Paulk et al v. Sevier County, Tennessee et al (TV2)
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION as set forth in following order.Signed by District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 11/30/12. (ABF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
CYNTHIA PAULK, surviving spouse of Billy
Duane Foster, Deceased for the benefit of herself
and the children of Billy Duane Foster, Deceased:
J.D., D.F., Duane Foster and Daphne Foster,
CYNTHIA PAULK, individually, and J.F.
and D.F., minor children of Billy Duane Foster,
by and through their mother, Cynthia Paulk,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SEVIER COUNTY, TENNESSEE,
SEVIER COUNTY COMMISSION,
RONALD L. SEALS, KENT HATCHER,
JESSEE TIMBROOK, TAMMY FINCHUM,
ROBERT M. MAUGHON, M.D., FIRST MED.,
INC., RHETT RUTLEDGE, JOSH BRIGHT,
JACK MOUNT, SCOTTIE VINEYARD, and
BARRY WEBB,
Defendants.
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No.: 3:12-CV-89
(VARLAN/SHIRLEY)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This civil action is before the Court on two motions: the Motion to Dismiss on
Behalf of Robert M. Maughon, M.D. [Doc. 10] filed by defendant Dr. Robert M.
Maughon (“Dr. Maughon”); and a separate Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Jessie
Timbrook (“Timbrook”), Tammy Finchum (“Finchum”), and First Med, Inc. (“First
Med”) (collectively, “First Med defendants”) [Doc. 12]. Plaintiffs submitted responses to
both motions [Docs. 15, 17]. Both sets of defendants submitted replies [Docs. 20, 21].
The motions are ripe for determination. For the reasons set forth herein, Dr. Maughon’s
motion to dismiss [Doc. 10] will be GRANTED, and Dr. Maughon will be DISMISSED
as a party to this action. The First Med defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. 12] will be
DENIED.
I.
Facts
On February 20, 2011, Billy Duane Foster (“the decedent”) began serving a prison
sentence at Sevier County Jail, where he was housed in the facility known as Dorm M-4
[Doc. 1, ¶¶ 19, 21]. On or about 7:22 a.m. on the morning of February 27, 2011, the
decedent began to have a seizure in Dorm M-4 [Id. at ¶ 25]. Shortly thereafter defendant
Timbrook, a nurse at the jail, arrived in Dorm M-4 and allegedly observed the decedent
having a seizure, with involuntary movements and warm, clammy skin. The decedent
was making snoring sounds and was incoherent [Id. at ¶ 26]. Around 8:12 a.m. that
morning, the decedent was moving with a staggering gait and was oriented only as to
place. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the decedent’s vitals were not taken, although Dr.
Maughon’s memorandum in support of his motion notes that the decedent’s vitals were
taken by Timbrook [Doc. 11 at 3].
At around 4:00 p.m. on the afternoon of February 27, Timbrook was called back to
Dorm M-4 as the decedent was having additional seizure activity [Doc. 1, ¶ 31].
Timbrook was present when the decedent had another seizure at 4:36 p.m. At that point,
after again taking his vital signs, Timbrook concluded the decedent needed to be taken to
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the emergency room [Id. at ¶ 32]. While preparing to transport the decedent, Timbrook
spoke with defendant Finchum, the jail’s supervising nurse.
Finchum allegedly
instructed Timbrook to return the decedent to his dorm and monitor him every two hours
[Id. at ¶ 34]. At 5:15 p.m., after observing another seizure, Timbrook was instructed by
Finchum to recheck the decedent’s vital signs at 6:00 p.m. and administer medicine if
there were further seizures.
Around 5:32 p.m., defendant Josh Bright, one of the
corrections officers at the prison, noted the decedent had stopped breathing and was nonresponsive [Id. at ¶ 41]. At that time, emergency personnel were contacted and the
decedent was taken to LeConte Medical Center, where he was pronounced dead at 6:11
p.m.
Plaintiffs, decedent’s wife and children, then filed the instant complaint against
Sevier County, the Sevier County Commission, Ronald Seals, the Sheriff of Sevier
County, Kent Hatcher, the supervisor of the Sevier County Jail, several corrections
officers at the jail, Finchum, Timbrook, First Med, the contracted health care provider for
the jail, and Dr. Maughon, the jail doctor, on February 23, 2012. In that complaint,
plaintiffs allege a violation of the decedent’s civil rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments as well as a claim for negligence against the Sevier County defendants
[Doc. 1, ¶¶ 48, 59].
Dr. Maughon and the First Med defendants brought the instant motions to dismiss.
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II.
Standard of Review
A party may move to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain allegations supporting all material
elements of the claims. Bishop v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 520 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2008).
In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations must be
taken as true and must be construed most favorably toward the non-movant.
Trzebuckowski v. City of Cleveland, 319 F.3d 853, 855 (6th Cir. 2003). Detailed factual
allegations are not required, but a party’s “obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions and a formulaic
recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Nor will an “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rather, the complaint must
contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading must “contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under
some viable legal theory.” Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434,
436-37 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101,
1106 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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III.
Analysis
A.
Dr. Maughon
In support of his motion to dismiss, Dr. Maughon argues that plaintiffs cannot
establish a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because plaintiffs have not alleged
that Dr. Maughon had any knowledge of decedent’s medical condition or the events
surrounding his death [Doc. 11 at 6]. Therefore, Dr. Maughon contends, plaintiffs cannot
establish a claim arising under the Eighth Amendment for acting with “deliberate
indifference” [Id. (citing Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir.
2004)]. Dr. Maughon further argues that, to the extent plaintiffs can show he acted in a
supervisory role as to defendants Timbrook and Finchum, § 1983 precludes liability on
the basis of a theory of respondeat superior [Id. at 7 (citing Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d
295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)]. Finally, Dr. Maughon asserts that plaintiffs do not have
standing to bring a claim under § 1983 because such an action is personal to the victim
[Id. at 10]. In their response [Doc. 17], plaintiffs argue that as the doctor for the Sevier
County Jail, Dr. Maughon was responsible for the supervision of defendants Timbrook
and Finchum, and that they had to receive their instructions from him. Thus, plaintiffs
claim one can infer that those defendants were consulting with and receiving instructions
from Dr. Maughon [Doc. 17, at 3]. Plaintiffs further argue that Dr. Maughon would have
established certain policies pursuant to his duties as jail doctor, which can only be
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discovered through the discovery process [Id. at 4]. Finally, plaintiffs respond that they
do have standing to sue pursuant to various state statutes [Id.].1
To state a cognizable claim against an individual under § 1983, “a plaintiff must
set forth facts that, when construed favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting
under color of state law.” Heyerman v. Cnty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir.
2012) (quoting Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)). “A
physician who contracts to provide medical services to prison inmates . . . acts under
color of state law for the purposes of § 1983.” McCullum v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696, 700 (6th
Cir. 2012) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988)). The Supreme Court has held
that “deliberate indifference” to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of
action under § 1983 as a violation of the prisoner’s rights under the Eighth Amendment.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); see also Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390
F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting the Eighth Amendment forbids prison officials
from “unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain” and citing to Estelle). A constitutional
claim for deliberate indifference contains both an objective and subjective component.
Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Serv., 555 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2009). The objective
component requires a plaintiff to show the existence of a “sufficiently serious” medical
need, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994), while the subjective component
1
The Court will analyze Dr. Maughon’s arguments based on the order of their
presentment.
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requires a plaintiff to “allege facts which, if true would show that the official being sued
subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he
did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk,” Dominguez, 555
F.3d at 550 (quoting Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001)).
“Knowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances indicating the existence of
such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference.” Horn v. Madison Cnty.
Fiscal Ct., 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994).
In this case, the pleadings show, and Dr. Maughon does not contest, that the
decedent’s seizure activity satisfies the objective component for finding deliberate
indifference. Dr. Maughon focuses on the subjective requirement, specifically arguing
that plaintiffs fail to assert that he ever provided care or had knowledge of the decedent’s
activity [Doc. 11, at 7]. Plaintiff responds that at this stage they must only “aver and
allege” facts to withstand a motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs’ complaint does not meet the
standard developed by Twombly and Iqbal.
Plaintiffs’ complaint first refers to Dr. Maughon by identifying him as a party and
stating that his responsibilities were “to provide professional and responsive healthcare
services” and to hire, train, supervise, and control the jail medical department [Doc. 1, ¶
12]. The complaint does not reference Dr. Maughon again until it lists him, along with
the other defendants (with the exception of Sevier County), under the heading “Failure to
Provide Constitutionally Adequate Medical Care” [Id. at ¶ 12]. Plaintiffs allege that Dr.
Maughon, along with the other defendants, “acted with deliberate indifference,” which is
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the equivalent of reciting the elements required to recover for a violation of the Eighth
Amendment rather than alleging facts that would tend to satisfy that element. Deliberate
indifference is a legal conclusion which requires facts to be alleged and subsequently
proven. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (noting a court is not “bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts in their complaint to support the claim that Dr.
Maughon acted with deliberate indifference, as they have not alleged that he was aware
of the decedent’s condition, that he had knowledge of defendant Timbrook’s actions, or
that he was at the prison facility during the relevant period in question. Cf. Phillips v.
Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 544 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that doctor’s knowledge and
conscious disregard of serious medical risk to plaintiff precluded summary judgment).
Nor have plaintiffs alleged any policy set out by Dr. Maughon which would be indicative
of Dr. Maughon acting with deliberate indifference. Plaintiffs only set forth the general
policies of the Sevier County Prison [Doc. 1, ¶ 20]. Dr. Maughon is not mentioned in the
factual narrative of the complaint, and plaintiffs have not otherwise provided any facts to
support their claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”).
Plaintiffs separately assert a claim based on “supervisory liability,” alleging that
Dr. Maughon was “responsible for the hiring, training, supervision, discipline and control
of the jail medical department, jail medical staff and corrections officers to ensure the
good health and wellbeing of the jail inmates” [Doc. 17 at 2]. The Sixth Circuit has held
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that Ҥ 1983 liability must be based on more than respondeat superior, or the right to
control employees.” Phillips, 534 F.3d at 543 (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295,
300 (6th Cir. 1999)). “A supervisor is not liable pursuant to § 1983 for failing to train
unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some
way directly participated in it.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see, e.g., Salehpour v.
Univ. of Tenn., 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[S]upervisory liability under § 1983
cannot attach where the allegation of liability is based upon a mere failure to act.”); Poe
v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding plaintiff’s allegations insufficient where
plaintiff did not aver “that any of the supervisory officials who [were] defendants . . .
actively participated in or authorized” the alleged prohibited behavior); Barnett v.
Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, 789 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding dismissal appropriate where
plaintiff did not allege that the individual defendant encouraged or participated in the
alleged prisoner mistreatment).
Plaintiffs’ claim against Dr. Maughon is based solely upon his role as supervisor
rather than any individual conduct undertaken by Dr. Maughon towards the treatment of
the decedent. Plaintiffs do not allege any facts that connect Dr. Maughon’s job as jail
doctor to the specific acts of misconduct alleged against defendants Timbrook and
Finchum. See Barnett, 414 F. App’x at 788 (finding plaintiff’s failure to supervise claim
insufficient where plaintiff did not allege that defendant took any deliberate action or
otherwise involved himself personally in co-defendant’s purported actions).
The
allegation that Dr. Maughon must have given some instruction to defendants Timbrook
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and Finchum, as plaintiffs set forth in their response to Dr. Maughon’s motion, even
taken as true, cannot make out a plausible claim as the complaint does not allege that any
such instruction regarding the decedent was given. Similarly, the general claim that Dr.
Maughon failed to train his subordinates is better suited against Sevier County and/or
First Med rather than Dr. Maughon individually, without alleging facts specific to Dr.
Maughon. See Phillips, 534 F.3d at 544 (finding allegations of improper training more
appropriate for municipality rather than supervisor).
Finally, to the extent plaintiff
alleges that Dr. Maughon was personally negligent in his supervision of the other nurses
with respect to the decedent, this alone would not give rise to liability under the Eighth
Amendment. See Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at
834) (noting that deliberate indifference requires something more than mere negligence).
For these reasons, the Court finds that plaintiffs have not stated a claim for which
relief can be granted as to Dr. Maughon. Thus, Dr. Maughon’s motion to dismiss [Doc.
10] will be GRANTED and Dr. Maughon will be DISMISSED from this case.2
B.
First Med Defendants
In support of their motion to dismiss, the First Med defendants submit that the
claims against them should be dismissed pursuant to the Supreme Court’s recent decision
in Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012), based on its holding that an inmate does not
have an Eighth Amendment Bivens claim for inadequate medical care against private
2
Because the Court finds dismissal appropriate pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for the reasons
stated above, the Court does not address Dr. Maughon’s remaining arguments.
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employees of a privately operated federal prison [Doc. 13 at 6]. Plaintiffs respond that
Minneci is inapposite here because the decedent was not a federal prisoner and was not in
a privately operated prison [Doc. 15 at 2].
The Minneci decision followed a line of Supreme Court decisions in which the
Court decided whether to extend its holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Supreme Court held that a
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures by a federal officer could give rise to a suit for damages. Id. at 389. This was
the first time the Court recognized an implied private action against federal officials for
violating an individual’s constitutional rights. Since Bivens, the Court has recognized a
similar private right of action for a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and for a violation of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, Carlson v. Green 446 U.S.
14 (1980), but has otherwise “consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context or
new category of defendants.” Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (citing
cases where the Court refused to recognize a claim for damages against a federal
official). In Malesko, the Court held that a plaintiff could not bring a Bivens claim
against a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of
Prisons. Id. at 63. The Court reasoned that a Bivens claim against the entity would not
fulfill the goal of deterring individual federal officers from committing constitutional
violations, id. at 71, and that the plaintiff did not lack an effective remedy in the absence
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of a Bivens claim, Id. at 72-73. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007) (stating that
recognition of a Bivens claim may require two steps: whether an adequate, alternative
process for protecting the constitutional interest exists; and whether the court should
exercise its judgment in “authorizing a new kind of federal litigation” (internal quotations
omitted)).
In Minneci, the Court followed the approach outlined in Wilkie to decline
recognizing a Bivens claim where a federal prisoner brought suit against a private
employee working at a privately run prison.
[W]here, as here, a federal prisoner seeks damages from
privately employed personnel working at a privately operated
federal prison, where the conduct allegedly amounts to a
violation of the Eighth Amendment, and where that conduct
is of a kind that typically falls within the scope of traditional
state law (such as the conduct involving improper medical
care at issue here), the prisoner must seek a remedy under
state law.
132 S. Ct. at 626. The Court focused its analysis on the fact that the plaintiff in Minneci
had a state tort claim against the employee in question available to him that could both
protect his rights and deter future constitutional violations. Id. at 623-24. In light of
Minneci, several courts in this circuit have dismissed claims against private contractors in
federal facilities. See Banks v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 11-2470-JDT-dkv, 2012 WL
4321716, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 2012) (discussing Minneci and dismissing federal
prisoner’s Bivens action against private prison employees); Baker v. Bannum Place of
Saginaw, LLC, No. 09-10360, 2012 WL 3930122, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2012)
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(same). The First Med defendants thus argue that here, where the decedent’s family is
suing a private contractor and its employees, Minneci’s reasoning applies with equal
force and the case should be dismissed.
However, plaintiffs are not bringing a Bivens claim against the First Med
defendants but rather a cause of action under § 1983, as the decedent was a state prisoner
in a state-operated facility that had contracted its medical services out to these
defendants. As discussed, supra, to state a viable claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must
allege a constitutional violation against a person acting under the color of state law.
Heyerman v. Cnty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d at 647 (quoting Sigley v. City of Parma Heights,
437 F.3d at 533). Specifically in the context of prison medical personnel, the Supreme
Court in West, 487 U.S. at 55-56, held that the focus in determining whether the
defendant acted under the color of state law was “the relationship among the State, the
physician, and the prisoner.” The Court noted that when a state employs or contracts out
to physicians, the doctor becomes “authorized and obliged to treat prison inmates” and is
“clothed with the authority of state law.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The Court
further noted that whether the physician is paid by contract or is “on the state payroll”
does not alter the analysis. Id. at 56. The central factor to be considered is “the
physician’s function within the state system, not the precise terms of his employment.”
Id.; see, e.g,. Salem v. Yukins, No. 04-72250, 2010 WL 456861, at *18 (E.D. Mich. Feb.
4, 2010) (citation omitted).
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The Minneci decision did not indicate, explicitly or implicitly, that it was
overruling the line of cases associated with West and § 1983. In fact, the dissenting
opinion in Minneci and the Court’s opinion in Malesko both reference the existence of §
1983 actions in support of their respective arguments. See Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 626-27
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that if the plaintiff were incarcerated in a state-operated
facility he would have a federal remedy for the alleged Eighth Amendment violation);
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71, n.5 (noting that report containing allegations of prison abuse
largely occurred in private facilities housing state prisoners, who enjoyed cause of action
under § 1983). Further, the First Med defendants have not cited to any case extending
Minneci to § 1983 actions, while several courts have refused to do so. See Winchester v.
Marketti, No. 11-CV-9224, 2012 WL 2076375, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2012) (refusing
to extend Minneci to “block § 1983 actions against private employees working in state
prisons”); Alajemba v. Rutherford Cnty. Adult Det. Ctr., No. 3:11-0472, 2012 WL
1514878, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. May 1, 2012) (stating it is “unclear” whether Minneci would
be extended to those asserting claims against private physicians under state contract and
refusing to so extend it). This Court follows their lead and declines to extend Minneci as
requested by the First Med defendants. The First Med defendants have not adequately
explained how Minneci, which refused to expand the narrow cause of action created by
Bivens in a case involving a private facility housing federal prisoners, applies to the broad
cause of action created by § 1983 in a case involving a state-run facility housing state
prisoners. Thus, the First Med defendants’ motion [Doc. 12] will be DENIED.
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IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, the Motion to Dismiss on Behalf of Robert
Maughon, M.D. [Doc. 10] will be GRANTED and Dr. Maughon will be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE as a party to this action. The Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 12] brought
by the First Med defendants will be DENIED.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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