Price et al v. Roane County et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND OPINION as set forth in following order. Signed by Chief District Judge Thomas A Varlan on 10/10/13. (ABF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
Estate of Crystal Price by ANGELA DAVIS,
mother and next of kin of decedent
CRYSTAL PRICE; JV and DH, minor children
of decedent CRYSTAL PRICE,
by ANGELA DAVIS, guardian,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
) No.: 3:12-CV-634
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(VARLAN/SHIRLEY)
ROANE COUNTY; JACK STOCKTON, Sheriff of
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Roane County, in his official and individual capacities; )
MAJOR KEN MYNATT, head jailer of Roane County, )
in his official and individual capacities;
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RON WOODY, Roane County Executive,
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in his official and individual capacities;
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JANE DOE, in her official and individual capacities, )
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
This civil action is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss First Amended
Complaint [Doc. 34] filed by defendants Jack Stockton (“Stockton”), Major Ken Mynatt
(“Mynatt”), and Ron Woody (“Woody”) (Stockton, Mynatt, and Woody, collectively,
“defendants”). Plaintiffs filed a response to the motion [Doc. 39], and defendants replied
[Doc. 40]. After careful consideration of the motion and the relevant law, the Court will
grant the motion to dismiss.
I.
Background
Plaintiffs filed this civil action after Crystal Price, who was in the custody of
defendant Roane County, developed flu-like symptoms and died. Plaintiffs asserted
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and
excessive use of force, as well as claims under state law for negligence, wrongful death,
infliction of emotional distress, and assault and battery [See Doc. 1].
In response to the complaint, Stockton, Woody, and Mynatt filed motions to
dismiss, asserting the complaint failed to state a claim against them [Docs. 15, 19].
Plaintiffs countered with a motion to amend the complaint, arguing that the motion was
“necessary in order to correctly identify Defendant Jane Doe as Defendant Elizabeth
‘Lisa’ Ewing” and to include averments of individuals who have come forward with
information after a local newspaper published an article about this case [Doc. 26].
Defendants, along with defendant Roane County, argued the Court should deny the
motion to amend because the amendments were futile [Doc. 28].
After consideration, the Court denied plaintiffs the opportunity to amend the
complaint to assert a claim against the named Jane Doe defendant and to assert § 1983
actions against the individuals defendants on futility grounds, but permitted plaintiffs to
amend the complaint to assert state-law claims against defendants [Doc. 31]. Plaintiff
thus filed a first amended complaint [Doc. 33]. Defendants now move the Court to
dismiss the § 1983 claims asserted against them in their individual and official capacities,
as well as the state-law claims against them [Doc. 34].
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II.
Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) sets out a liberal pleading standard, Smith
v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 576 n.1 (6th Cir. 2004), requiring only “‘a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the
[opposing party] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests,’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but a party’s
“obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than
labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do,” nor will “an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and determine whether the complaint
contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570; Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will [ultimately] . . . be a context-specific task that requires th[is
Court] to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
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III.
Analysis
Defendants assert that plaintiffs’ amended complaint asserts § 1983 claims against
them in their individual and official capacities and request that these claims be dismissed
under the law of the case doctrine. Plaintiffs admit in response, however, that the
amended complaint “omits the § 1983 individual and official capacity claims against
[defendants]” [Doc. 39]. Accordingly, the Court need not address defendants’ argument.
The Court must address, however, defendants’ remaining argument that plaintiff
fails to state a state-law claim against them. Defendants assert that plaintiffs’ state-law
claims relate to “omissions performed within the scope of [defendants’] employment”
[Doc. 35]. Defendants argue that they are thus immune from suit under the Tennessee
Governmental Tort Liability Act (“TGTLA”) because the TGTLA removes defendant
Roane County’s immunity for injuries proximately caused by the negligence or omission
of its employees acting within the scope of their employment [Doc. 35]. Plaintiffs
counter, asserting only that because Roane County is not immune from suit, neither are
the individual employee defendants [Doc. 39].
While, historically, courts have held governmental entities are immune from suit
absent an express waiver, Sallee v. Barrett, 171 S.W.3d 822, 826 (Tenn. 2005), the
TGTLA statutorily waived, in part, the immunity afforded to governmental entities,
rendering governmental entities liable “for injury proximately caused by a negligent act
or omission of any employee within the scope of his employment,” Tenn. Code Ann. §
29-20-205. Because plaintiffs do not contest defendants’ characterization of the amended
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complaint—that is, that all of plaintiffs’ state-law claims relate to omissions of
defendants taken within the scope of their employment—the Court finds that this
provision of the TGTLA applies here. Roane County’s veil of immunity is thus removed.
As a result, under the TGTLA, defendants Stockton, Mynatt, and Woody are immune
from suit. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310(b) (“No claim may be brought against an
employee . . . for damages for which the immunity of the governmental entity is removed
. . . unless the claim is one for health care liability brought against a health care
practitioner.”).
IV.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint [Doc. 34] will
be GRANTED, and Jack Stockton, Major Ken Mynatt, and Ron Woody will be
DISMISSED from this action.
ORDER ACCORDINGLY.
s/ Thomas A. Varlan
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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