Price et al v. Roane County et al
Filing
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ORDER that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint 26 is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendants Jack Stockton and Ron Woody 15 and the Motion to Dismiss filedby defendant Ken Mynatt 19 are hereby DENIED as moot. Plaintiff shall FILE anamended complaint consistent with the rulings set forth in this memorandum opinion and order within fourteen (14) days of entry of this memorandum opinion and order. Signed by Chief District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 6/24/13. (ABF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
Estate of Crystal Price by ANGELA DAVIS,
mother and next of kin of decedent
CRYSTAL PRICE; JV and DH, minor children
of decedent CRYSTAL PRICE,
by ANGELA DAVIS, guardian,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ROANE COUNTY; JACK STOCKTON, Sheriff of
Roane County, in his official and individual capacities;
MAJOR KEN MYNATT, head jailer of Roane County,
in his official and individual capacities;
RON WOODY, Roane County Executive,
in his official and individual capacities;
JANE DOE, in her official and individual capacities,
Defendants.
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) No.: 3:12-CV-634
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(VARLAN/SHIRLEY)
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This civil action is before the Court on the following motions: the Motion to Dismiss
filed by defendants Jack Stockton and Ron Woody [Doc. 15], the Motion to Dismiss filed by
defendant Ken Mynatt [Doc. 19], and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended
Complaint [Doc. 26].
Plaintiffs filed a response to the motions to dismiss [Doc. 27].
Defendants Roane County, Jack Stockton (“Stockton”), Ken Mynatt (“Mynatt”), and Ron
Woody (“Woody”) (Roane County, Stockton, Mynatt, and Woody collectively,
“defendants”) filed a response to the motion to amend [Doc. 28]. After careful consideration
of the motions and the relevant law, the Court will grant in part and deny in part plaintiff’s
motion to amend and deny as moot the motions to dismiss.
I.
Background
Plaintiffs filed this civil action after Crystal Price, who was in the custody of
defendant Roane County, developed flu-like symptoms and died. Plaintiffs assert claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and excessive
use of force, as well as claims under state law for negligence, wrongful death, infliction of
emotional distress, and assault and battery [See Doc. 1].
In response to the complaint, defendants Stockton, Woody, and Mynatt filed motions
to dismiss, asserting the complaint fails to state a claim against them [Docs. 15, 19].
Plaintiffs countered with a motion to amend the complaint [Doc. 26]. Plaintiffs argue that
the motion “is necessary in order to correctly identify Defendant Jane Doe as Defendant
Elizabeth ‘Lisa’ Ewing” and to include averments of individuals who have come forward
with information after a local newspaper published an article about this case [Id.].
Defendants argue the motion to amend should be denied because the amendments are futile
[Doc. 28]. They state that the proposed amended complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim
against defendants Stockton, Mynatt, and Woody and that the claim against Ms. Ewing is
time-bared because the complaint does not relate back [Id.].
II.
Motion to Amend1
A.
Standard of Review
“[A] party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or
the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “The court should freely give leave,” however,
1
While the motions to dismiss were filed before the motion to amend, motions to amend
shall be freely granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Moreover, granting a motion to dismiss before
addressing a pending motion to amend can be an abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Superior
Fireplace Co., 931 F.2d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 1991).
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“when justice so requires.” Id. Leave is appropriate “[i]n the absence of . . . undue delay,
bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of
allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.” Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d
888, 905 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); see also
Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 633 (6th Cir. 2009). “Amendment of
a complaint is futile when the proposed amendment would not permit the complaint to
survive a motion to dismiss.” Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 807 (6th Cir. 2005)
(citing Neighborhood Dev. Corp. v. Advisory Council on Historic Pres., 632 F.2d 21, 23 (6th
Cir. 1980)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) sets out a liberal pleading standard, Smith v.
City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 576 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004), requiring only “‘a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the
[opposing party] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957)). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but a party’s “obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do,” nor will “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, draw all
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reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and determine whether the complaint contains
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570; Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will
[ultimately] . . . be a context-specific task that requires th[is Court] to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
B.
Proposed Claim Against Named Jane Doe
In the original complaint, plaintiffs assert that Jane Doe “was a jailer at the Roane
County jail” whose “name is believed to be ‘Lisa’” [Doc. 1 ¶ 10]. Plaintiffs allege that
sometime in December 2011 Jane Doe took Crystal Price to the shower after Price lost
control of her bowels and then “severely beat . . . Price after water (or some other substance)
splashed onto the officer’s boots” [Id. ¶ 16]. Plaintiffs now seek to amend the complaint to
identify Jane Doe as Elizabeth “Lisa” Ewing and include additional factual allegations [Doc.
26]. The proposed amended complaint asserts the following claims against Ms. Ewing:
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and excessive force, in her official and
individual capacities, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and negligence, wrongful death, infliction of
emotional distress, and assault and battery under Tennessee law [Id.].2
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While plaintiffs assert the claim for assault and battery against “Defendant Jane Doe,”
the Court construes the proposed amended complaint to assert this claim against Elizabeth “Lisa”
Ewing for purposes of this memorandum opinion and order.
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“Where an amendment to a complaint would add a new party, the amendment must
come within the statute of limitations period or relate back to the original filing date of the
complaint.” Lovelace v. City of Memphis Police Dep’t, No. 08-2776, 2010 WL 711190, at
*3 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 24, 2010). “Naming a John Doe defendant cannot save a pleading from
this requirement.” Id.; Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996).
The statute of limitations period for § 1983 actions is one year. Lovelace, 2010 WL
711190, at *3. A party must bring claims for negligence, wrongful death, infliction of
emotional distress, and assault and battery under Tennessee law within one year as well.
McCurry ex rel. Turner v. Adventist Health Sys./Sunbelt, Inc., 298 F.3d 589, 589 (6th Cir.
2002); Campbell v. McMinn Cnty., No. 1:10-CV-278, 2011 WL 5921431, at *3 (E.D. Tenn.
Nov. 28, 2011); Reed v. Inland Intermodal Logistics Servs., LLC, No. 09-2607, 2011 WL
4565450, at *12 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2011). See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104. The
proposed amended complaint asserts that the actions underlying these claims took place in
December 2011 [Doc. 26]. Plaintiffs filed the motion to amend more than one year after the
date of the alleged injury; thus, unless plaintiffs’ claims against Ms. Ewing relate back to the
date of the original complaint—December 8, 2012—the Court must deny plaintiffs motion to
amend because of futility.
“Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs when an amended
pleading ‘relates back’ to the date of a timely filed original pleading and is thus itself timely
even though it was filed outside an applicable statute of limitations.” Krupski v. Costa
Crociere S. p. A., — U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2010). Where an amended pleading
changes a party or a party’s name, an amendment relates back to the original pleading if the
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amendment “asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading[,]”
and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the
summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment: (i)
received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in
defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the
action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning
the proper party’s identity.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C).
Defendants assert plaintiffs fail to satisfy Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), that is, but for the
mistake in identity, the proposed new defendant knew or should have known that an action
would have been brought against her [Doc. 28]. “The Sixth Circuit has long held the
position that a complete lack of knowledge as to the identity of a defendant—a suit against a
Doe defendant, for example—is not equivalent to a ‘mistake’ concerning the actual
defendant’s identity.” Flick v. Lake Cnty. Jail, No. 1:10-CV-532, 2011 WL 3502366, at *1
(N.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2011) (citation omitted); see also Moore v. State of Tenn., 267 F. App’x
450, 455 (6th Cir. 2008) (“In this court, a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge pertaining to an
intended defendant’s knowledge does not constitute a ‘mistake concerning the party’s
identity’ within the meaning of Rule 15(c).” (citations omitted)). Thus, pursuant to Sixth
Circuit precedent, the claims set forth in the proposed amended complaint against this newlynamed defendant would not relate back to the date of the original complaint, and it would be
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futile to allow plaintiffs to name Ms. Ewing as a defendant.3 See Miller, 408 F.3d at 817 (“A
court need not grant leave to amend, however, where the amendment would be futile.”
(citation omitted)).
C.
Proposed § 1983 Claims Against Defendants Stockton, Woody, and
Mynatt
Defendants Stockton, Woody, and Mynatt assert that plaintiffs’ proposed § 1983
claims against them are futile because the claims are based upon the theory of respondeat
superior. The proposed amended complaint asserts that a number of jailers had complained
3
In Krupski, the Supreme Court addressed Rule 15(c)’s mistake prong. The Supreme
Court broadly defined “mistake” as “an error, misconception, or misunderstanding; an erroneous
belief,” and provided the following example:
A plaintiff may know that a prospective defendant-call him party A-exists,
while erroneously believing him to have the status of party B. Similarly, a
plaintiff may know generally what party A does while misunderstanding
the roles that party A and party B played in the “conduct, transaction, or
occurrence” giving rise to her claim. If the plaintiff sues party B instead
of party A under these circumstances, she has made a “mistake concerning
the proper party’s identity” notwithstanding her knowledge of the
existence of both parties.
130 S. Ct. at 2494 (citations omitted).
Krupski, however, is distinguishable from this case. In this case, plaintiffs knew who
they wanted to sue; they just did not know her name. Indeed, they intentionally chose to sue
“Jane Doe” because they did not know her identity. “Krupski, in contrast, addressed the situation
where a party knew of the existence of two parties, but, confused as to their roles in a
transaction, mistakenly sued the wrong one.” Flick, 2011 WL 3502366, at *2; see also Bradford
v. Bracken Cnty., 767 F. Supp. 2d 740 (2011) (applying the Sixth Circuit’s rule and
distinguishing Krupski where the plaintiff originally sued “Kentucky State Police Officers,
Names Unknown” and later amended the complaint to name specific individuals); Burdine v.
Kaiser, No. 3:09CV1026, 2010 WL 2606257 (N.D. Ohio June 25, 2010) (applying the Sixth
Circuit’s rule and distinguishing Krupski where the plaintiff did not know the identities of the
parties until after the statute of limitations period ran). For similar reasons, the Court finds
Williams v. TLD America Corp., No. 3:08CV-510-H, 2010 WL 456869 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 3, 2010),
a case cited by plaintiffs, distinguishable.
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to defendant Stockton about Ms. Ewing’s treatment of inmates and pretrial detainees, that an
officer complained to defendant Stockton about “[d]efendant Roane County’s policy and
longstanding practice and custom of denying pretrial detainees and similarly-situated inmates
appropriate medical attention,” and that defendants Woody and Mynatt “knew or reasonably
should have known about these complaints, particularly given the volume of complaints,
their supervisory responsibilities, and prior lawsuits and claims of a similar nature made
against them and [d]efendant Roane County” [Doc. 26-1 ¶¶ 17, 29, 33].
In a suit brought under § 1983, liability cannot be imposed solely on the basis of
respondeat superior. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Bellamy v. Bradley,
729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984). The law is well settled that a plaintiff must allege that a
defendant official was personally involved in the unconstitutional activity of a subordinate in
order to state a claim against such a defendant. Dunn v. State of Tenn., 697 F.2d 121, 128
(6th Cir. 1982). There must be a showing that the supervisor encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. “At a minimum, a §
1983 plaintiff must show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved
or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.”
Bellamy, 729 F.2d at 421.
“[L]iability cannot be based solely on the right to control
employees.” Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989). Moreover,
simply failing to act after learning of a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct will not
impose liability upon a supervisory official. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.
1999).
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Plaintiffs’ allegations assert nothing more than defendants Stockton, Woody, and
Mynatt failed to respond to grievances that they knew about. However, “[a] combination of
knowledge of a prisoner’s grievance and failure to respond or remedy the complaint is
insufficient to impose liability upon supervisory personnel under § 1983.” Henry v. Pogats,
35 F.3d 565 (table), No. 93-2462, 1994 WL 462129, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 1994).
Plaintiffs do not assert that any of these defendants encouraged the alleged misconduct or in
any way participated in it. Accordingly, the proposed § 1983 claims against these defendants
are futile and plaintiffs’ motion to amend will be denied to the extent plaintiffs seek to assert
§ 1983 claims against these defendants.
D.
Proposed Claims Against Defendant Roane County and State-Law Claims
Defendants assert no argument with respect to plaintiffs’ proposed claims against
defendant Roane County or plaintiffs’ proposed state-law claims. Accordingly, and because
motions to amend should be freely granted, the Court will grant plaintiffs’ motion to amend
with regards to the claims against defendant Roane County and the state-law claims.
III.
Motions to Dismiss
In light of the Court’s rulings on plaintiffs’ motion to amend, the Court will deny
defendants’ previously filed motions to dismiss [Docs. 15, 19] as moot. See Pethtel v. Wash.
Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 2:06-799, 2007 WL 2359765, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2007)
(“[B]ecause an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, the filing of an
amended complaint normally moots a motion to dismiss the original complaint.”).
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IV.
Conclusion
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint
[Doc. 26] is hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the Motion to Dismiss
filed by defendants Jack Stockton and Ron Woody [Doc. 15] and the Motion to Dismiss filed
by defendant Ken Mynatt [Doc. 19] are hereby DENIED as moot. Plaintiff shall FILE an
amended complaint consistent with the rulings set forth in this memorandum opinion and
order within fourteen (14) days of entry of this memorandum opinion and order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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