Harris v. City of Knoxville, Tennessee et al (TV1)

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION as set forth in following order.Signed by District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 9/24/12. (ABF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
TY’RELLE LEE HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE,
DAVID B. RAUSCH, Police Chief for the
Knoxville Police Department,
THOMAS A. THURMAN, Individually and
in his official capacity as an officer for the
Knoxville Police Department, and
FRED KIMBER, Individually and
in his official capacity as an officer for the
Knoxville Police Department,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No.: 3:12-CV-319
(VARLAN/GUYTON)

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This civil action is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 3] filed by
defendant David B. Rausch (“Rausch”). Defendant moves the Court to dismiss all the
claims against him set forth in the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff did not file a response, and the time for doing so has
passed.

See E.D. Tenn. L.R. 7.1(c), 7.2.

After considering the arguments of the

defendant and the relevant law, the Court will grant the motion.

I.

Background1
Plaintiff Ty’relle Lee Harris commenced this action in the Circuit Court for Knox

County, Tennessee on or about June 15, 2012 [Doc. 1-1], asserting claims under the
Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“TGTLA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-20-101
et seq., and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution [Id. ¶ 7].
Defendants removed the case to this Court on or about July 6, 2012, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 [Doc. 1].
Plaintiff alleges that, during the early morning hours of June 17, 2011, sometime
between 2:48 a.m. and 2:50 a.m., plaintiff was walking behind the businesses near
Cumberland Avenue and 19th Street in Knoxville, Tennessee, and was struck by a
vehicle owned and/or operated by David C. Wilder (“Wilder”) [Id. ¶ 8]. Wilder allegedly
fled the scene, but was stopped and arrested by the Knox County Sheriff’s Department
around 4:32 a.m. the same day [Id.]. Plaintiff avers that the collision caused plaintiff to
sustain severe and disabling injuries, namely to his right leg and left foot [Id.].
According to plaintiff, “[a] few moments prior to the collision,” defendants
Thomas A. Thurman (“Thurman”) and Fred Kimber (“Kimber”), officers with the
Knoxville Police Department, performed a traffic stop involving Wilder [Id. ¶ 9].
Allegedly, Kimber saw Wilder cutting through parking lots and pulled him over around
2:48 a.m.; Kimber smelled alcohol coming from the vehicle and observed that Wilder had
1

For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court takes plaintiff’s factual allegations as
true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting that, “when ruling on a defendant’s
motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all the factual allegations contained in the
complaint” (citations omitted)).
2

blood shot eyes and a large can of beer in the center console of the vehicle [Id. ¶ 10].
Kimber gave Wilder a verbal warning about cruising on Cumberland Avenue, advised
Wilder to park and walk, and then released him [Id.]. According to plaintiff, Thurman
was present during the stop [Id.].
Plaintiff claims Kimber and Thurman had a reasonable suspicion or probable
cause to ask Wilder for a sobriety test, but they neglected to do one [Id. ¶¶ 11–12].
Plaintiff asserts had one been performed, the collision between Wilder and plaintiff
would have been prevented [Id.]. Plaintiff further claims that the City of Knoxville and
the Knoxville Police Department have a policy of “proactive policing and crime
prevention,” which Kimber and Thurman violated in not performing a field sobriety test
on Wilder when he was stopped at 2:48 a.m. [Id. ¶¶ 14–16].
In response to the complaint, defendant Rausch filed the instant motion to dismiss
[Doc. 3].

Rausch asserts that plaintiff has not alleged liability against him in his

individual capacity and that plaintiff’s claims against him in his official capacity are
redundant of those asserted against defendant the City of Knoxville [Id.]. He further
asserts that plaintiff’s TGTLA claims against him are barred by the statute [Id.].
II.

Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) sets out a liberal pleading standard, Smith

v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 576 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004), requiring only “‘a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the
[opposing party] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
3

rests,’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but a party’s
“obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than
labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do,” nor will “an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and determine whether the complaint
contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570; Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will [ultimately] . . . be a context-specific task that requires th[is
Court] to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
III.

Analysis
Rausch argues that plaintiff does not specifically allege that Rausch is liable in his

official capacity, and that a claim against a government official should not be construed
as such unless the claim for individual liability is clearly and definitely set forth in the
pleading [Doc. 4]. After reviewing the complaint, and noting in particular that plaintiff
4

sued Thurman and Kimber in their individual capacities, the Court agrees and declines to
construe the complaint as asserting a constitutional claim against Rausch in his individual
capacity. See Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1038 (6th Cir. 1995); Thiokol Corp. v.
Dep’t of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 383 (6th Cir. 1993); Hardin v. Straub, 954 F.2d 1193,
1199–1200 (6th Cir. 1992); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592 (6th Cir. 1989); Johnson
v. Turner, 855 F. Supp. 228, 231 n.8 (W.D. Tenn. 1994).
In addition, to the extent that plaintiff makes a claim against Rausch in his
individual capacity under the TGTLA, it must be dismissed. The TGTLA provides that
“[n]o claim may be brought against an employee or judgment entered against an
employee for damages for which the immunity of the governmental entity is removed by
this chapter unless the claim is one for health care liability brought against a health care
practitioner.”2 Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310(b). In other words, if the TGTLA waives
immunity for a government entity in regard to a certain type of claim, its employees are
absolutely immune from suit in their individual capacities as to that claim. Upon its
review of the complaint, the Court finds plaintiff’s TGTLA claim is based on negligence
[see Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 16, 20–24], and immunity has been removed for negligent acts of
governmental entities, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205.
With respect to any claims against Rausch in his official capacity, those claims
must also be dismissed.

Pursuant to federal law, a claim against an individual

government official, like Rausch, the Police Chief for the Knoxville Police Department,

2

This case does not involve any claims for health care liability.
5

is “another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690, n.55 (1978)). “As long as the government entity receives notice and
an opportunity to respond, an official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to
be treated as a suit against the entity.” Id. at 166; see also Spoper v. Hoben, 195 F.3d
845, 853 (6th Cir. 1999). “It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party
in interest is the entity.” Id. (emphasis in original). Likewise, under Tennessee law, a
claim against a government official in his official capacity is construed as a claim against
the government entity itself. See Greenhill v. Carpenter, 718 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1996) (citing Cox v. State, 399 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tenn. 1965)). Because there are
no allegations against Rausch other than those that are directed against defendant the City
of Knoxville [see, e.g., Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 3, 5, 6, 14], and because the City of Knoxville is a
party to this action, precedent dictates that the claims made against Rausch in his official
capacity must be dismissed.
IV.

Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons explained herein, the Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 3] will

be GRANTED. Defendant David B. Rausch will be DISMISSED as a party to this
action.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.

s/ Thomas A. Varlan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
6