Price et al v. Roane County et al
Filing
209
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The parties' Daubert challenges [Docs. 159 , 161 , 162 , 164 , 167 , 168 are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Signed by Magistrate Judge C Clifford Shirley, Jr on 11/4/15. Associated Cases: 3:12-cv-00634-TAV-CCS, 3:12-cv-00673-TAV-CCS (JBR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
ANGELA DAVIS, on behalf of the estate of
CRYSTAL PRICE and minor D.H.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ROANE COUNTY, TENNESSEE, and
SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS, INC.,
Defendants.
J.V., a minor, individually and on behalf of
CRYSTAL MARLENA PRICE, deceased,
as Child and next of kin, by
JESUS VARGAS, Parent and sole guardian,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ROANE COUNTY, ROANE COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFFICE; SHERIFF JACK
STOCKTON, in his official capacity; and
SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS, INC.,
Defendants.
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No.: 3:12-CV-634-TAV-CCS
Consolidated with
No.: 3:12-CV-673-TAV-CCS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Rules of this Court,
and Standing Order 13-02. Now before the Court are various Daubert challenges posed by both
the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. The parties presented oral arguments on these challenges to
the Court on September 3, 2015. Thereafter, this case was submitted to mediation, but the
mediation was not successful, [Doc. 206]. Thus, the Court finds that these challenges are now
ripe for adjudication, and for the reasons set forth herein, they will be GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART.
I.
BACKGROUND
For purposes of the instant motion,1 only the most basic parameters of this case are
relevant: Decedent Crystal Price was incarcerated in the Roane County Jail starting on
approximately December 10, 2011. Ms. Price remained in the Roane County Jail, and she was
provided medical care during her stay at the Roane County Jail. On December 30, 2011, at
approximately 8:00 a.m., she was found unresponsive in her cell. She was pronounced dead at
the Roane County Medical Center later the same morning.
Plaintiffs have brought Constitutional claims on Ms. Price’s behalf, pursuant to 42 U.S.
C. § 1983, relating to her medical care and treatment at the Roane County Jail.
During the relevant period, Defendant Roane County, Tennessee contracted with
Defendant Southern Health Partners, a private corporation, to provide medical services to
inmates at the Roane County Jail.
II.
ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert testimony. It provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
1
The Defendants have filed motions for summary judgment, to which the Plaintiffs have responded in opposition.
The statement of the basic facts relating to the instant motion should not be interpreted as a finding of fact with
relation to the dispositive motions pending before the Chief District Judge.
2
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme
Court of the United States stated that a district court, when evaluating evidence proffered under
Rule 702, must act as a gatekeeper, ensuring “that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Id. at 589. The Daubert standard “attempts to strike a
balance between a liberal admissibility standard for relevant evidence on the one hand and the
need to exclude misleading ‘junk science’ on the other.” Best v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 563
F.3d 171, 176–77 (6th Cir. 2009).
The factors relevant in evaluating the reliability of the testimony, include: “whether a
method is testable, whether it has been subjected to peer review, the rate of error associated with
the methodology, and whether the method is generally accepted within the scientific
community.” Coffey v. Dowley Mfg., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 958, 970-71 (M.D. Tenn. 2002)
(citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94). “Although Daubert centered around the admissibility of
scientific expert opinions, the trial court’s gatekeeping function applies to all expert testimony,
including that based upon specialized or technical, as opposed to scientific, knowledge.” Rose
v. Sevier Cnty., Tenn., No. 3:08-CV-25, 2012 WL 6140991, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 11, 2012)
(citing Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138-39 (1999)). “[A] party must
show, by a ‘preponderance of proof,’ that the witness will testify in a manner that will ultimately
assist the trier of fact in understanding and resolving the factual issues involved in the case.”
Coffey, 187 F. Supp. 2d at 70-71 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94).
The Rule 702 inquiry as “a flexible one,” and the Daubert factors do not constitute a
definitive checklist or test. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 138-39 (1999)
3
(citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593). Although the Rule 702 requirements are treated liberally,
“‘that does not mean that a witness is an expert simply because he claims to be.’” Coffey v.
Dowley Mfg., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 958, 971 (M.D. Tenn. 2002) (citing Pride v. BIC Corp., 218
F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2000)).
The holding in Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994), is especially
relevant to the challenges before the Court. Therein, the Court of Appeals held that expert
testimony expressing legal conclusions or defining legal terms should be excluded. Id. at 135354. In so holding, the Court of Appeals provided the following example:
Although an expert’s opinion may “embrace[] an ultimate issue to
be decided by the trier of fact[,]” Fed. R. Evid. 704(a), the issue
embraced must be a factual one. The expert can testify, if a proper
foundation is laid, that the discipline in the Detroit Police
Department was lax. He also could testify regarding what he
believed to be the consequences of lax discipline. He may not
testify, however, that the lax discipline policies of the Detroit
Police Department indicated that the City was deliberately
indifferent to the welfare of its citizens.
Id. at 1353 (emphasis in the original). Consistent with the holding in Berry, “[c]ourts have
permitted experts to testify about discrete police-practice issues when those experts are properly
credentialed and their testimony assists the trier of fact.” Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc.,
380 F.3d 893, 908 (6th Cir. 2004).
A.
Testimony of Michael T. McCormack, M.D.
Dr. McCormack has been retained by Plaintiffs to offer expert testimony in this case. He
did not treat Ms. Price but has reviewed relevant records. Dr. McCormack’s opinion can be
summarized as follows:
Ms. Cristal [sic] Price was clearly evaluated and treated in a substandard manner for her respiratory condition while in the custody
of the Roane County Correctional Facilities over the period of time
from 12/10/2011 through 12/30/2011 which ultimately resulted in
4
her death. Ms. Price was evaluated and treated by a health care
practitioner unqualified to provide the attempted diagnostic and
therapeutic interventions while the patient’s condition
progressively worsened, and to which the patient eventually
succumbed. By a review of the provided documents, appropriate
medical care was repeatedly denied Ms. Price with insufficient and
excessively delayed diagnostic and therapeutic interventions, and
the lack of an appropriately trained and qualified medical
practitioner being directly involved in her care.
. . . . The lack of medical follow up for 4-5 days is an egregious act
of medical negligence [and] was directly related to Ms. Price[’s]
death.
It is my medical opinion, that Ms. Price’s medical management
falls far below the accepted standard of medical care, and that this
negligence and mismanagement was responsible for her death.
With appropriate care, Ms. Price would have been expected to
have survived her respiratory illness without significant sequelae to
have allowed her to continue without functional impairment or
diminished quality of life.
[Doc. 166-1 at 12-13].
Defendants2 argue that Dr. McCormack should be barred from providing any expert
testimony that Roane County could be held liable for Plaintiffs’ claims under state or federal law.
[Doc. 166]. Defendants argue that Dr. McCormack should be barred from providing any expert
testimony stating that Roane County was deliberately indifferent to Ms. Price’s condition.
Defendants maintain that Dr. McCormack should be barred from providing any expert testimony
that Roane County committed a wrongful act regarding Ms. Price’s injuries. Additionally,
Defendant SHP argues that Dr. McCormack should be excluded from testifying in this case
because he does not have correctional healthcare experience. [Doc. 160].
2
Rather than separating its Daubert challenges into independent motions, Defendant SHP combined three
challenges into a single motion, moving the Court to exclude Dr. Ayo, Dr. McCormack, and Ms. Wild. The Court
has reviewed this motion as well and will note any relevant difference between the combined challenge filed by SHP
and the individual Daubert motions filed by the Roane County Defendants.
5
Initially, the Court finds that the Defendants have not challenged Dr. McCormack’s
education, which includes a medical degree from the University of Southern California. [Doc.
87-1].
Instead, the Defendants take issue with Dr. McCormack’s lack of experience in a
correctional facility. The Court finds that this challenge is not supported or well-founded.
At the hearing of this matter, it appeared that counsel for SHP proposed that correctional
healthcare was such a specialized area of medicine that experts were required to have specialized
in correctional healthcare in their career or face exclusion under Rule 702. Given the gravity of
this assertion and the lack of legal support for this assertion contained in SHP’s brief, the Court
allowed SHP’s counsel to file a supplemental brief on this issue [Doc. 201].
The Court has reviewed this brief and finds, based upon SHP’s brief and the Court’s own
research, that there is no binding authority from the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that
requires that a physician be excluded from testifying regarding medical incidents occurring in a
prison simply because he or she has not practiced medicine in a correctional facility. To the
contrary, the first case cited by SHP largely considers the physician’s obtaining medical degree
from a reputable university, family-practice residency, years working in emergency rooms and
cardiac and pediatric practices, rather than his time working as the clinical director for the
Bureau of Prisons, in finding that the physician’s testimony was admissible in a medical tort
claim that occurred in prison. Watson v. United States, 485 F.3d 1100, 1106 (10th Cir. 2007).
The remainder of the cases cited by SHP are equally unpersuasive, see, e.g., Gayton v. McCoy,
593 F.3d 610, 618 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that a physician was an expert in the area of prison
health care but not indicating any bright-line rule that would require wholesale exclusion where
there was a lack of knowledge regarding prisons).
While the Court has considered Dr.
McCormack’s lack of experience in correctional institutions, the Court is not prepared to exclude
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his testimony on this basis, especially, when he offers opinions regarding medicine and does not
purport to opine about the correctional procedures. The Court cannot endorse the seemingly,
bright-line rule requiring exclusion that is proposed by SHP. Instead, any lack of exposure to
correctional facilities would be most appropriately addressed through cross-examination and
other trial practices. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”).
With regard to testimony regarding deliberate indifference, the Court finds that this
argument is largely hypothetical. There is nothing in Dr. McCormack’s report that indicates he
expects to so testify, but in his deposition, Dr. McCormack indicated a willingness to use such if
he was asked to by Plaintiffs’ counsel. [Doc. 166-2 at 6]. Given this willingness, the Court finds
that an opinion in this regard would not be wholly advisory. Under the circumstances of this
case and the holding in Berry, the Court finds that such testimony could potentially be violative
of Rule 702. However, Dr. McCormack may offer the testimony described in his expert report
and the testimony generally related thereto, but Dr. McCormack may not testify that the actions,
either of Roane County or SHP, were deliberately indifferent, in a legal sense, and, thus,
violative of the Constitution. He may testify regarding the nature, extent, and quality of the
medical care Ms. Price received and opine regarding the effect and cause of her death.
Finally, with regard to Defendants’ request that Dr. McCormack be precluded from
offering testimony regarding its liability or regarding whether it committed wrongful acts that
proximately caused injuries, the Court finds that this request is wholly hypothetical. Defendants
have not directed the Court to any portion of Dr. McCormack’s report or deposition testimony in
which he purported to offer testimony regarding liability or whether acts were considered
7
wrongful under applicable law and proximately caused injuries. Thus, it appears that Defendants
seek a court-endorsed reminder reiterating the limits of expert testimony to Dr. McCormack and
Plaintiffs’ counsel. The Court declines to offer such an advisory opinion, but the undersigned is
confident that the Chief District Judge will ably apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
applicable law, especially the Court of Appeals’ holding in Berry, should Dr. McCormack
attempt to offer such testimony at trial.
Accordingly, the Defendants’ request that Dr. McCormack be excluded from offering
testimony in this case is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Dr. McCormack may
testify regarding the medical care provided to Ms. Price by the Roane County Jail, consistent
with the above, but he may not opine that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent.
B.
Testimony of Raye-Anne B. Ayo, M.D.
Dr. Ayo has been retained by Plaintiffs to offer expert testimony in this case. She did not
treat Ms. Price but has reviewed relevant records. Dr. Ayo offers two opinions in her report,
along with an overarching conclusion. [Doc. 163-1 at 5-6]. She opines that, given her medical
history, Ms. Price should have been further evaluated with regard to her medical issues. Dr. Ayo
also opines that there were “multiple” instances in which Ms. Price’s physical symptoms were
significant enough to warrant further medical care, and she concludes that some of the treatment
rendered fell below the standard of care. Overall, Dr. Ayo opines that Ms. Price’s condition
deteriorated while in custody and was undertreated. She opines that Ms. Price should have been
transferred from the Roane County Jail and that a physician should have been contacted about
her medical issues.
Defendants argue that Dr. Ayo is an expert in family medicine and has no certifications in
correctional healthcare. [Docs. 159, 162]. Defendants argue that Dr. Ayo has no understanding
8
of how healthcare is rendered at the Roane County Jail. Moreover, Defendants argue that Dr.
Ayo does not have specialized knowledge that would aid the jury in determining if a
constitutional violation occurred. Defendants argue that Dr. Ayo should be excluded from
offering testimony that “Roane County or its officers did anything wrong” or that they “caused
or proximately caused” Ms. Price’s injuries and/or death.
Plaintiffs respond that the fact that Dr. Ayo has never worked as a physician in a jail
setting goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of his opinions. [Doc. 189]. Further, Plaintiffs
argue that Defendants opinions relate to what should have been done to avoid Ms. Price’s death
from a medical standpoint. Plaintiffs maintain that the fact that Ms. Price was in jail does not
alter these medical opinions.
The Court has considered the parties’ positions, along with the applicable law, and the
Court finds that the Defendants’ challenge to Dr. Ayo’s testimony is not well-taken. Dr. Ayo is
qualified to testify regarding medical care that she believes should have been provided in
response to Ms. Price’s symptoms. The Defendants have challenged Dr. Ayo’s experience, but
not her medical credentials – doctor of medicine from Louisiana State University; board-certified
family physician. Thus, the Court initially finds that Dr. Ayo has obtained appropriate medical
education to offer the opinions at issue. Further, the Court finds that she has experience in the
medical field sufficient to deem her an expert in medical care, especially initial treatment. The
Court finds that Dr. Ayo’s testimony does not express legal conclusions, though as with Dr.
McCormack above, Dr. Ayo would be excluded from offering any testimony that Defendants
were deliberately indifferent, in a legal sense.
Consistent with the findings above, the Court finds that the fact that she has not practiced
medicine in a prison setting goes to the weight afforded to her testimony, rather than to its
9
admissibility. This critique of Dr. Ayo’s opinions is best addressed through cross-examination
and other trial strategy. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
Again, the Court finds that the Defendants have not directed the Court to any basis for
concluding that Dr. Ayo intends to offer testimony regarding liability or wrongful acts and
proximate cause, and therefore, the undersigned declines to provide hypothetical rulings on such
challenges.
Accordingly, the Defendants’ request that Dr. Ayo be excluded from offering testimony
in this case is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Dr. Ayo may testify regarding
the medical care provided to Ms. Price by the Roane County Jail, consistent with the above, but
she may not opine that the Defendants were deliberately indifferent.
C.
Testimony of Kathryn J. Wild, RN, MPA, CCHP
Ms. Wild has been retained by Plaintiffs to offer expert testimony in this case. She did
not treat Ms. Price but has reviewed relevant records. Ms. Wild offers a lengthy report detailing
her opinion regarding the care that was provided to Ms. Price at the Roane County Jail. Her
testimony is summarized by the Plaintiffs, the proponents of the testimony, who explain that Ms.
Wild opines: “that the jail medical staff, which consisted entirely of licensed practical nurses,
were unqualified to deliver appropriate medical care to Crystal Price; that it violates every
applicable standard of correctional healthcare to allow LPNs to diagnose and treat medical
conditions, as was done here, without direct physician supervision; that the LPNs recklessly
failed to obtain appropriate medical care for Ms. Price; and that the LPNs failed to monitor,
whatsoever, Ms. Price’s deteriorating condition from December 25, 2011 to December 30, 2011,
the day she died.” [Doc. 188 at 1].
10
Defendants argue that Ms. Wild’s opinions will not assist in deciding the issues in this
case. [Doc. 165]. As they did with Dr. McCormack and Dr. Ayo, Defendants move the Court to
bar Ms. Wild from offering testimony: regarding legal conclusions, regarding liability, and
proximate causation. Defendant SHP concedes that “Ms. Wild is imminently experienced in
correctional healthcare.” [Doc. 160 at 10]. However, SHP argues that Ms. Wild is not qualified
to give testimony regarding the standard of care under Tennessee law, and SHP maintains that
Ms. Wild improperly opines that healthcare and correctional personnel were deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiffs’ serious medical needs.
Plaintiffs respond that Ms. Wild has extensive experience in the areas which she proposes
to offer testimony. Plaintiffs maintain that Ms. Wild is qualified to offer testimony regarding
whether the care rendered was below state-law standards. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the
“locality rule,” which limits medical expert testimony in medical malpractice cases to experts
from contiguous states, is not applicable in the instant suit because Plaintiffs are not presenting a
claim for medical malpractice. Further, Plaintiffs argue that the use of the term “deliberately
indifferent” is unavoidable.
Plaintiffs maintain that all of Defendants’ critiques are best
addressed through cross-examination.
Again, the Court finds that Ms. Wild’s qualifications are not in dispute, and to the
contrary, SHP, at least, finds Ms. Wild to be “imminently experienced.” The Court has reviewed
and considered both Ms. Wild’s education and her experience, and the Court finds that she is
competent to offer opinion testimony regarding the nature and extent of the medical treatment
that Ms. Price received from nurses during her stay at the Roane County Jail.
The Court finds that Ms. Wild may not testify that the Defendants or their employees or
agents were deliberately indifferent to Ms. Price’s condition and medical needs. Under the
11
circumstances of this case and the holding in Berry, the Court finds that such testimony would
essentially be a legal conclusion beyond her expertise and violative of Rule 702. Ms. Wild may
offer the testimony described in her expert report and the testimony generally related thereto.
However, Ms. Wild may not testify that the actions, either of Roane County or SHP, were
deliberately indifferent to Ms. Price’s needs or that they violated the Constitution. Rather she
may opine on the medical care, and the jury will decide if that does or does not rise to the level
of deliberate indifference.
Defendants also argue that Ms. Wild’s testimony regarding care falling below applicable
standards is barred by Berry. The Court is not convinced that the locality rule or other medical
malpractice standards would preclude Ms. Wild from offering such testimony, nor is the Court
convinced that this testimony is barred by Berry as a legal conclusion. Instead, the Court finds
that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Ms. Wild is qualified to testify regarding the applicable
standard of care in correctional facilities and correctional healthcare3 and that her testimony on
this issue is relevant to the Constitutional claims presented in this case and the deliberate
indifference standard. Accordingly, the Court will not preclude Ms. Wild from offering such
testimony based upon a lack of relevance, but as with Dr. McCormack and Dr. Ayo, the Court
finds that Defendants’ arguments regarding Ms. Wild offering testimony relating to liability or
proximate cause are premature and hypothetical. Again, the Court declines to offer an advisory
opinion with regard to these objections. Additionally, Ms. Wild may not offer a legal conclusion
as to deliberate indifference. Finally, as to Defendants’ claims that she ignored the facts of this
case, the Court feels that such factual matters, the weight or lack of weight she assigned to them
and the effect, if any, on her opinions are best addressed through vigorous cross-examination.
3
Correctional healthcare being the very thing Defendants claimed Dr. McCormick and Dr. Ayo lacked but needed in
order to testify.
12
Accordingly, the Defendants’ request that Ms. Wild be excluded from offering testimony
in this case is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Ms. Wild may not testify
regarding deliberate indifference, in a legal sense. Otherwise, she may testify to the matters
discussed in her expert report, consistent with the above, including national standards and state
standards for healthcare in correctional facilities and the opinion as to whether the healthcare
provided to Plaintiff met these standards or not and including the scope of practice for LPNs in
Tennessee, per applicable standards, and whether, in her opinion, LPN Lester provided care
within such scope.
D.
Testimony of Michael W. Quinn
Mr. Quinn is a former deputy and jailer with the Harris County Sheriff’s Department. He
has a bachelor of science and a masters of public administration from the University of Houston.
He has been retained by Defendant Roane County to provide testimony in this case, and he has
reviewed records to permit him to offer testimony in this case.
Mr. Quinn’s report includes his recitation of the facts in this case. In the Statement of
Opinions portion of his expert report, Mr. Quinn begins by stating: “It is my opinion beyond a
reasonable degree of certainty that neither Roane County nor any other defendant was
deliberately indifferent to the welfare of inmates housed at the RCSO detention facility in
general, and Inmate Price in particular.” [Doc. 167-1 at 10]. His opinions stated thereafter
generally fall in line with this opinion by describing how Roane County provided appropriate
training and management for the jail. Mr. Quinn counters Plaintiff’s allegations by, for example,
opining that, because Roane County has contracted with SHP, it is not in control of provision of
medical services.
13
Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Quinn should be precluded from offering testimony as to
whether Roane County was deliberately indifferent, because Berry prohibits experts from
offering opinions that express legal conclusions. [Doc. 167]. Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Quinn
cannot opine as to the reasonableness of the medical care provided. Plaintiffs maintain that he
should be precluded from offering factual testimony regarding the acts and omissions
culminating in Ms. Price’s death, because such testimony is not likely to aid the trier of fact.
Roane County responds that Mr. Quinn should be permitted to provide expert testimony
regarding whether Roane County should be held liable. [Doc. 183]. Roane County states that
Mr. Quinn is qualified as an expert in corrections and has never been limited in testimony
relating to operations in a correctional setting. Roane County concedes that the use of the term
“deliberate indifference” appears to run afoul of Berry, but Roane County argues that underlying
testimony regarding officer training and jail procedures is appropriate. Roane County argues that
Mr. Quinn’s policy is consistent with the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment, as
interpreted by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
There appears to be no dispute that Mr. Quinn is qualified to offer testimony as to
correctional procedures, training, and protocol, and the Court finds that he is so qualified.
However, even his correctional testimony must be limited to a degree. It is ironic that – after
arguing, that the Plaintiffs’ experts should all be precluded from providing any expert testimony
regarding deliberate indifference, as legal conclusions – Roane County now takes the position
that their expert should not be excluded from offering testimony using the same legally
conclusory term: deliberate indifference. The Court finds and holds that like the other expert
witnesses discussed herein, Mr. Quinn is prohibited from offering testimony regarding legal
conclusions under Berry, and he shall refrain from doing so. The Court will not exclude Mr.
14
Quinn’s testimony regarding procedures, training, and protocol in correctional facilities and there
application in this case, but he may not testify that either Roane County or SHP were or were not
deliberately indifferent. Mr. Quinn shall not testify that the behavior of either defendant was
consistent with or otherwise appropriate under the United States Constitution.
With regard to Mr. Quinn’s testimony about Roane County’s liability, the Court finds
that Mr. Quinn is not an expert in agency law or contract law, and he may not offer testimony
regarding Roane County’s responsibilities or liability under its agreements with SHP. This
testimony, to the extent it also constitutes a legal conclusion, is barred by Berry.
The Court further finds that Roane County has not demonstrated that Mr. Quinn is a
medical expert or has any medical education. Accordingly, the Court finds that he may not
testify generally as to medical care that was, should, or should not have been given. He may
testify as to his experience with correctional policies, protocol, and training that may overlap
with medical issues, but he is not a medical expert. He may not offer opinions on specific
medical care, including the medical care given or not given to Ms. Price.
Finally, consistent with the Court’s comments on the record at the hearing on this issue,
Mr. Quinn – like any other expert – may testify to the facts relevant to his testimony as supported
by the evidence in the record. He may not offer testimony that is his version and wholesale
restatement of the facts. Such testimony will not aid the trier of fact and is likely to confuse the
trier of fact.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ request that Mr. Quinn be excluded from offering testimony
in this case is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Mr. Quinn may testify regarding
procedures, training, and protocol in correctional facilities and their application in this case,
consistent with the above.
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E.
Testimony of George Lyrene, M.D.
Dr. Lyrene is a physician with an undergraduate degree and medical degree from the
University of Alabama. He has been retained by Roane County to offer expert testimony in this
case. Dr. Lyrene has reviewed records to permit him to offer testimony in this case.
Dr. Lyrene opines that “the procedures in place for managing Ms[.] Price were
appropriate and appropriately followed.” [Doc. 168-1 at 2]. He states that the intake process
was standard for jails that are the size of the Roane County Jail. He opines that the medical
attention procedure is functional, and the access to medical personnel is adequate. He adds that
the relationship between Roane County and SHP is consistent with a widely-accepted practice.
Further, he asserts that: the use of isolation was appropriate; the use of a holding cell for medical
observation was appropriate; and the officers’ response to the emergency situation was
appropriate. Dr. Lyrene concludes, “There is no evidence that anything done or omitted by the
detention staff contributed in any way to her cause of death.” [Id. at 3].
Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Lyrene’s opinion regarding the appropriateness of Roane
County’s procedures, and the execution of those procedures, is inadmissible testimony regarding
legal conclusions. [Doc. 168]. Plaintiffs argue that he should be excluded from so testifying.
Further, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Lyrene’s testimony that there is no evidence that detention
staff contributed to Ms. Price’s death is a legal conclusion and should also be excluded.
Plaintiffs also object to Dr. Lyrene’s testimony relating to Roane County and SHP’s relationship
and its effect on liability.
Defendants respond that Dr. Lyrene is qualified to testify about the Roane County’s
policies and procedures regarding provision of medical care to inmates. [Doc. 184]. Defendants
note that Dr. Lyrene worked at a correctional facility for two years and later was director of
16
clinical services for a company that provides healthcare services for the Alabama Department of
Corrections. Defendants argue that Dr. Lyrene should not be excluded from giving testimony
about causation and should not be excluded from testifying about legal duties.
The Court finds that Dr. Lyrene is qualified to offer opinions regarding medical care,
policies, and procedures at Roane County and the extent to which those were or were not
medically appropriate. He may not testify as to whether those policies, procedures, or related
medical care were legally appropriate. He may also offer opinion testimony as to the medical
propriety of the medical care that Ms. Price received in the Roane County Jail. He may testify
that the medical care was adequate, appropriate, or typical, but he may not testify that the care
was legally adequate or inadequate. He may not opine as to how much or how little evidence of
wrongdoing there is in the record. The trier of fact will make that determination. Similarly, the
jury or Court will decide the degree to which the contractual relationship between SHP and the
Roane County Jail affects liability; Dr. Lyrene may not offer such testimony. As with the other
experts, Dr. Lyrene may testify regarding facts to the extent needed to give his opinion testimony
context, but he may not engage in a wholesale restatement of the facts, which is likely to confuse
the trier of fact.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs’ request that Dr. Lyrene be excluded from offering testimony
in this case is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Dr. Lyrene may offer testimony
regarding policies, practices, and procedures of correctional facilities as they relate to medical
care, consistent with the above.
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III.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the parties’ Daubert challenges [Docs. 159, 161, 162, 164,
167, 168] are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART consistent with the above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER:
s/ C. Clifford Shirley, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge
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