Atkins et al v. Foster et al

Filing 28

ORDER denying 17 defendant Ronald James Foster's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 21 plaintiffs' Motion for discovery under Rule 56(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and granting 24 plaintiffs' Motion for leave to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs are DIRECTED to file their amended complaint with the Clerk. Signed by District Judge Thomas W Phillips on November 1, 2012. (mailed to Aaron Foster) (AYB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

KITTY L. ATKINS, MARY F. SHEPARD,
TOMMY SHEPARD and ANDREW SHEPARD,
Plaintiffs,
v.
AARON JAMES FOSTER and
RONALD JAMES FOSTER,
Defendants.

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No. 3:12-CV-77
(Phillips)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case involves a motor vehicle accident, and is before the court on the
defendant Ronald James Foster’s motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs have
responded in opposition, requesting discovery under Rule 56(d), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Plaintiffs have also moved for leave to amend their complaint.

I. Summary Judgment Motion
This case arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on April 4, 2011,
in which a 2006 Chrysler operated by Aaron Foster collided with a 2004 Dodge Neon
operated by Kitty Atkins. Ronald Foster is the owner of the 2006 Chrysler which was
involved in the accident of April 4, 2011. Aaron Foster is the son of Ronald Foster. Ronald

Foster states that his son Aaron has not lived in his home for several years and was not
a resident of his household on April 4, 2011.

Ronald Foster further states that on April 4, 2011, Aaron Foster had not
driven any vehicle owned by Ronald Foster for approximately four years. On April 3, 2011,
Aaron spent the night at his father’s home in Wilksboro, North Carolina. On April 3, 2011,
Ronald Foster parked his 2006 Chrysler in the driveway of his home in Wilksboro, North
Carolina. The vehicle was still in the driveway when Ronald Foster went to bed that night.
On April 4, 2011, Aaron Foster did not have either express or implied permission from his
father to drive the 2006 Chrysler. Ronald Foster states that he did not entrust the 2006
Chrysler to his son, Aaron, at any time on April 3, 2011 or April 4, 2011.

In the early morning of April 4, 2011, Ronald Foster discovered that the
vehicle had been taken from his driveway without his knowledge by Aaron Foster. On April
4, 2011, upon discovering that the vehicle had been taken, Ronald Foster called and
reported the vehicle stolen to the Wilkes County Sheriff’s Department. Ronald Foster later
learned that Aaron had been involved in an accident in Tennessee and had been arrested
in Loudon County, Tennessee, and charged with two counts of vehicular assault, one count
of theft of property (2006 Chrysler), and one count of evading arrest. Aaron Foster entered
a guilty plea on all charges with the Criminal Court of Loudon County, Tennessee, and
currently resides in the Morgan County Correctional Complex, Wartburg, Tennessee.

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Plaintiffs have file the instant action against both Aaron Foster and Ronald
Foster. The complaint alleges that Ronald Foster negligently entrusted the vehicle/allowed
access to his son Aaron Foster.

On March 29, 2012, Aaron Foster submitted a letter to the court. In the letter,
Aaron avers that his father had no part in his actions of April 4, 2011, and had no idea that
he had taken the vehicle. He further avers that he was convicted of stealing the 2006
Chrysler. Ronald Foster has moved the court for summary judgment stating that he cannot
be liable under the theory of negligent entrustment because there was no entrustment as
a matter of law upon the facts.

Plaintiffs have responded by filing a motion under Rule 56(d), Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, requesting a reasonable time to conduct discovery to acquire facts
needed to respond to the motion for summary judgment. In support of the motion, plaintiffs
state that, to date, no discovery has been conducted in this case. Because Ronald Foster
has denied that he negligently entrusted the 2006 Chrysler to Aaron Foster, plaintiffs need
the opportunity to inquire further into the circumstances surrounding Aaron Foster’s
obtaining the 2006 Chrysler from Ronald Foster. These facts are currently not available
to the plaintiffs without discovery and are essential to plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion for
summary judgment.

Defendant Ronald Foster responds to plaintiffs’ motion for discovery by
stating that the issue raised in his motion for summary judgment is very narrow and all of
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the undisputed material facts necessary to a ruling on his motion are already before the
court, therefore, additional discovery will add nothing to the undisputed facts submitted to
the court.

Plaintiffs reply that in order to succeed on a claim for negligent entrustment,
they must demonstrate that “a chattel was entrusted to one incompetent to use it with
knowledge of the incompetence, and that its use was the proximate cause of injury or
damage to another.” Watrous v. Johnson, 2007 WL 4146289 at *2-*3 (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov.
21, 2007). Plaintiffs state that the documents submitted by Ronald Foster do not address
the issue of his knowledge of his son’s incompetence – his substance abuse. Further, it
is reasonable to infer that the after-the-fact actions of Ronald Foster in reporting the vehicle
as “stolen,” and Aaron Foster’s admission to stealing the vehicle from his father were selfserving attempts to cut off the liability of Ronald Foster.

In support of their motion for discovery under Rule 56(d), plaintiffs cite the
case of Strine v. Walton, 323 S.W.3d 480 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2010), wherein the Tennessee
court stated:
Because the only proof addressing whether Walton actually
was operating the vehicle with Father’s consent comes form
Father and Son, two very interested witnesses, we conclude
that Father’s evidence was insufficient to overcome the prima
facie evidence created by the statute [Tenn. Code Ann. § 5510-311] that Walton was operating the vehicle with Father’s
authority, knowledge, and consent.”
Id. at 489. Plaintiffs state that Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-311 provides that “proof of
ownership of the vehicle shall be prima facie evidence that the vehicle at the time of the
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cause of action sued on was being operated and used with authority, consent and
knowledge of the owner in the very transaction out of which the injury or cause of action
arose.” Plaintiffs assert that the reasoning applied by the court in Strine about the evidence
from “two very interested witnesses” being insufficient to overcome the prima facie
evidence is applicable to the case at bar. The court agrees.

It is well established that a plaintiff must receive “a full opportunity to conduct
discovery” to be able to successfully defeat a motion for summary judgment.

See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986); see also Celotex corp v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of
summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial”); White’s
Landing Fisheries Inc. v. Buchholzer, 29 F.3d 229, 231 (6th Cir. 1994) (“a grant of summary
judgment is improper if the non-movant is given an insufficient opportunity for discovery”).

Here, the parties have not conducted the initial discovery required by Rule
26, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or any other discovery. At this juncture in the
proceedings, the court finds defendant’s motion for summary judgment to be premature,
and that the plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to develop their case through
discovery. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion for discovery under Rule 56(d) is GRANTED; and
defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED, with leave to refile after the parties
complete the necessary discovery.
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II. Motion to Amend the Complaint
Plaintiffs have moved the court for leave to amend their complaint. No
opposition has been received to the motion. As Rule 15, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
instructs, leave to file an amended complaint shall be “freely given when justice so
requires.”

Accordingly, for the good cause shown, plaintiffs’ motion to amend their

complaint is GRANTED.

III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, (1) defendant Ronald James Foster’s motion for
summary judgment [Doc. 17] is DENIED; (2) plaintiffs’ motion for discovery under Rule
56(d), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Doc. 21] is GRANTED; and (3) plaintiffs’ motion
for leave to amend their complaint [Doc. 24] is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs are DIRECTED to file their amended complaint with the Clerk.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTER:
s/ Thomas W. Phillips
United States District Judge

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