Chaves v. AT&T (TV1)
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION as set forth in following order.Signed by District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 7/13/12. (c/m)(ABF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
HUGO ERNESTO CHAVES,
Plaintiff,
v.
AT&T,
Defendant.
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No.:
3:12-CV-80
(VARLAN/GUYTON)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This civil action is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss and/or for Judgment on
the Pleadings [Doc. 3] filed by BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC (“BellSouth”),1 in
which BellSouth moves this Court to dismiss plaintiff’s claim pursuant to Rule 8(a) and Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se,
did not file a timely response to BellSouth’s motion, see E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1(a), plaintiff
subsequently filed a Motion to Disregard [Doc. 6] and a Motion for Default Judgment [Doc.
7]. Bellsouth filed a timely response [Doc. 9] to both motions. For the reasons set forth
herein, Bellsouth’s Motion to Dismiss and/or for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. 3] will be
1
Bellsouth asserts plaintiff improperly sued AT&T, a point discussed later in this
memorandum opinion.
GRANTED, plaintiff’s Motion to Disregard and Motion for Default Judgment [Docs. 6, 7]
will be DENIED, plaintiff’s claim will be DISMISSED, and this case will be CLOSED.2
I.
Relevant Facts3
According to the complaint, which asserts a claim for defamation,4 plaintiff was an
employee of Bellsouth [Doc. 1]. Plaintiff states that he was wrongfully accused of
threatening a coworker on October 31, 2011 [Id.]. BellSouth investigated this accusation on
or about November 10, 2011 [Id.].
The Asset Protection Manager, Jim Spearman, interviewed plaintiff as part of
BellSouth’s investigation [Id.]. Others present for this interview included another manager,
Robert Ecot, and plaintiff’s union representative, Scott Pittman [Id.]. During the interview,
plaintiff denied making the alleged threat [Id.].
2
Plaintiff also filed a Discovery Plan and Motion for Order Attorneys Appear and Answer
to Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Default Judgment [Doc. 12], and defendant filed a Report
of Parties’ Planning Meeting and Defendant’s Proposed Discovery Plan [Doc. 13]. The Court has
reviewed these documents and determined that they are of no consequence to the motion to dismiss,
the motion to disregard, or the motion for default judgment. They are, therefore, not discussed
herein and will be denied as moot.
3
The following facts are taken from plaintiff’s complaint [Doc. 1], and will be assumed as
true for purpose of BellSouth’s Motion to Dismiss and/or for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. 3].
See, e.g., Directv, Inc. v. Treesch, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that in ruling upon
motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court must “construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff”).
4
Plaintiff’s complaint asserts a claim for “libel, slander, & defamation” [Doc. 1]. In
Tennessee, “[t]he law of defamation includes both slander, which is spoken, and libel, which is
written.” Watson v. Fogolin, No. M2009-00327-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 1293797, at *4 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Apr. 1, 2010) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court treats plaintiff’s complaint as
asserting a claim for defamation in general.
2
While interviewing plaintiff, Spearman drafted an employee statement on plaintiff’s
behalf [Id.]. The statement indicated that plaintiff had threatened a coworker and provided
the circumstances surrounding the alleged threat [Id.]. At the interview’s close, plaintiff
declined to sign the statement as drafted by Spearman because plaintiff had not written the
statement himself; and further, plaintiff believed that the substance of the statement was false
[Id.]. Spearman, Ecot, and Pittman are the only parties alleged by plaintiff as having been
privy to the employee statement [Id.].
II.
Standard of Review
BellSouth moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of defamation pursuant to Rule 8(a) and
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Doc. 3]. Rule 8(a)(2) sets out a liberal
pleading standard, see Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 576 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004),
requiring only “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,’ in order to ‘give the [opposing party] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests,’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). This standard does not require “detailed factual
allegations”; yet, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
“more than labels and conclusions.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do,” id., nor will “an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
3
“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss.” Id. at 679. A plausible claim must “permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct.” Id. In addition, the complaint must contain allegations
supporting all material elements of the claims. See Bishop v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 520 F.3d
516, 519 (6th Cir. 2008). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will [ultimately] . . . be a context-specific task that requires th[is Court] to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
As previously stated, plaintiff proceeds pro se in this matter [Doc. 1]. Pro se litigants
“are held to less stringent [pleading] standards than . . . lawyers in the sense that a pro se
complaint will be liberally construed in determining whether it fails to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.” Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). Still, this Court’s “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has
limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). “Neither [this] Court nor
other courts . . . have been willing to abrogate basic pleading essentials in pro se suits.”
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). For instance, federal pleading standards
do not permit pro se litigants to proceed on pleadings that are not readily comprehensible.
Cf. Becker v. Ohio State Legal Servs. Ass’n, 19 F. App’x 321, 322 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding
a district court’s dismissal of a pro se complaint containing “vague and conclusory
allegations unsupported by material facts”).
4
III.
Analysis
A.
Procedural History
BellSouth moves this Court to dismiss plaintiff’s defamation claim for three reasons
[Doc. 3]. First, plaintiff’s complaint does not identify the basis of this Court’s jurisdiction
[Id.]. Second, plaintiff does not state a plausible claim of defamation because he does not
allege sufficient facts to support the publication element of defamation [Id.]. Third, plaintiff
has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies [Id.].
Plaintiff responded by filing the Motion to Disregard [Doc. 6] and the Motion for
Default Judgment [Doc. 7]. In the Motion to Disregard [Doc. 6], plaintiff first asserts that
he correctly identified AT&T, rather than BellSouth, as the defendant in his complaint [Id.].
Second, plaintiff states that he did not receive, and did not have access to, Exhibit 2, which
was attached to BellSouth’s Motion to Dismiss and/or for Judgment on the Pleadings [Id.].
In the Motion for Default Judgment [Doc. 7], plaintiff claims that BellSouth failed to answer
the complaint.
In response, BellSouth clarifies that it, rather than AT&T, is the proper defendant
because plaintiff was employed by BellSouth, not AT&T [Doc. 9]. Second, BellSouth notes
that it filed a timely response to the complaint when it filed a dispositive motion under Rule
12 [Docs. 3, 10]; and so, BellSouth has “pl[ed] on behalf of itself” [Doc. 9].
The Court will first address plaintiff’s Motion to Disregard [Doc. 6] and Motion for
Default Judgment [Doc. 7]. To follow, the Court will address BellSouth’s Motion to Dismiss
and/or for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. 3].
5
B.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Disregard
Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, it appears that the complaint improperly identifies
AT&T as the defendant in this lawsuit [Doc. 6]. As noted in the Affidavit of Robert
Culpepper, in-house counsel for AT&T, BellSouth does business as “AT&T” [Doc. 3-5 ¶ 2].
Culpepper further explains that “[p]laintiff was hired by BellSouth” and “remained an
employee of such company up until the time of his termination” [Id.]. BellSouth provides
additional clarification in its response to plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment [Doc. 9 ¶
1]: “[T]he alleged defamatory statements associated with the [p]laintiff’s discharge would
be by BellSouth personnel. As referenced in the attached filings from the Tennessee
Secretary of State, there is no ‘AT&T.’” The Court thus finds that, at all relevant times,
plaintiff was employed by BellSouth, and his contended interactions took place with other
BellSouth employees.
In addition, plaintiff states that he did not receive, and did not have access to, Exhibit
2, which was attached to BellSouth’s Motion to Dismiss and/or for Judgment on the
Pleadings [Doc. 6]. BellSouth attached Exhibit 2, containing plaintiff’s employment
agreement [Doc. 3-3], to demonstrate plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies. As explained below, the Court need not address this assertion because BellSouth’s
second assertion suffices to dispose of plaintiff’s case. The Court does not base its
determination on BellSouth’s third assertion, which renders plaintiff’s receipt of, and access
to, Exhibit 2 irrelevant.
6
Accordingly, for these reasons, plaintiff’s Motion to Disregard [Doc. 6] will be
denied.
C.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment
Plaintiff claims that BellSouth did not file a timely response to his complaint [Doc.
7], but to no avail. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a). Rule 12 classifies a dispositive motion as a
“responsive pleading,” so BellSouth responded in a timely manner when it filed its Motion
to Dismiss and/or for Judgment on the Pleadings [See Docs. 2, 3]. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a), BellSouth has not “failed to
plead or otherwise defend.” Therefore, plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment will be
denied.
D.
BellSouth’s Motion to Dismiss and/or for Judgment on the Pleadings
BellSouth moves this Court to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, asserting (1) failure to
identify the basis of this Court’s jurisdiction [Doc. 3 ¶ 1], (2) failure to state a plausible claim
of defamation [Id. ¶ 2], and (3) failure to exhaust administrative remedies [Id. ¶ 3].
Regarding BellSouth’s assertion that plaintiff’s complaint fails to establish sufficient
grounds for this Court’s jurisdiction, BellSouth submits that plaintiff “fail[s] to include a
short and plain statement of the jurisdictional basis of a claim” [Doc. 3-1]. Bellsouth relies
upon Fraser v. James, 655 F. Supp. 1073, 1075 n.2 (D.V.I. 1987), in support. Yet, Fraser
recognized that a plaintiff may cure such defects by amendment. Id. Therefore, the Court
declines to dismiss plaintiff’s claim on this basis.
7
Next, the Court turns to BellSouth’s assertion that plaintiff’s complaint fails to adhere
to the Rule 8 pleading standard because his factual allegations fail to support all material
elements of his defamation claim. To establish a prima facie case of defamation in
Tennessee, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant published a statement, (2) with
knowledge that the statement is false and defaming to plaintiff, or (3) with reckless disregard
for the truth of the statement or with negligence in failing to ascertain the truth of the
statement. Sullivan v. Baptist Mem’l Hosp., 995 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tenn. 1999).
Regarding the first element of defamation, “[p]ublication is a term of art meaning the
communication of defamatory matter to a third person.” Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City
Buick Co., 876 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tenn. 1994). “[C]ommunication between officers and
agents of a corporation . . . is not publication . . . .” Siegfried v. The Grand Krewe of Sphinx,
No. W2002-02246-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22888908, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2003)
(affirming summary judgment for the defendant because the plaintiff failed to plead the
publication element of his defamation claim). “[P]ublication requires ‘the communication
of a defamatory matter to a third person’ and ‘communication[s] among agents of the same
corporation . . . are not to be considered as statements communicated or publicized to third
persons.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Sullivan, 995 S.W.2d at 572). The Court need “not
reach the matter of privilege, malice, or any other question until there is a publication.”
Woods v. Helmi, M.D.A., 758 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
BellSouth moves to dismiss plaintiff’s defamation claim because “the undisputed facts
contained in plaintiff’s complaint c[an]not establish the essential element of publication”
8
[Doc. 3]. As aforementioned, plaintiff’s complaint states that only Spearman, Ecot, and
Pittman—fellow employees of BellSouth—were privy to plaintiff’s employee statement
[Doc. 1]. Their privity to this statement was merely “‘communication among agents of the
same corporation,” rather than “the communication of a defamatory matter to a third person.”
Siegfried, 2003 WL 22888908, at *2 (quoting Sullivan, 995 S.W.2d at 572). As a result,
plaintiff fails to plead the publication element of defamation and, correspondingly, fails to
state a plausible claim of defamation. See id.; see also Woods, 758 S.W.2d at 222-23 (“It is
an elementary rule in this state that publication is an essential element of a [defamation]
action without which a complaint must be dismissed.”).5
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, BellSouth’s Motion to Dismiss and/or for Judgment
on the Pleadings [Doc. 3] will be GRANTED, plaintiff’s Motion to Disregard and Motion
for Default Judgment [Docs. 6, 7] will be DENIED, plaintiff’s claim will be DISMISSED,
and this case will be CLOSED. Plaintiff’s Discovery Plan and Motion for Order Attorneys
Appear and Answer to Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Default Judgment [Doc. 12] will
be DENIED as moot. An appropriate order will be entered.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5
This Court finds BellSouth’s second assertion to have merit; accordingly, it disposes of this
case on such grounds. Consequently, the Court need not address BellSouth’s remaining argument
that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies [Doc. 3].
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