-1 p. 49], creates a
genuine dispute that a physician has mandated treatment.
4
“[T]he collective acts of defendants cannot be ascribed to each individual defendant.”
Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 626 (6th Cir. 2012). In other words, “damage claims against
government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with
particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional
right.” Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original).
10
among other indicators, plaintiff’s trip to Mobile Imaging on the day he apparently
claimed an inability to walk supports that the Detention Facility affirmatively responded
to plaintiff’s complaints of pain or injury and was not deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs.
Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted in favor of defendants with
regard to plaintiff’s medical care claims.5
B.
Eighth Amendment Conditions-of-Confinement Claim
“[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . . which
house persons convicted of serious crimes cannot be free of discomfort.” Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Like a medical needs claim, a conditions-ofconfinement claim contains both objective and subjective components. “The objective
component requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that he has been subjected to specific
deprivations that are so serious that they deny him ‘the minimal civilized measure of
life’s necessities,’” Richmond v. Settles, 450 F. App’x 448, 455 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347), including “essential food, medical care, or sanitation,” Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 348. The subjective component requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the
accused officials “possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind”—that is, at a
minimum, deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s serious medical needs. Wilson v.
5
And to the extent plaintiff’s claims pertain to Dr. Townsend’s treatment decisions and
plaintiff’s disagreement with those decisions, the Court finds such allegations insufficient for
plaintiff’s claims to survive summary judgment. See Wooler v. Hickman Cnty., Civil Action No.
5:05CV-247-R, 2008 WL 5412826, at *22 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 30, 2008) (“Mere disagreement with
the nature of one’s medical treatment is not sufficient, standing alone, to constitute deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need.”).
11
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (stating that prison
official cannot be found liable for denying inmate humane conditions of confinement
“unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety”).
Plaintiff’s condition-of-confinement claim appears to be based on his allegations
that he was denied use of a handicap-accessible shower prior to November 19, 2011, and
that he was permitted to shower only once in seven days following his return from the
emergency room [Doc. 20-1 ¶¶ 19–26]. Neither of plaintiff’s arguments has merit.
1.
Cell with a Shower and Chair for Showering
Plaintiff first argues that he was placed in a cell without a handicap-equipped
shower, despite arriving at the facility on November 12, 2010, with crutches. In the
thirteen separate occasions plaintiff had been incarcerated at the facility, there is no
record of him requesting or being provided with handicapped accommodations [Doc. 721 ¶¶ 2–4, 7; Doc. 78 p. 5]. But according to plaintiff, during the booking process, he
stated he needed the crutches because he is diabetic and on medication for high blood
pressure and high cholesterol [Doc. 78 p. 3].
Regardless, only after being escorted to his originally-assigned cell did plaintiff
request to be housed in a handicap-equipped cell [Doc. 72-1 ¶ 7]. Although plaintiff was
not moved to a handicap cell, he was moved to a cell equipped with a shower and was
provided with a metal folding chair to use while showering [Id.]. The Detention Facility
has no record of any complaint, request, incidents, or accidents involving plaintiff and his
12
use of the shower between November 13, 2010, and November 19, 2011 [Id.]. Nor has
plaintiff presented any evidence that he was prevented from safely showering during this
time, aside from his own claims that he told the guards daily that he was almost falling
when using the shower.
Negligence is insufficient to impose § 1983 liability, and courts have rejected
prisoners’ Eighth Amendment claims in similar slip and fall cases. See Reynolds v.
Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1031–32 (10th Cir. 2004) (dismissing inmate’s Eighth
Amendment claim, even though inmate was on crutches and had specifically warned
prison officials that he was at risk of falling, where plaintiff had safely entered and exited
the shower area using his crutches on numerous occasions prior to his fall); Kirby v. Ky.
Corr. Psychiatric Ctr., 198 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that defendants acted with,
at most, mere negligence or lack of due care by failing to provide shower mats or railing
to inmate who required the use of a sling for one of his arms and subsequently slipped
and fell upon exiting the shower); Shaw v. TDCJ-CID, 540 F. Supp. 2d 834, 838–39
(S.D. Tx. 2008) (finding no deliberate indifference, even though legally blind inmate
“may have been more vulnerable than most to slipping on the wet shower surfaces,”
because the inmate’s allegations indicated, at most, that prison officials were negligent in
failing to ensure that the handicap showers were not slippery, a problem common to all
showers); cf. Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding triable issue of
fact when plaintiff wore a leg cast and relied on crutches, prison guards were aware
plaintiff had fallen and injured himself several times, prison doctor stated that plaintiff
13
should be placed in handicap unit, and plaintiff alleged that a variety of options, including
a chair in the shower, would have met his safety needs).
More specifically, plaintiff cannot show a genuine dispute on the subjective prong
of the analysis—that is, that any Detention Facility official consciously disregarded an
excessive risk to plaintiff’s health or safety. In fact, the record shows that the Detention
Facility took affirmative steps to address plaintiff’s shower situation—promptly
transferred plaintiff to a cell with a private shower and provided him with a chair for
showering. The record further supports that plaintiff used the shower without incident for
over a year prior to his fall and trip to the emergency room.
Accordingly, in the
circumstances of this case, the fact that the Detention Facility did not house plaintiff in a
cell or unit equipped specifically for handicapped inmates cannot establish an Eighth
Amendment violation.
2.
Alleged Denial of Opportunity to Shower Upon Return
from Emergency Room
Next, plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that he was denied the opportunity to
shower except for “one time in seven days” following his return to the Detention Facility
from the emergency room [Doc. 49 ¶ 24]. Plaintiff now claims he was denied the
opportunity to shower for eleven days straight, after defendants cited case law holding
that one shower per week is constitutionally permissible [See Doc. 73 p. 12 n.11
(defendants’ memorandum) (noting that the Sixth Circuit “has concluded that deprivation
of a shower and other personal hygiene items for a brief span of time . . . i.e., only six
days is not actionable conduct” under the Eighth Amendment) (quoting Richmond, 450 F.
14
App’x 455 (citation omitted)); Doc. 78 p. 7, 11 (plaintiff’s response brief) (noting the
case law in defendants’ memorandum and stating that eleven days without a shower is
four days over the constitutional minimum of one shower per week)].
Defendants argue that, on each of the seven days, plaintiff forfeited his
opportunity to shower by choosing not to shower in the period of time made available to
him [Doc. 73 p. 12]. Arguing that he did not “refuse” the opportunity, plaintiff claims
that every night he said he needed to be taken to a different housing unit to use a
handicap shower but that his requests were denied [Doc. 78 p. 7]. But as defendants
point out, not even plaintiff’s handwritten daily log references being denied the
opportunity to shower between November 20, 2011, and November 27, 2011.
Having reviewed the record, the Court concludes there is insufficient evidence to
create a genuine dispute that defendant was denied an opportunity to shower for a period
of time such that either the objective or subjective component of the Eighth Amendment
analysis could be established.6
C.
Supervisory Liability
Even assuming plaintiff provided sufficient evidence of a constitutional violation,
liability cannot attach to defendants White or Johnson during the relevant time period.
6
Plaintiff’s claims involving his medical care and conditions of confinement have been
analyzed under the Eighth Amendment because that amendment is the primary source of
protection to a prison inmate making such allegations. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. To the
extent plaintiff alleges violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights because of his
classification at the Detention Facility, such claims also fail as a matter of law. “[P]rison inmates
have no constitutional right to placement in any particular prison or to placement in any
particular section within the prison.” Meeks v. Schofield, 10 F. Supp. 3d 774, 797 (M.D. Tenn.
2014).
15
Any claim against these defendants predicated on the actions of their subordinates must
be analyzed under § 1983 supervisory liability principles.
To establish supervisory liability, “[t]here must be a showing that the supervisor
encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated
in it. At a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least
implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct
of the offending subordinate.” Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984);
see also Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that plaintiff must
show “active unconstitutional behavior” by the supervisor).
Specifically, the amended complaint alleges that defendant White is responsible
for plaintiff’s alleged injuries “under the theory of ‘respondeat superior,’ and for his
failure to properly train, monitor, or otherwise make rules or policies that would protect
the plaintiff in this emergency/serious medical needs and disabilities [sic]” [Doc. 49 p.
32]. In his response brief, plaintiff argues that the sheriff is responsible for acts of the
jailer and for establishing a system to monitor compliance with policies and procedures
through regular reviews and inspections [Doc. 78 p. 2; Doc. 79-1 p. 56]. But in light of
the legal standard and the available evidence, notably the lack of direct or indirect
involvement of defendants White or Johnson in plaintiff’s situation, plaintiff has not
created a genuine dispute that either defendant is liable under a theory of supervisory
liability.
16
D.
Municipal Liability
An official-capacity suit is treated as a suit against the entity of which the official
is an agent. See Petty v. Cnty. of Franklin, 478 F.3d 341, 348–49 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all
respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”)).
Therefore,
plaintiff’s claims against defendants White and Johnson in their official capacities are
properly analyzed as claims against Anderson County. A local government entity “may
only be held liable under § 1983 where ‘its policy or custom causes the constitutional
violation in question.’” Garner v. City of Memphis, 576 F. App’x 460, 462 (6th Cir.
2014) (quoting Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 813 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 389 (1989) (affirming that a municipality “can be
found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional
violation at issue” in that its policies or customs are the moving force behind the
constitutional violation).
In his response brief and supplemental brief, plaintiff recites several Detention
Facility policies and argues that those policies were not followed with respect to his
incarceration. For example, Detention Facility Policy and Procedure 4.03 provides that
“[i]nmates who display special needs during the intake booking process will be diverted
to special housing when such housing space is available”; “[a] classification reassessment
will be conducted on an as needed basis established for each inmate based on behavior,
needs and other classification issues”; and “inmates with . . . handicaps . . . will be placed
17
in separate housing and observed accordingly until an official has deemed them well or
capable of returning to their regular housing unit” [Doc. 79-1 p. 57–59].
And the
Detention Facility’s ADA policy, Policy 13.05, states that “[a]n arrestee with mobility
disability must have access to the toilet facilities, showers, and other amenities at the jail”
and that the facility “will observe proper classification procedures that will identify any
person who will require special consideration to a disability under ADA guidelines” [Id.
at 64–65].
Here, aside from plaintiff’s assertions to the contrary, there is no evidence to
support that plaintiff informed the facility that he was handicapped at his initial booking.
When plaintiff eventually requested a handicap-equipped cell, the facility moved plaintiff
to a cell with a private shower and gave him a chair for showering, where he lived for
more than a year without reported incident. Then after plaintiff’s fall and at his request,
on December 2, 2011, plaintiff was escorted to the handicap-equipped shower in the
minimum security housing unit [Doc. 72-1 ¶ 13].
It is by no means clear that the Detention Facility’s policies were violated. And
notwithstanding any violation, the Court finds the record does not create a genuine
dispute that Anderson County had a policy or custom that was the moving force behind
any of the alleged injuries or constitutional violations.7
7
As the Court previously found in dismissing the claims against Dr. Townsend in his
official capacity, “[t]here is nothing in the record to suggest that the alleged violation of
plaintiff’s civil rights was the result of any custom or policy on the part of Anderson County,
Tennessee” [Doc. 55 p. 8].
18
In sum, with regards to plaintiff’s constitutional claims, the Court will grant
summary judgment in favor of defendants White, Johnson, and Anderson County,
Tennessee.8
E.
Americans with Disabilities Act
Under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, “no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “[T]he plaintiff
must show that the discrimination was intentionally directed toward him or her in
particular.”
Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in
original).
Plaintiff has not done so here, let alone present evidence of any causal connection
between his alleged disability and his shower situation. See Moore v. Curtis, 68 F. App’x
561, 563 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Conclusory allegations do not create a genuine issue of
material fact which precludes summary judgment.”). In support of his ADA claim,
plaintiff argues that his physical impairments, including his obesity, degenerative disc
disease, and need for crutches, substantially limit him in the major life activities of
walking and performing manual tasks [Doc. 78 p. 2, 10, 12; Doc. 79-1 p. 64]. He further
8
Even if plaintiff could present sufficient evidence of a constitutional violation, the Court
finds that plaintiff has not shown that either defendant White or Johnson is not entitled to
qualified immunity. There is insufficient evidence to indicate that the actions of either official
were “‘objectively unreasonable in light of [plaintiff’s] clearly established constitutional rights.’”
Mallory v. City of Riverside, 35 F. Supp. 3d 910, 923 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (quoting Radvansky v.
City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 302 (6th Cir. 2005)).
19
argues that Sheriff White saw plaintiff’s crutches in his cell and knew plaintiff could not
walk without crutches, and therefore knew that plaintiff did not have a handicap shower
[Id.]. Plaintiff also questions why, after he returned from the emergency room and was in
a wheelchair and allegedly could not walk, he was housed in a unit without a handicap
shower [Id. at 12]. These arguments, however, are insufficient to create a genuine
dispute that plaintiff was not originally given handicap shower access or was later denied
a handicap shower because of his alleged disability. See Tucker, 539 F.3d at 532–33
(looking to whether appellant was intentionally subjected to discrimination solely
because of his disability).
Plaintiff’s ADA claim is also based on his allegations that he was denied medical
care during his incarceration. But courts have determined that “claims based solely on
the provision of inadequate or negligent medical care are not cognizable under the
ADA.” Centaur v. Haslam, No. 3:14-cv-00472, 2014 WL 940513, at *3 (M.D. Tenn.
Mar. 11, 2014) (emphasis in original) (collecting cases). And to the extent plaintiff’s
claim rests on his contention that the county failed to adequately train and monitor its
employees to prevent ADA violations, the Court notes that “[f]ailure to supervise is not a
viable theory for recovery of compensatory damages in a Title II ADA claim, since such
failure is necessarily not directed at a particular disabled individual.” Sears v. Bradley
Cnty. Gov’t, 821 F. Supp. 2d 987, 990–91 (E.D. Tenn. 2011).
20
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court will GRANT defendants’ motion for summary
judgment [Doc. 72] and DISMISS this action. The Clerk of Court will be DIRECTED
to CLOSE this case.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
21
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