Capps et al v. Cremation Options, Inc et al (TV2)
Filing
51
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION as set forth in following order. Signed by Chief District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 1/14/14. (ABF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
SHERRY J. CAPPS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CREMATION OPTIONS, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No.: 3:12-CV-545-TAV-HBG
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This civil action is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by
defendants Rhonda L. Barnes, James R. Barnes, Joseph A. Crumley, Steven R. Crumley,
and Pauline Rhodes (the “Family Defendants”) [Doc. 20] and defendant Cremation
Options, Inc. (“Cremation Options”) [Doc. 37]. Plaintiffs responded in opposition to
both motions and moved the Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) to
defer or deny the motions to allow plaintiffs to obtain affidavits and conduct discovery
essential to their opposition to the motions [Docs. 29, 40]. Cremation Options filed a
reply [Doc. 43] and renewed its motion for summary judgment [Doc. 49] after plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint [Doc. 46].1 For the reasons stated herein, the Court will
1
The Court finds that the filing of the amended complaint should not moot the pending
motions for summary judgment because the causes of action in the amended complaint are
substantially identical to those in the original complaint [Doc. 1], and thus the Court will address
the merits of the motion for summary judgment. See Graham v. City of Oklahoma City, 859 F.2d
142, 144–45 (10th Cir. 1988) (initial motion for summary judgment properly granted where
original complaint and amended complaint were “substantially identical” and plaintiff had
“adequate notice and sufficient opportunity to meet defendants’ arguments contained in the
initial motion for summary judgment” (footnote omitted)). In fact, the amended complaint
merely removed Angela Crumley as a defendant and plaintiffs’ cause of action for conversion of
estate assets [Compare Doc. 1 with Doc. 46].
grant Cremation Options’ motion and defer ruling on the Family Defendants’ motion
until after plaintiff has received the discovery sought from the Family Defendants.
I.
Background
Plaintiffs Sherry Capps, Charlotte DelGaicco, and Brian Pierce are the biological
children of Richard A. Pierce, Jr. (“the decedent”), who died on October 23, 2011, in
Sevier County, Tennessee [Doc. 38 p. 1]. Defendants Rhonda Barnes, Joseph Crumley,
and Steven Crumley are stepchildren of the decedent, defendant James Barnes is the
husband of Rhonda Barnes, and defendant Pauline Rhodes is the decedent’s sister [Doc.
46 ¶ 17]. The Family Defendants allege that after being admitted to LeConte Medical
Center on October 13, 2011, the decedent executed “Appointment of Health Care Agent”
and “Advance Care Plan” forms, which were provided by social worker Elizabeth
Robinson [Doc. 23 ¶ 6].
On these forms, Rhonda Barnes is listed as the person
designated by the decedent to make health care decisions on his behalf once he is unable
to do so, and the forms were purportedly signed by the decedent on October 13, 2011
[Doc. 26 pp. 3–5]. These forms are notarized [Id.]. According to the Family Defendants,
the decedent reviewed these forms and discussed his intentions with Rhonda Barnes and
Pauline Rhodes before signing them [Docs. 23 ¶ 6, 24 ¶ 4].
On the Advance Care Plan form, under the section entitled “[o]ther instructions,
such as burial arrangements, hospice care, etc.,” the word “creamation” [sic] is written
[Id. at 4]. Plaintiffs Sherry J. Capps and Charlotte P. DelGaicco aver that, based on their
familiarity with the decedent’s handwriting, he did not write the word “creamation” [sic]
2
[Doc. 33 ¶ 3; Doc. 35 ¶ 3]. Moreover, they submit that the decedent never indicated to
them his desire to be cremated [Doc. 33 ¶ 4; Doc. 35 ¶ 7].
On October 21, 2013, Rhonda Barnes signed a form in place of the decedent, who
was apparently unable to do so, using her maiden name, Rhonda Crumley, and
identifying herself as the decedent’s “daughter” [Doc. 34 pp. 2–3]. This form indicated
that the decedent did not have an “Advance Directive” [Id. at 2]. On the day after the
decedent’s death, an employee of LeConte Medical Center told Sherry Capps that there
was no advance care directive on file for the decedent [Doc. 35 ¶ 8].
Yet, the
aforementioned Advance Care Plan form was later produced from the records of LeConte
Medical Center [Doc. 26 pp. 3–4].
On October 24, 2011, Jarrett Vance (“Vance”), who was then an employee of
Cremation Options, was dispatched to an address in Sevier County, Tennessee, where he
met with Rhonda Barnes, Steven Crumley, and Joseph Crumley [Doc. 37-6 ¶¶ 2–3].
Vance avers that during this meeting, Rhonda Barnes told him that she was the
decedent’s daughter, and Steven and Joseph Crumley told him that they were the
decedent’s sons [Id. ¶ 4]. Further, when Vance inquired as to whether there were any
other siblings, Rhonda Barnes, Steven Crumley, and Joseph Crumley replied that there
were not [Id.].
Moreover, during this meeting with Vance, Rhonda Barnes, Steven Crumley, and
Joseph Crumley signed two documents authorizing Cremation Options to arrange for the
cremation of the decedent [Id. ¶ 5, Doc. 37-2]. In the first document, titled “Cremation
and Disposition Authorization,” these three defendants averred that: (1) they “are legally
3
authorized to arrange for the cremation, processing, and final disposition of the remains
of [the decedent],” (2) “all of the Decedent’s other adult children have been notified of
the decedent’s death and none of them have expressed an objection to the cremation,” (3)
“I/We are aware of no objection to this cremation by any . . . child . . . or any person in
the next degree of kinship to the Decedent,” (4) “I/We . . . certify that I/We have the legal
right to make [the cremation] authorization and agrees to hold Cremation Options, Inc. . .
. harmless . . . from any liability on account of said authorization, cremation,
identification, and final disposition,” and (5) the obligations of Cremations Options shall
be fulfilled when the decedent’s remains are delivered to Rhonda Barnes [Doc. 37-2].
Plaintiffs were not present when this document was signed, and the president of
Cremation Options, James Safewright, was not aware of their existence at that time [Doc.
37-1 ¶ 5].
The second document addresses the policies and procedures of East Tennessee
Cremation Company, to which Cremation Options delegated the task of cremating the
decedent [Doc. 37-4].
After the cremation had been completed, East Tennessee
Cremation Company was to deliver the decedent’s remains to Cremation Options, who
was to deliver them to Rhonda Barnes in accordance with the Cremation and Disposition
Authorization [Id. at 4]. On October 24, 2011, in accordance with a cremation permit
obtained from the state of Tennessee, the decedent was cremated [Doc. 37-1 ¶ 9]. On
October 25, 2011, James Barnes executed one of the decedent’s checks to Cremation
Options in the amount of $1,542.79, presumably as payment for the decedent’s cremation
4
[Doc. 34 p. 5]. Finally, as authorized by Charlotte DelGaicco2 and Rhonda Barnes,
Cremation Options released half of the decedent’s cremated remains to each of them
[Doc. 37-1 ¶ 10].
Both Charlotte DelGaicco and Rhonda Barnes signed forms
acknowledging this release on October 25, 2011 [Doc. 37-5].
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants are liable under Tennessee law for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, trespass upon
the right to possess body for decent burial, and conversion of cremated remains [Doc.
46]. The Family Defendants argue that the Appointment of Health Care Agent and
Advance Care Plan designated cremation as the decedent’s preferred method of disposal
of his body and granted Rhonda Barnes the right to control the decedent’s disposition
[Doc. 21 pp. 2–4]. And, because she acted in accordance with the decedent’s purported
wishes and with the authority granted to her by the decedent, the Family Defendants
submit that they are entitled to summary judgment. James R. Barnes and Pauline Rhodes
submit that they are also entitled to summary judgment because they did not sign any
agreement or contract for the decedent’s cremation [Id. at 4–5].3
Cremation Options contends that it is entitled to summary judgment under
Tennessee law because it had the right to rely on the contract into which it entered with
Rhonda Barnes, Joseph Crumley, and Steven Crumley and acted at all times in good faith
2
This authorization was given on October 25, 2011, one day after the decedent was
cremated [Doc. 37-5].
3
Angela Crumley was also listed in this document as a party entitled to judgment
because she did not sign any documents pertaining to the decedent’s cremation, but in plaintiffs’
amended complaint, Angela Crumley is no longer a defendant to this action [Doc. 46].
5
based upon its reasonable reliance on the representations of Rhonda Barnes, Joseph
Crumley, and Steven Crumley [Doc. 37 ¶¶ 2–3]. Alternatively, Cremation Options
asserts the validity of the Advance Care Plan form, wherein the decedent purportedly
memorializes his desire to be cremated [Id. ¶ 1].
Regarding the Family Defendants’ motion, plaintiffs submit that genuine issues of
material fact exist as to the genuineness and validity of the documents allegedly executed
by the decedent that indicate his desire that his body be cremated [Doc. 30 p. 3]. More
specifically, plaintiffs submit that “the observable dissimilarity in handwriting of the
word ‘creamation’ and the handwritten portions of the other parts of the Advance Care
Plan raises a genuine issue of material fact” as to whether the decedent completed that
portion of the form and aver that the decedent never indicated to them his desire to be
cremated [Id.]. In addition, both Rhonda Barnes and LeConte Medical Center denied the
existence of an advance care directive after this form had purportedly been executed [Id.].
Moreover, plaintiffs contend that the fact that neither James Barnes nor Pauline
Rhodes signed any agreement or contract concerning the decedent’s cremation is not
determinative of their allegations against these two defendants [Id. at 2]. To this end,
these defendants may have conspired orally to cremate the decedent’s remains and,
notably, James Barnes signed the check to Cremation Options, and Pauline Rhodes was
with the decedent when he purportedly executed to the Advance Care Plan form and
avers that she discussed this form with the decedent before he did so.
6
As for Cremation Options, plaintiffs submit that (1) the dissimilar handwriting on
the Advance Care Plan and (2) Stephen Crumley’s description of himself as the
decedent’s “step-son” on one of Cremation Options’ forms and “son” on another, coupled
with the difference in surnames between the decedent and Crumley males, as well as the
fact that the individuals labeled “son” and “step-son” have the same surname, create a
genuine issue of material fact as to the reasonableness of Cremation Options’ reliance on
these documents and defendants’ representations [Doc. 41 pp. 1–2].
Alternatively, plaintiffs move the Court pursuant to Rule 56(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to defer or deny defendants’ motions until plaintiffs can obtain
affidavits and conduct discovery as to facts essential to justify their opposition to
defendants’ motions [Docs. 29 pp. 2–3, 40 p. 2]. In support, plaintiffs’ counsel avers that
discovery will allow plaintiffs to obtain information from, and depose, all defendants in
order to learn their involvement in the cremation decision and the decision to halve and
distribute the decedent’s remains [Doc. 29 p. 4]. Moreover, plaintiffs’ counsel submits
that he will depose and request documents from non-defendant health care providers of
the decedent to determine the decedent’s mental state and competence when he
purportedly signed the forms at issue and will subpoena the production of handwriting
exemplars of the decedent for expert analysis to determine the extent to which the
decedent executed such forms. Plaintiffs’ counsel states that the parties’ discovery plan
contemplates the completion of discovery on or before January 14, 2014.
7
II.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
moving party bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issues of material fact
exist. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 n.2 (1986); Moore v. Phillip Morris
Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339 (6th Cir. 1993). All facts and all inferences to be drawn
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986);
Burchett v. Kiefer, 301 F.3d 937, 942 (6th Cir. 2002).
Yet, “[o]nce the moving party presents evidence sufficient to support a motion
under Rule 56, the nonmoving party is not entitled to a trial merely on the basis of
allegations.” Curtis Through Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1421,
1423 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317). To establish a genuine issue as
to the existence of a particular element, the nonmoving party must point to evidence in
the record upon which a reasonable finder of fact could find in its favor. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The genuine issue must also be material;
that is, it must involve facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law. Id.
The Court’s function at the point of summary judgment is limited to determining
whether sufficient evidence has been presented to make the issue of fact a proper
question for the factfinder. Id. at 250. The Court does not weigh the evidence or
8
determine the truth of the matter. Id. at 249. Nor does the Court search the record “to
establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford &
Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989). Thus, “the inquiry performed is the
threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for a trial—whether, in other
words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder
of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 250.
In addition, when a summary judgment motion is filed, the party opposing the
motion may, by affidavit under Rule 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f)), explain why he or she
is unable to present facts essential to justify the party’s opposition to the motion. See
Wallin v. Norman, 317 F.3d 558, 564 (6th Cir. 2003). The Rule provides in pertinent
part:
(d) When Facts Are Unavailable to the Nonmovant.
If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that,
for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to
justify its position, the court may:
(1) defer considering the motion or deny it;
(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or
to take discovery; or
(3) issue any other appropriate order.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
“Before ruling on summary judgment motions, a district judge must afford the
parties adequate time for discovery, in light of the circumstances of the case.” Plott v.
9
Gen. Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190, 1195 (6th Cir. 1995). However, the party seeking the
additional discovery bears the burden of “demonstrat[ing] why such discovery is
necessary.” Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 2004). Bare allegations or
vague assertions of the need for additional time for discovery are not enough. United
States v. Cantrell, 92 F. Supp. 2d 704, 717 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (citing Lewis v. ACB Bus.
Serv., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 409 (6th Cir. 1998)). The Sixth Circuit has found that a party
must make such a request with “some precision” and must state “‘the materials he hopes
to obtain with further discovery and exactly how he expects those materials would help
him in opposing summary judgment.’” Summers, 368 F.3d at 887 (quoting Simmons Oil
Corp. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 86 F.3d 1138, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also Cacevic
v. City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 489 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that a party making a
filing under Rule 56(f) must “indicate to the district court its need for discovery, what
material facts it hopes to uncover, and why it has not previously discovered the
information” (internal quotations omitted)). The nonmoving party “must show how
postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him to rebut the motion for summary
judgment.” Lyons v. Ray, No. 5:05-405-JMH, 2007 WL 679005, at *4 (E.D. Ky. March
1, 2007) (quoting Lewis, 135 F.3d at 409).
The Sixth Circuit has stated that five factors should be considered when ruling on
a Rule 56(d) motion:
(1) when the party seeking discovery learned of the issue that is the
subject of the desired discovery; (2) whether the desired discovery
would change the ruling; (3) how long the discovery period lasted;
(4) whether the party seeking discovery was dilatory in its discovery
10
efforts; and (5) whether the non-moving party was responsive to
discovery requests.
HCA-Info. Tech. & Servs., Inc. v. Informatica Corp., No. 3:10-CV-01155, 2011 WL
5117727, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 25, 2011) (citing Plott v. Gen. Motors Corp., 71 F.3d
1190, 1196–97 (6th Cir. 1995)).
III.
Analysis
1.
Family Defendants
Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) motion is accompanied by a declaration in which counsel for
plaintiffs states that he cannot present facts essential to justify plaintiffs’ opposition to the
Family Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Namely, he submits that discovery,
including interrogatories, requests for production, subpoenas, and depositions, would
likely reveal pertinent facts concerning: (1) “the precise involvement of each defendant in
the decision to cremate the decedent’s remains;” (2) “the precise involvement of each
defendant in the decision to halve and distribute the cremated remains;” (3) “the mental
state and competence of the decedent on or about the time that he allegedly executed
various documents relied upon by the defendants;” and (4) “handwriting exemplars of the
decedent . . . to determine the extent to which the decedent may have filled out or
executed various documents relied upon by the defendants” [Doc. 29 p. 4].
The Court finds that this information is essential to plaintiffs’ opposition to the
Family Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. 20].
The declaration of
plaintiffs’ counsel is sufficiently precise in describing the information that plaintiffs seek
through discovery, and plaintiffs note in their supporting memorandum that this
11
information could be determinative of the Court’s ruling on the Family Defendants’
motion, making it essential to justify their opposition to the motion [Doc. 30 p. 4]. To
this end, such discovery will allow plaintiffs to adequately address the involvement of
each Family Defendant in the decedent’s decision-making process regarding the handling
and disposition of his body following his death and the validity of the Family
Defendants’ assertions that the decedent voluntarily elected, while of sound mind, (1) that
his body be cremated and (2) that Rhonda Barnes control the disposition of his remains.
Furthermore, given that discovery had yet to begin when plaintiffs filed their motion, as
well as the aforementioned potential of the sought discovery to change the Court’s ruling
on the Family Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the first, second, and third
factors of the Sixth Circuit’s five-factor test weigh in favor of granting plaintiffs’ motion,
and the fourth and fifth factors are inapplicable. Thomason v. Amalgamated Local No.
863, 438 F. App’x 358, 361 (6th Cir. 2011). Therefore, plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) motion as
to the Family Defendants will be granted, and consideration of the Family Defendants’
motion for summary judgment will be deferred pursuant to Rule 56(d).
2.
Cremation Options
In Tennessee:
Any person signing a funeral service agreement, cremation
authorization form, or any other authorization for disposition shall
be deemed to warrant the truthfulness of any facts set forth therein,
including the identity of the decedent whose remains are to be
buried, cremated, or otherwise disposed of, and the party’s authority
to order such disposition. A funeral establishment shall have the
right to rely on such funeral service contract or authorization and
shall have the authority to carry out the instructions of the person
whom the funeral establishment reasonably believes holds the right
12
of disposition. No funeral establishment is responsible for contacting
or independently investigating the existence of any next-of-kin or
relative of the decedent.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-5-707. Moreover,
No funeral establishment or funeral director who relies reasonably in
good faith upon the instructions of a person claiming the right of
disposition shall be subject to criminal or civil liability or subject to
disciplinary action for carrying out the disposition of the remains in
accordance with the instructions unless the funeral establishment or
funeral director knew or had reason to know that the person did not
have the right of disposition.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-5-708.
In this case, Vance, an employee of Cremation Options, has stated that Rhonda
Barnes, Steven Crumley, and Joseph Crumley told him that they were the children of the
decedent and that no other siblings existed [Doc. 37-6 ¶ 4]. Then, these three defendants
signed a Cremation and Disposition Authorization in which they (1) instructed Cremation
Options to arrange for the cremation of the decedent, (2) stated that all of the decedent’s
children had been notified of the decedent’s death and that they knew of no objection to
cremation by any of his children, (3) averred that they had the legal right to authorize the
decedent’s cremation, and (4) agreed to hold Cremation Options harmless from any
liability stemming from their authorization or the cremation, identification, and
disposition of the decedent [Doc. 37-2]. Moreover, the president of Cremation Options,
Safewright, states that he relied on the representations of Rhonda Barnes, Steven
Crumley, and Joesph Crumley in arranging for the cremation to be performed on October
24, 2011, and did not know of the existence of plaintiffs at that time [Doc. 37-1 ¶ 5, 11].
After the decedent’s cremation, with the authorization of Charlotte DelGaicco and
13
Rhonda Barnes, Cremation Options released half of the decedent’s cremated remains to
each of them [Doc. 37-5].
Under Tennessee law, Rhonda Barnes, Steven Crumley, and Joseph Crumley were
deemed to warrant the truthfulness of the statements made in the Cremation and
Disposition Authorization, including that they possessed the authority to order the
decedent’s cremation, and Cremation Options had the right to rely on such statements.
Moreover, Cremation Options was legally authorized to carry out the instructions of a
person whom it reasonably believed held the right of disposition. Tenn. Code Ann. § 625-707. Here, the affidavits of Safewright and Vance, along with the documents signed by
Rhonda Barnes, Steven Crumley, and Joesph Crumley, warrant that these three
individuals had the authority to order the decedent’s cremation and support Cremation
Options contention that it reasonably believed that these individuals held the right of
disposition.
Furthermore, though plaintiffs argue that the fact that Steven Crumley
identified himself as a step-son on one of Cremation Options’ forms creates a genuine
issue of material fact as to the reasonableness of Cremation Options’ belief, “[n]o funeral
establishment is responsible for contacting or independently investigating the existence of
any next-of-kin or relative of the decedent.” Id.
Additionally, plaintiffs submit that the observable dissimilarity on the Advance
Care Plan form of the word “creamation” [sic] from the rest of the words on the form
creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cremation Options reasonably
relied on such documentation, or reasonably believed that Rhonda Barnes, Steven
Crumley, and Joseph Crumley had the authority to order the decedent’s cremation.
14
Given the aforementioned facts and law, investigating the validity of a word on the
Advance Care Plan form is beyond what is required of Cremation Options in light of the
oral and written representations by Rhonda Barnes, Steven Crumley, and Joseph
Crumley.
To this end, if a funeral establishment “relies reasonably in good faith upon the
instructions of a person claiming the right of disposition,” that establishment cannot be
held liable for carrying out the cremation and disposition in accordance with that person’s
instructions “unless the funeral establishment or funeral director knew or had reason to
know that the person did not have the right of disposition.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-5-708.
Here, the representations made by Rhonda Barnes, Steven Crumley, and Joseph Crumley,
along with the affidavits of Safewright and Vance, indicate that Cremation Options
reasonably relied in good faith on the instructions of these three defendants and had no
reason to know that they did not possess the right of disposition, if they in fact did not.
Moreover, as mentioned, Cremation Options was under no duty to independently
investigate the representations of these three defendants. Accordingly, based on the
record before the Court and the applicable law, there is no genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Cremation Options is liable to plaintiffs.
Yet, plaintiffs contend that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), they
need discovery to obtain facts essential to their opposition to Cremation Options’ motion.
But in plaintiffs’ counsel’s declaration in support of this argument, the examples of
necessary discovery bear upon the validity of the decedent’s alleged wish that he be
cremated, except for the information concerning the involvement of defendants in the
15
decision to halve and distribute the decedent’s cremated remains.4 The validity of the
decedent’s intentions is relevant to plaintiffs’ opposition to the Family Defendants’
motion for summary judgment, but not that of Cremation Options, which can be disposed
of based on the validity of Cremation Options’ reliance upon the statements of the Family
Defendants under Tennessee law, rather than the actual intentions of the decedent.
In addition, as for the discovery sought pertaining to the decision to halve and
distribute the decedent’s remains, Charlotte DelGaicco and Rhonda Barnes signed forms
authorizing Cremation Options to distribute half of the decedent’s remains to each of
them.
More fundamentally, plaintiffs have not provided evidence or made specific
allegations probative of any impropriety on the part of Cremation Options with regard to
this distribution of the decedent’s remains or described with any specificity how the
information plaintiffs seek through discovery on this point would help, much less prove
essential, to plaintiffs’ opposition to Cremation Options’ motion for summary judgment.
The Sixth Circuit has stated that when ruling on a Rule 56(d) motion, courts
should consider:
(1) when the party seeking discovery learned of the issue that is the
subject of the desired discovery; (2) whether the desired discovery
would change the ruling; (3) how long the discovery period lasted;
(4) whether the party seeking discovery was dilatory in its discovery
efforts; and (5) whether the non-moving party was responsive to
discovery requests.
4
As mentioned, in addition to information concerning the involvement of defendants in
the decision to halve and distribute the decedent’s remains, plaintiffs seek information pertaining
to the involvement of each defendant in the decision to cremate the decedent’s remains,
information concerning the decedent’s mental state and competence when he executed
documents relied upon by defendants, and handwriting exemplars of the decedent to determine
the extent to which he executed such documents.
16
HCA-Info. Tech. & Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 5117727, at *2 (citing Plott, 71 F.3d at 1196–
97). Plaintiffs are correct in stating that because discovery had yet to begin when
plaintiffs filed their Rule 56(d) motion, the first and third factors militate in favor of the
motion, and the fourth and fifth factors are inapplicable. The second factor, however,
weighs strongly in favor of denying the motion because plaintiffs have failed to
specifically state how the sought discovery would change the Court’s ruling on
Cremation Options’ motion. Put simply, bare allegations or vague assertions of the need
for additional time for discovery are not enough. Cantrell, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 717 (citing
Lewis, 135 F.3d at 409).
Instead, a party must make such a request with “some
precision” and must state “‘the materials he hopes to obtain with further discovery and
exactly how he expects those materials would help him in opposing summary
judgment.’” Summers, 368 F.3d at 887 (quoting Simmons Oil Corp., 86 F.3d at 1144).
Given plaintiffs’ failure to state with specificity how the sought materials are germane to
their opposition to Cremation Options’ motion for summary judgment, the Court finds
that, on balance, the Plott factors and other applicable case law do not weigh in favor of
granting plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) motion.
Having considered the current record, the written representations of Rhonda
Barnes, Steven Crumley, and Joseph Crumley, and the applicable law, the Court finds
that the discovery sought by plaintiffs is too vaguely related to plaintiffs’ opposition to
Cremation Options’ motion. See Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.3d 713, 720 (6th
Cir. 2004) (“It is not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the discovery
17
request when the party makes only general and conclusory statements [in its affidavit]
regarding the need for more discovery and does not show how an extension of time
would have allowed information related to the truth or falsity of the [document] to be
discovered.”) (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs support their Rule 56(d) motion by stating that “clearly the proposed discovery
set forth in the declaration of the undersigned has the potential to change any potential
ruling on the motion” [Doc. 41 p. 4]. This general and conclusory statement does not
provide adequate support for plaintiffs’ motion, considering that the proposed discovery
does not “clearly” have such potential [Id.]. Accordingly, the Court will deny plaintiffs’
Rule 56(d) motion as to Cremation Options and now finds that there is no genuine issue
of material fact as to plaintiffs’ claims against Cremation Options. Thus, the Court will
grant Cremation Options’ motion for summary judgment.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, Cremation Options’ motion for summary judgment
[Docs. 37, 49] will be GRANTED, and plaintiffs’ claims against Cremation Options will
be DISMISSED. Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) motion as to Cremation Options [Doc. 40] will
be DENIED. In addition, for good cause shown, plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) motion as to the
Family Defendants [Doc. 29] will be GRANTED, and consideration of the Family
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. 20] will be DEFERRED pursuant to
Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In light of the representation by
plaintiffs’ counsel that discovery is to conclude on or before January 14, 2014, it will be
ORDERED that plaintiffs shall have until and including January 28, 2014, to file a
18
supplemental brief to their response to the Family Defendants’ motion, and the Family
Defendants shall have seven (7) days from the filing of plaintiff’s supplemental brief to
file a supplemental brief in reply. Plaintiffs’ failure to file a supplemental brief will result
in the Court’s determination of the Family Defendants’ motion based upon the record
before the Court.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?